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AREA HANDBOOK
for
NORTH KOREA

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AREA HANDBOOK
for
NORTH KOREA

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FOREWORD

This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of various countries. The emphasis is on objective description of the nation's present society and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future. The handbook seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition as limitations on space and research time permit. It was compiled from information available in openly published material. Extensive bibliographies are provided to permit recourse to other published sources for more detailed information. There has been no attempt to express any specific point of view or to make policy recommendations. The contents of the handbook represent the work of the authors and FAS and do not represent the official view of the United States Government.

An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehensive as possible. It can be expected, however, that the material, interpretations, and conclusions are subject to modification in the light of new information and developments. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretive, or other change as readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions. Comments may be addressed to—

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

PREFACE

Since the publication in 1964 of the *Area Handbook for Korea* in which both North Korea and the Republic of Korea are discussed, significant changes have taken place in the north sufficient to warrant a comprehensive examination of the background and implications of these developments. The Communist regime of Premier Kim Il-sung has become increasingly hostile toward the Republic of Korea and its foreign allies, and has intensely promoted the ideal of what it calls *chuch'e* (roughly, national identity and self-reliance). This concept has formed the basis of Communist efforts to accelerate industrialization as the foundation of a self-reliant economy, to transform the north into an armed camp, to broaden international contacts among non-Communist nations in competition with the Republic of Korea, and to assert a greater measure of national autonomy in dealing with the Soviet Union and Communist China. North Korean leaders have proclaimed these measures to be essential to the building of a "powerful revolutionary base" in the north in order to "liberate" the people of the south.

This book is an attempt to provide a compact, balanced, and objective exposition and analysis of the dominant social, political, and economic aspects of the society. It is a book about people as individuals and how they live as members of the society. It is designed to give readers an understanding of the dynamic forces operating in the society and an insight into the aspirations and goals, needs and achievements of its people.

The present study represents a thorough revision and substantial expansion of that portion dealing with North Korea in the 1964 version of the *Area Handbook for Korea.* The 1964 version, an updated study of an earlier handbook for the country published in 1958, was researched and written by a team made up of Frederica Muhlenberg, Frances Chadwick Rintz, and Rinn-Sup Shinn, under the chairmanship of Harvey H. Smith. The research and writing for the present study were completed on December 16, 1968.

The study of a closed Communist society in which all information for internal and external dissemination is controlled and ma-

nipulated by the regime presented obvious difficulties. Part of the source materials used in this study emanated from North Korea in fragmentary form and had to be treated with reservations. To minimize the distortions of propaganda, the Communist source material was scrutinized against non-Communist data available in Korean, Japanese, and English. This effort was at best only partly successful because of the limited amount of independent information and studies available about North Korea.

Thanks are due the following specialists for their contributions to the completion of this study: Donald P. Whitaker, who wrote Chapter 17, Character and Structure of the Economy; Elizabeth G. Gallagher, who prepared Chapter 18, Agriculture, and Chapter 19, Industry; Hubert K. Ladenburg, who submitted preliminary drafts for Chapter 22, Foreign Economic Relations, and Chapter 23, Financial and Monetary System; and Nei Hei Park, who extracted and translated useful Korean source materials into English.

Particular credit is due Key P. Yang, Korean Section, Orientalia Division, Library of Congress, for supplying helpful suggestions and for providing valuable information for Chapter 9, Education, and Chapter 14, Political Dynamics and Values. The generosity of Kim Tong Young, who placed at our disposal useful North Korean source materials from his own collection, is gratefully acknowledged. Credit is also due Kim Won-ho and his staff at the Korean Information Office, Korean Embassy, for their valuable assistance in gathering information available in the Republic of Korea.

The use of place names in this study conforms, wherever possible, to the 1963 edition of *Gazetteer No. 75 (North Korea)*, prepared by the United States Office of Geography, Department of the Interior. For the spelling of Korean names and terms, the McCune-Reischauer system of transliteration is used except in those few cases where a conventional form is mandatory for clarity, as in Kim Il-sung (instead of Kim Il-sŏng), Pyongyang (P'yŏngyang), or Panmunjom (P'anmunjŏm). Rules of capitalization followed are those established by the United States Government Printing Office *Style Manual* (January 1967).

COUNTRY SUMMARY

1. COUNTRY: North Korea, created at the end of World War II as a puppet political instrument of the Soviet occupation forces in that part of Korea north of the 38th parallel. Proclaimed itself Democratic People's Republic of Korea in September 1948.

2. GOVERNMENT: Unitary system. Nominally a republic with power vested in a representative assembly to which a Cabinet and the judiciary are subordinate. Actually ruled by the Korean Workers Party, the name adopted by the Korean Communists. All governmental institutions controlled by Kim Il-sung, General Secretary of the Party and Premier.

3. POPULATION: Over 13 million in mid-1968, composed almost entirely of ethnic Koreans. Annual growth rate: about 3 percent. Population density: 258 per square mile. Regional distribution: 59 percent concentrated in western coastal plains. Urban-rural distribution: 47.5 percent to 52.5 percent in 1965. About 44 percent of total population under age 15 in 1968.

4. SIZE: Area, 47,071 square miles, or 55 percent of the Korean Peninsula; broadest at northern border (860 miles) and narrowest at waist (95 miles). Northeast-southeast: 450 miles. Separated from the Republic of Korea by the Military Demarcation Line, a temporary boundary only slightly readjusted as the result of the Korean war, 1950–53.

5. TOPOGRAPHY: 80 percent mountainous, and 20 percent plains and lowlands. Major mountain ranges in the north-central and northeastern sections and along eastern coasts. The highest peak: Mount Paektu (about 9000 feet). Important rivers: the Yalu, Taedong, and Tumen.

6. LANGUAGE: Official language, Korean, spoken by nearly 100 percent of the population; dialectal differences minor.

7. RELIGION: No official religion. The authorities are suppressing the indigenous system of beliefs derived from Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, Animism, and Ch'ŏndogyo as rapidly as they can.

8. EDUCATION: The Government claims 100 percent literacy. In 1967 a system of 9-year compulsory free education was instituted

for students aged 7 to 16, with emphasis on technical training; 9,170 elementary and secondary schools plus nearly 100 institutions of higher learning with a total enrollment of 2.6 million students. University enrollment was about 156,000.

9. HEALTH: The Government claims an increase of 20 years in life expectancy and a reduction of one-half in mortality since 1945. Free medical care guaranteed to all, but its quality varies between rural and urban areas and between the ruling elite and the governed. Sanitation, immunization, and other health measures promoted, but public water supplies and sewage disposal were minimal outside the most advanced areas.

10. CLIMATE: Temperate with considerable intraseason variation produced by differences in altitude and proximity to seas. From 50 to 60 percent of annual precipitation during June, July, and August; dry season, October through April.

11. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: Nine provinces, three special cities, and one region; 163 counties and 15 cities; 163 towns, 4,179 wards and villages, and 166 workers' settlements.

12. JUSTICE: The judiciary is patterned after the Soviet model. Divided into the three-tier courts (Supreme, Provincial, and People's) and the procuracy headed by the Procurator General. Court verdicts are set for "re-education" as much as for punishment. The judiciary is independent of the executive branch, but not of the Party.

13. ECONOMY: Centrally planned system organized into State-owned and cooperative-owned sectors. In 1963 the State and cooperative sectors accounted for 74 percent and 26 percent, respectively, of the gross national product; industry contributed 62.3 percent (as compared with 23 percent in 1946), and agriculture contributed 19.3 percent (as compared with 59 percent in 1946) to the gross national product. Estimated gross national product in 1967: $2.7 billion. Per capita national income claimed to be the equivalent of $200 in 1966.

14. INDUSTRY: Growing steadily with emphasis on heavy industry. Some increases in light industry and consumer goods in the first half of 1960's. Machinery making, metal processing, and development of mining power given high priority.

15. LABOR: Estimated labor force of 6.5 million: roughly one-half in agriculture, and the remainder in industry. Labor shortage in both rural and urban areas. Women account for 48 percent of total force. Utilization of "voluntary labor" common practice; 69 percent of students performing some productive work.

16. EXPORTS: Based mainly on metal and mineral resources, but include some fish, rice, fruit, and tobacco. Estimated total exports for 1967: equivalent of U.S. $260.2 million, 221.5 million to Communist countries and $38.7 million to non-Communist countries.

17. IMPORTS: Emphasis on machinery and industrial raw materials and, in some years, on large quantities of wheat. Estimated total imports in 1967: equivalent of U.S. $239.8 million, $212.7 million from Communist countries and $27.1 million from non-Communist countries.

18. FINANCE: Currency stable at about 2.5 wŏn to 1 United States dollar since 1959; no fixed value on international markets. Stability maintained by rigid Government controls over prices, wages, imports, exports, and budgetary expenditures. Banking system under strict State control. Size of national budget in 1968: equivalent of U.S. $2.1 billion.

19. COMMUNICATIONS: Government controls the postal, telephone, and telegraph systems. International telephone lines connect Pyongyang with Moscow, Peking, and other Communist capitals. Network of radio stations controlled by the Government. Few privately owned radio sets. Wired broadcasts reach every public establishment and nearly every home; over 1 million wired receivers in the midsixties. A television station has begun operation; receiving sets numbered about 2,000 and were owned by Party and governmental functionaries. In 1966, 96 percent of the rural villages and 81 percent of all farmhouses were supplied with electricity.

20. RAILROADS: About 6,500 miles of track in 1968. The major west coast line: between Sinŭiju and Kaesŏng via Pyongyang. On the east coast: the Wŏlla line from Wŏnsan to Najin. The only through line from east to west: the P'yŏng-wŏn line between Wŏnsan and Pyongyang. By 1966, 21 percent of railroads reported electrified. In 1963 railroads carried 93 percent of all freight.

21. ROADS: Of limited utility due to lack of petroleum; 3,500 miles in 1961. In 1962 and 1963 trucks carried 5.9 percent of all freight. In 1960 motor vehicles carried 28 percent of passenger traffic; railroads, 71 percent.

22. PORTS AND WATERWAYS: Water transport: of minor utility. Shipping heavier on the east coast than on the west coast. Navigable rivers: the Yalu and Taedong. Ports are ice free. Major ports: Namp'o, Songnim, and Sinŭiju on the west coast and Unggi, Najin, Ch'ŏngjin, Kimch'aek, Hŭngnam, and Wŏnsan on the east coast.

23. AIRFIELDS: Civil aviation controlled by Air Force. Sunan Airport, 10 miles north of Pyongyang, serves as international airport and has facilities for domestic military and civilian use. Other major civilian airfields at Pyongyang, Hamhŭng, Ch'ŏngjin, and Wŏnsan.

24. AIRLINES: International air services connected Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow with three flights weekly in past; status of Pyongyang-Peking service not clear in 1968 because of strained relations between the two capitals.

25. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES: Numerous agreements with the Soviet Union; Communist China; Eastern European Communist countries; and non-Communist countries of Asia, Africa, Middle East, and Latin America; mainly concerned with trade, economic aid, and cultural exchange. Trade agreements in force with all Communist nations except Yugoslavia.

26. AID PROGRAMS: *Civil.* Principal economic aid supplied by the Soviet Union and Communist China. Heavy dependence on outside aid after Korean war declined sharply in the 1960's. *Military.* Mutual assistance treaties signed with the Soviet Union and Communist China in July 1961 provide automatic assistance if attacked.

27. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND MEMBERSHIPS: North Korea is a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 1953 and is represented on the Military Armistice Commission established under the agreement. As of 1961, claimed membership in about 50 international organizations. Has not been admitted to United Nations. Belongs to numerous world Communist organizations.

28. THE ARMED FORCES: Total strength 400,000: Army of 360,000, Air Force of 800 combat aircrafts and 30,000 men, and a Navy with defensive coastal fleet of 160 small craft and 10,000 men. Regular forces supplemented by a militia of 1.2 million. Conscription between ages 20 and 25 in peacetime and 18 through 45 in wartime. Normal peacetime service: from 3½ to 4 years. Women subject to conscription, but relatively few inducted. Defense budget for 1968: about 31 percent of total budget, or an equivalent of U.S. $636 million.

NORTH KOREA

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Figure 1. Position of North Korea in the Far East.

SECTION I. SOCIAL

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

North Korea occupies slightly more than half of the land area of the mountainous Korean Peninsula, which extends southward from the northeast rim of the Asian mainland, between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. The area is bordered by Communist China's Manchurian provinces and by the Vladivostok area of the Soviet Union. Across the seas are Japan on the east and Communist China on the west. In 1968 an estimated 13 million people resided within the area, almost all of them ethnic Koreans speaking the Korean language and using the Korean phonetic alphabet for written communication. Population density varied greatly between the sparsely settled mountain areas and the coastal plain and river valleys, where most of the country's food is cultivated and where most of the urban population is located.

The society in the north was a mixture of ancient, indigenous tradition and an imported system of totalitarian ideology and institutions imposed, through no choice of its people, by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. It was a Communist society, completely dictated by the Party and its leader, Kim Il-sung, but it retained some of its heritage. Some of its social values persisted, prompting Party leaders frequently to decry the evils of "feudalistic Confucian ideas, parochialism, nepotism and family-ism." On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Government in September 1968, Premier Kim Il-sung declared, ". . . since the development of the ideological consciousness of people lags behind the change in the material conditions of society, the survival of old ideas left over from the exploiting society persist long in the minds of the working people even after the socialist system has triumphed . . ." North Korea was in the process of restructuring the entire society based on a new system of values, but in 1968 the process still was far short of the goal of a classless society ruled by the proletariat.

Although the society was under communism and was relatively orthodox in its application of the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, exhibiting a strong Stalinist tinge, there were internal and external factors that distinguished it from other Communist States. Under-

lying these was the fact that World War II brought about an artificial division of a people who for centuries had lived in an exceptionally homogeneous society and culture. This ethnic solidarity had deep geographic, historical, and political roots. Thus the development of two Koreas along sharply differing political, economic, and cultural lines since the partition in 1945 has produced special stresses within both areas of the Peninsula.

Regardless of the political and ideological differences that have converted them into two bitterly hostile entities, the Koreans take pride in both their antiquity and in the continuity of their society, which dates back to pre-Christian times. Their pride is sustained by a sharp awareness of their common origin, language, and culture. The people feel strongly that theirs is a pattern of life distinct from neighboring China and Japan, although they readily acknowledge that their culture was historically influenced by that of China. In contrast to Korean attitudes toward Japan, traditional China is viewed more as a benefactor than as an intruder. This background has produced an inherent urge for unity on both sides of the line dividing the Peninsula. A Communist effort in 1950 to reunite the country by military force was frustrated by the Republic of Korea, assisted by the United Nations, with strong United States participation. Nevertheless, national unification continues to be the foremost stated objective of the Communist regime.

The defeat inflicted on the Communists in the Korean conflict, only partly salvaged by Soviet support and Chinese Communist military intervention, has not discouraged the Communist leaders from the belief that unification may yet be accomplished on their terms, either through a renewed military effort, through peaceful political means, or through internal subversion. In 1967–68 a policy of subversion was being pursued by the North Korean regime; the aggressive military posture supporting it did not allay a widespread belief that the Communists had not renounced force as a possible solution of the unification problem.

The leaders have devoted much of their time to inspiring hatred among the people toward the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the United States, identifying them with "bourgeois nationalism," "imperialism," and "capitalism." At the same time, however, they have recognized the need for positive values with which to attract the allegiance of the population. For this purpose it has developed the concept of *chuch'e* (national identity and self-reliance) which, given an almost mystical quality by the Communist regime, seeks to throw off the effects of hundreds of years of subjection to foreign influence and to develop self-identity in every field—cultural, economic, political, and military. Ideally, *chuch'e* would involve complete self-reliance, yet it has had to settle for something less,

since the regime continues to depend on external sources for both economic and military support. At the same time *chuch'e* is put forward to defend Premier Kim Il-sung's own brand of revolutionary doctrine said to be justified by Korean peculiarities, thus avoiding possible criticisms for nationalistic deviation.

Although the Government expressly renounces "nationalism," it encourages "socialist patriotism," which it defines as a new form of nationalism combining the love of fatherland with adherence to "proletarian internationalism." According to Premier Kim, socialist patriotism means the "unity of national and international interest;" this concept has enabled his regime to reject selectively any of the past that might interfere internally with its revolutionary goals. Externally, the regime has exercised the self-proclaimed right to reject right or left deviations based on its own interpretation of "internationalism."

Until mid-1968 nationalism and internationalism were portrayed as two equal, mutually reinforcing political principles. Events surrounding the Czech crisis of August 1968 and North Korean response to the situation showed where Premier Kim Il-sung would stand in case of conflict between the two principles. Supporting the Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Premier declared: "If someone goes back on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and takes to national egoism under the pretext of maintaining independence, he is gravely mistaken. . . ."

Because of circumstances governing the development of the society, it was first involved in exclusive reliance upon the Soviet model, followed by a period of experimentation with Communist Chinese policies and, finally, by a growing self-confidence that has characterized the more recent search for *chuch'e*. Since the mid-1960's the last phase has had the advantage of enabling the regime to avoid lining up too explicitly on either side of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It has also aided Premier Kim's absolute reign.

To establish the substance of *chuch'e,* the regime rationalized its socialist and revolutionary undertakings in light of Korea's own antecedents or "progressive national heritage." Its propagandists sought for clues in history; the most publicized was Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese partisan experiences of the 1930's. In the 1960's the earlier North Korean acknowledgment of the Soviet role in transplanting communism in the north was accorded minimal attention in official publications, in an effort to treat the Soviet role merely as one of many episodes highlighting Korea's own history of "class struggle" which is said to date from earliest times.

One major aspect of the self-identity drive is reflected in a deep preoccupation with education as a means of creating a "new Com-

munist man" and providing the technical skills necessary to the country's planned economic needs. Heavy emphasis on technical training is a consequence of these needs, whereas intensive ideological training is regarded as a means of assuring continuity in the long-term drive toward a completely communized society. In 1967, a 9-year free, compulsory technical program began for students aged 7 to 16.

Geography has had great influence on the character of Korean society. Korea has been, through the ages, a two-way buffer and sometimes a battleground between China and Japan, at times suffering the blows of that situation. In some ways the two parts of the Korean Peninsula have continued to perform the buffer function, comprising the frontier region between the Communist and non-Communist forces of Asia.

The North Koreans have moved rapidly ahead with economic development despite the severe setback suffered as a consequence of the Korean war and, simultaneously, have pressed forward with efforts to revolutionize the older generation while bringing up a new generation in the Communist mold. Starting from scratch in 1953, the north has substantially developed its basic economy. It also has raised living standards as rapidly as it felt necessary to meet the consumption demands of the population. It has been able, however, to provide only a minimum standard of subsistence for the majority of the population.

This standard includes free schooling, free medical care, low-cost shelter, old age and disability pensions, and food and clothing sufficient to constitute an incentive for the labor force. It has not provided leisure time or surplus income, except for a small elite, nor has it provided individual freedom for anyone. Although there have been scattered reports reaching the outside world concerning dissatisfaction with the all-pervading austerity and limitations on human freedoms, there has been no evidence of open dissidence. Korean political tradition has contained a strong flavor of Confucian reverence for order and authority, and official tolerance toward dissidence has been minimal. The same characteristics in a Communist-controlled society are not wholly in conflict with tradition.

The Koreans have been influenced in varying degrees by the culture of the peoples with whom they have come in contact. They have been able to share in the larger tradition of Chinese civilization while achieving and preserving through processes of selective adaptation a unique social and cultural identity. Distrust and fear of foreigners other than the Chinese, however, finally produced in the latter part of the 19th century a policy of isolation from all except the Chinese, earning the country the name of "The

Hermit Kingdom." Near the end of the century, foreign pressures, nevertheless, succeeded in reopening the doors to goods and ideas from Japan and the West.

The most important element absorbed into Korean culture from abroad was Confucianism, which originated in China and which served as a unifying social and political force throughout the Yi dynasty (1392–1910) and has continued to exert an influence. When Japan subjugated Korea in 1910, the Confucian philosophy continued to prevail. The country was maintained as part of the Japanese colonial empire until the Allied victory in World War II. During the period of Japanese rule, nationalism grew, and the North Korean Communist regime has as its antecedents an anti-Japanese guerrilla movement aided by Chinese and Soviet Communists.

North Korea's claim to legitimacy—a claim which the Republic of Korea, the United States, and their allies do not accept—grows out of the circumstances of Japan's surrender. The Soviet Army occupied the northern portion of Korea, which it had invaded upon entering the war during its closing days. The southern portion came under the jurisdiction of the United States, which regarded the partition along the 38th Parallel as a temporary military expedient. When the allies could not agree on terms for uniting the two parts, the United States submitted the problem to the United Nations, which called for free elections to establish a single all-Korea government. Because of Soviet opposition, the elections were held only in the south, resulting in the formation in August 1948 of the Government of the Republic of Korea with a United Nations backed claim to sovereignty over all Korea. In the following month, however, the Soviets set up the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," patterned after the Soviet model, and the Communists announced a rival claim to jurisdiction over all the Peninsula.

Soviet occupation personnel withdrew at the end of 1948, and United States forces left the Peninsula in 1949. Less than a year later the North Koreans struck across the 38th Parallel in an effort to forcibly bring the whole Peninsula under Communist rule. Before the end of 1950, Communist China intervened to save the North Koreans from military defeat. The history of North Korea as a separate political and social entity began for practical purposes with the Korean armistice, which ended the hostilities in July 1953. Basic political and economic institutions were little changed, however, from those established by the Soviet occupation before its 1948 departure.

The Stalinism of the pre-1950 period is reflected in the structure of the society, beginning with the strong emphasis on the cult of

the individual that has developed around the person of Kim Il-sung. Idolization of the Communist leader has become one of the distinctive characteristics of North Korean political life. Premier Kim did not reach this pedestal in a single step; he put down a series of challenges to his primacy and, through repeated purges, reduced the factionalism that threatened to split the Korean Workers Party (Choson Nodong Dang), the name adopted by the Communist party during the early days of the regime.

The Party maintains a hierarchy parallel to and ruling over the governmental organization at each level. Membership in the Party, rather than official position in the Government, has constituted the primary avenue to political power and social mobility. Members of the Party form the political elite of the country. Because of a membership embracing a reported 13 percent of the population, the Party is one of the largest Communist parties, relative to total population.

The highly centralized nature of control, with Kim II-sung as the Premier and General Secretary at the center, has provided unity to the society, however forced it may be, and stability for political institutions. This continuity of leadership and relative stability has provided an essential precondition for economic growth. Despite the development of factionalism and the resulting purges, the Government has been free from coups, inflation, unemployment, and other political and economic disruptions. Enforced unity has been purchased, however, at the price of individual freedoms and consequently has deprived the regime of many incentives to individual effort and initiative.

Politics and economics are not entirely separated in a Communist society. The regime has as its objective the creation of a modern industrial economy by reorganizing the predominantly agricultural society inherited from the Japanese. There were certain inherent advantages available to the Communists that facilitated such an undertaking, including rich natural resources, a well-developed hydroelectric power system, and a certain amount of heavy industry left in place by the Japanese. Underpopulation helped to achieve self-sufficiency in food.

Much of the inherited physical plant, however, was destroyed by the Korean war, and the Communists were compelled to make a new start. The degree to which resources were to be devoted to the establishment of heavy industry and socialist infrastructure at the expense of light industry and production of consumer goods became the most important single political issue of the postwar period. Premier Kim insisted upon austerity and sacrifice on the part of the population to rebuild and expand the basic economy first, and his view prevailed over all challenges.

Although agreeing to a larger allocation of resources for consumer goods in the early years of the Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan, with began in 1961 and was extended to 1970, the Premier held the country to continued emphasis on heavy industry. The population meanwhile was told that eventually this would enable production of consumer goods on a much more plentiful scale, and it was called upon to make further sacrifices in the present for a better life in the future. The decision, made in December 1962 and reemphasized in October 1966, to strengthen armaments for a possible new showdown with the Republic of Korea and its allies, made it clear, however, that the day of affluence for all would be delayed still further.

Except for peasant markets, strictly controlled and operated with participation of the Government, private commerce has been abolished. All manufacturing enterprises and service trades are operated by the Government, so that all their workers are employees of the State. In the rural areas, the regime first went through the motions of land reform, as had been done in the Soviet Union, and Communist China; it then moved to the collectivization of all farms, which has been accomplished, in stages, by late 1958. At the same time a program of state-owned farms was instituted, and the regime made it clear that ultimately it intended to bring all agriculture under state ownership the same way as it had done with industry. For fear of antagonizing the peasants, however it has made no serious effort to force the pace of this change. The collective farms are managed by locally elected functionaries who are more often Party appointees, and the peasants must work at such times and places as they are told and for such compensation as the regime determines.

Daily necessities for urban workers are strictly rationed, as are manufactured needs of farmworkers. Rationed goods are sold at nominal prices, and housing rents are high enough to pay only a small part of capital and operating costs. Medical care is free and, although its quality varies according to urban-rural distinction, a member of the society can satisfy his most essential needs with little cash income, and wages are held down accordingly. The vast majority of the population are at bare subsistence level, but at the other end of the economic scale is a small managerial class of high Government and Party officials, intellectuals, and military officers who enjoy relative affluence.

The Government establishes priorities in the allocation of physical resources and manpower, but the economy suffers from rigidity and is at the mercy of planners who concern themselves more with theory than with practical reality. The economy, therefore, is to some extent subject to disruption from imbalances, poor distri-

bution of raw materials and finished products, and failure of the distribution system to respond to consumer preferences, seasonal demands, or geographic idiosyncrasies.

Despite all such shortcomings, the Government has been able to convert the economy from an agrarian to an industrial one with less emphasis on agriculture. By 1963 the industrial sector had accounted for 62 percent of the gross national product. The north, traditionally deficient in food production, by 1968 could feed itself, although it did not produce as much rice as the population would have liked. Other grains, primarily millet, had to be substituted. Rice is often exported to earn foreign exchanges, and wheat, cheaply available, was imported to feed the people.

The economic achievements of the regime have been possible only by massive outside help and by making ever-increasing demands on the labor force, which has been pushed to the limit of its physical endurance. Help has come primarily from the Soviet Union and Communist China, but other Communist countries have also contributed equipment and technicians. Since the early 1960's this assistance has declined in volume as the regime has pushed its policy of self-reliance and independence.

In 1968 the cohesive and divisive forces in the society were in uneasy balance. The homogeneous nature of the society and its compact, sharply defined geographic environment helped the integrative forces. The cultural heritage and shared hardships of the Korean people also created a bond of unity. Communism with its strict controls and discrimination in favor of the political and military elements from which it draws its support assured a measure of stability at the top, but heavy govermental demands on the physical capacities of the people and unfulfilled promises of future accomplishments engendered tensions at the bottom.

Because religion had been a cohesive influence in traditional Korean society, the suppression of it has been a divisive force under communism, as has been the Party's insistence on supplanting family, clan, and community loyalties with loyalty to Party organizations. The creation of many new organizations for women, youth, workers, and peasants has given the people opportunities to participate in the political process, but only in the narrow context rigidly specified by the Party. The educational system also has been designed to aid the integration of the society, and it has achieved some success in this regard, at least among the youth.

The Government has frequently acknowledged that the peasants are less well off materially than are urban workers, partly because of the emphasis given to rapid industrialization and the accompanying creation of an urban proletariat. The Party has pledged both the elimination of differences between living standards of

urban and rural workers and the acceleration of "ideological, cultural, and technical revolutions" in the countryside. It has publicly recognized that the "bourgeois mentality" of the peasants, including their strong individualistic attachment to land, is difficult to dispel and will continue to impede the successful completion of the Communist revolution for some time to come.

Foremost among major problems is the frustrated desire to reunite with the south on Communist terms. Unification is out of the question without backing from the giant Communist neighbors. The regime must walk a tight rope between the two and must not alienate either. Nonetheless, the North Korean Communists have leverage in their bid to obtain support without sacrifice of independence since, from the viewpoint of the Communist world, they are manning a frontline position in direct confrontation with the non-Communist world. Neither Communist China nor the Soviet Union can afford to permit the collapse of the North Korean regime under such circumstances.

The geographical position is a sources of strength in dealing with other Communist powers, but it entails relative geographic and political isolation. Although the isolation has suited the purposes of the regime in the past, if the Party continues seriously to pursue the aim of independent identity, it will need to develop stronger political and trade ties abroad in order to lessen its dependence on Communist China and the Soviet Union.

The Communist effort to remold the traditional society is a continuous process, and, in 1968, it was not possible to judge how deeply Party indoctrination had penetrated. A generation has grown up under communism, and the group now in power has spent most of its adult years under the influence or tutelage of the Party.

During that time Party loyalty has been indispensable to individual social, political, or economic advancement. Yet Communist ideology is essentially an expression of Western political thought, and Korean values have a dynamic of their own that has yet to be fully utilized. Most authorities believe that these values in the long run increasingly will assert themselves.

The monolithic unity which the Party has imposed in the name of socialist construction remained rigid in 1968 so far as outsiders could detect, but the Party's need for expertise and dependence on technical, administrative, and managerial personnel was steadily multiplying.

A rising standard of living, expanded education, and the creation of a sizable number of relatively pragmatic technical bureaucrats (as distinguished from specialists in power and ideology) were producing pressures for greater material rewards.

Although expressions by the leaders have indicated an awareness

of a pressing need to protect the integrity of the revolution, most open evidences of dissent in the society have related to disputes within the Party over policy as well as ideological issues. Such disputes, which have recurred continuously for some 20 years, have usually been resolved by purges, sometimes at the cost of removing technically trained and highly educated personnel from key positions.

Many expressions from North Korean leaders and Party publications shown concern that passage of the first-generation revolutionaries from the scene and the ascension of a ruling group that has not experienced struggle against the twin enemies of imperialism and capitalism may cause the momentum of the revolution to run down. This possibility is often mentioned as a cause for giving ideological education top priority in all official endeavors. The leadership is aware that those who have not experienced foreign domination or war may not have the desire for ". . . revenge and the burning hostility toward the unforgivable enemy . . ." that is the regime's declared policy to instill in the youth.

The official magazine for women, discussing education, told readers that there was ". . . danger that our society may gradually undergo qualitative change and that our revolutionary achievements will be lost if we fail to provide our posterity, who will inherit our splendid achievements, with revolutionary education . . . to become thorough Communists."

CHAPTER 2

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

The Korean Peninsula thrusts southward from the northeast Asian mainland, separating the Yellow Sea on the east from the Sea of Japan on the west (see fig. 1). North Korea occupies 47,071 square miles, or 55 percent of the total area (85,285) square miles). Broadest at its northern border and narrowest (95 miles) at its center, it extends 450 miles from the extreme northeastern corner to the Ongjin Peninsula in the southeast.

The northern frontier shares an 850-mile border with two of Communist China's Manchurian provinces. The border with the Soviet Union in the extreme northeastern corner, about 75 miles southwest of Vladivostok, is only 10.4 miles long. Most of the frontier is marked by two rivers, the Yalu and the Tumen (Amnok-kang and Tuman-gang, respectively, in Korean; Yalu and Tumen are Chinese variants). The Yalu rises on the slopes of an extinct volcano, Mount Paektu, Korea's highest mountain (9,000 feet), and flows southwest to the Yellow Sea. The Tumen rises in the same area and flows first northeast, then southeast into the Sea of Japan.

North Korea is largely mountainous, although the mountains generally are not high. Sixty-five percent of the total area is composed of mountains and hills which are less than 3,280 feet in height; only 15 percent rise above 3,280 feet; and the remaining 20 percent is plains and lowlands. The major mountain ranges are located in the north-central and northeastern sections and along the eastern coast. On the east coast the hills drop sharply down to a narrow coastal plain, whereas on the west the slope is more gradual, forming broad, level plains. The Peninsula lies in a stable geologic zone; there are no active volcanoes, and only a few minor earth tremors occur yearly.

The population is concentrated in the coastal plains and in the river valleys where agriculture can be practiced. Arable land amounts to only 20 percent of the total area, and even in the plains and valleys the soil is not of the best quality for cultivation, as it lacks the necessary organic substances. To compensate for the lack of farmland and to maximize productivity, the Government has been utilizing modern techniques of irrigation, reclamation, and fertilization in its drive to attain economic self-sufficiency.

Climatic factors have also affected agricultural patterns. The country is subject to two monsoonal winds: a summer wind that originates over the Pacific and brings moist air westward across the Peninsula, and a cold, dry winter wind from the Asian continental land mass. Thus, the rainy season is concentrated in 2 or 3 summer months, whereas winters are cold and dry. Peasants are limited generally to one crop per growing season, and irrigation is required during the dry months. Other climatic determinants are latitude, height of terrain, and maritime influence.

North Korea does, however, possess the essentials for an industrial base in its river systems and mineral resources. In the mountainous regions there are many winding rivers with swift currents, suitable for hydroelectric generation. A number of dams and powerplants are now in operation, and there are potential sites for others. Substantial deposits of coal and iron ore, as well as tungsten, graphite, lead, and copper, provide fuel and raw materials for industry and are the chief source of foreign exchange earnings. Petroleum deposits are lacking, however, and in order to conserve foreign exchange by limiting imports of oil and gasoline to a minimum, the railroads, rather than the highways, are used as the principal means of transportation. Mineral deposits and refining centers are well connected by the country's rail system.

PHYSICAL SETTING

Terrain

Mountains and uplands cover four-fifths of the territory; the proportion is as high as 90 percent in the northern Provinces of Chagang and Yanggang (see fig. 2). The major mountain ranges form a crisscross pattern extending from northwest to southeast and northeast to southwest. The Mach'ŏllyŏng Range extends from the vicinity of Mount Paektu in a southeasterly direction toward the east coast. This range has peaks over 6,500 feet in altitude. Running northeasterly from the center of the Mach'ŏllyŏng Range toward the Tumen River valley is the Hamgyŏng Range, which also has a number of peaks over 6,500 feet, including Mount Kwanmo (8,334 feet), Korea's second highest mountain. The southwest extension of the Hamgyŏng Range is known as the Pujŏllyŏng Range. To the west of the Hamgyŏng and Pujŏllyŏng Ranges lies the relatively low (averaging 3,280 feet) Kaema Plateau, a heavily forested basaltic tableland. West of the Kaema Plateau is the Nangnim Range, averaging 4,920 feet, extending to the southeast. To the west of the Nangnim Range are two less prominent ranges,

the Chogyurŏng and the Myohyang, both of which are from 1,640 to 3,280 feet in height. The Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River flows in the valley between them.

South of Wŏnsan rises Korea's other major mountain chain, the T'aebaek, which extends down the eastern side of the Peninsula and is often called the "backbone of Korea." Only a short portion



Figure 2. Topography of North Korea.

of its length is in North Korea, but this section includes the scenic Mount Kŭmgang (Diamond Mountain), 5,373 feet in height.

The terrain east of the Hamgyŏng and T'aebaek Ranges consists of short, parallel ridges which extend from these ranges to the Sea of Japan, creating in effect a series of isolated valleys accessible only by rail lines branching off from the main coastal track. West of the T'aebaek chain, the terrain of central Korea is characterized by a series of lesser ranges and hills that gradually level off into broad plains along the coast.

The plains regions are more important to the nation's economy, although they constitute only one-fifth of the total area. Most of the plains are alluvial, built up from silt deposited on their banks by rivers in their middle and lower courses. Other plains, such as the Pyongyang Peneplain, were formed by eons of erosion from surrounding hills. A number of plains areas exist on the west coast, including the Pyongyang Peneplain, Unjon, Anju, Chaeryŏng, and Yŏnbaek Plains. Of these, the Chaeryŏng Plain and the Pyongyang Peneplain are the most extensive, each covering an area of about 200 square miles. They are followed in size by the Yŏnbaek Plain, which is about 120 square miles; the rest are about 80 square miles each. The mountains along the east coast drop abruptly to the sea and as a result, few plains are found. The most important are the Hamhŭng, Yŏngch'ŏn, Kilchu, Yŏnghŭng, and Susŏng Plains, of which the 120-square mile Hamhŭng Plain is the largest. The plains support most of the country's farmlands, and their smallness indicates the severe physical limitations placed on agriculture.

Rivers

The mountainous areas are located mainly in the northern and eastern parts of the country, whereas the western region consists of lower hills and plains; thus, the major rivers flow westward into the Yellow Sea. These include the Yalu, Taedong, Ch'ŏngch'ŏn, Imjin, and Yesŏng Rivers. On the east coast there are many short, swift-flowing rivers, but only two of major proportions, the Tumen and the Songch'ŏn (see table 1). The rivers and streams flow strongly during summer, fed by seasonal rainfall and melting snow in the mountains, but the volume drops considerably during the dry winters. The rivers serve a threefold economic function: they provide a source of water for irrigation during the dry months (October through April); they are utilized as an auxiliary means of transportation to ease the strain on the railroads; and their current is used to generate electricity. Official sources have stated that there are 64 rivers and streams containing about 200 sites for electric power generation with a total potential output of 8 million kilowatts (see ch. 19, Industry). In order to bring power to certain

regions on the east coast, a number of westward-flowing streams have been diverted in the opposite direction by means of tunnels bored through the mountains.

The major river is the Yalu, which flows 480 miles from Mount Paektu to the Yellow Sea. Because its course cuts through rocky gorges for much of its length, its alluvial plains are less extensive than its size would suggest. Oceangoing vessels can dock at Sinŭiju, and small craft can travel upstream as far as Hyesan. Although it is important for transportation and irrigation, the Yalu's main value lies in its hydroelectric power potential. Dams on the Yalu and on four of its tributaries, the Changjin, Hŏch'ŏn, Pujŏn, and Tongno Rivers, can generate a total of 2.8 million kilowatts of electric power (see ch. 19, Industry).

Table 1. Rivers of North Korea

	Length (in miles)	Navigable Length (in miles)	Basin (in square miles)
Yalu	491.0	420.0	24,185
Tumen	324.0	50.0	15,880
Taedong	247.0	150.0	7.485
Imjin	157.5	76.8	n.a.
Ch'ŏngch'ŏn	123.0	94.2	3,655
Yesŏng	107.8	40.3	1,563
Songch'ŏn	61.0	n.a.	898

n.a.—not available.

Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam, 1945–1968* (Seoul), p. 28; and *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (Tokyo), p. 71.

The Taedong River is the most important waterway in the west-central region. It waters the farmlands of the extensive Pyongyang Peneplain and serves as a major transportation artery for internal commerce. Ships of 2,000 tons can travel almost 40 miles upstream, and small craft, about 150 miles. Three principal cities, Pyongyang, Namp'o, and Songnim, have developed along its banks. The Taedong is susceptible to flooding; in 1967 flash floods ruined part of the crops on the Pyongyang Peneplain.

The Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River is navigable as far as Sinanju. The Tumen, on the other hand, is of negligible value as an inland waterway since it is too narrow; it is capable, however, of generating 1 million kilowatts of hydroelectricity. The value of the Imjin River to the country is limited, as it flows through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and part of the Republic of Korea before reaching the inland sea south of Kaesŏng.

Coastlines and Ports

Of the Korean Peninsula's 5,400 miles of coastline, excluding offshore islands, North Korea holds approximately one-fifth of the total, or about 650 miles along the west coast and 500 miles of the east coast. The west coast is highly indented and irregular, with a multitude of small offshore islands. The Yellow Sea is shallow, with a mean depth of about 140 feet, and the tidal difference ranges from 20 to 40 feet. According to official claims, 735,000 acres of tideland have potential value as agricultural land, reed fields, and for salt evaporation facilities. The main port is Namp'o, at the mouth of the Taedong River, a center for both international and domestic trade. At Namp'o floating docks have been constructed to cope with the tidal problem. Other ports are Tasado, a trading center, and Sinŭiju, located at the mouth of the Yalu. Songnim is situated on the Taedong River, but can accommodate ships of 6,000 tons.

The east coast is relatively straight with few islands, and the coastal waters of the Sea of Japan are deep, averaging over 5,500 feet. Two currents flow along the east coast. One is the warm Tsushima Current, flowing north from the Korea Strait; the other is the cold Liman Current, originating in the northern parts of the Sea of Japan. The atmospheric turbulence produced by the air above these currents often causes fogs along the east coast. Occasionally, their persistence causes crop failure. The principal ports are Unggi, Wŏnsan, Ch'ŏngjin, Kimch'aek, and Najin. Of these, the first two were built by the Japanese for military purposes. Najin is the southern terminus of the railroad to the Soviet Union, and Ch'ŏngjin, currently called the gateway to North Korea by the Japanese, serves as the distributing center for the east coast. One of the goals of the Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67), as extended to 1970, is the expansion of the harbors at Wŏnsan, Ch'ŏngjin, Tanch'ŏn, and Hŭngnam, as well as Namp'o on the west coast, to accommodate 10,000-ton ships.

Climate

Because North Korea is located on a peninsula and also abuts the Asian land mass, its climate has both marine and continental characteristics. Winter temperatures throughout the north show much diversity, mainly because of varying latitude and elevation. Winters are most severe in the northern interior Provinces of Chagang and Yanggang, where 5 winter months have temperatures below freezing and there are only 130 frost-free days a year. The average January temperature at Chunggangjin, on the Yalu, is −6°F. The east coast is generally warmer during the winter months because the mountains, especially the Hamgyŏng and Pujŏllyŏng Ranges,

provide partial shelter from the cold air masses of the Asian hinterland. The average January temperature at Unggi, in the extreme northeast, is 15°F.; at Kimch'aek, 21.4°F.; and at Wŏnsan, farther south, 25°F. The western part of the country, however, receives the full force of the winter wind. Sinŭiju, on the Yalu, has an average January temperature of 15.5°F.; Pyongyang, 17.6°F.; and the Hwanghae Peninsula, to the south, 22.6°F.

Summer temperatures are much more uniform throughout the north, averaging in the 70's. In the northern interior region, however, summer temperatures prevail for only about 2 months, so that only fast-maturing crops may be sown. Farther south, the growing season extends for at least 4 months, with an average of about 900 hours of total sunshine from June through September. The southern part of the north has about 175 frost-free days per year.

Average annual precipitation ranges from 32 to 60 inches, depending on locale. Areas with the lightest amount of rainfall include the Tumen River valley, with a range of 20 to 25 inches, and the lower parts of the Taedong River, which receive 24 to 28 inches annually. The heaviest rainfall occurs in the upper Ch'ŏngch'ŏn valley, the Wŏnsan area, and the Imjin River basin, each recording over 50 inches a year. Great fluctuations may occur from year to year, even in the same region. Kaesŏng averages 51.4 inches of rain per year, but in 1964 in received 89.3 inches.

The outstanding characteristic of precipitation is its seasonal nature. From 50 to 60 percent falls during June, July, and August, the result of the moisture-laden, summer monsoonal wind from the Pacific. Moreover, a large percentage of the rain can fall in a single day or even within a few hours, causing rivers to overflow their banks and flood their basins, resulting in widespread crop damage. Only 15 percent of precipitation occurs during the dry months.

Snow falls in the northern mountain regions from late October until April; elsewhere, from early November to March. Typhoons are uncommon because of the proximity of the continental land mass. Only one or two per year strike the north, usually in July or August.

Soil

Over 60 percent of the soil is dervied from gneiss and granite, which produce a brown, infertile soil with a high sand content. A reddish-brown soil, the product of limestone bedrock, exists in the southern parts of Hamgyŏng-namdo and Kangwŏn-do. Only at the Yalu and Tumen estuaries is a quantity of rich black soil to be found. Most of the soil is alluvial, washed down into the valleys by rivers and streams, and moved about in the coastal lowlands by

wind, rain, and floods. These movements have minimized weathering, causing the soil to retain the characteristics of the original rock and retarding the chemical processes necessary for fertility.

Aware that the poor quality of the soil adversely affects agricultural output, the Government is stressing the artificial enrichment of the soil with chemical fertilizer, produced in abundance at Hŭngnam (see ch. 19, Industry). Official sources also stated that soils lacking in specific chemical properties would be treated with compounds of phosphorus, potash, and magnesium, in addition to basic nitrogenous fertilizer. The Government's concern with the infertility of the soil is linked to its goal of achieving agricultural self-sufficiency.

RESOURCES

Minerals

North Korea contains 80 to 90 percent of all known mineral deposits on the Peninsula (see fig. 3). Official sources state that the north possesses about 300 kinds of minerals, of which approximately 200 have economic value. Of these, the country ranks among the first 10 nations in the world in both deposits and production of gold, tungsten, graphite, magnesite, barytes, molybdenum, limestone, mica, and fluorite. Other important mineral deposits include asbestos, aluminum, chromium, copper, kaolin, lead, nickel, potash, silica, silver, and zinc (see ch. 19, Industry).

Iron ore reserves are estimated at 1.3 billion tons, 1.1 billion in the form of magnetite at the Musan area alone. The ore is not of high quality, however, and requires enrichment processes. Iron ore deposits on the west coast are in the form of limonite.

Coal reserves are estimated at 8 billion tons, 5 billion of which is low-quality anthracite. Deposits of bituminous coal, needed by industry for coking, are small, and much has to be imported. The major anthracite coalfield lies along the Taedong River, not far from Pyongyang. The Anju mine along the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River is important as the site of the only lignite coal deposit on the west coast. Two particular mines are located on the east coast: one at Aoji, with higher quality anthracite than elsewhere, and another at Kocham, in southern Hamgyŏng-pukto, the site of a lignite coal deposit. Lignite is used as fuel in private homes and as raw material for organic fertilizer, and may be liquified to produce fuel oil and kerosene.

One important resource for a modern industrial establishment is lacking—petroleum. Imports of oil are held at a minimal level, restricted to satisfying military requirements and propelling a limited amount of highway commercial traffic.



Figure 3. Major resources in North Korea.

Forests

North Korea's moist climate is conducive to the growth of forests, but excessive cutting before 1945 destroyed most of the original stands in all but the most inaccessible parts of the country. The northern interior still contains first stands of larch, spruce, and pine trees, which are commercially harvested. In the central hills, away from areas of heavy settlement, forests of red and

Korean pine are intermingled with deciduous trees (mostly oaks, chestnuts, and elders). Elsewhere are secondary growths of scrub pine and oak. Besides man, the forests have been harmed by insects, particularly the pine bug, and by uncontrolled forest fires.

Recognizing the value of the forests as a marketable product and as an antierosion agent, the regime has embarked on a reforestation program. Its goal was to plant 980,000 acres with saplings by 1970 and ultimately to cover 1,470,000 acres. The northern Province of Yanggang has been subject to a 10-year reforestation program since 1959, the aim of which is to transplant 3.7 million saplings. Throughout the country trees have been planted by roadsides, on riverbanks, and on barren land to prevent soil erosion and to provide protection from wind damage.

In the reforestation program the concept of the economy forest is stressed. The term refers to the seeding of certain species for a distinct economic purpose. Forests of poplars and paper mulberry trees were to provide raw materials for the fiber-making and papermaking industries; walnut and pine nut stands were to become a source of fats and oil. Miners were instructed to plant fast-growing species near their sites for use as shaft beams, and villages could develop their own stands as a source of firewood. The 7-year plan called for the transformation of natural woodland into economy forests wherever possible.

Marine

The principal fishing ground is the Sea of Japan, since the presence of both a warm and a cold current attracts a great number of species. Fish caught include pollack, octopus, anchovy, sardines, flatfish, cod, sandfish, herring, mackerel, and, occasionally, whales. The main fishing ports are Sinp'o (the site of a modern cannery), Samho, Soho, and Wŏnsan, all located on the east coast. Species found in the Yellow Sea are yellow corvina, hair-tail, stingray, sand-eel, and shrimp. The main fishing ports on the Yellow Sea are Haeju, Sinŭiju, and Namp'o. In the early 1960's the total catch was over 800,000 tons. Pollack accounted for almost half, and the octopus catch amounted to about 100,000 tons. The 7-year plan has called for an annual catch of 1.2 million tons by 1967. The attainment of this target would make available considerable tonnage for export.

Freshwater fish are also considered an important natural resource. In lakes, rivers, streams, and reservoirs, carp, sweetfish, and gray mullet abound. The regime is actively promoting the expansion of freshwater fish breeding. Fish-breeding farms were ordered established in every city and county, and cooperative farms were directed to construct a breeding pond covering a surface

area of at least 1,000 p'yŏng (1 p'yŏng equals 36 square feet). Mines and industries along waterways were instructed to set up filtering and sedimentation factilities if their waste products were interfering with breeding efforts.

BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

The northern boundary with Communist China and the Soviet Union, as marked by the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, is internationally recognized as the historic northern limit of Korea (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Formal recognition of the Yalu as the Korean-Chinese boundary dates from at least 1875 and of the Tumen, from 1909. In the early 1960's there was evidence of disagreement between Communist China and North Korea over the control of Mount Paektu, but the issue was settled peacefully in September 1963 (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). The Tumen River marks the Soviet-Korean boundary for 10.4 miles. Although no formal treaty of delimitation has been signed between North Korea and the Soviet Union, the boundary has never been a cause of dispute between the two countries.

The southern boundary, although not recognized as permanent by the Kim Il-sung regime, marks the cease-fire line at the end of the Korean conflict. Under the Armistice Agreement of July 1953, this line is referred to as the Military Demarcation Line. The line winds across the Peninsula from a point on the Han River estuary directly south of Panmunjom to a point about 5 miles south of Kosŏng on the east coast. The Armistice Agreement also established a buffer area, called the Demilitarized Zone, that extends 2 kilometers (1.24 miles) on each side of the Demarcation Line.

There were nine provinces in 1968: Chagang-do, Hamgyŏng-namdo, Hamyŏng-pukto, Hwanghae-namdo, Hwanghae-pukto, Kangwŏn-do, P'yŏngan-namdo, P'yŏngan-pukto, and Yanggang-do; one special city (Pyongyang), one region (Kaesŏng), and two cities administered directly by the Central Government (Hamhŭng and Ch'ŏngjin). Pyongyang and Kaesŏng had administrative status equal to that of the provinces (see fig. 4). Before the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, the southern portion of the former Province of Hwanghae, including the city of Kaesŏng, had been under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea. Under the 1953 armistice pact, this area became part of North Korea.

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Most of the population is found in the coastal lowlands and in the valleys of rivers and streams. These regions contain both the best agricultural land in the country and the sites of cities and



Figure 4. The administrative divisions of North Korea, 1968.

industrial complexes. The limited economy of the mountainous areas in the northern and central regions supports little of the population, except logging centers, such as Hyesan on the Yalu, and mining communities, such as Musan in the extreme northeast.

Rural

The rugged topography and the shortness of the growing season make the uplands unfavorable for agriculture. Farming communi-

ties are isolated because arable plots are scattered. Before 1945 a number of farmers practiced slash-and-burn agriculture in the present northern Provinces of Chagang and Yanggang. After exhausting the fertility of their small plot, they would move on to another. The regime has sought to organize these nomadic cultivators into cooperatives in an effort to end their wasteful agricultural methods but, according to a Western source published in 1966, slash-and-burn farming has continued. Since 1945 the Communist authorities have moved many farming families from the mountainous regions to the more fertile plains, where their labor was expected to produce greater yields.

On the coastal plains and in river valleys, the pattern is one of dense settlement with houses close to one another. Such close groupings are based partially on economic interdependence; villagers must work together to irrigate, transplant, and harvest the rice crop and to build earthen embankments for protection against flooding rivers. In the lowlands villagers prefer to locate their houses at the foot of the southern side of hills, which provide shelter from winter winds. Such a location is likely to have a water table relatively close to the surface that is readily accessible by simple wells.

Urban

Urbanization is largely an outgrowth of the industrialization of North Korea, begun initially by the Japanese and continued by the present regime. The location and growth of urban centers have been influenced by proximity to mineral deposits, major railroad lines, and harbors.

Pyongyang, with more than 1 million inhabitants, is not only the capital city, but also the hub of the country's railroads. It is a major industrial center, its factories powered by coal from the nearby deposits along the Taedong River. Songnim is the site of an iron ore refinery, in addition to being an important river port. Namp'o is the principal port on the west coast and is a center for gold and copper refining. The Haeju area maintains a copper refinery and several chemical plants. Sinŭiju, at the mouth of the Yalu, is an important producer of chemicals, electrical equipment, textiles, and consumer goods. Sariwŏn is an agricultural center.

On the east coast mining communities such as Aoji, on the Tumen River, and Kilchu grew at the sites of lignite coal deposits. Hŭngnam is the center of the country's chemical industry, and Ch'ŏngjin is both a major port and a steel producer. Wŏnsan, the site of a major naval base, has an oil refinery. Traditional fishing villages declined as a result of competition from commercial fleets based at Sinp'o.

Mining communities include Chaeryŏng, Iwŏn, Musan, and Puk-

chin. Strategically located at railroad and highway junctions are Ch'ŏngjin, Kilchu, Manp'o, Najin, Sangsambong, Sariwŏn, Sinanju, Sinŭiju, and Wŏnsan.

Before the Korean conflict, the cities consisted mostly of single-story buildings spread over a wide area. Since 1953, however, the Government has been constructing multistory apartment houses to replace ruined dwellings. The apartment houses are found in Workers' Settlements, communities built especially for those employed in industry and mining.

MANMADE FEATURES

Transportation

Railroads

With 6,500 miles of track in 1964, the railroads provided the principal means of transportation. They follow the coastlines and river valleys (see fig. 5). The mountainous terrain in the interior has limited the full integration of the country by rail; there is only one east-west railroad—the P'yŏng-Wŏn line from Pyongyang to Wŏnsan. The basic pattern consists of two main coastal lines with branches running across the plains or up into the interior valleys.

On both coasts, however, mines and agricultural regions are adequately linked with refineries and processing centers. The major railroad in the west is the Kyŏng-Ui line, which runs from Kaesŏng to Sinŭiju, unifying the entire economy of the west coast. Ores from the gold, copper, zinc, and lead mines are moved along this line to the foundries at Namp'o. The P'yŏng-Nam line, between Pyongyang and Namp'o, connects machine-building industries, foundries, and mines in the Namp'o area with the Kangsŏn steelworks, among the country's largest. The P'yŏng-Dŏk line, running along the Taedong River, passes through the coalfields of southern P'yŏngan-namdo and serves as the main artery for hauling anthracite to distribution centers for transshipment. The Wŏlla line, which runs from Wŏnson to Najin, unites the east coast, serving the metal, mining, chemical, and fishing industries while bringing foodstuffs, salt, and consumer goods to communities in the northeastern regions.

The country has five railroad links with Communist China. Three cross the Yalu at Sinŭiju, Manp'o, and at a point about 45 miles northeast of Sinŭiju. The other hookups are at Onsŏng and Sangsambong, on the Tumen. A line from Hongŭi-ri connects with a Soviet track across the Tumen.

The steady annual increase in freight volume has obliged the



Figure 5. Major cities and transportation facilities of North Korea.

Government to take measures to improve the railroads on both a physical and an administrative basis. One such step has been the conversion of the more heavily utilized narrow gauge branch lines to standard-gauge width in order to reduce freight shipment time. New trackage has been constructed to ease the traffic volume on existing lines; the Chihari-P'yŏngsan line, for example, was built to alleviate the burden on the P'yong-Wŏn line.

The Government is currently engaged in a program of electrifying the railroads. Under the 7-year plan, the target was the electrification of 50 percent of the rail lines. As of 1966 over 21 percent had been electrified. Among the advantages cited for electrification were that electric locomotives, which are domestically manufactured, could pull 2.7 times as much freight as a steam locomotive on an average grade; that electric locomotives could be operated continuously for a greater length of time than steam locomotives; and that labor power needed for engine operation could be reduced by one-third. The main consideration for the stress on electrification was that the country was unwilling to increase imports of oil that a conversion to diesel locomotives would have necessitated, whereas electric power resources were readily available.

Highways

Highway transportation is not nearly as significant as the railroads although its use is increasing. In 1961 there were about 3,500 miles of highways. Major roads parallel the rail lines, and others follow valley floors into the interior of the north. As was the case with the rails, there are few east-west highways. With the exception of highways from Pyongyang to the airport at Sunan and from Pyongyang to Kang-dong, the roads are not paved. The main obstacle to the development of large-scale highway transportation was the reluctance of the regime to spend foreign exchange on imports of gasoline for motor vehicles.

River and Coastal

To ease the burdens on the railroads, river and coastal transportation is used as much as possible. The most important rivers utilized for freight transportation are the Yalu, Taedong, and Chaeryŏng. Grain, sand, and gravel are floated down the Yalu. Agricultural products and iron ore can be sent down the continuous waterway formed by the Chaeryŏng and Taedong Rivers to Namp'o, Songnim, and Pyongyang. To facilitate such commerce harbors were scheduled to be built along the banks of these rivers during the seven-year plan.

Along the west coast salt is moved by boat from evaporation pans along the shores of Hwanghae-namdo and sent to Haeju. Products such as fertilizer, mineral ores, apples, and sand are transported by water to Namp'o and then sent to their destinations by railroad. On the east coast coal and lumber are shipped from Najin to Ch'ŏngjin and Hŭngnam.

Air Transport

There are a number of airfields at cities and towns throughout

the country which had been built originally by the Japanese for military purposes. The civil airline, which has been under the control of the Air Force since April 1960, maintains schedules between the major cities but, in general, air transport does not play an important role in the country's affairs. Airplanes are used for such activities as geological exploration, forest patrols, fishing surveys, and spraying insecticide (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade).

Irrigation and Reclamation

Irrigation projects have a high priority with the Government in order to lessen dependence on the seasonal rainfall. In 1966 the total area under irrigation was claimed to have been 1.96 million acres. The major irrigation projects are located on the western coastal plains, where channels can be dug on the relatively level terrain to bring water from great distances.

The Yalu irrigation system is the country's largest, bringing water to over 200,000 acres. The system consists of over 500 miles of waterways and 15 miles of tunnels. Power requirements are met by 22 power plants with a combined output of 25,000 kilowatts. Two reservoirs were created in the Nangnim Range, which provided both water reserves and sites for fish breeding.

The P'yŏngnam irrigation system is the second largest, having a total of 122,500 acres under irrigation in 1965, with plans for adding another 36,760 acres. It has 930 miles of irrigation channels, through which water is pumped from the Taedong and Ch'ŏngch'ŏn Rivers for a distance of almost 50 miles. Other major irrigation networks are the Ujidon, Kiyang, Sin'gye, and Chungdan systems, all on the west coast. The ultimate goal is to create a network of interlocking waterways, composed of rivers, reservoirs, and irrigation channels, on the west coast.

Other means of increasing the utility of the land are reclamation and the development of the mountainous regions. Land is being reclaimed on the flood plains, estuaries of rivers, and the tidal flats along the west coast. Embankments have been built to prevent the salinization of reclaimed fields along the coast. In 1964 a project to straighten the bends of an estuary west of Pyongyang added 148,200 acres of arable land. Although the mountainous areas have limited agricultural potential, they are suitable for such economic activities as sericulture, bee and livestock raising, and pomiculture. The expansion of apple orchards, in particular, has been undertaken in the uplands. Cooperative farms have been directed to develop adequate irrigation facilities for orchards and to construct terraces for orchards located on hills having a grade of over 20°.

CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL SETTING

Throughout 2,200 years of recorded history the Koreans have been influenced in varying degrees by the culture and activity of the peoples with whom they have come in contact. As a result, many Koreans accept the popular belief handed down for generations that their national destiny has been determined less by internal than by external factors.

Foreign influences penetrated the country long before the Christian era in the form of tribal and Chinese intrusions from the north across the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The Chinese ruled part of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula for more than 400 years (108 B.C.–A.D. 313), leaving an indelible imprint on the culture of Korea. Among other events underlying what the Koreans describe as their historic fate (yŏksajŏk sukmyŏng) were the centuries of vassal ties to China (with an interregnum of vassalage to the Mongols from 1259 to 1368) lasting well into the last days of the 19th century; the devastation wrought by the Mongols in the 13th century, by the Japanese in the 16th century, and by the Manchus in the 17th century; the frontal clash in 1904–05 between Czarist Russia and Japan in their expansionist machinations for control of the strategically located Peninsula; and the 35 years of colonial experiences under the Japanese. The post-World War II involvement of the Soviet Union and the United States is seen by the people as still another confirmation of the historical trend.

The country, whose Western name is derived from the medieval dynasty of Koryŏ (A.D. 935–1392), already had a common language and a comparatively homogeneous population before the Chinese invasion in 108 B.C. After a relatively uneventful phase of history during which three indigenous kingdoms had competed for hegemony, the people were brought together for the first time in A.D. 676 under the single authority of the Silla dynasty (A.D. 676–935). Silla's highly stratified society and Buddhist culture continued through the period of Koryŏ domination.

The advent of the Yi dynasty (1392–1910) marked the rise of Confucianism, which provided the guiding principles by which Koreans governed not only their personal behavior but their social

and political life as well. These principles upheld the mastering of Chinese classics as the means of acquiring power and prestige, extolled the primacy of civilian rule, and stressed the virtues of loyalty to authority and to one's kinship group. The impact of Confucianism was generally to sanction the rigidity of a hierarchical social order, to stifle intellectual creativity, and to frustrate aspirations for political as well as social change.

In the latter half of the 19th century Korea found itself incapable of mustering sufficient strength to modernize itself and to meet external challenge on equal terms. In 1876 the "Hermit Kingdom" succumbed to Japan's influence and abandoned its seclusionist policy.

Since 1945 independent historians and historiography have disappeared from Communist North Korea. Both history and historians have been used by the Communist propagandists as political instruments for rationalizing the purpose, role, and policy of the ruling Korean Workers Party. All historical explanations which contradict the Party line have been dismissed as "bourgeois historical science." Consequently, peasant uprisings and social unrest are presented as manifestations of class struggles and social contradictions; all popular resistance to foreign invaders and domination is glorified as "heroic, patriotic liberation struggles." Moreover, the Party historians have described Kim Il-sung's little-known anti-Japanese partisan campaigns of the 1930's as "the highest stage in the history of the revolutionary movement of the Korean people."

HISTORIC ORIGINS

According to a legend, Korea was founded in 2333 B.C. by a mythical figure named Tan'gun in what is now the lower Taedong River basin in the northwestern region of the Peninsula. This myth was popularized after the 12th century, especially in times of foreign invasions, to foster the development of national solidarity. Although it is dismissed as a fairy tale in North Korea, the myth is regarded as an important national heritage in the Republic of Korea, where the Government has adopted 2333 B.C. as the year of Korea's birth.

Another legend, given some substance by several Chinese chronicles, states that a Chinese prince named Chi-tzu, or Kija in Korean, established the country around 1123 B.C. after the decline of Tan'gun Korea. This account, however, is disputed by nearly all Korean historians.

Knowledge of prehistoric Korea, called Chosŏn, derives mainly from several early Chinese sources, since Korea had no form of

writing until Chinese characters were introduced during the latter part of the second century B.C. The name "Chosŏn," literally the "Land of Morning Freshness," was first mentioned in a Chinese history recorded probably between the third and second century B.C. It comes from the name of a powerful native tribe settled in areas around modern Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea.

The earliest Korean peoples are believed to have been migrants or invaders from present-day Manchuria or northern China, of either Tungusic or Mongoloid origin; their language was probably related to the Altaic family (see ch. 5, Language and Communication; ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups). Neolithic remains found in all parts of the Peninsula indicate that the earliest settlers had, by the third millennium B.C., moved into the country along the northwestern coastal lowlands as well as into the Tumen River valley in the extreme northeast.

Living by hunting, fishing, and pastoral pursuits, they worshiped nature deities and ancestral spirits, a phenomenon common to the tribal peoples of northeast Asia at the time. This pattern of worship, called shamanism, persisted through the centuries even after the introduction of new religions from China (see ch. 11, Religion).

Korean history comes into clear focus after about the third century B.C. when an indigenous Han tribal family ruled along the lower Taedong River region. In 194 B.C. Wiman, a tribal chieftain of either Korean or Chinese origin, overthrew the Han family and established the kingdom known as Wiman Chosŏn. The deposed family migrated south to the Han River basin, then controlled by a tribe called Chin. The Han family rose again shortly thereafter, and the three major tribal powers—Ma-Han, Chin-Han, and Pyŏn-Han—which had ruled the southern half of the Peninsula before the rise of the Three Kingdoms—were all named after the Han family.

In 108 B.C. Emperor Wu Ti of the Chinese Han dynasty destroyed Wiman Chosŏn and established four colonies in the northern half of Korea, of which the most important was Lolang (Nangnang in Korean), roughly coterminous with present-day P'yŏngan-pukto and P'yŏngan-namdo (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). As the political, cultural, and trade center of Chinese colonists, Lolang left an enduring cultural imprint on Korean society. Its officials, scholars, and merchants introduced metal and bronze culture, their form of writing, and classics. The brilliance of the "Lolang culture" is demonstrated by a large number of material remains excavated in the vicinity of modern Pyongyang.

Chinese rule was not welcomed by the indigenous tribes. By 75 B.C. all but one of the colonies had to be abolished because of local

resistance and revolts. Lolang remained the only Chinese outpost until it was wiped out in the early third century.

THE THREE KINGDOMS

From the third century B.C. to the mid-seventh century A.D., apart from Lolang, three Korean kingdoms competed for hegemony: Koguryŏ in the north, Paekche in the southwest, and Silla in the southeast.

Koguryŏ was the first to emerge along the Yalu basin around 50 B.C. Founded by a group of tribes originating from the Tungusic Puyŏ tribes of northern Manchuria, it terminated Lolang in A.D. 313 and ruled much of the area north of the Han River and a substantial portion of southern Manchuria.

The Koguryŏ people were culturally advanced; they were also warlike, frequently fighting off hostile, aggressive tribes north and northwest of the Yalu River. One of the most celebrated wars in Korean history, for example, took place in A.D. 612 when an invading Chinese army of more than 1 million was crushed by the Koguryŏ army of 300,000 in a series of pitched battles at Liao-tung ch'eng (modern Liao-yang, southwest of Mukden in Manchuria), at Pyongyang, and along the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River. According to Korean chronicles, only 2,700 Chinese survived the battles. Ulchimundŏk, commanding general of Koguryŏ, is honored all over Korea.

In the late third century Paekche rose south of the Han River under a branch of the Puyŏ tribes from the north. Paekche enjoyed an advanced culture, strongly influenced by its contacts with Lolang and Tai-fang, a Chinese colony formed early in the third century south of Lolang in order to pacify the increasingly rebellious anti-Chinese local tribes; the new colony was eliminated shortly after the fall of Lolang. Although relatively affluent, Paekche was troubled by internal disunity and frequently had to ally itself with its eastern neighbor, Silla, and sometimes with Japan in order to counter warlike Koguryŏ.

In the fourth century Silla emerged to the east of Paekche. It was the least developed of the Three Kingdoms, at least in part, because of its isolation from Chinese influences. Moreover, it was continually harassed by Japanese pirates, by Koguryŏ, and by its sometimes ally, Paekche. Nevertheless, allied with the T'ang dynasty of China, it eliminated Paekche in A.D. 660 and Koguryŏ in A.D. 668.

This alliance proved costly because T'ang was quick to annex Koguryŏ's territory in southern Manchuria and establish its garrison in Pyongyang. Aroused further by T'ang's other maneuvers

to assert its authority over the defeated Paekche, Silla waged war against T'ang expeditionary armies and, in A.D. 676, forced them to retreat to the north of the Taedong River. South of the Taedong, Silla was recognized by China as a tributary but self-governing state.

Korean historians attribute Silla's ascendancy, in part, to the support it received from the anti-Chinese, nationalistic peoples of former Paekche and Koguryŏ and, in part, to the able leadership provided by its own tribal groups. Political and military leaders came from an elite circle of 500 to 1,000 youths called *hwarang* (flower boys), chosen exclusively from the nobility. They played a crucial role as able ministers and generals during Silla's rise to supremacy. Inspired by Confucian as well as Buddhist precepts, the *hwarang* stressed five virtues: loyalty to the king, filial piety, sincere friendship, no retreat in battles, and no killings without necessity. The spirit of *hwarang* was revived in the Republic of Korea during the Korean conflict (1950–53) to inspire patriotism and bravery; it is ignored in North Korea.

INTRODUCTION OF BUDDHISM AND CONFUCIANISM

Buddhism and Confucianism, both from China, were introduced to Koguryŏ in A.D. 372 and, subsequently, to Paekche and Silla. As vehicles for the transmission of Chinese culture, they were to influence Korean society in the ensuing centuries.

Buddhism spread more rapidly than Confucianism. Korean rulers actively aided its propagation, believing—as did Chinese rulers—that Buddhism exerts magical influences in bringing about prosperity and in repelling evils. Stressing tolerance, harmony, and secular rather than transcendental and speculative matters, Buddhism was able to win over many people by offering colorful and awe-inspiring features which had been lacking in the traditional spirit-worshiping cults (see ch. 11, Religion).

Confucianism, a philosophy developed by Confucius (c. 551–479 B.C.), was less popularly appreciated in those days because of its exclusive identification with the ruling literati (see ch. 11, Religion). It spread through a Chinese-type academy which was founded in Koguryŏ in A.D. 372 to teach Chinese classics and Confucian scriptures. In about A.D. 375 a Korean scholar from Paekche, named Wang-in (Wani in Japanese), transmitted to Japan the Analects of Confucius, or dialogues of Confucius with his disciples, and a text of 1,000 Chinese characters. Paekche was also instrumental in passing Buddhism on to Japan in either A.D. 538 or 552.

UNIFIED KOREA UNDER SILLA (A.D. 676–935)

Emerging as a unified political entity for the first time in 676, the country was not divided again until 1945, nearly 1,300 years later. With the perennial threat of invasion from the north temporarily removed, the Silla people were able to devote themselves to cultural pursuits. The century following unification, described usually as the golden age of artistic and cultural achievement, is a major source of national pride to all Koreans. Scholars from the Peninsula traveled widely throughout China and continued to bring home advanced Chinese culture (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The country was ruled by a king and hereditary nobles, whose status and function were determined solely by birth and legitimized by a highly rigid system of rank classification. Under the system only the Kim families of first rank were entitled to the throne. The administrative structure was organized mainly on the Chinese model, and Silla was divided into nine provinces, with the northern territorial limits marked by the Taedong River. To insure compliance with central authority, each provincial lord was required to send a hostage to the capital, Kyŏngju, 55 miles northwest of Pusan.

Silla began to decline after the mid-eighth century, by which time an increasing amount of public land, the principal source of state revenues, had passed illegally into the hands of powerful aristocrats and local lords. Financially weak, the king's authority became increasingly challenged. The situation deteriorated rapidly after the late eighth century when the monarch, until then the symbol of national unity, came to represent the supremacy of merely one clan or power faction over the others. The elitist institution of *hwarang* became divided along factional lines and lost its initial vigor and purposes.

In A.D. 788 the royal court attempted to regain its authority and to improve administrative efficiency by introducing a new system of talent recruitment. It adopted the Chinese examination system, knowing that in China, by the eighth century, the new system had blossomed into an effective channel for providing able leaders. The Chinese system, however, was not received well by many important families whose privileged position depended on hereditary and family connections.

Beginning in the early ninth century, Silla was plagued by mounting peasant insurrection, banditry, and piracy. Many peasants were impoverished by forced labor, high taxes, and high tenancy rents; moreover, they had to borrow grains at usurious rates from the landlords each spring when provisions ran critically short

and some people died of starvation. These phenomena are historically known as *ch'un'gung,* literally spring scarcity, the annual cycle of distress from which the Koreans were not freed until as recently as the 1950's. Until late in the 19th century, indigent peasants and persons unable to pay off debts frequently sold themselves voluntarily into slavery to be relieved from public or personal obligations, or from both.

The Silla society was basically a three-tiered structure. At the top were the kings, aristocrats, provincial lords, senior civil and military officials, and Buddhist monks, many of whom were also scholars. The middle tier included the peasants, merchants, and craftsmen; at the bottom were the outcasts called *ch'ŏnmin,* literally "lowborn" or "despised" people. The outcasts included slaves and their offspring, prisoners of war, criminals and their families, and persons convicted of treason or charged with rebellion. In some instances, a whole village or a group of villages was branded disaffected and was discriminated against. The despised people were required to maintain segregated residential areas. Silla's social stratification was inherited by succeeding dynasties and grew more rigid as centuries passed (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups).

Culturally, the Silla period was the golden age of Buddhism and literary and artistic achievements (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). A prolonged period of peace, combined with the leisure and wealth of the aristocracy, was conducive to cultural pursuits. Kings patronized temples and monasteries with generous gifts of tax-exempt land, built temples and pagodas, and encouraged painting and sculpture to enhance the royal prestige and to bring together every segment of society through the medium of Buddhism. Pulguksa (the Temple of Buddhist Nation) and a Buddha statue in a stone cave, both located today in the vicinity of Kyŏngju, are considered to be among the finest works of Buddhist art deriving from this period.

The study of Chinese classics was stimulated after the establishment of a national college in A.D. 682. This, in turn, led to the invention of a script by Sŏlch'ong, one of the most honored Confucian-Buddhist scholars in the literary history of Korea. The script, called *idu,* was developed in the late seventh century, using Chinese characters for their approximate phonetic value to indicate participles and verbal endings in the spoken Korean language. Used mainly by monks, who were also the largest single literate segment of Silla society, *idu* contributed to the development of a native folklore literature *(hyangga). Idu* also inspired the invention of Korea's first phonetic alphabet many centuries later (see ch. 5, Language and Communication; ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The foreign relations of Silla were predominantly cultural and commercial. Each year several hundred monks and lay students studied in China, and some had traveled as far as India. Silla traders carried on a thriving maritime trade with China and Japan and maintained a number of settlements along the eastern coast of China. It was probably through such seafaring activity that Silla first became known to an Arab geographer, Ibn Khurdadhbih, who, in the mid-ninth century, had correctly recorded the location of "al-Shila."

KORYO DYNASTY (A.D. 935–1392)

Koryŏ, a shortened version of Koguryŏ and from which the English name of the country is derived, was established by Wang Kŏn, a general during the last days of Silla. The new State was regarded by its founders as a successor to Silla. To extend governmental authority uniformly throughout the country, four regional capitals were created: Central Capital at Kaesŏng, Eastern Capital at Kyŏngju, Northern Capital at Pyongyang, and Southern Capital at Seoul. Of these, Kaesŏng (known variously as Kaeju, Song'ak, and Songdo) was the most important.

Remembering Silla's mistakes in its later days, the founders of Koryŏ built a strong institution of kingship by curbing the power of aristocrats and local strong men, by disbanding all private armies not in the service of the State, and by tightening centralized control over landholding and taxation. They also reduced the number of slaves owned by aristocratic families and excluded the military officers from important positions of power.

The governmental structure, however, remained along Chinese lines, and officials were chosen through highly rigorous civil service examinations. The bureaucracy was divided into two broad categories, civil and military, forming what was then known as *yangban,* literally two groups (see Glossary). The civilian officials were more highly regarded than their military counterparts because many of the military officials, coming from the commoner class, lacked the scholarly qualifications held to be essential to the Confucian ideal of enlightened rule.

The State continued to own all lands, its historic foundation of political and financial stability. Private ownership was not recognized. Under an elaborate system of distribution designed to check the concentration of lands in the hands of a few great families, the Government assigned farmlands to its various departments, the royal household, temples and monasteries, and public officials, including certain meritorious subjects who aided in the founding of the dynasty.

Two centuries of relative calm were disrupted by the gradual ascendancy of aristocrats who, by means of intermarriage with the royal line, had gained important powers in the Government. Through shifting matrimonial alliances they undermined the authority of kingship and precipitated incessant court intrigue. The resulting chaos at the court led to the military seizure of power in 1170.

The takeover was led by General Chŏng Chung-bu, who had been biding his time after a humiliating incident in which his whiskers were scorched by a civil official. Because of social prejudices against the military, General Chŏng had been unable to demand an apology. During and after his assumption of power, however, he ordered a wholesale massacre of ranking civil officials.

The reason for the coup, however, went beyond the apparent personal vengeance of General Chong. As early as 1014 a group of officers had publicly voiced their dissatisfaction with the social and political discrimination against the military, a treasonable conduct in those days of civilian supremacy.

The coup was followed by two decades of rebellions by peasants and slaves and by a temporary breakdown of the old political and social order. Army officers reduced the monarch to the position of a puppet, and many aspiring commoners and lowborn persons managed to rise to high Government positions. Political anarchy hastened a disintegration of the landholding system, resulting in the steady, illegal transfer of public lands into private estates. Power aspirants, including many Buddhist monasteries, built private armies to protect their holdings. State revenues declined, and the Government found itself defenseless against foreign invasions.

Mongol Invasions

A disunited and weak China after the collapse of the T'ang dynasty and shortly before the rise of Koryŏ almost immediately affected the latter's security. Koryŏ was forced to contend with powerful tribes from the north without any Chinese help. The last 160 years of the kingdom were especially turbulent, punctuated by waves of Mongol invasions which laid waste large areas of the country.

After nearly 30 years of resistance, Koryŏ capitulated to the Mongols in 1259 because its economic resources were systematically destroyed by the invaders and its manpower was critically depleted. In 1254 alone about 206,000 Korean male captives are said to have been carried off by the Mongols.

In 1259 the northern part of the country was incorporated into the Mongol empire, soon to be known as Yüan (1271–1368); the

Koryŏ royal line itself became a branch of the Mongol ruling family through intermarriage between its kings and Mongol princesses. The crown princes of Koryŏ were obliged to reside in Peking, capital of Yüan, as hostages and, in time, the customs and language of the Mongols became part of the Koryŏ court. In addition, Koryŏ was required to pay tributes, including large numbers of virgins. Korea was subjected to additional hardships after 1274 as the result of heavy burdens imposed by the Mongols in their two unsuccessful attempts to invade Japan in 1274 and 1281. On both occasions Koryŏ expended large amounts on ships and manpower.

Koryŏ regained national freedom in 1368 when Yüan was succeeded by the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644). For a while the fate of Koryŏ hung in the balance because its ruling officials split into two rival factions, one favoring continued vassal ties with the Mongols and the other advocating a pro-Ming policy. The issue was resolved in 1388 when the pro-Ming group, led by General Yi Sŏnggye, seized control of the Government. Between 1390 and 1391 he destroyed all land registers, confiscated all private estates, and instituted a new landholding system. The economic backbone of leading Koryŏ families was effectively broken.

Society and Culture

As in Silla, the Koryŏ society was a three-tiered structure: the ruling class at the top, the commoners in the middle, and the outcasts at the bottom. Buddhism influenced nearly all facets of national life. Many monks served as high-ranking advisers to the court. Richly endowed with tax-exempt land and thriving on lucrative usury and brewery ventures, the institution of Buddhism acquired formidable economic and political power. Some monasteries had private armies to protect their mundane interests and often provided military support to the court and to leading civil officials in their contest for power. By the end of the 13th century Buddhism lost much of its religiosity, and many scholar-officials turned to Confucianism for national revival.

An outstanding cultural relic of this kingdom is a Buddhist scripture engraved on 81,240 wooden printing plates. Undertaken during the period of Mongol invasions as an act of prayer to Buddha for deliverance from the Mongols, these plates are preserved intact today at Haein-sa, a Buddhist temple about 28 miles west of Taegu in the Republic of Korea, where they are listed as a national treasure. *Chosŏn T'ongsa,* North Korea's official history of the country, however, does not mention these plates.

Koryŏ is noted also for a number of historical works, such as the *Samguk Sagi* (Annals of the Three Kingdoms), compiled by

a 12th century scholar-statesman-general named Kim Pu-sik. This is the earliest and the most important source of the history of the Three Kingdoms. The legendary founding of Korea by T'angun was first recorded in this work.

Probably the most widely known remains of this kingdom are the pale-green and light-blue porcelain ware, inspired originally by the ceramics of the Chinese Sung dynasty. As perfected by the Koryŏ potters, the celadons, as they are called, excelled even those of China and are greatly prized by porcelain fanciers the world over.

YI DYNASTY (1392–1910)

In 1392 General Yi Sŏng-gye ascended the throne and soon moved his capital from Songdo, modern Kaesŏng, to Seoul, then called Hanyang. The Yi dynasty also adopted the ancient name of Chosŏn, apparently to claim antiquity as well as continuity of Korean people.

The new dynasty adopted Confucianism as the official State doctrine, promoted Confucian scholarship, and reformed the governmental system. Early in the 15th century King Sejong—the greatest monarch of the 500-year dynasty—recovered the northwestern and northeastern fringes of the Peninsula south of the Yalu and Tumen, the territories previously lost to China in the latter half of the seventh century. The king divided the country into eight provinces: Kyŏnggi, Ch'ungch'ŏng, Chŏlla, Kyŏngsang, Kangwŏn, Hwanghae, P'yŏngan, and Hamgyŏng.

The Yi society was even more rigidly stratified than that of Koryŏ. At the top were the royal family and members of the *yangban,* the civil and military bureaucracy; as a rule, the civil officials enjoyed greater social prestige than did the military. The monks, the favored group under previous dynasties, were no longer held in high regard, partly because of their own moral degeneration and partly because of the pro-Confucian policy of the Yi dynasty. From 1456 onward the monks were forbidden to enter Seoul because of their alleged subversive potentiality; this restriction was lifted only in 1895, partially as a result of mounting reformist sentiments.

Below the *yangban* was a group known as *chung'in* (middle people), a hereditary professional segment of minor civil and military officials, accountants, geographers, interpreters, copymen, and law enforcement officers; they were required to reside in the central part of Seoul, hence the term "middle people." The northern, southern, and a portion of the western sections of the city were reserved for the *yangban;* the eastern section was settled by junior military officers.

Lower in social standing than the middle people but still socially acceptable to the professional group was *sang'in,* or commoners, such as peasants, fishermen, and merchants. At the lowest rung were *ch'ŏnmin,* the least socially acceptable, such as public and private slaves, actors, acrobats, shamans, *kisaeng* (female entertainers), and butchers.

The most notable intellectual achievement of the dynasty was the invention in 1443 of a Korean phonetic vernacular writing system, known in North Korea as *chosŏnmun* (Korean letters), but as *han'gŭl* (also Korean letters) in the Republic of Korea (see ch. 5, Language and Communication). The public was slow to accept the new system because the ruling class of scholar-officials continued to favor the traditional Chinese written language and ridiculed the new as fit only for persons of little education, women, and the commoners. Efforts to link the two writing systems culminated in the mixed use of both Chinese characters and native alphabet for the first time in 1886.

Confucian Influences

The period of Yi dynasty is known as the golden age of Confucianism, especially of the neo-Confucian school as perfected by Chu Hsi (A.D. 768–824), a renowned Chinese philosopher. Confucian political and social ideals became firmly embedded in the country, and Korea became a subordinate member of the Chinese culture area (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups; ch. 11, Religion).

Politically, as in China, good government was regarded as possible only under a virtuous, benevolently paternalistic ruler and his morally and intellectually excellent scholar-officials. As a rule, bureaucrats were recruited through highly rigorous, competitive examinations open to all aspirants but limited mainly to the affluent who could afford the leisure so essential to mastering Confucian classics. An indication of good government was considered to be tranquillity. Social unrest and natural catastrophe, such as famines and floods, were generally regarded as indications of Heaven's disfavor with particular rulers. The right to rebellion was implicitly recognized in the Confucian ideal of government.

The Confucian social order centered around five human relationships; namely, between king and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, and between friends. Essentially, Confucian teachings extolled the virtues of loyalty to the State and to kinship groups. In times of conflicts between the two patterns of loyalty, kinship considerations were more often placed above the State, paradoxically, because of the pivotal importance of the family in the Confucian scheme of social order, in

which families and clans served as the foci of political, social, and economic activities. Individuals had no status apart from their families; they rose and fell politically with their kin (see ch. 7, Family).

The Confucian political order was sustained by men of letters. Education, especially the mastery of Chinese classics, was the key to power and prestige. Since only holders of degrees in the classics were allowed into positions of responsibility, studies in technical and professional subjects, such as engineering, agriculture, medicine, and military science, were generally neglected. These trends were progressively rigidified after the mid-16th century when Confucian learning spread through private academies more rapidly than ever before. By and large, men in ruling circles were accomplished but sterile and inflexible classicists. Uncritical upholders of tradition, they were unable to cope with new internal and external tensions.

Patterns of Politics

The politics of the Yi dynasty, especially after the 15th century, was featured by rampant factional strife. Political competition was organized around a faction brought together by kinship, by the commonality of regional and school affiliation, or by teacher-disciple relationships. Factionalism became deeply rooted in Korean society, and its residual effect persisted well into the mid-20th century.

Factional competition began shortly after the initiation of a new landholding policy in the mid-15th century, by which time the court had been unable to assign reward lands to newly appointed Government officials. The ever-increasing number of officials and a rapid increase in private estates had forced the court to eliminate the old system of land assignment. As a result, a group of disgruntled junior officials began demanding reforms in the Government and in the landholding system; they were frustrated by the established group of senior officials. This friction between the two groups heralded the beginning of notorious court struggles, eventually embroiling nearly all members of the *yangban* class.

Confucian heritage was also a contributing factor. Because of the limited openings in Government positions, an increasing number of degree holders were denied entrance into the civil service, the only honorable profession acceptable to the *yangban.* As a result, some unemployed scholars as well as these discontented officials resorted to the pastime of intrigue in the capital; some returned to their country estates for scholarly pursuits or for enlisting political support. Still others founded private Confucian academies on their estates, ostensibly for educational purpose, but

more often as centers of political activity. In 1864 the Government abolished all but 40 of nearly 600 academies because of their deep involvement in court politics. By supporting their leaders in the capital the intellectuals associated with an academy or a cluster of academies in a particular locality usually shared the ups and downs of their leaders.

Triumph of one faction inevitably led to sweeping purges of rivals in the form of execution, dismissal, or banishment to such undesirable areas as the northwestern, northeastern, and southwestern fringes of the Peninsula. Moreover, the localities of purged officials were usually branded as disaffected and were politically discriminated against for generations. The families of these officials were similarly subjected to political discrimination. Because of the Confucian exhortations of filial piety and of upholding the family name, feuding was invariably handed down along family or clan lines.

As time passed, factionalism became socially and politically institutionalized. Even at the height of the Japanese invasions in the late 16th century, political leaders at all levels of society were unable to unite effectively across factional lines. Eventually, the practices of recruiting officials through the examination system were eroded by favoritism and nepotism.

Japanese and Manchu Invasions

Its leadership divided and its military forces demoralized, Korea was defenseless against the Japanese invasions of 1592 and 1598. Both attacks, directed by the Japanese general, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, were the first steps in his efforts to conquer China, efforts which ended with his death in 1598. The military operations laid waste nearly the whole Peninsula and were followed by recurrences of famines, epidemics, and peasant revolts. The war against the Japanese, however, produced one of the country's most celebrated heroes, Admiral Yi Sun-sin, inventor of the world's first iron-plated, turtle-shaped warships. In 1592 the admiral is credited with having destroyed much of the Japanese fleet and cut off its supply lines with the warships. Posthumously awarded an honorary title of Ch'ungmu (Loyalty-Chivalry), the admiral is honored throughout Korea (see ch. 24, The Armed Forces).

Korea had scarcely begun to recover from its disasters when the Manchus overran the country in 1627 and 1637, causing further depletion of manpower and economic resources. The Yi dynasty became a vassal state of the new Ch'ing dynasty of China which was founded by the Manchus in 1644.

THE OPENING OF KOREA

Alarmed by the increasing number of foreign ships appearing in its waters, Korea adopted a policy of isolation from the non-Chinese world. Debilitated earlier by foreign invasions, it had neither the strength to resist external pressure nor the courage to initiate internal reforms.

Social, Cultural, and Economic Conditions

Early in the 18th century, nearly 130 years after the first Japanese invasion, the country was not yet fully recovered from the devastations wrought by the Japanese and Manchus. The amount of taxable land under effective State control then was still less than half the pre-invasion level. Destruction of land registers during the invasions had enabled landowning officials to transfer public land illegally into their estates. The consequent decline in State revenue had to be supplemented by harsh taxation schedules. Many peasants left their lands, some taking to the hills for slash-and-burn farming, others migrating to Manchuria across the Tumen River in the extreme northeastern corner of the Peninsula, and still others joining gangs of bandits. The Government's ineptness in mitigating the grievances of the people resulted in frequent local insurrections.

The social and economic depression of the 17th and 18th centuries fostered the rise of a new intellectual movement which advocated that human knowledge must be put to practical use. Pioneered by a Confucian scholar-official named Yi Su-kwang (1563–1628), the new movement—soon to be called Silhak, or "practical learning"—was inspired partly by his firsthand knowledge of occidental sciences which he had acquired while on official visits to Peking (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The Silhak movement, brought to maturity by Chŏng Yak-yong (1762–1838), was, in effect, an antiestablishmentarian protest against the sterility and formalism of neo-Confucian orthodoxy, a protest undertaken first by early Ch'ing scholars. It was supported by a group of discontented scholars, lower officials, ex-officials, and some commoners. Although the movement had little political impact, its followers contributed a number of pioneering studies in medicine, geography, mineralogy, agriculture, botany, and mapmaking. Several encyclopedias dealing with these subjects were also written by Silhak scholars (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The germination of Silhak thought was accompanied by and, in turn, aided the spread of Catholicism, which had reached the country early in the 17th century through the Jesuit mission in China.

Along with occidental scientific knowledge, the new religion was part and parcel of what was then known as Sŏhak (Western learning). Catholicism was popular with a limited number of reformist Silhak scholars and among many socially oppressed commoners and lowborn persons. It was rejected by the *yangban* as heretical and subversive. The Christian disapproval of the Confucian customs of ancestor worship was especially singled out as endangering the whole fabric of family system and, hence, of society. A Government ban of the Christian movement in 1786 was followed by ruthless and systematic persecutions.

Foreign Rivalries and Internal Disunity

The first half of the 19th century witnessed an increasing number of foreign vessels seeking trade. As a dependent state of China, however, Korea was unprepared to conduct foreign relations independently. Shocked by the spectacle of China, the traditional protector and the fountainhead of civilization, after the Opium War of 1839–42, Korea sought refuge in a policy of seclusion. Internally, Christians were persecuted; in 1866 alone some 13,000 Catholic converts were executed.

Japan was the first to force the country open. In 1875 it dispatched a warship to Korean waters on a provocative mission, a mission calculated to test the efficacy of the Chinese claim to suzerainty over Korea. After its ship was fired upon by Korean shore batteries, the Japanese Government, supported by force, demanded reparations and a treaty of amity and commerce. China failed to intervene on Korea's behalf. The treaty between Korea and Japan, signed in February 1876, while noting that ". . . Korea, being an independent state, enjoys the same sovereign rights as Japan," granted Japan extraterritorial rights—rights to try Japanese nationals under their own laws in Korea. The unequal treaty opened three ports of Japanese choosing: Pusan in 1876, Wŏnsan in 1880, and Inchon in 1883.

Japan was also the first to dispatch a diplomatic mission to the country in 1877 and, 4 years later, it became the first non-Chinese foreign state to which the Korean court sent a study mission for modernization purposes. In 1882, on Chinese urging, Korea dispatched a similiar mission to China to acquire new weaponry.

Confronted with the impending danger of losing its traditional vassal state, China sought to counter Japan by widening Korea's external relations and by playing off one occidental power against another. In 1882, through China's good offices, Korea signed a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States; in 1883 it sent the first diplomatic mission to Washington. About the same time, American missionary-educators reached Korea. The conclu-

sion of the treaty was the culmination of American efforts to establish trade relations with the country, started almost two decades earlier. In 1886 an armed American merchant vessel, U.S.S. *General Sherman,* had cruised up the Taedong River as far as Pyongyang, defying the Korean ban on trade with foreign states other than China. When it refused to withdraw from Pyongyang, the vessel was attacked and set on fire by local authorities. The ship was sunk and, according to Korean chronicles, its crew members, 25 in all, were killed.

Korea also concluded treaties with Great Britain and Germany in 1883, Italy and Russia in 1884, and France in 1886. In each case, they were accompanied by a letter from the Korean king enunciating his country's dependency on China.

Despite Chinese attempts at counteraction, Japan, by the mid-1890's, had emerged as the most influential foreign power in Korea. In 1893 Japan accounted for 91 percent of Korea's annual export trade and over 50 percent of its imports. Moreover, although alarmed by Japan's aggressiveness, a growing number of Korean reformists, such as Kim Ok-k yun and Pak Yong-hyo, became inspired by their neighbor's successful modernizing experiences.

Internally, the Korean court was divided into three major factions: pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, and pro-Russian, the last two being more reformist than the first. The shifting political fortunes of these factions were determined, in part, by the ebb and flow of foreign influences in the country. The intensity of internal struggles and of foreign rivalries was indicated by the turbulent Cabinet changes that happened between 1876 and 1910. Thus, the reformist Cabinet in power from 1876 to 1882, favorably inclined to follow Japan's lead in modernization, was succeeded by Prince Regent Taewŏngun's isolationist leadership, June—July 1882; pro-Chinese, July 1882—October 1884; a 3-day pro-Japanese Cabinet in October 1884; pro-Chinese, October 1884—June 1894; pro-Japanese, June 1894—June 1895; pro-Chinese and pro-Russian coalitions, June—August 1895; pro-Japanese, August 1895—February 1896; pro-Russian, February 1896—February 1904; and pro-Japanese, March 1904—August 1910.

In 1885, in an attempt to exclude all foreign influences from the country, the German consul general to Seoul proposed a plan for the permanent neutralization of Korea. Under foreign pressures, however, the plan was rejected by the Korean court.

Tonghak Rebellion and the Reform of 1894

The internal and external tensions, especially after the mid-19th century, gave rise to the emergence of an indigenous social and religious movement which was inspired by Buddhism, Confucianism,

Taoism, and even Catholicism (see ch. 11, Religion). Founded in 1860, Tonghak (Eastern learning), as it was then called in contradistinction to Sŏhak, was critical of the neo-Confucian social and political order and was antigovernmental as well as antiforeign. Although it was suppressed by authorities because of its reformist thrusts, Tonghak gained popular support, mainly from the socially oppressed, impoverished peasants, and some discontented scholars.

The Tonghak rebellion of 1894, which is alleged by North Korea to be the greatest struggle in the history of Korean peasants' movement, was touched off in January 1894 by what was to be a localized insurrection against a despotic county magistrate. Aided by a succession of victories over the Government forces and led for the most part by Tonghak followers, the rebels, within a few months, occupied most of the western half of the Peninsula south of the 37th Parallel.

The Government, unable to contain the rebels, requested aid from China. Japan, on the pretext of safeguarding its nationals, rushed a contingent of troops to Seoul. The result was the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on Korean soil in mid-1894, ending in easy victory for the Japanese. By the end of the year the last remaining pockets of Tonghak resistance were wiped out by the combined forces of Korea and Japan. Under a treaty concluded with Japan in April 1895, China formally renounced its historic claim to suzerainty over Korea and recognized the latter's independence.

At the height of the rebellion the reluctant Korean court, then under a pro-Chinese, conservative faction, was being pressed by Japan for an urgent initiation of a modernization program. A pro-Japanese reformist Cabinet, installed in June 1894 under Japanese backing, initiated a series of social, economic, and political reform measures. Korean historians are quick to point out that Japan imposed the program to pave the way for a more systematic penetration; they do not question, however, the historic significance of the new measures. Professor Lee Ki-baek, a noted historian in the Republic of Korea, describes the event as "the starting point of Korea's modernization."

Most of the reform measures struck at the very foundation of Korean society, at least in intent. On the whole, changes were more rapid in the political than in the social sectors. The politically salient features of the 1894 reform were: renunciation of dependency on China and assertion of sovereignty, separation of the royal household from the Government Ministries, governmental reorganization along Japanese lines, separation between judicial and executive functions and the establishment of an independent court system, centralization of governing powers instead of decentraliza-

tion, and the sending of talented students abroad for advanced training.

Socially, all forms of discrimination, including those against the military, were to be banned. Public and private slaves were freed, widow remarriage sanctioned, early marriage and traffic in human beings proscribed, and torture as well as punitive practices extended to the members of the family and relatives of a criminal discontinued. Old restrictions under which former scholar-officials were forbidden to engage in any occupations other than the Government service were lifted. The Confucian examination system, the social and political instrument of the *yangban* class, was abolished in favor of a new recruitment which accepted talented persons from all walks of life.

Economically, innovations included the adoption of a new taxation system based on payment in cash rather than in kind, the adoption of a silver standard for currency and the metric system of measurements, and the establishment of modern banks and business corporations. Militarily, the reform called for modernization of the Army under Japanese auspices and for the adoption of a conscription system.

These sweeping reforms were legitimized by a 14-point governmental program promulgated by the king in January 1895, partly as a result of Japanese instigation. Sometimes referred to as Korea's first constitution, the 14-point royal edict enunciated the spirit of the 1894 reform. Modernizing efforts continued in 1895 with the opening of postal services and adoption of a solar calendar system. The school system was reorganized along Japanese lines.

For the most part, the people greeted the change with skepticism and apprehension. Traditionally distrustful of authorities and resentful of the Japanese, they were neither enthusiastic nor saddened over the new edict. To those senior officials whose immediate political fortunes depended on the outcome of factional infighting, however, the only recourse was either to support the Japanese or seek out their assistance, or to turn to someone else who disliked the Japanese. Many of the powerful, conservative officials adversely affected by the reform sought aid from the Russians.

Russo-Japanese Rivalry

Russia's acquisition in 1860 of the Manchurian coastal region, known as the maritime provinces, from a weak and troubled China resulted in the sharing of a common frontier with Korea (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Covetous of Korea's ice-free ports, rich mineral resources, and strategic location, Russia had managed to emerge as the principal rival to Japan by the mid-1890's. Through a friendly Cabinet formed after a palace coup which it had backed

in February 1896, Russia secured timber concessions along the Korean side of the Yalu River and on the island of Ullŭng in the Sea of Japan. Other concessions included mining rights in the northeastern corner of the Peninsula and rights to link the Seoul-Wŏnsan telegraph line with that of Siberia. In addition, Russia prevailed on the Korean court to reorganize its Army along its own lines, with weapons and advisers coming from Saint Petersburg. It also acquired de facto control of fiscal affairs through a financial adviser. The Russian example set in motion a scramble for concessions among foreign powers, including Japan, France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States.

The specter of Korea's being dismembered prompted King Kojong, in 1897, to proclaim his country to be independent and sovereign and to crown himself Hwangje (Huang-ti in Chinese), or emperor, the throne title traditionally reserved only for Chinese sovereigns. He also renamed the country Tae Han, or "Greater Han," after the ancient ruling house of Han in the present-day northwestern region of the Peninsula. Such formality aside, the country's unequal relationship with Russia was not altered.

Moving quickly and allied with Great Britain, Japan, in 1900, foiled the Russian attempt to secure Mokp'o and Masan on the Korean Strait as bases for its Far Eastern fleet. Then, in 1903, Russia proposed to Japan to divide Korea at the 39th Parallel, offering to recognize Japan's special position in the southern half in return for its consent, among other things, to transform the northern half into a buffer zone. This scheme was thwarted because of Japanese insistence on establishing the buffer zone farther north along the Yalu and Tumen River lines.

This rivalry exploded into the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 ending with Japan's victory. Under the peace treaty signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in September 1905, Russia acknowledged Japan's "paramount political, military and economic interest" in Korea.

Two months later Korea was obliged to accept Japanese protectorate; it became a Japanese colony under the Treaty of Annexation signed on August 22, 1910. The Treaty recognized the dignity of the Korean royal family and awarded titles of nobility to important pro-Japanese collaborators. Prime Minister Yi Wan-yong, who had signed the Treaty and who had figured prominently between 1896 and 1901 on the anti-Japanese, pro-Russian Cabinet, has since become the symbol of treason to the Korean people.

National Awakening

The Governmental ineptitude and foreign ascendancy in the 1890's aroused a small but growing number of educated people.

They hoped to awaken the masses and alert them to the deplorable state of their nation. Most prominent politically was the activity of an Independence Club organized in 1896. The club, which included a number of Protestant converts, advocated a program of national renascence, called for the termination of foreign concessions, and published the tabloid-size *Tong'ip Sinmun* (Independent News) using only the Korean phonetic alphabet. The newspaper also had a page printed in English. In 1899 the organization was ordered disbanded by authorities for its radical program, and some of its younger members (for example, Syngman Rhee) exiled themselves in the United States.

Instrumental in fomenting the sense of national identity were a number of schools established by American missionary-educators who had opened the first modern private school in 1885. Most of the leading private institutions of secondary and higher learning originated at that time. In time they helped spread Western ideas, as well as Christianity. In addition, some nationalist leaders founded their own schools. All of these private institutions encouraged the study of Korean history and culture and introduced Western civilization, dealing especially with the nationalist, independence movement of other people (see ch. 9, Education). In a similar vein, the military exploits of General Ulchimundŏk and Admiral Yi Sun-sin were widely popularized. The antiforeign aspect of the Tonghak movement was given added stress in 1904, when the syncretic religion was renamed Ch'ŏndogyo, or "the Teaching of Heavenly Way." In 1909 the legendary account of Tan'gun as national founder was revived in the form of Taejonggyo, or "Great Tan'gun Teaching" (see ch. 11, Religion).

Apart from educational activities, the Christian missions were active in the philanthropic and medical fields. They also pressed for social reforms, hoping to improve the status of women, encourage monogamy, and eliminate superstitious practices.

JAPANESE RULE (1910–45)

Korea, or Chōsen, as the Japanese called it, was placed under the Government General of Korea (Chōsen Sōtokufu) which was headed by a governor general reporting directly to Tokyo. The administration, backed by the gendarmery formed shortly before the annexation, reorganized the political and economic structures and pursued a systematic policy of colonization. Through police-state methods, it brought order and stability to Korea and substantially improved its material conditions. The new political and economic order primarily helped Japanese nationals and only secondarily the Koreans. The 35 years of Japanese occupation is deplored by the Koreans as an era of suffering and resistance.

Japanese authorities suppressed vocal, nationalist newspapers as well as political activities; they also sought to eliminate Korean culture. By the end of 1919 they brought in about 347,000 immigrants, including officials, engineers, merchants, businessmen, usurers, farmers, and fishermen; the number represented a twofold increase over that of 1910. Most of the important administrative and managerial positions were taken over by Japanese nationals. Health measures, harbors, roads, railroads, and communication facilities were substantially improved, and a modern banking system was instituted in major cities.

The colonial administrators also carried out a systematic land survey program whereby much of the State, communal, and private land was taken over by the Japanese Government or forcibly sold to Japanese settlers. Large numbers of the farm population were severed from the lands they had tilled for generations; moreover, the system of paying taxes in cash subjected the farmers to the fluctuations of money economy, and many were forced to leave their lands. By 1916, as many as 246,000 had taken to the hills for slash-and-burn farming; by 1927 the number had risen to 697,000. By 1921 over 600,000 farmers had moved to Manchuria and 158,000, to the Russian Far East. Between 1915 and 1925, some 126,000 Koreans migrated to Japan as wage earners. About 6,000 persons sought a new life in Hawaii, Mexico, and the United States.

The land survey program also affected landowners, some of whom lost lands on the grounds of tax delinquency. On the whole, however, they were allowed to retain their old economic, but not political, status in return for their support of the Japanese colonial policy.

Independence Movement of 1919

Nationalist sentiments were particularly stimulated in January 1918, after President Woodrow Wilson enunciated the principle of self-determination for all dependent, oppressed peoples. In February 1919, aroused by the rumor that King Kojong, who had been dethroned in 1907, had been poisoned to death in January 1919 by the Japanese, some 600 Korean students in Tokyo drafted a resolution demanding independence and submitted it to Japanese authorities. Inspired by these students, a group of 33 leaders in Seoul proclaimed a "Declaration of Independence" on March 1, 1919, precipitating spontaneous, peaceful protest demonstrations throughout the country.

Although caught by surprise, the Japanese gendarmery and police crushed the demonstrations in which about 370,000 persons

participated. According to Korean sources, the total casualties included 6,670 killed, 16,000 wounded, and 19,525 arrested. In commemoration of this event, symbolic of the Korean struggle for independence, March 1 is celebrated each year all over Korea as the March First Movement Day.

The demonstrations marked the beginning of a more intensified phase of the independence struggle, especially among Korean exiles abroad. In Shanghai a Korean Provisional Government was formed in April 1919, with Syngman Rhee, who was then in the United States, as President. Some Koreans promoted the nationalist cause in the United States and in Japan.

According to North Korean sources, Premier Kim Il-sung (called Kim Sŏng-chu at birth in 1912) organized, in 1932, anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in southern Manchurian districts (then under Japanese occupation) across the length of the Tumen River; he is said to have initiated, in 1933, anti-Japanese operations in these areas, part of which adjoin the Soviet Far East. These sources also assert that the anti-Japanese struggles were inspired and organized by Kim Il-sung only, but they do not mention the Chinese and Soviet assistance which he received. Sometime in 1940–41 he was forced by Japanese authorities to flee to Soviet territory.

In Korea the resistance movement continued, especially among students, factory workers, and urban intellectuals. In the early 1920's a strongly nationalistic labor union movement was started. In April 1925 a group of intellectuals in Seoul organized a Korean Communist Party; the Party soon joined the Communist International but, on the Soviet Union's order, was disbanded in 1928 because of factional fighting within the organization. A student uprising in Kwangju, in the south, in 1929 continued to underscore the weighty role of youth on the country's political scene. Lasting nearly 5 months and participated in by as many as 54,000 students, the uprising has since become, for the Korean youth, a symbol of protest against repression and injustice.

The March 1919 demonstrations also occasioned a new phase in Japan's colonization policy. The Japanese administrators softened their earlier police-state tactics and began limited efforts to placate the local population. They improved farming methods and encouraged local industry and commerce. An increasing number of Koreans were given administrative positions, but mostly at local subdivision levels. As a result, some Koreans were able to improve their social and economic positions.

Nevertheless, the Japanese continued to deny the Koreans the advantage of association and experience in political and economic management. They also intensified the policy of eradicating Ko-

rean cultural identity by forbidding the use of the Korean language in schools, by banning the study of Korean history, and by stopping Korean publications. They also forced Japanese surnames upon the people, introduced Shintoism in schools, and encouraged Confucianism in order to take advantage of its authoritarian features.

The policy of Japanizing the Peninsula was accelerated after 1937 when the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) broke out. To satisfy its growing military requirements, Japan began to fashion the Korean economy into the so-called continental logistical base; it developed North Korea's rich mineral resources, built dams for hydroelectrical generation, and constructed factories to process iron ores and to produce chemical fertilizers. In time the Peninsula evolved economically into two distinct halves: the industrial north and the agricultural south. Furthermore, the Peninsula emerged as an integral part of Japan's expanded wartime economic structure (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Japan also utilized the country's manpower for war efforts in 1937 by instituting a so-called "voluntary enlistment" system for male adults; in 1942 this system was changed to a conscription basis. Those Koreans who had served in the Japanese Army later became the leadership core in the police and Army after 1945. A great number of Korean laborers were also drafted into wartime labor services in Japanese mines and munition factories. Some of them chose to settle in Japan after World War II and, together with those who had migrated earlier as wage earners, formed the nucleus of the Korean minority in Japan (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force; ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Cairo Declaration

Korea reentered the limelight of history during World War II. Its struggle for independence was given formal recognition on December 1, 1943, by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and China in a joint statement issued in Cairo. After deliberating on the future course of military operations against Japan, the three Allied Powers declared their determination to strip Japan, once defeated, of all the territories Japan had taken after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. They, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea," also resolved that " . . . in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

The Cairo Declaration, as it is commonly referred to, was reaffirmed at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 by the three

Powers, which specifically stated that " . . . Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshu, and Shikoku and such minor islands as we shall determine." On August 8, 1945, by which time Japan's defeat was certain, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, with which it had been on non-belligerent terms under the Russo-Japanese neutrality treaty of April 1941. On the same day, the Soviet Union also announced its adherence to the Potsdam statement and, hence, to the Cairo Declaration and secured for itself a legitimate pretext for gaining a foothold in Korea. The Soviet troops entered the Peninsula on August 10 by land and sea, with minimal Japanese resistance.

KOREA DIVIDED

To accept the surrender of Japanese forces in the Peninsula after August 15, 1945, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to divide the country at the 38th Parallel into two occupation zones, with the Soviet forces in the northern half and the Americans in the south. The line of demarcation was intended to be a temporary military expedient, but all ensuing diplomatic efforts to lift the line and unify the country ended in failure. Nearly all non-Communist Koreans have, since 1945, blamed the Soviet intransigence, in part, for the country's continued division.

The first significant attempt to unite the country was made in December 1945 by the representatives of the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Meeting in Moscow, they agreed to establish a trusteeship under four powers, including China, for the country for a period of up to 5 years " . . . with a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state." Their agreement also provided for the formation of a Joint U.S.–U.S.S.R. Commission to assist in organizing a single "provisional Korean democratic government." The trusteeship proposal was immediately opposed by all Koreans, except the Communists who, at first, also objected but, under Soviet pressure, quickly changed their position.

The Joint Commission met in Seoul intermittently from March 1946 until it adjourned indefinitely in October 1947. The Soviet insistence that only those "democratic parties and social organizations" upholding the trusteeship plan be allowed to participate in the formation of an all-Korean government was unacceptable to non-Communist nationalist leaders. The nationalist leaders, represented by the United States, argued that the Soviet formula, if accepted, would put the Communists in controlling positions throughout Korea.

In September 1947 the United States submitted the Korean

question before the General Assembly of the United Nations which, in November, over the Soviet objection, adopted a resolution stipulating that elected representatives of the Korean people themselves should establish the conditions of unification and determine their own form of government. A United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was formed to observe nationwide free elections and to carry out the terms of the November resolution. After the Soviet refusal in January 1948 to admit the commission to the northern half, elections were held on May 10, 1948, only in the southern half. Four days later the Communist authorities completed the severance of North-South ties by shutting off power transmission to the south (see ch. 19, Industry).

NORTH KOREA UNDER SOVIET OCCUPATION

The first 10 days after the Japanese surrender mainly belonged to groups of veteran anti-Japanese nationalists and, in a lesser degree, to a few local Communists. Together they set up self-governing bodies in various localities to take over powers from the departing Japanese. The arrival of the Soviet occupation forces in Pyongyang on August 24, however, quickly altered the local political scene, and North Korea has since been under Communist rule.

The Soviet authorities, on August 26, 1945, transferred the administrative powers of the Government General of Korea in the north to a coalition body of nationalists and Communists called the People's Political Committee. To lay the foundation of the Soviet-type political system, they helped local Communists convene a meeting on October 10 after restricting the political activities of all non-Communist organizations 2 days earlier. The establishment of the so-called North Korean Chapter of the Korean Communist Party was announced on October 13. This organization, now officially described as "the first, new-type Marxist-Leninist Party of the Korean Communists," was later renamed the North Korean Organizational Committee of the Korean Communist Party.

The Soviet command installed its protégé Kim Il-sung as head of the Party. Kim Il-sung had returned to the north under the pseudonym of Kim Yŏng-hwan with the occupation forces in the Soviet Army uniform of a major.

At first the Soviet authorities and Kim Il-sung did not press for any one-party Communist dictatorship; instead, they invoked the principle of self-determination for the people and sought to maintain the fiction of nationalist-Communist cooperation. For this purpose, they installed Cho Man-sik, the most popular, non-

Communist political leader in the north, as chairman of a new executive establishment called the North Korean Five-Province Administrative Bureau which, on October 28, 1945, had replaced the People's Political Committee.

Political power was wielded by the Soviet authorities, who were aided by four major categories of Communists: the Soviet Koreans; Kim Il-sung's personal followers; returnees from Yenan, China; and the domestic elements. Indications at the time were that the Soviet authorities, as well as Kim Il-sung, did not trust the domestic group because of its factious inclination. The first Soviet move to strengthen Kim Il-sung's influence at the expense of the domestic group resulted in the reorganization of the North Korean Organizational Committee in mid-December 1945 as the North Korean Communist Party.

By the end of 1945 the Communists had also infiltrated every segment of the population. With Kim Il-sung firmly in control of the Party, the Soviet authorities were ready for the initiation of more direct Communist rule without going through the pretense of alliance with nationalist elements. In January 1946 they detained Cho Man-sik, allegedly because of his opposition to the trusteeship plan which had been announced in late 1945. He has not been heard of since.

Socialist Reforms and Legitimization

The communization process entered a new phase after February 1946 when the executive establishment was reorganized as the North Korean Provisional People's Committee. The Cabinet of the new organization, which replaced the Five-Province Administrative Bureau, immediately announced an 11-point program, which was expanded to a 20-point program late in March 1946, providing for sweeping social and economic reforms.

The program was carried out, beginning in March 1946. A law expropriating all lands, private or public, in excess of 12.25 acres was announced on March 5; the expropriated lands were redistributed to the landless peasants. On June 24 a law purporting to safeguard the welfare of the workers was promulgated; within a week a system of paying taxes in kind was instituted, and a law guaranteeing equal rights to men and women was proclaimed. The culminating point of the so-called socialist reform was the law for the nationalization of basic industries, transport and communication facilities, and banks, announced on August 10, 1946. Under this measure all but 10 percent of the industrial and financial sectors came under State control. By the end of August 1946 the antifeudal reforms had been, for the most part, completed.

On the political scene the Communists used the tactics of mass mobilization, as seen in the formation, in July 1946, of a North Korean Democratic National United Front which was composed of 13 political and social organizations dominated by the Communist Party. They used the Front to enforce compliance with the Party line, to forestall the development of any autonomous center of power, and to maintain the fiction of a cross-sectional unity and participation (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

In mid-1946 the Kim Il-sung group was being challenged by the relatively moderate organization, called the New People's Party, which had been formed in March 1946 by returnees from Yenan; the new group under Kim Tu-pong drew support mainly from the intelligentsia, urban and rural middle-class elements, and a substantial number of peasants. In late July the Communist Party and the Yenan organization announced an agreement to merge under the name of the North Korean Workers Party; the formal merger took place in late August under the nominal chairmanship of Kim Tu-bong, with Kim Il-sung holding the vice-chairmanship.

The process of legitimizing the new social, economic, and political order was undertaken in earnest, beginning in November 1946, when delegates were elected to local governing bodies at provincial, city, and county levels. In February 1947 these delegates, who were benefited by the new Communist system, held the Convention of the People's Committee, endorsing the whole series of laws issued after February 1946. In addition, they elected the North Korean People's Assembly as the supreme legislative body. The assembly, in turn, approved the formation of the North Korean People's Committee as "the supreme executive organization" under the chairmanship of Kim Il-sung. The new executive body replaced the North Korean Provisional People's Committee set up earlier in February 1946.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The final act of legitimacy building was the promulgation, on July 10, 1948, of a Constitution prepared by the People's Assembly-appointed constituent committee. The Constitution, which remained in effect in 1968, was ratified by the Supreme People's Assembly formed late in June 1948. Based on this Constitution, the establishment of the Communist party-state, called Chosŏn Inmin Minjujuŭi Konghwaguk (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), was formally announced on September 9, 1948. Kim Il-sung, nominally the vice chairman but actually the head of the Party, assumed the premiership of the newly announced Cabi-

net (see ch. 13, The Governmental System; ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The Soviet occupation forces, secure in the knowledge that a satellite state was firmly established, withdrew from the north by December 26, 1948, but Colonel General Terenti Shtykov, the chief of the Russian delegation on the Joint U.S.–U.S.S.R. Commission, returned in January 1949 as the first Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang. A secret Soviet military mission arrived in the same month to oversee the North Korean Military Establishment.

On the Party level, Kim Il-sung's preeminence was formally institutionalized in late June 1949 when the Korean Workers Party (Chosŏn Nodong Dang) was formed through a merger between the North Korean Workers Party and its southern counterpart, the South Korean Workers Party; the southern organization had been established in Seoul in November 1946 by Pak Hŏn-yŏng, leader of the domestic group, in alliance with other "progressive" political parties. Kim Il-sung was elected chairman of the newly named party which, in 1968, continued to be the ruling Communist Party (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Through totalitarian methods of control and mobilization, the regime was able to present an impression of efficiency, dynamism, and purpose. For many of the people, however, especially for those with skill and education, life in the north became a matter of sheer survival; some acquiesced in the Communist rule, while others fled to the free Republic of Korea. Between 1945 and 1950 over a million, or one out of every 19 persons left the Communist-controlled northern half.

THE KOREAN CONFLICT

North Korean forces launched a full-scale invasion across the 38th Parallel at dawn on Sunday, June 25, 1950. At the request of the United States, the United Nations Security Council met in emergency session and adopted a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the invading forces from the south; it also called on all members of the United Nations to refrain from aiding the Communist regime. The action of the Security Council was possible because of the absence of the Soviet Union, which had been boycotting the Council after January 1950.

When the resolution was ignored, the Security Council, on June 27, asked the members of the United Nations to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea. The United States responded by ordering its air and naval units into action in support of the Republic; by the end of the month American ground forces had been also ordered to action. Eventually, 15 other nations, Australia, Bel-

gium, Great Britain, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the Union of South Africa, joined the Republic of Korea and the United States forces. All nations aiding the south fought under the flag of the United Nations and were placed under the unified direction of General Douglas A. MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, who was appointed to this position by the United States in accordance with the Security Council recommendation of July 7, 1950.

With relative ease the invaders overcame resistance and, by September 5, had taken possession of all but a small beachhead area of the south. The tide, however, turned against the invaders 10 days later when the United Nations forces successfully broke the invaders' extended supply line by landing at Inchon. The invading force was, for the most part, crushed in the south. North Korea calls this turn of events "a strategic retreat."

A resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on October 7 recommended that all appropriate steps be taken to insure "... the establishment of a unified independent democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea." On the same day units of the United Nations forces crossed the 38th Parallel, took Pyongyang on October 20, and within a week reached several points on the Yalu River. The defeat of the North Korean forces was averted only by the massive intervention of the Communist Chinese, beginning on October 25, 1950.

Through counteroffensives, the combined Communist forces had recovered the entire northern half by the end of December. Again crossing the 38th Parallel, they reoccupied Seoul in early January 1951 but were driven out in mid-March. In mid-June 1951, battlelines were more or less stabilized along the 38th Parallel; a prolonged military stalemate seemed apparent.

The Soviet Union's plea for ending the Korean conflict, as indicated by its delegate to the United Nations on June 23, 1951, paved the way for the start of truce negotiations on July 10, without a cease-fire. After 2 years of prolonged discussions marked by mutual recriminations and by bitterly contested battles for possession of tactically important hills, an armistice agreement was signed at P'anmunjom on July 27, 1953, by the representatives of the United Nations Command, North Korea, and Communist China; the Republic of Korea, not a signatory, refused to recognize the validity of the agreement. The pact provided for, among other things, a demilitarized zone and the convening of a high-level political conference within 3 months to determine the conditions for Korea's peaceful unification and for withdrawal of foreign troops from the country; attempts to carry out the terms of the

armistice agreement at P'anmunjom in October 1953 and later at Geneva in April-May 1954, brought no results because of Communist obstruction.

RECONSTRUCTION AND INTENSIFIED SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

The north suffered heavily from the war it started. According to a 1961 North Korean source, the northern population at the end of 1953 showed a decrease of 1.13 million, or nearly 12 percent of the 1949 level of 9.6 million. Non-Communist sources attribute half of the decline to actual war deaths and the remainder to the exodus of freedom seekers to the south (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force). Physical destruction left the economy almost crippled; official sources showed the 1953 level of basic industrial production to be 64 percent of the 1949 level and consumer goods production to be less than 10 percent of the preinvasion output. Grain production decreased by 88 percent (see ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 19, Industry).

Reconstruction efforts began in August 1953 with the adoption of a 3-year economic recovery program (1954–56) which, while giving priority to heavy industry, stressed "the simultaneous development of light industry and agriculture." The program also called for the gradual initiation of collectivization. In its efforts the Government was aided substantially by grants and assistance extended by Communist nations; major donors were the Soviet Union, which, in September 1953, promised an equivalent of $250 million in grants, and Communist China, pledging an equivalent of $325 million in grants 2 months later (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). The Government then inaugurated a 5-year plan (1957–61). Presumably to divert more resources to the economic sector and to expedite the fulfillment of the plan, a reduction of military strength by 80,000 was announced in August 1956. This reduction was made possible by the presence in the north of over 80,000 Communist Chinese troops. The Chinese troops withdrew from the north in October 1958. The 5-year plan, as formally adopted in June 1958 but made retroactive to January 1957, continued the basic economic line of the earlier 3-year program (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). The delayed adoption was caused by disagreements and power struggles at the highest levels of the Party (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

To insure the successful outcome of the plan, the Government set in motion a mass mobilization measure called the Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse) movement (see Glossary). The measure was designed to maximize production in all economic sectors by spur-

ring the people to the limits of their physical endurance. As a result, the 5-year plan was declared fulfilled by the end of 1960 (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Developments during the 5-year plan period included agricultural collectivization in August 1958, the reorganization of the industrial sector beginning in August 1958, and the reorganization of the school system in 1960. The educational reform was designed to intensify technical education and to produce a greater number of technicians and engineers. Official efforts in the late 1950's to win over the Korean minority in Japan and to induce their migration to the north were prompted, in part, by labor shortages (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force; ch. 9, Education; and ch. 16, Public Information).

The Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67), endorsed by the Party's Fourth Congress in September 1961, envisaged a self-sustaining economic system no later than 1967 (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). In October 1966, however, the fulfillment of the plan was declared postponed by First Deputy Premier Kim Il for 3 years because of the urgent need for "greater" defense efforts. He conceded that the Party policy of developing the economy in parallel with the reinforcement of the defense capacity might entail some readjustment in the projected rate of economic development. The extension of the plan was rendered necessary because of a sharp decrease in Soviet aid following Pyongyang's brief alignment with Peking (1962–64) in the Sino-Soviet dispute (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values; ch. 15, Foreign Relations; and ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

CHAPTER 4

POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE

In 1968 an inadequate population and labor force remained among the biggest hindrances to North Korea's economic development. The Government, in its desire to create a modern industrial-agricultural state, was aware of the need for a labor force commensurate with its economic ambitions. With approximately 13 million people in mid-1968, North Korea was underpopulated because of losses resulting from heavy casualties during the Korean conflict and the exodus of many to the south to escape Communist rule. Consequently, no official birth-control program had been implemented to reduce the high birth rate of over 40 per 1,000 in 1963.

Underpopulation has meant a severe labor shortage in the critical 16- to 60-year age group. Measures such as agricultural collectivization, the widespread use of female labor, and labor drafts have been used to increase productivity. Great emphasis has been placed upon the technical training of students and workers with the object of creating a skilled labor force.

The North Koreans believe that the Korean community in Japan, numbering over a half million, constitutes a potential source of labor power. The North Korean Government has, therefore, conducted extensive propaganda and educational activities among them, seeking to win support for communism and to awaken a desire for emigration to the north. By December 1967 about 88,000 people had left Japan for North Korea. Special arrangements by the Japanese Red Cross to facilitate the movement of Koreans from Japan to North Korea were discontinued in November 1967. After the mid-1940's the number of Koreans leaving for the north was very small.

Most statistics concerning population are based on North Korean sources and have not been verified or validated. The total labor force in mid-1968 was roughly 6.5 million, divided more or less evenly between the industrial and agricultural sectors.

POPULATION

Size and Distribution

The most recent North Korean sources gave the population as 11,950,000 in 1964; in mid-1968 the actual figure was probably 13,350,000, based on an estimated annual increase of approximately 3 percent. The population is ethnically homogeneous. Since the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Japanese nationals after 1945, only a few non-Koreans remain as permanent residents.

Most of the population lives in the 20 percent of level terrain where most economic activity occurs. These areas include the eastern and western coastal lowlands and the valley floors of rivers and streams where agriculture is practiced and urban centers and transportation routes are located. The most sparsely populated areas are in the mountains of the north, where the only communities of any consequence are mining centers and road and rail junctions. In 1964 the average population density was 258 per square mile. This figure is misleading, however, since relatively few people live in the 80 percent of mountainous and inhospitable terrain. On the intensively cultivated western coastal plain and in the urban areas, population density rises to an average of over 1,000 per square mile.

Growth

The natural rate of increase of the population has been variously estimated at from 2.9 percent to 3.3 percent a year (see table 2). Nevertheless, industrial expansion, population losses from Korean conflict casualties, and movements of refugees to the Republic of Korea have produced a labor shortage. The Communist regime therefore regards the high reproduction rate as a natural solution to the labor problem.

Before the 20th century the population of Korea had registered a very slight annual increase because a high mortality rate largely offset the birth rate. During the Japanese rule, however, epidemic controls and rudimentary sanitary regulations were instituted. These controls resulted in a general decline in the mortality rate, especially that of infants and young children, and in the virtual elimination of epidemics and famines. The population of the provinces now composing North Korea (except Kangwŏn-do) rose from 6,160,000 in 1925 to 8,859,000 in 1944. These figures do not include the sizable number of emigrants to Japan and Manchuria during the 1930's. Even with the reduction in mortality under Japanese rule, life expectancy at birth was only 36.3 years for males and 38.5 years for females. The regime has claimed that because of improved public health services, the death rate has

been cut in half since 1949 and that the average life expectancy has risen 20 years (see table 3; ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Table 2. Population Increase in North Korea, Selected Years, 1946–64

Date	Population (in thousands)
December 1946	9,257
December 1949	9,622
December 1953	8,491
September 1956	9,359
December 1959	10,392
December 1960	10,789
October 1963	11,568
..... 1964	11,950

Source: Adapted from *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam* (1964) in *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (One Korea Yearbook, 1967–68), p. 828.

Table 3. Vital Rates of North Korea, Selected Years, 1949–63
(per thousand)

Year	Births	Deaths	Natural Increase
1949	41.2	18.7	22.5
1953	25.1	18.1	7.0
1956	31.0	17.6	13.4
1959	39.3	12.0	27.3
1960	38.5	10.5	28.0
1963	42.7	12.8	29.9

Source: Adapted from *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam* (1964) as quoted in *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (One Korea Yearbook, 1967–68), p. 828; and *Pukhan Yoram (1968)* p. 190.

Age and Sex Composition

No statistics of age groupings have been released by official sources. Because of the high annual growth rate, the population is young; approximately 44 percent of the total are 15 years of age or under (see table 4). The sex ratio in the 35- to 55-age range has been unbalanced since 1953 in favor of females, reflecting the casualties of the Korean conflict (see table 5). This imbalance has had important social and economic consequences, making it necessary for women to accept employment in construction and mechanical trades as well as in the more conventional female occupations. State-controlled nurseries were established to care for the children of working mothers (see ch. 7, Family; ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Mobility

Between 1900 and 1953, millions of Koreans moved about within

the country and to and from foreign lands in response to changing economic and political developments. Migrants have predominantly been young men. The impact of this mobility has been felt in almost all aspects of life.

Internal Migration

Because of its agricultural limitations, northern Korea historically has supported fewer people than the south. As the Japanese developed industrial resources in the north, a northward movement began. Migrants settled along the east and west coasts in the provinces of P'yŏngan-pukto, P'yŏngan-namdo, Hamgyŏng-namdo, and Hamgyŏng-pukto and near the sites of mines, factories, and refining centers elsewhere. By 1944 more than one-third of the total population lived in the area comprising North Korea. In 1966 only the two provinces that had the most inhospitable terrain, Chagang-do and Yanggang-do, in which only logging and mining were significant industries, had significantly less than 1 million inhabitants each (see table 6).

Table 4. Estimated Age and Sex Composition of the Population of North Korea, July 1, 1968

(in thousands)

Age	Male	Female	Total
Under 5	1,167	1,130	2,297
5–9	967	940	1,907
10–14	809	783	1,592
Total under 15	2,943	2,853	5,796
15–19	659	614	1,273
20–24	597	550	1,147
25–29	551	500	1,051
Total 20–29	1,148	1,050	2,198
30–34	439	434	873
35–39	227	354	631
40–44	253	304	557
45–49	251	257	508
50–54	206	210	416
55–59	184	182	366
60–64	144	138	279
Total 30–64	1,751	1,879	3,630
65–69	88	100	188
70–74	63	78	141
75 and over	51	76	127
Total 65 and over	202	254	456
TOTAL	6,703 (50.2 percent)	6,650 (49.8 percent)	13,353

Table 5. Sex Composition of the Population of North Korea, Selected Years, 1946–68

(in percent)

Date	Male	Female
December 1946	50.0	50.0
December 1949	49.7	50.3
December 1953	46.9	53.1
December 1956	47.8	52.2
December 1959	49.3	51.7
December 1960	48.4	51.6
October 1963	48.7	51.3
July 1968 *	50.2	49.8

* Based on United States Government sources.

Source: Adapted from *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam* (1964) as quoted in *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan 1967–68*, p. 828.

Table 6. Estimated Population of North Korea by Administrative Divisions, December 1966

(in thousands)

Province	Population
Chagang-do	739
Hamgyŏng-namdo	1,699
Hamgyŏng-pukto	1,333
Hwanghae-namdo	1,301
Hwanghae-pukto	993
Kaesŏng Region	265
Kangwŏn-do	1,050
P'yŏngan-namdo	1,875
P'yŏngan-pukto	1,599
Pyongyang (special city)	1,364
Yanggand-do	422
Total	12,640

Source: Adapted from *Korean Statistical Yearbook* (1964) as quoted in *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam, 1945–1968* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945–1968), p. 35.

The imposition of a Communist regime in North Korea in 1945 reversed the south-to-north flow of population. An estimated 1 million refugees crossed the 38th Parallel between 1945 and 1950. No accurate count was possible since many refugees crossed the Parallel at points where they could not be registered. The population movement to the south increased during the Korean conflict (1950–53). During the course of the hostilities, millions of Koreans were pushed back and forth before the advancing and

retreating armies. Roughly 1 million additional refugees left North Korea for the south.

Since the conflict, the regime has been resettling the populace for maximum economic benefit. Stress on industrialization has continued the movement to the cities that began during the Japanese occupation; in 1967 urban dwellers comprised slightly less than half the total population (see table 7). In the midsixties there were nine cities with a population of 100,000 or more (see table 8). Urbanization in some cases has proceeded too rapidly, however, taking away too many people from agriculture. A number of people have been sent back to the land, and Korean repatriates from Japan have been urged to accept agricultural employment. In the countryside the collectivization campaign caused a certain amount of population movement. Some peasants were moved from their less fertile fields in the uplands and resettled in the cooperatives where their labor was expected to be more productive.

Table 7. Urban-Rural Population Structure, Selected Years, 1953–67

(in percent)

Year	Urban	Rural
December 1953	17.7	82.3
September 1956	29.0	71.0
December 1959	38.0	62.0
December 1960	40.6	59.4
October 1963	44.5	55.5
December 1967	47.5	52.5

Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam 1945–1968* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945–1968), p. 36; and *Pukhan Yoram (1968)*, p. 191.

Table 8. Estimated Population of Major Cities in North Korea, 1967

City	Population
Pyongyang	840,000 [1]
Hamhŭng	420,000 [2]
Ch'ŏngjin	265,000
Kimch'aek	265,000
Wŏnsan	215,000
Sinŭiju	165,000
Kaesŏng	140,000 [1]
Namp'o	130,000
Haeju	115,000

[1] Does not include population outside metropolitan area.
[2] Includes nearby city of Hŭngnam.

Source: Adapted from various United States Government sources.

Emigration and Repatriation

Large-scale emigration from Korea began around 1904 and continued until the end of World War II. During the years of Japanese domination, some Koreans went to Manchuria, China, Hawaii, and the United States to escape Japanese rule (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Many migrated for economic reasons, as employment opportunities did not keep pace with population growth. Many farmers lost their land after the Japanese introduced a money economy and imposed higher land taxes to pay for services such as irrigation. Those in the northern provinces went mainly to Manchuria, Soviet Siberia and China; those in the south went to Japan. Many others were conscripted as unskilled labor to work in Japanese industry or to serve in the Japanese Army, especially after the onset of World War II. By 1944 an estimated 1.5 million Koreans lived in Japan, 1 million in Manchuria, 600,000 in Soviet Southeastern Siberia, and 60,000 in China. An additional 40,000 were scattered among other countries.

Between August 1945 and the spring of 1948, 1 million or more Koreans were reported to have returned from Japan. The great majority settled in the Republic of Korea, and perhaps as many as 351,000 went to North Korea. The withdrawal of the Japanese and the establishment of a Communist government in the north resulted in an influx of Koreans from Siberia and as many as 300,000 from Manchuria. At the outbreak of the Korean conflict, a few of these persons returned to Manchuria, but most of them stayed in the north.

The Korean Minority in Japan

After 1957, North Korea devoted much attention to the problems involving the schooling, welfare, and legal status of the Korean residents in Japan because these people could be used as an additional source of labor force and utilized as an effective instrument of foreign relations and propaganda (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations; ch. 16, Public Information). In 1968 there were about 590,000 Koreans in Japan, three-fourths of whom had been in the country continuously since before 1945. Two-thirds of the total number were born in Japan.

Most of the Koreans were in the country as permanent residents; they regarded their residency as a matter of "right" to be asserted because of the prevalent Korean view that the Japanese Government was morally responsible for having conscripted them during World War II for compulsory labor service in Japan. Under a 1965 agreement between the Republic of Korea and Japan providing for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, however, all Korean residents are required to

register with appropriate Republic of Korea consulates and Japanese authorities as citizens of the Republic of Korea and to apply to Japanese authorities for acceptance as permanent residents. By May 1967 about 90 percent of the Korean community had failed to respond to the requirements of the agreement, having disagreed with the Japanese position that the host country had sovereign power to grant or reject permanent residency.

The Korean minority has been the object of social discrimination when seeking employment and has not been regarded highly by the Japanese. In 1959 only about 22 percent of working-age people were actually employed. Of the employed, half had unskilled jobs in factories and in construction. Almost one-fifth were either restaurant owners or salesclerks. Less than 3 percent were technicians, specialists, or in managerial positions. Much unemployment and a feeling of alienation from Japanese society were responsible for a high crime rate.

North Korea has been able to take advantage of the grievances of the minority concerning their unfavorable economic and social positions. Although more than 98 percent of the residents came from the provinces that are now part of the Republic of Korea, North Koreans through their front organization, the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Zainichi Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai—commonly abbreviated as Chōsōren), continued in 1968 to influence from 30 to 60 percent of the total.

North Koreans claimed to have contributed the equivalent of $23.5 million over an 11-year period (1951–68) in support of the Chōsōren-controlled school system for the Korean minority in Japan. In January 1968 the Chōsōren operated 90 primary schools, 45 junior high schools, and nine high schools, with a total enrollment of about 34,000. In addition, the Chōrōsen had 25 kindergartens and numerous evening schools for adult education. The pro-Communist community also had an institute of higher learning called Chōsen University, located near Tokyo. All classes in the schools operated by the Chōrōsen were taught by Communist instructors and used textbooks approved by the North Korean Government and published by its outlet in Tokyo.

Because the pro-North Korean schools emphasized the teaching of Communist ideology and Korean nationalism, veiled often in anti-Japanese terms, after 1966 the Japanese Government sought to regulate the school system maintained by all foreign communities. The pro-Communist segment of the minority continued, in 1968, to oppose the Japanese attempt, asserting that such a restrictive measure was directed particularly against the Chōsōren schools (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

In 1957 because of its shortage of skilled and unskilled labor,

North Korea turned its attention to the Korean residents in Japan. A nongovernmental agreement concluded in August 1959 between the Red Cross societies of North Korea and Japan made it possible for the Korean residents to be sent to North Korea if they so desired. From December 1959 to the end of 1967, more than 88,000 persons were repatriated to the north; the bulk of the repatriation took place in 1960 and 1961, accounting for approximately 80 percent of the total. About 56 percent of the repatriated Koreans were those who had been born after 1940, so their formal education was for the most part acquired through North Korean-controlled schools in various parts of Japan. The number of repatriates decreased sharply after 1963, reportedly because of unfavorable living conditions to which many returnees were subjected in North Korea (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

LABOR FORCE

In mid-1968 the total labor force was estimated at 6.5 million, of which roughly half was engaged in agriculture, fishing, and forestry; the other half was employed in industry, commerce, and white-collar occupations. Official statistics show only a generalized breakdown of the occupational structure of the population on a percentage basis (see table 9).

Manpower resources pose a serious problem. North Korea has an acute scarcity of labor of all types, which constitutes a severe handicap in the framework of its comprehensive developmental goals. In August 1953 Premier Kim Il-sung had put forth a six-point program to deal with the labor shortage: the transfer of

Table 9. Labor Force of North Korea, by Occupation, Selected Years, 1953–63

(in percent)

Occupation	December 1953	September 1956	December 1959	December 1960	October 1963
Factory workers	21.2	27.3	37.2	38.3	40.2
Officeworkers	8.5	13.6	13.4	13.7	15.1
Peasants on cooperatives	.....	40.0	45.7	44.4	42.8
Individual peasants	66.4	16.6	.....	.....	.....
Handicraftsmen in cooperatives	0.5	1.1	3.3	3.3	1.9
Individual handicraftsmen	0.6	0.3	.....	.....	.....
Entrepreneurs	0.1	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tradesmen	1.2	0.6	.....	.....	.....
Others	1.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	.....

Source: Adapted from *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam* (1964), as quoted in *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam 1945–68* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945–69), p. 35.

specialists and technicians from Government ministries and bureaus to the "field;" utilization of female labor on a broad basis; introduction of large-scale mechanization; removal of peasants from upland areas of marginal output to industrial districts; increase of working hours; and wider use of extra labor hours without pay. In addition, the regime regards the large number of Korean residents in Japan as a source of additional manpower.

Agricultural Sector

Since 1953 a labor shortage has existed in the agricultural sector, caused by a mass exodus of peasants to the south before and during the Korean conflict, by wartime casualties, and by shifts of manpower to the industrial sector. In the early 1960's the regime realized that it had transferred too many farmworkers to industry, and it was obliged to return some of these workers to the cooperative farms. Other groups scheduled for assignment to the agricultural sector include repatriates from Japan, youths graduating from rural secondary schools, and discharged soldiers from rural areas.

The pressure on the agricultural labor force is evidenced by the statistic that most cooperative farms have an equal number of chŏngbo (1 chŏngbo equals 2.45 acres) and peasants, which averages about 1 chŏngbo for each peasant to cultivate. Despite the introduction of mechanization on the cooperatives, periodic labor drafts of students, government employees, and Army units are required for special rural projects, such as harvesting, basic construction, and irrigation (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Slack agricultural periods are utilized for instructing peasants in the use of improved techniques and equipment.

Industrial Sector

In 1968 the shortage of labor, both quantitative and qualitative, continued to be one of the country's most important problems. In relation to its ambitious development goals, the regime's manpower resources were extremely limited. The loss of trained technical and managerial workers as a result of the Japanese departure in 1945 caused a serious problem in the north. High casualties during the Korean conflict, plus the flight of about 2 million people to the Republic of Korea between 1945 and 1953, greatly depleted the labor force. Included among those who fled south were a large percentage of persons who had received some degree of technical training from the Japanese.

The regime is striving to distribute the available personnel in a manner most beneficial to its economic goals. Accordingly, young and physically able persons are being assigned to more strenuous

activities, such as mining, fishing, and lumbering. Light and local industry, by contrast, are usually managed by women. In 1958 women constituted over 60 percent of the labor force in local industry. Their proportion of the total labor force had risen from 35 percent in 1960 to 48 percent by 1967, according to official sources.

Periodic labor mobilization campaigns have been necessary for specific projects. For example, in 1964 about 100,000 workers, students, and housewives in Pyongyang were required to assist in construction work. Structures to be built included a thermal power station, a municipal water heating system, a broadcast house, and two buildings of nine and 20 stories, respectively. Women, students, and Government officeworkers can expect to be given periodic 1- or 2-day work assignments on road construction and similar tasks, since by law all those between 16 and 60 years of age are eligible for labor mobilization drives. Army units also are used for industrial construction; they have supplied much of the labor involved in railroad expansion. Units of the Chinese People's Volunteers, until their departure in October 1958, assisted the North Koreans on irrigation and reservoir projects and with rail construction.

The shortage of trained labor has been a major factor inhibiting the economic development program. The Government has attempted to meet the problem by instituting a number of training programs for workers. As early as 1948 schools and correspondence courses were established for training workers in their spare time. By mid-1965 there were 38 "factory colleges" located in the larger plants and at other major enterprises and designed to give workers a higher technical education on the job. The aim of the factory colleges was to link engineering theory with practical working experience in order to raise production and to encourage the development of technology. In 1963–64 over 69 percent of all students were worker students, according to an official source. There was also an overseas training program, the purpose of which appeared to be the development of professional technicians and highly skilled workers. In addition to the normal training being given, large numbers of workers were serving 1- to 2-year periods of on-the-job training in other countries.

The school system, reorganized in April 1967, emphasizes the development of technical knowledge. Polytechnical education is introduced in the middle schools and continued at the high school level. In lieu of attending high school a student can go directly into a 3- or 4-year technical school. Graduates of these schools are considered technicians or secondary specialists. All students, therefore, are exposed to some degree of technical education (see

ch. 9, Education). The Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67) has called for the training of 180,000 engineers and qualified specialists and 460,000 assistant engineers and specialists. Some of the trainees produced under the plan were included in the total of 425,000 engineers, assistant engineers, and specialists which the regime stated were at work in all sectors of the economy in 1967.

The Government's programs have undoubtedly raised sharply the educational and technical levels of the workers. The level achieved, however, is still below that required for the industrial society envisioned in the economic plans.

In order to meet the immediate needs for managerial personnel and technicians, the Government has had to depend heavily on foreign technical personnel provided by the Soviet Union, the East European countries, Communist China, and some nonaligned countries. Foreign specialists also have been training North Koreans while carrying out their operational assignments, often lecturing and conducting informal schools outside of working hours.

CHAPTER 5
LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION

Only one language, Korean, is indigenous to North Korea. It is generally considered to be unrelated to any particular language family, although some scholars regard it as one of an Altaic group of languages originating in the Altai Mountain region of Central Asia, and a few others assert that it is closely linked to Japanese. As a result of long-continued Chinese cultural influence, more than 50 percent of the current vocabulary has been borrowed from Chinese. Since 1945 Russian has become important as a foreign language, and some Russian words and terms have found their way into the Korean vocabulary.

Since the Communist takeover in 1945, there has been an increasing emphasis on language reform and purification. Literacy has been made a goal, and the Government claims to have practically erased illiteracy throughout the country.

Three main dialects are spoken in North Korea: Hamgyŏng, P'yŏngan, and Kyŏnggi, the name of the dialect corresponding to the province in which it is the principal speech. There is no difficulty in mutual understanding; each dialect is readily intelligible to speakers of other dialects. The establishment of modern means of transportation and communication since 1945 and the wartime movement of people in the early 1950's have contributed to the lessening of these dialectal differences.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Between 1910 and 1945 the Japanese made a concerted effort to educate the Koreans in the Japanese language, an effort resented by the Koreans. After 1938 only Japanese was used in the schools, and the teaching of Korean was prohibited. Korean-language books, magazines, and newspapers were suppressed. As a result, most students who had had at least 6 years of primary schooling by 1945 became bilingual.

In 1945 Russian replaced Japanese as the principal foreign language. Persons who began their formal education after World War II cannot understand Japanese.

Foreign-language training continues to be stressed at all levels

of the school system, including the primary level (see ch. 9, Education). Teachers and researchers are encouraged to improve their competence in foreign languages. The Government recognizes two spheres of activity in which the knowledge of foreign languages is important: the preparation of propaganda literature for foreign consumption and the field of technical training and development. In late 1964 the Government was exploring the possibility of offering college students English, French, German, Chinese, and Japanese as optional languages. In mid-1968 it was unknown whether these languages were actually taught.

WRITING AND LITERACY

Until the 15th century the spoken language was Korean, but the written language was composed of Chinese characters. The time and effort required to master the Chinese ideographs precluded their use by the common people. About the middle of the 15th century a phonetic alphabet (originally called *hunminjŏng'ŭm;* literally, "the right sounds to teach the people," but later known as *ŏnmun* until 1945) was developed at the instigation of King Sejong. Although it was much easier to learn than the Chinese characters, the new alphabet failed to replace the conventional system of writing because, until the beginning of the 20th century, it had been disparaged as being the written language fit only for the less educated and for women (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Since 1945 both North Korea and the Republic of Korea have adopted different terms for *ŏnmun.* In the south, Koreans call it *han'gŭl* (Korean letters), but North Koreans prefer *chosŏnmun* (also Korean letters). This distinction was largely politically motivated: in the south, Korea is called Han'guk; in the north, it is known as Chosŏn.

The Korean alphabet is the official form of writing in North Korea, as it is in the Republic of Korea. All official correspondence is in the Korean alphabet. *Chosŏnmun* consists of 10 vowels and 14 consonants, each standing for a particular sound; it is written in a square box system of syllables and arranged in columns from right to left, or horizontally from left to right. The columnar style is ill adapted to typewriters or mechanical presses.

Until 1945 there was no standard Korean dictionary, and hence there were many dialectal and spelling differences. North Korean scholars, aware of these problems, completed a six-volume dictionary by the end of 1962. Efforts to improve upon the 1962 version and to further explore the development of the language have continued ever since.

After 1945 the Government began substituting Korean words

for Japanese. Many new words have had to be coined, and the lack of Korean words for scientific and political concepts limits what can be written purely in *chosŏnmun.* Scientific terms in North Korea, for example, are usually of Japanese or Russian origin.

Government documents, propaganda materials, periodicals, and educational literature are written almost exclusively in *chosŏnmun.* There is an effort being exerted to have the classical writings translated into *chosŏnmun.* The Government claimed to have achieved almost 100 percent literacy by 1949 through an effective program of compulsory primary school education, adult literacy courses, and the wider use of the simplified writing system.

LANGUAGE POLICY

The Government uses language as a social as well as a political tool. Although the knowledge of foreign languages, particularly Russian, is encouraged, the Korean language is employed as a medium of search for national self-identity. Korean is also being extolled as a symbol of national unity and pride.

The Government's policy of encouraging the use of the Korean language is in part motivated by the desire to convey Communist Party policies. Korean is also stressed as a sign of national uniqueness. For centuries the Koreans have seen wave after wave of invaders sweep over their land, and their culture has been greatly influenced by China. *Chosŏnmun,* however, is an original product of Korea; it stands as a distinct element which keeps the Koreans apart from other peoples.

Government policy has been also to expunge words of foreign origin which are regarded as hindering the development of the Korean language. The Government claims to have eliminated the use of Chinese characters from the language. School textbooks were revised in 1949, replacing Chinese words and expressions with *chosŏnmun.* Since the educational reform in 1959, Chinese literature, or classical Chinese, has been dropped from the school curriculum.

The removal of Chinese loanwords was judged from the standpoint of the following criteria: words failing to become absorbed into the language, words duplicating Korean words in meaning, words not in common use, or those retaining their foreign flavor.

SOCIAL CONNOTATIONS OF THE LANGUAGE

The Korean language is a highly flexible instrument for indicating social distinctions. It embodies well-defined levels of speech which delineate status relationships. The choice of pronoun and word endings indicates the social relationship between two people,

such as that between superior and inferior or between close friends. Apparently it is sometimes difficult for Koreans to decide which form to use, and the convention can be adapted to humor or insult through deliberate misuse.

Use of slang and cursing has traditionally been associated with low-class status; this has also been true of the showing of strong emotion through gestures, facial expressions, or loud tones. Personal names of parents are never used in direct address nor in the presence of their children unless the speaker is a generation older than the person referred to.

The use of honorific terms is important. The Korean Communists have two expressions for the word "comrade." One, *tongji,* is honorific, and the other, *tongmu,* is ordinary. The use of *tongji* is reserved for addressing superiors.

Surnames in Korea are patrilineal, meaning that the surname of the father passes to his children. In all Korea there are approximately 400 surnames; among the most common are Yi, Kim, Yun, Yu, Hong, Shin, Hwang, Cho, Han, Chong, and Pak. The same name may be anglicized in a number of different ways; thus, Rhee, Li, and Lee are all variants of Yi.

The traditional place of origin of the clan is usually prefaced to the family and to the clan surname. Although not used in direct address, it is important in determining whether two families that have the same surname belong to the same patrilineal clan. Thus, the Kyŏngju Yi, the Ch'ŏngju Yi, and the T'aen Yi bear the same family name but are members of different clans which trace their origins to three separate geographical areas (see ch. 7, Family).

A name is usually written in three Chinese characters. The name in the *chosŏnmun* equivalent is spelled with three phonetic symbols, one for each Chinese character. The first character, or phonetic symbol, always stands for the family surname. The second character indicates one's distinctive personal name; its choice is based in part on sex distinction. Chinese characters that imply masculinity are used for boys, and girls are given characters with feminine meanings. The third character indicates generational status, arranged in hierarchical order. The generational name is predetermined by the ancient Chinese astrological "theory of the five elements." The birth year is assigned to one of the five elements of gold, fire, wood, earth, and water. The same predetermined Chinese character is used for all family members of the same generation. Hence, fathers and uncles share the same generational name, whereas brothers and sisters share another.

The generational name makes it possible for a person to ascertain his relationship to any other member of the clan. Deference is given or received in part on the basis of one's standing on the

predetermined scale rather than on actual age. Although this practice is rapidly diminishing, a man of 40 years of age may sometimes be expected to show deference to a boy only 10 years old if the boy happens to be higher in generational standing. The order of the second and third Chinese characters, that of personal name and generation, is sometimes reversed.

PATTERN OF COMMUNICATION

There is strict control of all communication media. Public communications are used mainly for conveying Communist ideology and setting forth the Party line (see ch. 16, Public Information).

Family participation in cultural and ideological training programs is required for all persons. These programs are organized by the Party's local branches, which must insure that all families in their area are enrolled.

During the workday, study circles and lectures are conducted at places of employment. Visiting Party propagandists explain Government policy and clarify the Party line on domestic and international developments. These meetings are held during rest periods.

Because of strict Party political surveillance, most people are not free to communicate with one another. Social communication is mainly intrafamily, confined within the home.

CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ETHNIC GROUPS

The Communist regime has remodeled the entire social system. New social classes and a new political elite have been established. The foundations of traditional society—the Confucian ethic, the elite group represented by the *yangban* (literally, two groups—see Glossary), and the extended family—have been either replaced or eliminated. Communist ideology has been substituted for the Confucian ethic; a Party-affiliated elite, for the traditional status group; and the nuclear family system, for the extended one.

The Koreans are a homogeneous people who have maintained their ethnic identity through the centuries. The concept of ethnic continuity and homogeneity was extolled by the North Korean leadership and used as a means of inducing the people to support the regime. The term *chuch'e* was employed to convey the idea of national identity, self-reliance, and, hence, social solidarity. The regime continued to stress the concept of *chuch'e* in an attempt to instill in the people a sense of pride in all things Korean.

The framework of North Korean society in 1968 was basically a two-class structure. At the top was the managerial class, the leading members of the Party who replaced the traditional upper class which had been divested of its economic and political power. The new class was composed of ranking members of the Party hierarchy, senior military officers, managers and engineers, and the intelligentsia. The socioeconomic background of the new elite was different from that of the old nobility; many were from middle-class and peasant families and had been involved in the Communist movement and in partisan activities against the Japanese.

The working class, ranking below the managerial elite and including workers and peasants, comprised the bulk of the population. It was to this great reservoir of people that the regime looked for its new leaders and intelligentsia. One of the most pressing needs of the Government was the creation of a new technical intelligentsia, indoctrinated in Party ideology and in full accord with it.

The unifying forces operating in the nation-building process were varied. Fundamentally, however, they were based on the personality cult of Premier Kim Il-sung and his interpretation of

Communist philosophy. Kim Il-sung was acclaimed the architect and defender of the revolution, and his words and deeds were sacrosanct.

Constant stress was placed on the necessity for defense against attack and invasion from what North Korea considered its surrounding enemies—the Republic of Korea and the United States Armed Forces. According to a Japanese observer in 1967, schoolchildren wore buttons bearing the slogan *hangsang chunbi* (constant preparedness).

Party cadres were exhorted to go out and win the people over by working with them. In 1960 Kim Il-sung visited the village of Ch'ŏngsan-ni and spent 15 days there in order to demonstrate to Party officials and cadres the results that could be obtained from working with the people. This working visit by the Premier has come to be known as the Ch'ŏngsan-ni method.

A force creating a tendency toward disunity was the implementation of a series of production drives which called for an all-out effort on the part of every worker to work to the limits of his physical endurance. The ever-increasing pressure led workers to feel that they had too much work with too little time for recreation. The rural population also tended to feel that living conditions were better in the cities and that urban workers were given preferential treatment in job conditions and opportunities. They were constantly reminded that they had to raise their cultural and ideological levels to those of the urban workers.

Contributing to the forces of disunity was the evidence that the Party elite considered themselves a privileged class. "Commandism," the imposition of authority, promoted a feeling of oppression within the working class. The common man realized that, despite Party propaganda, he did not live in a society in which all were said to be equal.

According to official reports, resistance to social change, especially in rural areas, was still in evidence in 1968. Patterns of the traditional social structure and strong communal bonds were firmly rooted in the working class. Agricultural organizations and the Party cadre conducted programs to reeducate the peasants and instill in them a sense of belonging to the new social order.

BACKGROUND

Until the end of the 19th century the country had a rigid class structure sanctioned and supported by Confucian precepts. Government officials, senior military officers, and landowners were members of the upper class *(yangban)*, which was distinguished from the rest of the population by prestige, power, wealth, dress,

education, and social behavior. Members of the upper class were educated in Confucian classics and etiquette. The commoners, who formed the overwhelming majority of the population, were small farmers, agricultural laborers, merchants, craftsmen, and serfs. The lowest position on the social scale was occupied by the so-called lowborn or despised people, such as slaves, butchers, and female entertainers.

Social mobility, in general, was extremely restricted. In rare instances, however, a commoner moved upward into the ruling class by winning high honors in the national examination system and thereby obtaining a Government post, which provided him with the means to improve his economic and social position. Since social status was ascribed not to an individual but to a family, his family moved up the social hierarchy along with him. Downward mobility occurred through loss of land, the possession of which was essential to the maintenance of upper-class status.

The most important unit in the traditional social organization was the extended family. Households composed of several nuclear families, related through the male line, were the basic economic, political, social, and religious units; on various occasions the extended family operated as a collective unit (see ch. 7, Family). Households were generally smaller than the full extended family but often included grandparents, parents, one or more married sons, and minor children. These households were usually grouped into villages; in some villages all the members belonged to the same extended family. On an informal basis, the respected elders of the village acted as a restraining influence in maintaining order and served as a buffer between the people and Government representatives. The village was the common unit of economic cooperation and social contact outside the family. The only associations based on common interests other than family ties were the guilds into which most merchants and handicraft workers were organized.

Transformation of the traditional social structure began in the late 19th century as a result of Western ideas. This process increased after the Japanese occupation in 1910 and became much more rapid after 1945. During the early decades of the 20th century a class of urban workers began to develop and, as a consequence, the functions and authority of the traditional family were reduced.

Soon after the beginning of Communist rule, a major step was taken to reconstitute the socioeconomic foundation of North Korea. The land reform of 1946 expropriated more than 2.5 million acres of land and distributed it to the peasants without cost. Members of the landowning elite were uprooted and, in the process, the in-

tricate web of social ties which, traditionally, bound the landlord-tenant relationship, as well as those between families, was severed or disrupted.

Party cadres were organized and used to fill the void formerly occupied by the *yangban.* Various new decrees governing marriage and family relationships continued the process of changing the traditional order. The changes made it possible, at least in theory, for the Government to establish a direct link with the people.

Despite the strength of the Communist attack on the traditional social order, there has been resistance to the imposed changes. Although many innovations have been introduced, the language, manners, and some of the customs and rituals remain as they have been for centuries. The leaders of North Korea are themselves products of the traditional cultural milieu and retain a Korean outlook.

The possibility for social mobility under Communist rule was high. The Government had fostered the idea that mobility was an individual, rather than a family, matter. Participation in the activities of the Korean Workers Party and its affiliated organizations was the most important, although not the only, prerequisite for upward movement. Education was another avenue to advancement on the social scale. The educational system was fully supported by the Government, and there was an extensive scholarship program.

ETHNIC GROUPS

The Koreans form a single ethnic group, bound by a strong feeling of unity and possessing a common physical type, language, and culture. Regional variations exist in both the culture and the physical characteristics of the people, but these are insignificant. This homogeneity has spared the people the problems that sometimes arise in countries where a multiplicity of ethnic groups and physical types exist.

The Koreans are a Mongoloid people, similar in appearance to the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Japanese. Although not quite as tall as the northern Chinese, the Korean male is taller and sturdier than the Japanese. He is strong and noted for endurance, especially the ability to climb, run long distances, and carry heavy loads for long distances.

The head shape is wide with a high forehead, generally exceeding those of the Chinese and Japanese. Both long and broad faces are found, and the nose and chin are usually more prominent than among Chinese and Japanese. The Koreans are somewhat lighter skinned and show a higher percentage of brown hair than the Chi-

nese and Japanese. A larger proportion of light-brown eyes is also found.

No ethnic minority of any significance was to be found in Korea in 1968. When Korea was liberated from Japanese rule in 1945 there were 80,000 Chinese, about three-fourths of whom were males. They were generally small businessmen and laborers who dealt with the Koreans for business purposes only, maintaining separate residential areas, schools, and clubs. During the Korean conflict thousands of Chinese troops entered North Korea but, by October 1958, they had all been withdrawn.

In 1945 there were about 700,000 Japanese living in Korea, principally in the larger cities where they held the more important positions in Government and business. By the end of 1945 these Japanese had been expatriated; intermarriage between Koreans and Japanese had been infrequent.

TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Social Classes

The Yangban

The *yangban* included the wealthy and all those holding influential Government positions. The most essential qualifications for being a member of this class were mastery of Chinese classics, belonging to a family of reputable standing, and observance of the elaborate system of etiquette associated with Confucianism. All employment other than Government office or landownership was considered beneath their dignity, and manual labor was felt to be particularly demeaning.

While holding office, all the higher ranks of nobility lived in the capital city of Seoul. Provincial officials, retired nobles, and families of high nobles lived on country estates. Although at one time the nobility was rigidly exclusive, by the 19th century admission could be achieved in one or two generations. The son of a commoner who excelled in the civil service examinations could enter public office, thereby elevating his own and his family's social position (see ch. 9, Education).

There was also the possibility of downward movement if a branch of a noble family lost its landholdings. The conditions of upper-class status required considerable landed wealth in order to maintain the essential patterns of extended family living, hospitality, and education. As a result of these movements, members of both the major classes might be represented among the different branches of the extended family and clan. There were some gradations within the upper class, but the most significant distance lay between nobles and commoners.

Marriage rarely crossed class lines and, within the upper class, rarely crossed factional lines. Upper-class males, however, often took commoners as concubines. The offspring of one noble and one commoner parent suffered from social discrimination by the upper class, but was normally considered to be a member of the *yangban* class.

The houses of the nobility, although not differing greatly in basic design from those of the common people, were usually larger and had whitewashed walls and tile roofs. In addition to the primary structure, which took the form of a hollow square with a central court, the house might include additional courtyards for each of the nuclear family units within the extended family and separate quarters for servants and retainers.

The food of the upper-class families differed from that of commoners and was more closely correlated with wealth than some of the other class differences. Rice was a highly prized food that could be afforded by the peasantry only in autumn and the early part of winter. Meat appeared only on the tables of persons of considerable wealth. Another sign of nobility was extensive hospitality, which included lavish feasts for male friends and relatives of the households.

Dress also distinguished the upper class from the common people. Until 1910 fine gradations of rank were indicated by the type and cut of dress and ornamentation worn, and were fixed by law. Although these minute prescriptions disappeared with the advent of Japanese rule, members of the upper class could still be distinguished by their flowing robes and the use of silk and other fine materials.

Male members of the nobility spent many years learning the Chinese classics and Confucian philosophy. Ideally, they learned to appreciate and compose Chinese poetry, showed great restraint in their social relationships, and accepted responsibility for those dependent upon them. They were addressed in special honorific forms of speech but used "low" language to all others, including the female members of their family.

Distinctions between classes appeared in speech and manners, as well as in the extent to which family ties were maintained and the elaborateness of weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies (see ch. 7, Family). The upper class enjoyed exemption from taxation and military duty and received special privileges by law. No low-caste person could institute legal proceedings against a member of the nobility.

Upper-class women occupied an anomalous position. Although subordinate to the male members of the class, they were held in such respect that they were extremely restricted in their activities

and movements and actually had less power and influence on their own social level than lower-class women. Like the men of their class, noble women received training in traditional etiquette, certain arts and handicrafts, and, sometimes, in reading Korean script. All training was carried on entirely within the home, however. Women were kept secluded from all males, with the exception of relatives, from the time they reached 7 or 8 years of age; they had the right to privacy in their own sections of the house, even to the exclusion of relatives.

The few suitable occupations for these women consisted of teaching girls in other noble families, practicing acupuncture, raising silkworms, and beekeeping. They might also do sewing and embroidery, and many learned to play a musical instrument.

The rules with respect to the inheritance and management of property were very strict for upper-class women and, even if they earned any money, they were forced to turn it over to a husband or male relative. Their power lay mainly in their family's social position, through which they could usually force their husband's family to treat them well.

Commoners

The class of commoners was actually a very diverse group, characterized generally by their lack of wealth or title and their association with agriculture. They ranged, however, from small landholders living comfortably to tenant farmers who frequently faced starvation. Variations within agricultural families of commoner status depended mainly on the amount of their wealth.

Few families obtained an education for their children before the opening of Christian missionary schools in the 1890's and the Japanese schools in the 20th century. Traditionally, the mastery of the Chinese classics and Confucian philosophy served as an important mark of distinction between the *yangban* and the commoners.

Unlike the *yangban* families, the seclusion of women was impossible because of the small size of the houses and the necessity for working outside the home. Women in respectable city families, however, covered their heads when walking on the streets.

The clothing of the lower-class people, while similar in cut to that of the nobility, was distinguished by the use of coarser materials and the absence of silk. Respectable families tried to maintain high standards of cleanliness but, under the existing conditions of life, found it difficult.

The women of this class had fewer social restraints and greater control over property than upper-class women. They could engage in many more activities; whereas an upper-class wife would in-

variably turn over the proceeds of her work to her husband, the lower-class woman was not compelled to do so. In some cases of inheritance, women of such families might control the family property if there were no proper male heir.

On the other hand, the lower-class woman had less control over her treatment by her husband's family; her treatment seems to have been related essentially to the respect in which her own family was held and the desire of her husband's family to maintain good relationships. Many more lower-class than upper-class women were sent away from the house if they did not please their husbands, and marriages tended to be much less stable than within the upper class.

Outcasts (or despised persons)

The commoners, although poor in many instances, were considered respectable members of society. There were categories of people, however, who made their living in ways considered disreputable according to Confucian ideals which denigrated unproductive pursuits. Boatmen, *mutangs* (female shamans or sorcerers), *kisaeng* (female entertainers), meat sellers, butchers, traveling peddlers, basketmakers, actors, criminals, slaves, and, occasionally, monks and nuns were considered outcasts. Individuals might be quite prosperous, and some of the functions performed by them were essential to society; nevertheless, they were held in low regard by even the poorest members of the commoner class.

The *kisaeng* frequently lived in luxury and, in some instances, were among the best educated women. Some became the concubines or second wives of nobles. The *mutangs,* though feared and despised, often made a good living because of the great faith placed in their ability to propitiate evil spirits and cure the sick. Monks were held in low esteem, allegedly for their celibacy and consequent failure to comply with the first obligation of filial piety—continuing the family. Peddlers were despised because of their nomadic life.

A number of these occupations required almost constant mobility, and this fact, in a predominantly stable, agricultural society, contributed, in part, to their low social position. Landownership was the most important sign of status, and none of these occupations entailed such ownership. Women of this class were free from most of the restrictions placed upon respectable members of their sex.

There were two categories of slaves, public and private. Public slaves were found in the court, in the various Ministries, and in the courier stations. Private slaves included those who were bought at the marketplace and those who came with the bride as part of her

dowry. Less frequently, commoners would sell themselves into bondage in payment of debts. Slaves were encouraged to marry, since the children of slaves remained slaves. Slavery was abolished in the 1894 reform, and both public and private slaves were freed (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Non-Kin-Based Associations

Traditionally, non-kin associations performed important functions which were not fulfilled by the social unit of the family (see ch. 7, Family). They also frequently served as the basis for personal bonds and loyalties outside the family.

The village was the principal unit of social cohesiveness, forming the basis of almost all social contacts. Members of a village developed a strong feeling of communality, cooperating in agricultural tasks, giving mutual assistance in times of crisis, and functioning as political units. Certain less formalized types of associations for recreation and mutual assistance often developed according to age and sex. This situation persisted largely intact throughout the period of Japanese control.

Until recently, many of the people lived in small rural communties or villages. These villages varied considerably in size, ranging from one or two households to 100 or more. The size of the village was closely related to the agricultural conditions of the area in which it was located. The great majority of the villages were composed of farming households of two main types: those founded by a noble family and composed of members of just one clan, and those composed entirely of commoner families, representing a number of different clans.

Traditionally, the villages were governed by a council of influential elders who debated and acted on matters of common interest. The elders helped to organize mutual aid groups for communal proceedings, such as funerals, flood control, and guarding the forests. Special rites and festivities associated with the propitiation of those spirits guarding the village welfare were also the concern of these mutual self-help groups. Although the traditional authority of the village elders declined during the Japanese occupation, the elders were still used as liaison between the villagers and the authorities, and the social aspects of village life remained much as before. Community feeling was usually strong enough so that members were eager to contribute to the cooperative projects. Villagers were expected to share the joy and sorrow of neighbors by attending weddings, funerals, 60th birthday celebrations, and other special occasions within the community.

Age-Group Associations

Most recreational activity was carried on among persons of the

same sex and approximately the same age. As soon as boys began to spend much of their time away from the household, they formed play groups with other boys of the same age, and many of the friendships lasted throughout life. In some villages these same boys later worked together at herding; when they became active farmers, these early cultivated friendships often formed the basis for cooperative work groups. Only men in the same age group could indulge in uninhibited drinking and humorous discourse.

The village schools were commonly used as men's clubhouses after school hours. Here the younger men gathered for recreation while their elders discussed village affairs.

Girls, too, had play groups among their own age sets in their earlier years but, unlike boys, these friendships seldom lasted beyond puberty. At an early age girls began to perform household tasks. Since they married young and moved to the village of their husband's family, most of their associates would be other female members of the household.

Individuals sometimes formed special friendship-brother attachments, formalized to the extent that the agreement was witnessed by a third person over a bottle of wine or signalized by the mingling of their blood. Adults made only one such arrangement during a lifetime. Children, however, pledged more such allegiances, since these friendships were not binding when the one adult bond was formed. Outside of family or clan ties, this was the strongest interpersonal tie in the society. Such a friend was said to be almost like a real brother or sister.

COMMUNIST CHANGES AFTER 1945

New Social Alignments

The Communist regime has consciously broken with the past in reorganizing the social structure. Factors which assisted in the social transformation were: the loss of authority by the political and social elite during the Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945; the flight of members of the elite to the south from 1945 to 1953 and the elimination of others for political reasons; the almost complete destruction of towns and cities and the consequent uprooting and dislocation of the population during the years of the Korean conflict.

Urban and Rural Working Class

Following the end of hostilities in 1953, the Government's decision to collectivize agriculture was a significant move in furthering its policy of reorganizing society and increasing its control over the population. By 1958 all private ownership of farmland had ended. Cooperative farms became basic units for political,

economic, and social control by the regime. In 1960, as a measure of concession to what it described as the "backward mentality" of the peasant, the Government relaxed its pressure to the extent of allowing each farm family to maintain a small plot of land for its own use.

An additional element in the new order was the establishment of State farms. The workers were employed by the Government on these farms and received wages, but they did not share in the profits. According to Kim Il-sung, State farms were the highest form of social organization. In theory, the ultimate goal was the attainment of an agricultural system made up entirely of such farms, populated by enlightened rural workers on an equal level with the urban workers. There were indications that the change from cooperative to State farms was not being pursued with vigor in 1968 (see ch. 18, Agriculture).

The officially stated goal of the Party's social changes was the transformation of the entire society into one class, the working class. The differences which existed between urban and rural workers were to be eliminated, and the ideological, cultural, and technical levels of the peasantry were to be brought up to those of the urban working class.

The actual situation in mid-1968 was one of rural-urban imbalance. This was based, in part, upon the difference between the two groups' occupational structures and social allegiances that the Party called "level of social consciousness." The slcwer pace of social change in rural areas and the backwardness of rural workers were perennial concerns of the regime.

Much official thought and attention were devoted to the problem of the rural population and, through the years, various approaches to a solution were tried. The regime charged local government agencies and Party cadres with the responsibility of reeducating the peasantry. Enforced population shifts were attempted in rejection of the traditional concept of being bound to the land. The Ch'ŏllima movement (see Glossary) and required attendance at ideological sessions were other instruments of change. Besides the benefits of conditioning, these sessions so occupied the peasant's time that there was little time remaining for reminiscing about the old ways. There was a definite attempt to repudiate the past and direct the attention of the worker to the future.

Despite its professed desire to raise the rural population to the level of the urban workers, the Government instituted some practices which served to perpetuate existing rural-urban imbalances. Other practices were continued which tended to create clear distinctions between all workers and the managerial elite. In urban areas the Government's emphasis on rapid industrialization pro-

vided an attractive opportunity for social advancement to the ranks of the technically capable and the politically reliable. It was an opening to potential membership in the higher ranks of the elite, for the special value of the technocrat was being recognized as the society became more modernized.

The Elite

The new elite consisted of the ranking members of the Party and Government, managers of State enterprises, scientists, the more highly skilled technicians, men of arts and letters, and the upper echelons of the Army. The uppermost ranks of the elite were the highest Party leaders. Many of them owed their initial rise to power to Soviet backing at the time of the Soviet occupation and assumption of political control in 1945. The middle elite was composed of military officers, Party administrators, and managers of small industrial enterprises. A lower level elite was made up of local heads of People's Committees and the heads of cooperatives. Officially, great stress was placed on political reliability, technical competence, and active support of the Party; it was these factors, together with personal connections, which largely determined an individual's position in the social order.

Residual influences of the traditional social stratification and authority patterns were apparent within the elite. The attitudes of the lower level Party members toward the higher level members were in accord with traditional standards: honorific terms were still used when speaking to one's superior (see ch. 5, Language and Communication).

Social affairs and ceremonies reflected the higher and favored status of the Party bureaucracy. Marriage ceremonies were elaborately planned and well attended, in contrast to Party dicta to the people concerning the need for austerity and restraint in conducting social affairs (see ch. 7, Family).

The Armed Forces were held up for honor as defenders of the revolution and were provided with many material benefits. The officer corps was composed of Party members or candidates for Party membership (see ch. 24, The Armed Forces).

In spite of Communist propaganda to the contrary, there was much evidence of privileges being granted on the basis of social status. Allocation of housing was one example. Houses were classified into five grades. These dwellings ranged in size from one-room, half-sized kitchen apartments to private houses with well-kept gardens. Office workers and general laborers were assigned the smallest apartments, while teachers, chairman of Ch'ŏllima work teams, heads of provincial Party organizations, and administrators

vied for the next three classes of housing. Private dwellings were reserved for the highest ranking Party members.

There was also a formula based on social and political status that was used to determine the distribution of scarce consumer goods. Even basic necessities such as food and clothing were distributed, to a cretain degree, in accord with the individual's social standing. Emoluments were given to those in power and to those whose work, consonant with Party goals, entitled them to some status within the society (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Modern Associations

Local associations and clubs once formed a structure through which an individual associated with his peers and performed his role in society. The Communists have incorporated this custom and established centrally directed associations to further their political goals.

In 1968 Government control over groups and associations was pervasive. All types of activities, social strata, and interest groups were organized on a national basis and on local levels. Workers were organized in labor unions; peasants, in Agricultural Workers Unions; youth, in the Socialist Working Youth League; and women, in the Korean Democratic Women's Union. Such groups as the Korean Musicians Union, the Korean Artists Union, and the Korean Red Cross carried out cultural and other State-directed activities.

The Socialist Working Youth League was of particular importance in terms of both size and influence. Members assisted in the Government's efforts in conscription, campaigns against disease, elections, and adult education.

Farm cooperatives, factories, and workers' settlements were modern institutions which handled mutual aid. They served as continuing bodies through which the regime could exercise administrative control. These associations assumed many of the functions formerly fulfilled by the old, traditional villages. In appropriating these functions, the regime effected a break with the past and established a link between the national society and the local society of the rural and urban areas.

Membership in the various organizations was virtually compulsory. Besides being instruments for regimentation and indoctrination, they provided a controlled forum for the expression of opinion, which gave the authorities some gauge of the acceptability of particular official policies. It was largely through participation in the organizations that individuals indicated their identification with the Party; it was also through the recommendations of

fellow members that political posts and educational opportunities were made available. These groups, with their direct ties to the Central Government and the Party rather than to the family and other kin groups, were the chief means of upward mobility; the regime encouraged the concepts of individual movement and direct responsibility to the State.

CHAPTER 7
FAMILY

Since the Communists took over the Government in 1945, the nuclear family (a man, his wife, and their children), rather than the traditional extended patrilineal family (two or more nuclear families united by common ancestry), has been the basic socio-economic unit. The process of family change is being consciously fostered by the Government to undermine the authority of the older members of society and to transfer primary individual loyalty from the family to the State.

In 1968 the family could no longer be depended on to fulfill the function of caring for its distant kin in times of need, yet the feeling persisted that this was a family obligation. There were fragmentary indications of tensions within the family system, particularly between members belonging to different generations, over divergent intepretations of the rights and duties of the members of the household. Tensions arose when the traditional family values, such as the importance of assisting close relatives or accepting the advice of elders, conflicted with the new patterns of family life. The functions of the family had become more circumscribed; its authority, weakened.

The Government continued to assert that the traditional family hampered its efforts to create a new socialist order. It initiated a series of new policies designed to eliminate the so-called "feudal and bourgeois" vestiges. Women and young people were being urged to assert their rights independently of traditional family ties. Women were strongly encouraged to obtain outside employment. It was considered undesirable for family relations to influence behavior in government, commerce, production, or education. Despite the Government's professed efforts to "remodel" the family system, occasional official condemnation of "nepotism" and "bourgeois" vestiges in the society suggested that its endeavors had not been altogether successful.

The family system, with some modification, was patterned mainly after the Soviet model. Political regimentation and intensified industrialization, accompanied by increased urbanization, tended to foster the development of the nuclear family (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups).

THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

The extended patrilineal family was the prevailing social unit until 1945. It formed the residence groups and the unit for economic and social cooperation. Families were grouped into larger units called clans, which were composed of all the men and women related to one another through the males of the family. The functioning segments of the clan, however, were the extended groups of related males, since the women usually moved to different villages when they married. Among clan members living close to one another—for example, in a village or in clusters of villages consisting of households to which all the men of a single clan belonged—there was much cooperative activity, and the clan tie had considerable social significance. Among clan members living in widely separated areas, however, the functions of the clan were usually limited to honoring the clan ancestors and to regulating marriage. Marriage to a person of the same clan was prohibited; clan records made it possible to identify distant relatives.

Structure and Functions of the Family

Despite the homogeneity of Korean history, the social structure found in the north was slightly different from that in the south. Both the Confucian family system and the social structure were less rigid in the north. Most private Confucian academies, after the mid-15th century, were located in the south, and their influences were felt somewhat less in the north. A majority of court officials were selected from south Korean families, whereas many purged officials were banished to the northern fringes of the country.

Fewer cultured people were in the north than in the south, and this situation tended to minimize the significance of the extended family as being of collective importance or necessity. The concentration of more farms and irrigation projects and a larger proportion of the highest social class (*yangban*) in the south emphasized the importance of the extended family as a social and labor unit.

A complete household consisted of the grandparents, their sons and son's wives, and the children of these couples. In practice, when land became too scarce to support so large a household, many younger brothers moved out of the patriarchal household after their first children were born; however, as long as the father remained alive, these younger sons remained members of the immediate family, even though not of the household.

The family ideally was a permanent group which persisted longer than the lives of any living members and included the spirits of the deceased members. The most important function of the family

was to perpetuate family lines. This was the reason given for early marriage and for the pressing desire for many male childern. Although related to the need to have descendants carry on the ritual observances for ancestral members of the family, large families and male progeny became values in themselves.

The value placed on the permanence of the family was reflected in the extreme reluctance to sanction divorce. The Confucian ethic did not acknowledge divorce as the term is understood in the West. Marriage was a serious affair; it was an alliance between families. The "fortunes" of the two families, especially the bridegroom's, depended on making a good match. For the girl, marriage meant leaving her father's house and protection. If the wife greatly displeased her husband, he might repudiate her and send her back in disgrace to her father's house. The husband who disowned his wife was not able to take another as long as the first wife lived. He was free, however, to take as many concubines as he could support. Concubines were not regarded as legal wives, and the children of these unions were not recognized as legitimate offspring.

Remarriage of a widow was discouraged because such a step would take the children away from the deceased husband's household. It was also felt that remarriage on a woman's part was a shameful affront to her husband's spirit. Young widows, however, were often kidnaped by men from another village. Thus, a socially approved marriage could be effected since the widow was taken away against her will. Widowers, on the other hand, were encouraged to marry again and add new members to the family.

The status of an individual was primarily determined by his own position within the family and by the family's position in society, whether noble or common, scholars or peasants, merchants or butchers (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups). Family status also depended on the number of generations of venerated ancestors (see ch. 11, Religion).

Within a family an individual's status depended upon his generation, relative age, and sex. Generation was the primary factor, and grandparents and parents of either sex had to be treated with respect by their descendants. Within a generation, however, sex and then age were the determinants; a wife was obliged to defer to her husband, a sister to her brother, and a younger brother to an older brother.

The family was the basic economic unit in the society. It was the usual land-cultivating unit among farmers; men and their brothers worked together even when they maintained separate households. The products of the labor were shared by the household, in which the eldest brother or the father was responsible for the maintenance of all members under his authority—sons or

younger brothers, their wives, and their children. More distant relatives had claims on their family's help in times of need and on their hospitality at any time. As long as the traditional family was predominant there was seldom any orphaned child, widow, or aged person who could not be cared for in some household.

Relationships

The most important family relationships were those between members inhabiting the same household: husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, cousins, grandparents, mother-in-law and father-in-law, and wives of brothers. Although such ties varied with different individuals, rules of conduct and traditional relationships produced certain general patterns.

The father-son relationship was considered the most important since, particularly in the case of the oldest son, this was the line of descent through which the family would be perpetuated. The oldest son was the one who would, when his father died, maintain the family property, carry on the reverence of the family ancestors, and be responsible for the welfare of family members. The nature of the relationship was conditioned by the Confucian concept of benevolent paternalism and the proper respect patterns to be observed. The father was expected at all times to serve as a model of good behavior before his son, thus making impossible any intimate conversations, games, or joking between them. He was also the ultimate source of authority and the planner of his son's career, and he was supposed to be stern and reserved in his son's presence.

The father's relationship with his daughters was likely to be less strict, but it was so reserved that his communications with them were made primarily through his wife. Much the same relationship was then extended to his sons' wives although, since they lived in the household, they frequently had closer contact with him than his own daughters, who had left home at maturity. It was the duty of both sons and daughters, however, to return to the household for the funerals of both parents.

The husband-wife relationship also tended to be distant, since rules of etiquette required formal behavior between the sexes as well as between age groups. Marriages were arranged by parents and were based on the accomplishments of the individuals and on their family backgrounds rather than on the wishes of the couple. The rules of respect and dignity between husband and wife were reinforced by the fact that the couple did not know one another well and had little in common to discuss. Where the living arrangements permitted, the husband and wife spent most of their time in separate quarters of the home. Over the years the growth of

their children and common interests in their welfare frequently brought about more communication between husband and wife, and it was through her children that the wife gradually achieved some influence in the family.

The relationship between mother and children was close and warm, particularly when the children were young. The mother and the paternal grandmother cared for the needs of the children and were their source of comfort in times of stress. As teacher and disciplinarian the mother was a person to be respected by her children. Sons began to spend most of their time in male company after 7 years of age, but they continued to rely on the mother for comfort and sympathy. This close tie continued even after the son's marriage and was sometimes a source of mother-in-law troubles. The daughter-in-law, who owed respect to her husband's mother, had to accept her direction in the conduct of household affairs and could not reply to frequent criticisms of the way she executed the tasks delegated to her. There might be great antagonism between the two women, particularly when the relationship was new; on rare occasions a husband might intercede for his young wife.

The intimate mother-daughter ties ended at the time of the daughter's marriage. The daughter had to develop ties with her husband's family. Since the new household was frequently some distance away, it was difficult for a mother and her married daughter to keep in frequent contact after children had been born and the daughter had been accepted by her new family.

Brothers shared their possessions, slept together, and worked cooperatively during their childhood. Nevertheless, since the oldest brother was destined to be the head of the household, he had to be addressed by a special term of respect and treated in a respectful manner by the others.

Another close tie was that which developed between a younger brother and his eldest brother's wife. The wife of the eldest brother had to be very circumspect with her father-in-law and was under the constant and usually not very sympathetic supervision of her mother-in-law. Although her relationship with her husband's brothers were generally formal, she often became almost a second mother to a young brother-in-law.

Grandparents of either sex were persons to be greatly respected by their grandchildren. They tended to be less strict than the parents, partly because of their age and their right to break some of the forms of etiquette insisted upon for others in the family, and partly because of the great importance to them of their grandchildren (particularly males) as leaders in their worship after the death of the grandparents. They frequently spent much time

in their grandchildren's company, carried them about as babies, and generally catered to their wishes in a way that a parent, especially the father, would never do. The actual duties of caring for and training the children were often performed as much by the paternal grandmother as by the children's own mother.

Life Cycle

For the first 7 years children were allowed a great deal of freedom, then the separation of the sexes began, and boys and girls played in groups of their own sex and age. At about this time girls began to learn household tasks. The women of the household, particularly the mother, frequently spoke to them of marriage and the duties of a wife, but sexual matters were never discussed with unmarried girls. Boys over 7 were expected to spend much more time with the adult males than with the women. Most boys of upper-class families received a primary school education, and at least one son was encouraged to acquire the additional education necessary to pursue a life of scholarship or Government service. Lower-class boys began to work in the family fields at an early age.

The basic patterns of the Confucian ethic were absorbed by children primarily through observing the behavior of older members of the family or through being reprimanded for disregarding family rules. Girls learned that their most important functions would be childbearing and the maintenance of smooth family relationships by the diligent pursuit of household chores and by deference to male relatives to whom respect was owed. A boy learned that his principal duty would be to arrange for the welfare of those dependent on him. An upper-class boy learned that a cultured man controlled his emotions and desires and applied himself to becoming adept in the Chinese classics—the guide to right conduct. The behavior expected of lower-class families differed considerably from this ideal, but the function of the patriarchal male head of the household prevailed in all strata of the society, and women held a subordinate role even when it was not economically possible for them to be idle or secluded.

Many of the attitudes taught were related to the maintenance of smooth interpersonal relationships through standardized forms of conduct based on one's position in the family. The Confucian ethic also extended to such matters as honesty in dealing with others and the responsibilities of Government position, since dereliction in the performance of any duty would bring shame on the family as well as on the individual.

Marriages were arranged at an early age. The bridegroom often was younger than his wife, but no one would be likely to be un-

married at the age of 20 unless the family were in dire financial distress.

Although wedding ceremonies varied considerably between social classes, all families exerted themselves to observe the occasion as elaborately as possible and often contracted heavy debts in order to do so. In North Korea, 3 or 4 months before the wedding the bridegroom sent the dowry and other gifts; in the south the bride took the dowry to the bridegroom's house after the wedding. On the appointed day the bridegroom rode to his bride's house for the ceremony. The first part of the rite consisted of an exchange of prescribed vows between bride and bridegroom (indicating their mutual consent to the arrangement) and the drinking of rice wine from the same cup. The bride was then transported in a sedan chair to her husband's home, where her clothing and other belongings were carefully inspected by the female members of her new family.

Soon after her arrival the bride was formally introduced to her husband's father and mother and, in earlier times, to the ancestral tablets of deceased members of the family. Throughout the day the bride was supposed to keep her eyes lowered and not to speak or smile, but the rest of the wedding party, which included her male relatives, relatives of the bridegroom, and villagers, participated in a gala celebration which included as much feasting and drinking as the family of the bridegroom could afford. Soon after the wedding the husband paid a short visit to his wife's family, and some weeks later the bride made a longer visit home before taking up permanent residence in her husband's household.

Although marriage formally marked the change from childhood to adulthood, the bridegroom's family relationships changed slowly. Only with birth of a first child and his increasing ability to support a family and make decisions regarding its care was he considered an adult. It was largely these factors which determined when a married son would establish his own household. Even after marriage a man's leisure time was largely spent with other males of the same age group; only with these friends could a man drink and joke with few inhibitions.

In a society where a woman's role was closely related to having children, the first years in her new household were frequently unhappy and difficult. Gradually, however, with the birth of children, improved status, and the establishment of some rapport with her husband, she acquired a degree of influence over those affairs which related to the children. As her mother-in-law grew older the younger woman took over more of the operation of the household. By the time she was an old woman with grandchildren of her own, she could openly assert her authority.

For the male, the passage of his 60th birthday was a major occasion marked with as much pomp as the family could afford. Life was seen as occurring in 60-year cycles; upon entering his second cycle, the man assumed the role of patriarch, whose wisdom was to be sought and whose wishes were to be indulged.

Death in the traditional Korean view was merely a change of state, not a complete severance from the family. A living member of the family became one of its dead spirits who could influence family affairs; feasts given on special occasions recognized the deceased member's continued presence (see ch. 11, Religion).

Little regret was felt at the death of a man or woman who had many descendants and who had lived to a fairly old age. Children of less than 7 years of age, hardly considered permanent members of the family, were little lamented. If a child lived to be 7 but died before adulthood it was felt that misfortune had struck, but no unmarried person received special burial ceremonies and, for this reason, their spirits were especially feared. A man or woman who had children was always given a burial service (except in Buddhist families, which practiced cremation), the expense and elaborateness of which reflected the individual's position in society and the status of the family. Korean families strained their resources to provide the best possible funeral, since the way in which these forms were observed reflected on the family as a whole.

Upon the death of a man of social standing and wealth, the relatives would assemble to mourn aloud. The body, clothed in special garments, was placed in a pine coffin. Geomancers were requested to select a propitious day and a grave site for the funeral. Because of the elaborate preparations in the case of a prominent person, the funeral might not take place for several months; in most instances, however, burial occurred a few days after death.

FORCES FOR CHANGE

The opening of Korea to Western trade and influence in the late 19th century permitted new ideas to penetrate the country, and these in time had the effect of undermining the traditional family system. One of the most potent influences was Christianity. The Christian missionaries attacked the cult of ancestor worship so basic to the traditional family life. Through their spread of secular, Western education, the popular attitude toward women changed (see ch. 9, Education). Another source of change was the education of women, which enabled women to acquire Western attitudes toward the role of women in society. Among Christians, women were encouraged to emerge from their seclusion in the home to attend churches and schools, to work, and to participate with men on social occasions. Education for both sexes led to some

degree of economic independence and this, together with ideas of the importance of the individual, led to an increase in marriage by choice rather than by parental arrangement.

During the 35 years of Japanese rule (1910–45), these Western intellectual influences were intensified and, in many instances, codified in law. Government schools provided many Koreans of both sexes with a primary education (see ch. 9, Education). The number of available books and periodicals—some dealing with the outside world—greatly increased. Laws were passed allowing the private ownerhip of property and delegating the family responsibility to the head of the nuclear family rather than to the head of the extended one. Prostitution was legalized, and the rights of illegitimate children were recognized. Divorce was made relatively easy, although old attitudes prevented widespread divorce by any but the most westernized Koreans.

The large-scale introduction of a money economy into the rural areas, slow but steady industrialization, and urbanization under Japanese rule led also to the modification of the traditional pattern. New trends undermined the patriarchal family structure which was designed for a stable, landholding, agricultural type of society. As the small farmers became impoverished, younger sons were forced to migrate, and the industries which the Japanese were developing frequently provided an alternative. The young men who were successful in their new occupations seldom returned. For a while they continued to send part of their wages back to the head of the house, but after a period of years a complete break frequently occurred. Poverty made large, extended households impossible, weakening a link in the maintenance of strong family relationships. As industry and a market system developed, the famly became economically less self-sufficient.

Since the cultural changes took place more rapidly in the cities than in the countryside, rural-urban differences became increasingly evident by the 1920's and 1930's. It was primarily in the cities that the higher educational institutions were located, and modern ideas were more widely adopted. Many young people and women became financially independent, more individualistic, and less likely to accept the guidance of elders or the responsibilities of extended family ties than they were in former years.

The Communist takeover in 1945 was followed by a planned program of social reorientation. In the decade that followed, Government leaders were inspired by the Soviet policy on family. Marriage laws and family laws were designed to conform to the Soviet model. The implementation of agricultural collectivization and the establishment of worker's settlements brought about a further modification in family structure.

Changes in family life were also caused by the mass exodus of people to south Korea to avoid Communist rule; between 1945 and 1950, over 1.5 million people fled south. The Korean conflict (1950–53) also caused extensive movements of people; ties between families were broken and further disintegration of the traditional family system occurred.

THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNIST RULE

Official Policies

Since 1945 the regime has actively pursued a course of action calculated to break down the traditional family patterns. To create a new social order, the Government asserted that all traces of the old ways of life must be eliminated. Foremost among these were "family-ism" and feudal Confucian ideas. Toward that end the Government instituted a neighborhood five-family mutual surveillance system and assigned a member of a Party cadre to each such unit for purposes of control and political indoctrination. His influence extended even into the private affairs of the family.

Lineage records, essential to the operation of the extended family system, were burned by the Government. Family connections, maintained through many generations, were erased. Responsibility for the upkeep of each register had been vested in the head of the household and worked to strengthen his position within the family. He could have a name excluded from the rolls and sometimes did so, for example, in the case of an imprudent widow. The Communists, by destroying the records, not only wiped out the documented bonds of kinship, but undermined the authority of the head of the household.

Measures that affected the family were laws liberalizing divorce and giving women political and economic equality with men. Paternal authority, based upon feudal tradition, was eliminated: In the mid-1960's a man or woman could obtain a divorce with relative ease, without the consent of the families involved. The system of monogamy was enforced, and marriage based upon free choice was used as a cornerstone for women's emancipation. Married couples living apart were encouraged to obtain a legal divorce. In addition, to eliminate the opportunities through which the social bonds of the traditional family system were reinforced, the Government restricted the number of attendants at a wedding ceremony.

The legal basis for marriage was the Constitution, promulgated in 1948. Articles 11, 12, 17, 22, and 23 have had a decisive influence on the traditional family relationships. Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 23 state the legal foundation of the family system and anticipate a comprehensive codified family law.

Before the enactment of the Penal Code in March 1950, family law was administered as a separate entity but, after 1950, enforcement functions were handled under the Code. This procedure was inspired by Soviet legal procedures, but North Koreans attempted to formulate laws according to their own needs.

In November 1958 the first comprehensive law on marriage was published. It was a compilation of family laws and was not meant to be final. It was a tentative draft and its purpose was to serve as a guideline; it constituted a legal basis for the future.

In 1961, the latest year for which information on the family structure was available, there were still many issues for which written laws were lacking. Legal questions were answered by judges whose verdicts were based upon "democratic consciousness and interests of the Korean People."

The enactment of family laws has been delayed by North Korea's desire not to antagonize the people of the south. In 1968 they were acting on an ad hoc basis, fearing that the promulgation of any definitive family law might have adverse repercussions politically and socially.

Betrothals were not recognized legally, and child marriages or parentally arranged marriages were not permitted. As a rule, plural marriages were forbidden.

There were no explicit laws against incest. Marriage between two people sharing the same name was allowed, whereas under the traditional family system this had been strictly forbidden. Questions of incest violation and nullification of marriage were handled in a court of law by judges who based their decisions upon "democratic consciousness."

Marriage must be reported and duly registered, and this was the only legal recognition accorded to it. Couples appeared in the registrar's office, filled out the proper forms stating that the marriage was freely entered into, and answered questions as to the number of previous marriages and the number of children born of these marriages. The couples were then presented with a certificate of marriage. Traditional wedding ceremonies and common law marriages were not recognized. Only couples living together were regarded as being married.

When a couple married they could use either the same or different family names. This was sanctioned by the Government in recognition of the independence of either spouse.

Couples shared and managed their property equally. Property acquired during marriage was common property, but that acquired before marriage was considered personal, as was property inherited during marriage. All disputes involving property settlement were handled by the courts.

Marriage through choice rather than parental arrangement was officially sanctioned, although many young couples sought approval from the Party or an affiliated organization before marrying. Wedding dates were selected so that they fell on a Sunday or a holiday, thus avoiding the loss of a workday. Marriage ceremonies were not elaborate; sometimes they took place in schools or factories rather than in the bride's home. Decorations were limited to a picture of Kim Il-sung, and wedding finery was eschewed in favor of everyday clothing. Civil marriages were performed, and the local Party secretary or foreman handled the registration procedures. The purpose of this was to demonstrate the loyalty of the couple to the Party and to Premier Kim Il-sung. Couples received a paid 3-day holiday after the marriage but, upon their return, were required to make up lost production time. Unmarried persons living together were encouraged to marry with or without parental consent. According to an official claim, couples—married or not—attending schools were often subsidized by the Government, presumably to lessen their dependence on their families.

Marriage could be dissolved in one of two ways, either through divorce or the death of a spouse. Before April 1956 a "free divorce system"—divorce by mutual consent—was in effect. The Government found, however, that too many couples took advantage of this procedure, and it decreed that all divorce proceedings must pass through a People's Court, which sat only in cities and counties. The courts, in turn, either attempted to reconcile the parties or acted as arbitrator. Impulsive divorce was made punishable under the law. To further discourage divorce, application fees were made expensive. In instances where the proceedings were directed against a person judged to be anti-Party or anti-Government, however, the fee was low. Remarriage was recognized for both parties but, in the case of an individual who sought a third divorce, the petition had to be made to a Provincial Court, where the fee was even higher.

Divorce was not allowed when the wife was pregnant or had a child under 1 year of age. Proceedings could not be started against a solider of the People's Army.

In most instances, both parties were required to attend divorce hearings. In 1953, however, the Supreme Court issued a guidance directive stating that if either party defected to the enemy or if the life or death of one party could not be ascertained, divorce proceedings could be instituted without the presence of the second party.

Sixtieth birthday celebrations, once very auspicious occasions for men (and still so in the Republic of Korea) were restricted by the Party. They were criticized as a waste of time. Authorities as-

serted that a man of 60 should be working as hard as a younger men. The celebrations actually were frowned upon because they traditionally served as important occasions for family or clan reunions, occasions to renew family loyalty.

Funeral services were also viewed as time-consuming episodes. Those who held funeral services were permitted 3 days off from work, with the stipulation that they make up for lost time. In cities cooperative associations took care of funeral arrangements, but the maximum number of family members and close friends allowed to go to the cemetery was 30. Those people who could not provide the necessary funds for a funeral were allowed to borrow a communal truck to transport the body. Young men often did not take part in funeral services for fear of Party criticism, but old men continued to participate in the traditional funeral procession.

All memorial services were discouraged after the end of the Korean conflict. It was thought that the people who gathered on such occasions would reminisce over the old days and complain about the difficulties of the new. These occasions encouraged a tendency toward the perpetuation of old family ties, the waste of needed food and materials, and the fear that such social gatherings would enable "enemies" of the people to plot against the Party. Since 1958 Party restrictions on memorial services have been eased, in part because the memorial services could be used for the dissemination of Party propaganda.

Status of Women

Strong efforts to implement the policy of economic equality for women have been dictated by ideological reasons as much as by the pressing shortage of the labor force. Women were found primarily in light industry and educational fields where they made up the majority. A few were chairmen of agricultural cooperatives. In order to facilitate the "emancipation" of women, many kindergartens and nurseries have been established in factories and agricultural cooperatives. According to a North Korean report in 1967, about one-half of all employed persons were women (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force).

Women from 18 to 55 years of age were permitted to join the Korean Democratic Woman's Union. Their rights were explained to them, and an indoctrination program was carried out. They were admitted to the State-controlled organizations, in which they were considered coequal with their husbands. More women were given political appointments, particularly as members of the people's committees, as lay judges (assessors) and as members of propaganda cadres.

It has been considered particularly important to indoctrinate

women in the "new socialist morality" because of their influence on children. Although children were educated mainly by state schools, parents were urged to recognize that "children are not merely the sons and daughters of their parents, but they are also the sons and daughters of the Fatherland, of the Party, and of the people as a whole." Indoctrination was so pervasive that some children voluntarily reported the activities of their parents to the Party organization. Parents, therefore, were called upon to raise their ideological and cultural levels, verse themselves in "scientific" views of life, and maintain close contact with the schools.

Young men and boys were encouraged to join youth groups. The Socialist Working Youth League accepted young men from 14 to 30 years of age. The Young Pioneers enrolls all children between 9 and 13 years of age. Young people were taught that the power of the State is superior even to that of the father. The youth groups have been used to enforce compulsory school attendance, and through them the children have learned to establish new social relationships outside the family. The children were expected by the Party to find in the groups a source of support for defying or questioning parental authority.

Rapid industrialization and the manner in which the rural economic life was organized around cooperatives advanced the trend toward smaller nuclear families and toward the elimination of the family as the basic economic unit. Modern apartment houses, five and six stories high, were being built in the cities and in workers' settlements. Family size was limited by the number of rooms available in each apartment unit. The Government was building and repairing farmhouses. Attempts were made to break up larger families by having members move to different cooperatives where their talents and capabilities could be better utilized.

The age-old customs of intrafamily welfare responsibilities were decreasing in the smaller households. The State instituted programs whereby the disabled, the aged, and orphans were granted pensions and subsidies.

CHAPTER 8
LIVING CONDITIONS

Living conditions constituted one of the most difficult of the ideological issues confronting the Communist regime in 1968. The problem was to maintain a delicate balance between the priority objective of industrialization and the provision of sufficient consumer goods and social services to prevent dangerous dissatisfaction among the populace. The regime also needed consumer goods as material incentives to production and as a means of strengthening those groups—particularly industrial workers, intellectuals, and bureaucrats—on which it depended most for support. At stake was the entire ideological foundation of the society.

As these considerations were predominant, the economic circumstances of every individual were fixed by the same centralized, detailed governmental planning that determined all other aspects of life under the Communist regime. In short, the Government tried to make a total welfare state replace the family-oriented welfare system of the past; the State provided for health, food, clothing, housing, education, and entertainment.

Verifiable information about the living conditions of the people is scanty. The closed nature of Communist societies is reflected with increased intensity in North Korea under Premier Kim Il-sung. This characteristic is accentuated also by war and cold war conditions that have prevailed on the Korean Peninsula for nearly a quarter of a century and by the relative geographic and almost complete political isolation of North Korea. Only a few correspondents, limited to individuals regarded by the authorities as ideologically dependable, are allowed to enter the country. Most other visitors also must be ideologically acceptable and, consequently, their observations upon leaving the country usually echo the propaganda line of the Government and the Party. Even those regarded as "reliable" are not permitted to travel freely.

Some of the information available to the outside world relies upon reports received by the Republic of Korea, which is in a state of suspended hostilities with North Korea, or by other governments, many of which are allied with the Republic. Other sources are the official statements of the North Korean Government and its propaganda publications, as well as the limited number of defectors to the south.

Government statements are designed to create a particular impression abroad or to increase the loyalty and zeal of domestic workers. Their ambiguity makes them suspect. Most official statements concerning the welfare of the population are couched in relative terms—percentages of increaese over arbitrarily selected base years, per capita averages which have little meaning when applied to a society in which the average man exists only as an abstraction, and broad generalities unsupported by statistical evidence.

The general picture which emerges from available sources is that the people in 1968 were somewhat better off materially than they were either under Japanese occupation or at any time since. There is evidence, however, that a high price in human endeavor and human freedom has been paid for this advance. The spiritual quality of life is also part of the price. Lack of unregulated leisure, the steadily increasing pressures for greater productivity, the endless ideological indoctrination, the rigid institutionalization of all forms of human activity, the absence of individual freedom, and the disruption of social patterns which had prevailed for centuries have undermined that quality.

It is also clear that the living standards of the urban worker have advanced more rapidly than those of the peasant. The Government, especially since 1961, has repeatedly promised to eliminate this disparity.

Other generalizations about living conditions in the north are difficult to make because discriminatory price, allocation, and rationing systems create widely varied standards of living. The Party hierarchy, key bureaucrats, leading intellectuals, military officers, and other members of the elite live on one level, whereas the ordinary workers and peasants subsist on quite another. Announced basic salaries mean little in judging living standards since fringe benefits are the major determinant. One official Communist publication estimated in 1967 that such benefits amounted to 1½ times a worker's wage.

It was evident from leaders' statements and from all other available sources that even the best living standards were still low when compared with those of most other countries in 1968. Although improvements undoubtedly have been achieved in food, shelter, clothing, public health, and medical care, the North Koreans have a long way to go to attain the goal of what Kim Il-sung described as a bountiful and cultural life. That it was necessary to ration daily necessities was evidence that they were in short supply. Nevertheless, when it is considered that the economy was in ruins at the end of the Korean conflict, the amount of reconstruction so far achieved has been a feat of considerable magnitude.

National income per capita was declared by Kim Il-sung, in a speech to the Supreme People's Assembly in December 1967, to have reached 500 wŏn (approximately 2.5 wŏn equal U.S. $1) in 1966, which the Premier said was a "1.2-fold increase" over that in 1962. He predicted it would reach 580 wŏn in 1967. In 1968 he reported that national income in 1967 was 9 times that of 1946 and 4.4 times that of 1949.

That dissatisfaction exists despite any such gains is acknowledged by the Communist leadership, but always with a glowing forecast of better days to come and with a justification based on the necessity for advancing the revolutionary cause through individual self-denial. The outside observer becomes aware of three separate North Koreas within the Communist propaganda framework: one which the Government promises for tomorrow or next year, another which the leadership describes as already having been achieved, and a third which corresponds to reality and which the outside world hears the least about.

Little information is available about the extent of popular dissatisfaction. That some dissatisfaction exists can be inferred chiefly from the fact that the leadership dwells upon the subject of livelihood in its most important public utterances. The motivation undoubtedly is twofold: to spur greater production and to tell all groups that the top leadership is aware of and is giving attention to their problems.

When promised improvement in living conditions does not take place to the extent forecast, as has been the case annually, the leadership offers such excuses as unexpectedly bad weather or a need to increase defense efforts because of the so-called threat of aggression from the United States and the Republic of Korea.

The latest mechanism in the country's defense program that has a direct bearing on living conditions is a program to create a nationwide system of interlocking *saenghwal-kwŏn* (lit., livelihood circles), or self-supporting units. These units were being established in 1967 in each city and village, in each factory, and on each cooperative farm. Under the plan, even if an area were cut off from its external environment it would be expected to subsist independently of others. In this way, national defense and local economy are being integrated into a functioning parallel pattern.

PROMISES AND PERFORMANCE

Kim Il-sung asserted in 1968 that the people had been freed from worry about livelihood and beggars had been banished from the streets. At the same time, however, he acknowledged that only the most essential problems had been solved and that "we

have not yet been able to make their life very bountiful and cultured."

The Premier spoke against the background of the Fourth Party Congress decision in 1961 to alter the proportion between heavy and light industry to provide an increase in the percentage of consumer goods while retaining priority for heavy industry. He had promised in 1961 that 1964 would be the year of a great new turn in living conditions. Specifically, he pledged 3 million tons of rice, 200,000 tons of meat, nearly 330 million yards of fabric, and modern houses for 600,000 families in both town and country by 1964. All of the people, he assured, would ". . . lead a rich life, living in tile-roofed houses, eating rice and much meat, and wearing fine clothes."

His 1968 acknowledgment merely confirmed what he had been forced to recognize in 1964, that the prophecy had not been fulfilled and that a great new turn was still in the future. He held out the promise that disparities in the living standards of country and city residents would soon be eliminated.

That the Premier's glowing forecast had not been fulfilled by October 1968 was evident from an editorial in the Government daily newspaper, *Minju Chosŏn* (Democratic Korea), which demanded improvements in quality, quantity, and variety of consumer goods. It stressed a need for better cloth and more tasty and nutritious food and called for a heightened sense of responsibility and better planning, among other remedies, on the part of officials.

As a demonstration of its intentions, the regime spent 1 billion wŏn between 1961 and 1965, according to a report of First Deputy Premier Kim Il in 1968, for the improvement of the peasants' living conditions. This inclusive figure represented about 200 million wŏn each year; in 1963 the annual average represented about 6 percent of that year's total national expenditure. This undoubtedly accounted for part of the increased investment in education, culture, housing, public facilities, commerce, and social services which the Government said occurred in 1960 and in the first 3 years of the Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67).

That 1964 was not the year of plenty that the Premier had promised was acknowledged by Deputy Premier Kim Kwang-hyŏp in September of that year. He commented that "the quality of our products is not very high and they are not as abundant as to meet all the requirements of the people. . . ."

Speaking to a Party conference in 1966, Kim-Il-sung again complained of lack of adequate progress in improving quantity and quality of food and clothing. "We must . . . radically im-

prove the material and cultural standards of the people," he was quoted as saying.

Despite the Premier's urging, he was forced to make the same appeal again in an address to the Supreme People's Assembly in May 1967. "The question is," he declared, "whether or not our workers and cadres will wage a resolute struggle to expand the varieties of goods and improve their quality." At that time he again spoke of the need for promptly raising the quality of goods "to the world level."

The Premier stated in December of the same year that not only more food and clothing were needed, particularly winter clothing, but better distribution practices were necessary. He also called for expanded and improved service on the part of restaurants and other public service establishments.

In April 1968 this exhortation was followed in an address by First Deputy Premier Kim Il to the Party's Central Committee. He criticized leading cadres in trade for their "irresponsible work attitude" and called on them to make a study of consumer demands for different areas, seasons, and walks of life. He blamed "irresponsible" distribution procedures for many commodities being unsold in some places while the same goods were in short supply elsewhere, causing losses to the State. He particularly criticized failure to achieve an adequate distribution of vegetables, meat, eggs, and edible oil in the capital city while such supplies were in dead stock in stores. For the rural areas he demanded a sharp increase in household goods, cloth, shoes, cabinets, sewing machines, radio and television receivers, clocks, and soap.

One of the most candid admissions that the regime had failed in its promise to raise the living standards was made by First Deputy Premier Kim Il in April 1968. In a speech to a Party gathering, he complained that ministers and their top subordinates were not giving sufficient attention to the livelihood of the workers. He attributed the lack of significant improvement in welfare service work to the failure of the leading cadres to pay attention and organize work in a responsible manner. He added:

> The problem is that leading cadres are irresponsible and unconcerned about the working peoples' problems of food, clothing, and housing. As Comrade Kim Il-sung teaches, lack of concern about welfare service work is an expression of the outdated capitalist ideological concept.

Nevertheless, internal and external Communist sources continued in 1968 to assert that all problems of livelihood had been basically resolved in North Korea.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

Despite an irregular diet lacking in protein, calcium, and several vitamins—particularly A^1, B^1, and B^2—the average life expectancy had increased 20 years and mortality had been reduced by one-half between 1945 and 1960, the Government asserts (no absolutes have been disclosed) (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force). The substance of this claim has not varied for some years, and the same statistic was used in 1967 by Kim Il-sung in a public speech. The regime also boasts that infant mortality had been reduced by three-quarters in the same time period, although the absolute rate per 1,000 has not been made public. Nevertheless, little evidence is offered by the Governmnt to show that there has been any material relief from the many parasitic infections, widespread tuberculosis, and other epidemic diseases which have plagued the people for centuries. These conditions were aggravated by the war years, and the physical vitality of most North Koreans may well be below its potential.

The health and sanitation program has been highly centralized after the manner of its Soviet model. The Government asserts that free medical care is provided for all, with at least a clinic in each *ri* (village) and more elaborate facilities in provincial and other large centers. Most village clinics are equipped with first aid supplies, one doctor, and one nurse. Each *kun* (county) has a People's Hospital staffed by three or four interns and one to three doctors; only simple operations can be performed at that level.

A 1968 Communist broadcast boasted that, in 1966, expenditures for public health were 13.5 times the amount spent in 1952. In the first half of 1967, the Government said, prophylactic and therapeutic installations had increased 5.8 times; doctors, 21.6 times; and hospital beds, 5.3 times over 1952.

Background

Traditionally, medical care has been the concern of the family, and spirit beliefs provided the basis of an understanding of disease (see ch. 11, Religion). In 1968 such beliefs and practices, although officially disparaged and gradually lessened, continued on a limited basis in rural areas where some believe that problems of health and disease can be solved by establishing a proper relationship with the world of spirits. Some spirits, especially those of persons who died away from home or by violence, may cause serious diseases, it is thought. In such cases a shaman is called in, and an elaborate ceremony is performed to conciliate the spirit and drive it away.

The Communists have sought to combine the best of the tra-

ditional and modern practices. They have emphasized preventive medicine as well as the usefulness of *tongŭihak* (Eastern or Chinese medicine) side by side with modern medicine which was introduced into Korea in the late 19th century by Protestant medical missionaries. Propaganda organs take great pride in certain Korean discoveries in *tongŭihak* called *kyŏngnak* (related to the central nervous system) which they have proclaimed as "epoch making" in contemporary biology and medicine. Traditional medicine relies on herbs and acupuncture, and modern scientific research methods are being used to determine their value in contemporary medical practice. The regime has established the Tongŭihak Central Hospital in Pyongyang and *tongŭihak* hospitals in at least some of the provinces. Other hospitals have tongŭihak departments, and the Pyongyang Medical College and other medical schools have *tongŭihak* faculties. The Ministry of Public Health collected about 9,000 formulas for traditional medicines and published them in 1965.

National Organization

Power to enforce public health measures and operate medical care and sanitation is vested in the Ministry of Public Health. In 1967 the Ministry was divided into six bureaus, dealing with planning, medical administration, finance, prevention of communicable diseases, quarantine, and pharmaceutical-medical equipment manufacturing. In addition, it maintains the Medical Science Research Institute, State-operated hospitals, and an office for training public health cadres. A national health insurance system has been established, hospitals and medical education have been nationalized, and doctors and other medical personnel have been employed by the Government.

The regime has not published complete or recent statistics on the number of physicians, dentists, nurses, and other medical personnel. A 1964 report for dissemination abroad said that, in 1963, the number of doctors and assistant doctors was 18 times the number in 1946. One official report gave 22,706 as the number of doctors and resident doctors in 1964, or about 19 for every 10,000 persons.

In his December 1967 speech, Kim Il-sung reported that there had been an increase in medical facilities that year, but expressed dissatisfaction and called for still greater effort to improve all medical services, traditional and modern. He declared also that "the qualifications of doctors should be raised decisively" and called for the production of more antibiotics and other medicines. This was echoed the following spring by Deputy Premier Kim Il, who told the Party's Central Committee that a rapid in-

crease in the production of medicines was needed as well as a drastic expansion of their variety.

To alleviate the shortage of medical personnel, the Government is educating not only full-fledged physicians but also so-called junior medical doctors, who receive short-term medical training, and auxiliary health workers. As in the case of modern medicine, there are two grades of doctors practicing traditional medicine, one with more training than the other. There are also schools in which women receive professional nurses' training. Medical personnel are trained at four medical colleges—at Pyongyang, Ch'ŏngjin, Hamhŭng, and Haeju—which graduate about 1,000 students annually. In addition, there are more than 10 medical schools for short-term training.

Republic of Korea sources report that in 1963–64 North Korea allowed about 6,000 doctors and junior doctors to graduate with only 1 year of training in order to staff rural clinics. This may have been the basis for the Premier's demand for improvement of doctors' qualifications.

As part of the emphasis on preventive medicine, every city block, factory, and village has organized a committee for the prevention of epidemics. County and city hospitals have been assigned general responsibility for the health of the communities in which they are located and for the inspection of sanitary conditions. Teams of doctors and nurses are sent from village to village to give lectures on sanitation.

The compensation for doctors and other medical personnel is decided in much the same way as for urban workers or peasants. They are assigned to a particular locality, and their pay is based on a point system reflecting the number of patients treated, thus conforming to the Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse) movement (see Glossary). Doctors complain of an inordinate amount of paperwork, whereas patients complain that doctors prefer to treat only the slightly ill so that they can treat more patients and gain a higher point score.

Doctors must issue certificates to enable a worker to be absent without losing his food ration, and they must report on the patient's condition every 5 days. A longer absence requires approval by higher medical authorities. Patients must go first to their nearest village clinic, then to a county hospital before being admitted to a provincial hospital. While a worker is ill, he is entitled to from 40 to 60 percent of his regular pay, according to official North Korean reports.

The health insurance plan was established in 1945. Under its provisions all Government employees and workers in industrial plants and mines are entitled to free medical care; 60 percent

of the cost of medical care for their dependents also is paid. Peasants who are members of collectives are included in the program. Employees contribute 1 percent of their incomes for 7 months of the year to the fund; the rest of the cost is met by the employer, whose contribution may range from 5 to 12 percent of the total wage payment. Five categories of patients receive free care without regard to their employment or family status: mental cases, children up to 3 years of age, maternity cases, students with scholarships, and persons with communicable diseases.

In 1962 the Government reported the number of public hospitals to be 167. Another report in 1964 said the number had increased 6.29 times over 1946, and the total number of hospital beds was asserted to have increased by 24 times. The Central Statistical Bureau of the State Planning Commission announced in 1964 that during the first half of that year the number of hospitals and clinics increased by 3 percent and the total number of beds by 6 percent over the corresponding period of the previous year. The regime boasts also of specialized hospitals for such purposes as the treatment of mental patients, children's diseases, and tuberculosis. Various sanatoriums and rest homes are also maintained.

Most of the equipment in the larger hospitals was left behind by the departing Japanese in 1945 or was provided by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Rumania. Much of it is obsolete. Most of the large provincial hospitals were built by Rumania and Bulgaria. Only provincial hospitals and those in large factories and enterprises have X-ray facilities. Most of the city hospitals are constructed with funds provided by the Central Government, whereas clinics in rural areas are paid for with funds furnished by cooperative farms.

There are two major pharmaceutical manufacturers, in Sunch'ŏn and Hŭngnam, and small-scale factories are scattered in other major industrial areas. Since medicines are expensive, most families must reply upon those dispensed at their local clinic or hospital. There is one "People's Drug Store" in each county, however, which has simple remedies for sale.

Environmental Sanitation

Water Supplies

In general, water supplies are adequate except in certain areas of the extreme north, but rainfall in Korea is seasonal and fluctuating so that cities and rural areas must cope with floods and drought from time to time. In rural communities and smaller towns water is taken from rivers, creeks, wells, and springs,

nearly all of which are contaminated because of the use of night soil for fertilizer.

Waste Disposal

For centuries human excreta has been collected and used for fertilizer. Although the Communist regime has had little to say on this subject, the practice is traditional in most of Asia where there are insufficient supplies of commercial fertilizer. This has resulted in the spread of various types of parasitic and other diseases. Until recently there were few flush toilets, even in the largest cities, only a few private septic tanks, and no sewage treatment plants. Although modern apartment houses in cities are equipped with bathrooms, water is not always supplied, and housewives may have to carry water to their apartments in order to use the equipment. Usually there is one toilet facility on each floor but, where water supplies are not adequate, the facility cannot be used. In some instances, a wooden frame toilet has been constructed in the backyard for use by as many as 100 persons.

Insects and Rodents

Insects and rodents, which carry various contagious diseases, have in the past abounded. The impact that public health measures have had, including rat and mosquito extermination efforts, is not known.

Diseases

Detailed statistics on morbidity and mortality are not made public by the Government. Tuberculosis, leprosy, Japanese B encephalitis, and poliomyelitis are known to have been major medical problems in the past. Typhoid fever and diphtheria are also said to have been prevalent.

There is almost universal parasitic infection, and various diseases of the digestive tract are among the leading causes of death. Three types of typhus are reportedly present, and smallpox is endemic on all of the Peninsula. There were no authenticated reports on whether cholera and malaria were current problems by 1968, and the venereal disease rate was not known.

Communicable Disease Control

Almost immediately after the Ministry of Public Health was organized in 1948, it launched an extensive immunization program. Shots or vaccinations for smallpox, typhoid, paratyphoid, and cholera are compulsory, and each individual is required to carry proof of immunization. Periodic spot checks are carried out by the authorities, and additional shots are given in case of an epidemic. According to official sources, Japanese B encephalitis has been completely eradicated through the use of an effec-

tive vaccine developed in 1962 and through spraying to eliminate mosquitoes. The extent of vaccination programs has been limited by the availability of medical personnel and vaccines; their supply has varied considerably among localities. In Pyongyang crews of doctors and nurses cover the city systematically by blocks, checking records and immunizing those who can not produce them. In the remote mountainous areas, however, there probably have been few innoculations.

According to law, acute communicable diseases must be reported to the health authorities, and patients must be segregated for treatment. Communicable disease centers, usually headed by a junior medical doctor, have been set up in cities, counties, and townships. Periodic case-finding days are designated, during which an epidemiological team, consisting of a security force officer, a district health worker, and a district clerk, carry out home inspections to locate unreported cases of communicable disease.

PUBLIC WELFARE

Within the Communist system the State does not confine its paternalism to medical care. Benefits are provided for workers temporarily disabled, women during pregnancy and childbirth, funerals, and workers permanently disabled by accident incurred or occupational disease contracted while on duty. These are paid for by the social insurance fund. In theory there also are old-age pensions, but Communist sources have been silent as to whether this part of the plan is fully operative. Since 1964 the Home for the Aged in each province has been under the Ministry of Labor. Education is free and compulsory.

In February 1956 the Cabinet specified the rates of social insurance benefits for ". . . workers who have rendered distinguished services to the State in the national liberation struggle . . . and in political, economic, military, scientific, cultural, artistic and other social fields . . ." and for their dependents. The decision called for monthly payments of 100 percent of the last monthly salary, including extra pay, for eligible men over 60 years of age and women over 55 years who were temporarily or permanently incapacitated for work because of age, illness, or injury. Amounts to be paid to dependents of meritorious workers in case of death and funeral benefits were also provided.

Although scattered informants have reported that certain benefits were paid under this system, available evidence is that average payments are considerably less than the specified rate of 100 percent. Since average wages do little more than meet minimum household requirements, many incapacitated workers would have difficulty supporting their families even with free medical care.

NUTRITION, CLOTHING, AND HOUSING

The lives of North Koreans have been changed profoundly by both war and Socialist transformations. Once predominantly rural, the population has been forced to shift increasingly to urban living to meet the ideological drive of the Communists for industrialization. Very few Koreans have ever lived far above a subsistence level, so it is plausible, as a number of foreign observers report, that the people were better fed, better housed, and better clothed by 1968 than they were in earlier times. Nevertheless, lack of consumer goods and poor quality of those that are available continue to constitute a serious grievance among most of the population. This grievance can be detected between the lines of the statements of the Communist leaders, who regularly hedge boasts of problems solved with such qualifying phrases as "basically," "in the main," or "for the most part."

Food is a case in point. Although the Government claims it has achieved self-sufficiency in grain production and an export surplus in certain grains such as millet, this is somewhat misleading since it acknowledges that only half of the food grain production is rice, traditionally the preferred food of the people. By 1967 over half of the grain production was estimated to be rice, as against about two-thirds which was announced as a goal some years ago. Another indication that self-sufficiency has a limited meaning is to be found in the fact that North Korea imported 1.4 million bushels of wheat from Canada between July 1966 and June 1967. The leadership also calls repeatedly for greater production of meat, poultry, fish, vegetables, and other foods.

That the Government has become seriously concerned about the shortfall in consumer goods is reflected in its reorganization of the Government structure dealing with this area of production. In January 1967 it announced the abolition of the Ministry of Light Industry and the establishment of the Ministry of Textile and Paper Industries and the Ministry of Food and Daily Necessities in its place.

Defectors who have reached the Republic of Korea and whose views have been publicized have confirmed that supplies of consumer goods continue to be inadequate. This is the most frequent subject of their complaints, apart from lack of freedom. Some other sources, however, including British and Japanese businessmen and foreign diplomats, are in agreement that the amount of consumer goods available for purchase, such as bicycles and radios, has been increasing steadily. Some have estimated the North Korean standard of living to be higher than that of Communist China.

Food

The normal diet, within its limitations, follows traditional patterns, consisting of rice, supplemented by other grains (primarily millet), fish, soup, vegetables, and fruit. Dried fish is a common food. Meat, milk, eggs, and dairy products are only available at intervals in small amounts. Boiled rice water is the leading beverage, taking precedence over tea which most other Asians prefer.

Korean foods are cut into small pieces and eaten with spoons and chopsticks from brass dishes, rice bowls, and soup bowls. Wood and charcoal predominate as fuel, both for cooking and for heating in individual homes. Many foods are highly seasoned; *kimch'i,* a form of pickled cabbage or other vegetable, is a prime example. *Kimch'i* is served with most Korean meals and is prepared in quantity in the late fall to last until spring. It is mixed in a crock and stored in the ground outside the house.

Although the city dweller is given an advantage in food rationing, the peasant may be better off nutritionally, since he can produce his own food, even though the amount he can retain from his main crop production may be meager. Individual garden plots and tools were taken away from the peasants in 1958 in the cooperativization process, but were returned to them in 1960, presumably as an incentive to greater production. Fruit trees, chickens, rabbits, and other livestock are sometimes raised individually, with official encouragement. One handbook published in North Korea in 1960 exhorted the peasant to have his family increase its production of livestock, including dogs, and vegetables, so that they could "sell them on the peasants' market and earn enough money to build a new house."

Housing

An official estimate placed the amount of housing destroyed during the Korean conflict at approximately 33.48 million square yards. Whether new construction has kept pace with the population increase may be questioned despite the high priority given this activity by the regime. Official statistics in 1964 claimed that well over 35.8 million square yards of housing space were built during the first 10 years after the conflict, about equally divided between rural and urban areas. Kim Il-sung stated in 1967 that dwellings with about 12.2 million square yards of floor space were built between 1963 and 1966. Another boast was that approximately 409,032 square yards of housing space were built in Pyongyang in 1964. The 7-year plan called for the construction of 1.2 million new housing units, half in the city and half in the coun-

try. Communist sources asserted in 1967 that soon half the population would be living in houses built since 1961.

The Communists say that the mud-walled, thatched roof huts which made up much of Korean housing in rural areas in the past have disappeared, giving place to brick and masonry dwellings with tile or slate roofs. Although some visitors have confirmed progress in this direction, Kim Il-sung acknowledged in 1967 that this would not be entirely true for at least a few years. Photographs in official publications designed for foreign consumption show many small, neat brick homes as being typical of a cooperative farm settlement and straight rows of multistoried apartment dwellings in the cities. References are also made in these publications to dormitories for single workers and community dining halls in the cooperatives. These have produced a marked change in North Korean living patterns.

Traditionally, the typical Korean house was a one-story structure built in the shape of an "L" or a "U" with an inside court. The better constructed houses had walls of masonry for a height of 4 feet and walls of plaster reinforced with timber for the remainder. Rooms were small, and floors consisted of flat stones covered with successive layers of clay surfaced with oiled paper. Heat was conducted from one room to another underneath the floors by means of flues connected to an inside fireplace. Little detailed information is available, but there are indications that at least some of these architectural features have been carried over into the new construction. The regime has boasted of the heating system as a distinctly Korean architectural development.

Urban housing reportedly is classified in five groups, ranging from one room and a half-size kitchen in the first grade to two heated rooms, one wood-floor room, a storage room, and a bathroom with a toilet in the fourth grade. There also is a special class including detached houses with individual gardens. These are reserved for top-ranking Government and Party officials. The first grade is for general laborers and officeworkers, and the second is for chairmen of Ch'ŏllima work teams, leading members of provincial organizations, factory division heads, and teachers in elementary and middle schools. The third grade is for executives of firms, principals of elementary and middle schools, associate professors of colleges, and department heads of provincial organizations. Fourth-grade housing is for managers of enterprises, Party functionaries, college professors, actors, and departmental or bureau chiefs in the Central Government.

Once an individual has been assigned quarters he cannot move to others unless he is promoted to a position high enough to entitle him to better facilities. Rents for any given accommodations

vary according to the salary of the occupant, but housing is built with State funds, and rents are kept low. Assignments are made without regard to family size. The Communists say that the State pays 89 percent of the cost of electricity and provides fuel at half cost. They maintain that the average rent, including utilities, takes about 3 percent of a worker's income. In the rural areas, from 10 to 25 percent of the income of cooperatives is used for construction.

According to official statistics, 98.2 percent of all farm villages and 86.1 percent of all farmhouses were receiving electricity by the end of 1967, leaving only those dwellings in scattered mountain areas without electricity. One source reported that rapid expansion of the power supply to rural areas had caused a dimming of city lights.

Information reaching the Republic of Korea was that, in 1968, electricity furnished to private homes was severely limited. Families were not permitted to use light bulbs over 40 watts, and each family was restricted to the use of two bulbs. Electrical appliances could be used only by high officials. These sources also reported that high-rise apartments and office buildings were not supplied with elevators.

Clothing

Traditional Korean clothing is still worn in most of the country, particularly in rural areas, although Lenin caps and Mao uniforms, student uniforms, and standardized work uniforms for men and women are also widely used. Men's Western-style dress is seen most often on the streets of Pyongyang and other urban centers. An estimated 95 percent of the women wear the traditional long skirt, somewhat shorter than in former years, with long-sleeved, high-waisted jackets.

Korean dress has traditionally been made of white cotton or silk and padded in winter. Men wear baggy trousers tied at the ankles, and a tunic with a short, colored satin vest covers the torso. They sometimes wear long coats. Elderly gentlemen formerly wore high-crowned, finely woven horsehair hats, but available evidence suggests that this custom survives only in remote areas. Women's dress includes padded white stockings and gondola-like rubber slippers. Since much of the clothing is mass produced and distributed by the State either free or through State stores, there has been a shift to a more utilitarian style. A publication reported in 1965 that 1 million winter suits and caps of uniform appearance were given free to children between the ages of 4 and 8.

The difference between urban and rural areas is pronounced

in the matter of clothing supply. High officials or those going abroad have been able since 1965 to import items of clothing from Japan, Hong Kong, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, but for most urban workers the quality of Western-style clothing is low. Synthetic fibers are high priced; a pair of nylon stockings, for example, costs three times as much as wool stockings.

The quality and amount of clothing for each person are determined by his classification, ranging from high officials who are outfitted without charge to second- and third-class users who may purchase a summer suit each year, one winter suit every 2 years, and one overcoat every 3 years. Those in the fourth class receive a similar ration except for the overcoat. The price of woolen underwear is prohibitive, equaling several weeks' pay for the average worker. White shirts are in short supply. Work clothing is supposed to be issued free. Jewelry, handbags, makeup, and similar articles are available only to wives of high officials and to some returnees from Japan.

Personal Services

Hotels, inns, restaurants, barbershops, beauty parlors, public baths, tailor shops, and laundries are called "convenience facilities" and are run by the State. Restaurants were nationalized in 1958.

Pyongyang maintains one hotel for foreign visitors, and Koreans are not permitted to register there. Four or five inns are maintained in each provincial capital and one or two in each county, and small guest cottages are available in each village. Guests are required to register at fixed hours, 5 to 7 p.m., to allow time for security officials to study the registrations. After this, guests are required to submit to an interview. Each must bring a food ration coupon to buy meals. Meals are at fixed hours, and diners are summoned by the ringing of a bell. It is unusual for one to obtain a single room.

Restaurants open at noon and generally do not remain open late in the evening. One restaurant in Pyongyang facing the railroad station remains open 24 hours a day for the convenience of official travelers. Only a simple menu is offered by restaurants. Diners may choose between a rice meal, rice mixed with another grain, or a noodle dish. Very few restaurants offer meat or eggs, and these are high priced. The Communists have established one large restaurant in Pyongyang, which is said to have the capacity to serve 2,000 persons simultaneously. There are about five or six restaurants for each 100,000 people.

In the few existing barbershops, each barber is expected to

give about 20 haircuts each day. There are also few beauty parlors, which are criticized as being one of the appurtenances of bourgeois living. Special facilities are maintained for wives of high officials, but they reputedly are of inferior quality.

Shops are maintained to repair and alter clothing, repair shoes, and repair bicycles; all shops are State-run. Laundries are patronized only by Government officials and bachelors.

PATTERNS OF CONSUMPTION

Since the Government is able to allocate all commodities, fix their prices, determine work hours and conditions of all workers, and ration consumer goods, consumption patterns vary from year to year as the result of central planning rather than as a response to such market forces as supply and demand, even though they play a role in influencing the planners.

The regime has greatly emphasized its abolition of most direct taxes, including the tax in kind which individual peasants formerly turned over to the State out of their harvests but which was discontinued by 1966. Instead, the Government obtains its revenues from the profits of State enterprises, including the collection and distribution of grain. In short, the State finances most of its expenditures by the difference between what it buys and what it sells, so that the individual pays indirect rather than direct taxes. Since this system involves certain bureaucratic administrative costs, the producer of goods or labor is likely to be less well off than by paying direct taxes. According to a Communist source, the 1967–68 budget called for the payment of no more than 2 percent of Government costs from income tax, compared with 28 percent 10 years earlier. A similar claim was made for 1964. The same source asserted that taxation had been "wiped out" for peasants in 1966 and would be eliminated for workers in 1968.

The use of food and other daily necessities as a reward for quantity and quality of work performed is an established policy. In December 1967 Kim Il-sung explained that this system of distribution based on ability was necessary because production ". . . has not yet attained such a level as to insure distribution according to the needs."

"Voluntary" savings, which are cited as a patriotic duty, and other sacrifices, which are demanded from time to time, are among the factors affecting demand and consumption. Although the price level for necessities is kept low and reasonably stable as a matter of State policy, luxury goods are priced exorbitantly or are nonexistent. One Communist observer who visited North Korea acknowledged that industrial consumer goods, even domes-

tically produced goods, were still high priced in 1967 in relation to salaries, but he described the essentials of life as "ridiculously cheap."

In the mid-1960's an average factory worker's wage was about 40 to 45 wŏn a month, as compared with 270 to 280 wŏn for a minister (see ch. 20, Labor Relations and Organization). Doctors were paid from 85 to 120 wŏn per month, and nurses, from 45 to 70 wŏn. Most women were expected to work, and they were paid 30 to 35 wŏn per month, so that the income for any ordinary working couple would average about 73 wŏn, plus certain fringe benefits and perhaps incentive bonuses or special awards.

In mid-1966 a family with three children—one in middle school, one in primary school, and one infant—had to spend at least 75 wŏn a month: 22.32 wŏn for food, 12.5 for heat, 17.76 for clothing, 2.47 for education, and 3.20 for "culture," which left only 14.75 wŏn for all other purposes.

The patterns of both income and expenditure are different for peasants and are more difficult to estimate. The peasants are formed into work brigades and teams and, except for "voluntary" work, are compensated under a point system based on quantity and quality of work. Payment is made in cash and kind (see ch. 20, Labor Relations and Organization).

Although private trade is nominally legal, in practice, very little is permitted. Since rigid controls are imposed upon it, the consumer must fulfill his needs and wants primarily through State stores under strict rationing (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade).

According to a Communist report released in 1966, a typical village store stocked 500 different items and also accepted "special orders." The manager of the store kept a record for each family with the name, sex, and age of each member and an estimate of the needs of each during the year ahead. These cards, said the report, were made out at the beginning of each year and specified not only quantities but also the times at which the goods would be needed and the measures taken by the storekeeper to comply with the requirements. The storekeeper reported that his sales had doubled in the previous year. He said that, whereas he previously had received a shipment of goods once a week, in 1966 he was receiving two shipments a week.

Information is not available as to how much of the peasant's market or free market continued by 1968, but some peasants were known to be trading other grains to obtain more rice. There are also reports of some black-market activity, but this is subject to severe punishment and probably is not widespread. The rice ration is received once or twice a month, and many families follow

the practice of dividing the ration into equal portions to be used each day. There is, however, no information to indicate that the "spring famine," once a yearly feature of Korean life during the interval between crops, has continued to create hardship.

State rationing in 1968 was divided between the special rationing program and the general rationing program. These covered both foodstuffs and basic necessities. Eligible for the special program were the ranking officials of the Party and the Government at the central and provincial levels. The difference between the two systems was that the special category provided for an all-rice ration of nearly 2 pounds per day, whereas the ration for others was only 40 to 50 percent rice, with the rest in other grains.

The total ration was somewhat lower on the average also, except for those engaged in hard manual labor or hazardous work who also received a mixed ration of 2 pounds daily. Dependents received 1 pound, and other rations ranged between 1.25 and 2 pounds, the latter for soldiers. In 1968 the price of rationed rice was 7 to 8 chŏn (100 chŏn equal 1 wŏn) per kilogram, which was less than 1.5 cents per pound. Other grains were priced at 4 to 5 chŏn per kilogram. In short, prices for food grains were nominal, but the amount of ration was an important factor in the life of every North Korean. Government statistics showed a 1960 price index 49 percent lower than that of 1953, but no information was available about the items included in the index. Probably it was concerned with daily essentials rather than luxury goods.

The Communists maintain a special commissary where top-level Party members and Government officials are able to buy unlimited amount of rationed rice as well as imported foods and other luxury goods at special prices (see table 10).

The ordinary citizen receives a meat ration only a few times a year, particularly on national holidays when an extra rice ration also is issued. The meat ration usually is pork, rarely beef. Much of the country's fish catch is exported to the Soviet Union and Communist China to pay for industrial imports. When a surplus exists, it is salted for later use in the country.

The supply of vegetables is relatively abundant since not only peasants but also many large State firms and factories have their own garden plots. Cider, syrups, mineral water, fruit wine, ginseng wine, and beer are available for purchase, but the alcoholic beverages are on sale mainly on holidays and are too costly for the ordinary worker. Beer reportedly is available only in Pyongyang, and ginseng wine is reserved mainly for officials. About 60 kinds of cigarettes and cut tobacco are manufactured; the leading brands are Pyongyang, Kŭmgang (Diamond), Kŏnsŏl (Construction), and Kalmaegi (Sea Gull).

Table 10. Price List of Selected Commodities in North Korea, Mid-1960's
(in North Korean currency [1])

Food, Tobacco, and Beverages	
Rice	3 to 3.5 chŏn per pound
Soy sauce	18 chŏn per quart
Bean paste	9 chŏn per pound
Sugar	1.5 wŏn per pound
Noodle dish	50–70 chŏn per bowl
Dog soup	1 wŏn per bowl
Beef	2.5 wŏn per pound
Pork	2–3 wŏn per pound
Chicken	5 wŏn each
Dog	40 wŏn each
Rabbit	5–10 wŏn each
Eggs	2–3 wŏn per 10
Duck eggs	1 wŏn per 10
Beer	55 chŏn per 20 ounces
Ginseng wine	5–7 wŏn per pint
Milk	20 chŏn per 10 ounces
Cigarettes	10 chŏn to 1 wŏn per package
Clothing	
Western suit (wool)	100 to 250 wŏn each
Korean man's suit (winter)	30–38 wŏn each
Dress shirts	15 to 25 wŏn each
Neckties (domestic made)	2 to 5 wŏn each
Socks (cotton)	60 chŏn to 1.20 wŏn per pair
Socks (wool)	2 to 3 wŏn per pair
Socks (nylon)	6 to 7 wŏn per pair
Nylon stockings (women's)	4 to 15 wŏn per pair
Leather gloves	10 wŏn per pair
Man's cap (with visor)	3 to 5 wŏn each
Man's sweater (imported)	70 to 90 wŏn each
Woman's sweater	50 to 60 wŏn each
Korean woman's dress (velvet)	250 wŏn each
Woman's one-piece dress (cotton)	6 to 20 wŏn each
Overcoat (mixed fabric)	100 to 120 wŏn each
Cotton cloth	2.5 wŏn per yard
Silk	14 to 45 wŏn per yard
Wool cloth (domestic)	18 to 72 wŏn per yard
Wool cloth (imported)	27 to 108 wŏn per yard
Overcoat material (Japanese made, wool)	36 to 135 wŏn per yard
Shoes (leather)	30 to 35 wŏn per pair
Sneakers	4.3 wŏn per pair
School uniform	20 to 30 wŏn each
Wrist watch (Swiss, 17 jewel)	200 to 300 wŏn each
Wrist watch (Soviet, 17 jewel)	150 to 200 wŏn each
Wrist watch (Japanese, 17 jewel [2])	200 to 300 wŏn each
Radio (domestic make)	150 wŏn each
Radio (imported)	200 wŏn each

Table 10. Price List of Selected Commodities in North Korea, Mid-1960's (in North Korean currency[1])—Continued

Clothing—Continued	
Bicycle (domestic make)	150 to 200 wŏn each
Bicycle (Japanese make)	300 to 400 wŏn each
Sewing machine (domestic)	240 wŏn each
Soap (laundry)	50 chŏn to 1 wŏn per bar
Soap (toilet)	1.20 to 1.50 wŏn per cake
Toothpaste	70 chŏn to 1 wŏn per tube
Fountain pen (domestic)	3 to 7 wŏn each
Pencil	2 chŏn each
Haircut	30 to 70 chŏn
Public bath	20 chŏn
Motion picture admission (ordinary)	20 to 30 chŏn per person
Motion picture admission (first-class seat)	1.5 to 2 wŏn per person
Play and ballet admissions (Pyongyang)	3.5 wŏn
Newspaper subscription	1.2 wŏn per month

[1] Approximately 2.5 wŏn equal U.S. $1. One wŏn equals 100 chŏn.
[2] According to Republic of Korea information, imported for the equivalent of about $10.

Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Yoram* (1968), by Ministry of Public Information, Republic of Korea, pp. 212, 213; *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam, 1945–1968* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945-1968), pp. 426–429; and *Korean Affairs*, Seoul: 1964, p. 169.

LEISURE ACTIVITIES

Efforts of the regime to remold the people's thinking to conform to Party ideology have required extensive programming of leisure time activities. Coupled with unending demands for greater productivity to meet progressively higher work quotas, the study periods, self-improvement sessions, and "voluntary" extra work imposed by the system leave very little time at the disposal of the individual. If he has spare time he is expected to perform some service for the State and he is often expected to forgo the limited number of holidays provided in order to demonstrate his loyalty and patriotism. Many factory workers must take extension or correspondance courses or attend factory colleges after hours. Despite the 8-hour day and the maximum of 250 hours overtime per year prescribed for workers, non-Communist sources report that a 14-hour day is not uncommon in practice for urban workers, and peasants are likely to work even longer hours (see ch. 20, Labor Relations and Organization). As a result of these stresses, the populace reportedly is "bone tired."

Most activties outside working hours are supervised by unions or Party and Government organizations. As soon as he finishes his workday, which is likely to include "voluntary" unpaid over-

time, a worker usually is expected to attend indoctrination lectures or participate in meetings, rallies, or social service. This applies to Sunday mornings as well, when military drill also may be involved. Recreational facilities are limited (see ch. 16, Public Information).

A 1966 account told of a model cooperative farm with 750 families which had 15 Party policy study groups with a combined membership of 600. These groups were guided by 59 agitators and seven conversation leaders. The cooperative maintained six Korean Workers Party history study rooms and various other circles. It also received periodic visits from guidance groups sent by the Party's Central Committee.

Holidays

Sources in the Republic of Korea say that workers are nominally given two Sundays off for rest each month, whereas the Party and the intellectual elite are given all Sundays off. Peasants actually are said to have no regular Sunday holidays. In theory, the worker is entitled to a 2-week vacation with pay each year, but if an individual is willing to forgo this in the interests of the Ch'ŏllima movement, he will receive credit for that much added pay.

In additional to the four national holidays, there are many "commemoration days" which are observed with some form of ceremony (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Some of the commemorative days are the Socialist Working Youth League of Korea Day, January 17; International Women's Day, March 8; Fisherman's Day, March 22; Kim Il-sung's Birthday, April 15; Lenin's Birthday, April 21; Anti-Japanese Partisan Unit Founding Day, April 25; Poch'ŏnbo Battle Memorial Day, June 4; Young Pioneers of Korea Day, June 6; Fatherland Liberation War Day, June 25; Fatherland Liberation War Victory Day, July 27; Day of Promulgation for the Law on the Equality of Men and Women, July 30; Promulgation Day for the Law Nationalizing Important Industries, August 9; Miners Day, the third Sunday in September; Student Day, the first Sunday in October; Sports Day, the second Sunday in October; Korean Phonetic Alphabet Day, October 9; Founding Anniversary of the Korean Workers Party, October 10; Kwangju Student Uprising Day, November 3; and October Revolution Day, November 7.

Any of these days may be declared a holiday locally, provided the local authorities are satisfied that production will not be unduly impaired. Local functionaries are permitted to declare up to six such holidays each year, but evidence suggests that few are actually taken.

Many of the traditional holidays of the Korean people are re-

lated to the lunar calendar, which is still in popular use even though the Western calendar is used for official purposes. Special days of the lunar calendar mark the changing of seasons, planting and harvesting, and the like.

Sports

The Government has maintained a compulsory program of physical education for the entire population. It requires all workers to begin their day with a series of calisthenics and running exercises. Workers are also urged to exercise between shifts and to take cold baths. A mass sports program has been carried on for the youth, and the regime has attempted to develop athletes capable of competing in international sports events, including track and field. Because of political reasons, however, North Korea has not yet fielded a team in the Olympic games (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

A propaganda publication reported that 4,000 athletic organizations were started in 1947 with 180,000 youths as members. Physical culture and sports departments have been set up in all schools and in many social and government organizations, and the National Physical Culture Institute has been established under the Cabinet to train physical education instructors assigned to the provinces. Mass games and calisthenics are held in all parts of the country as a spectator attraction. Sports and physical education activities are part of the program of the Young Pioneers, along with training "to hate U.S. and Japanese imperialism," one Communist publication reported.

Sports long enjoyed in Korea include soccer, wrestling, table tennis, judo, swimming, a variation of field hockey, ice skating, skiing, sledding, weight lifting, and several forms of bowling. Volleyball and basketball are also played. Chinese chess, banished from factory lunch periods with the advent of the Ch'ŏllima movement, is a popular form of recreation for adults. Children like kite flying, paper dolls, tag, hide-and-seek, blindman's buff, a kind of boxing with the feet, and the making of snowmen. Little girls play house, using clamshells and oystershells for dishes; older girls like rope jumping and swinging. Children are not free, however, to indulge in unlimited play. They, too, have "socialist tasks" to perform. For example, in Pyongyang schoolchildren, among others, collected and turned over to the ironworks and steelworks tens of thousands of tons of scrap iron during a 3-month period in 1968, a propaganda organ reported.

One of the proudest boasts of the Communists is that there is no unemployment within their system, and this claim must be taken at face value. Productive work is compulsory.

OTHER ASPECTS OF LIVING

Both photographic evidence and reports of travelers indicate that the Communists have made a showplace of Pyongyang, which required complete reconstruction after the Korean conflict. The city has broad, tree-lined streets. A sports stadium, a luxury hotel, theaters, parks, and a zoo are features of the capital. In 1967 the regime announced that the city had about 56.2 square yards of "green belt" for each citizen, whereas the amount was approximately 28.7 yards in the recent past. A large number of schools, including institutions of higher learning, are located in Pyongyang. A British businessman who visited the city in 1958 and again in 1964 said he had found it changed beyond recognition because of the modern construction, public transportation, and consumer goods on sale. Even Communist publications, however, in their photographs of Pyongyang, show virtually no vehicular traffic on its streets apart from a few buses and trucks.

Behind this facade, life is somewhat less than attractive, judged on the basis of information from defectors and reports published in the Republic of Korea. Even the few freedoms granted to East European Communists are denied to North Koreans. For example, churches, Western movies, and Western dancing, features of living which North Korean leaders undoubtedly regard as "revisionism," are nonexistent in North Korea. A North Korean's job is allocated by the authorities, and he cannot change it without approval. Although he may marry without official permission, he may be criticized unless he first obtains approval from the Party.

Restricted Movement

Although North Koreans may travel freely within the country, they are restricted because of rationing control and the necessity to stay on the job or lose pay. In any event, travel is costly; a 1-day, 200-mile trip from Pyongyang to Ch'ŏngjin on the east coast cost 50 to 60 wŏn in 1968, which is more than an average worker's monthly wage. Only officials and members of governmental and Party delegations travel outside the country.

Movement is controlled in various ways. Anyone who moves without official permission is unable to register his new residence, and a certificate of residence is necessary for employment. Employment, in turn, is necessary in order to obtain ration coupons. Individual ownership of a house or building plot is impossible. A residence registration drive started in April 1966 and was supposed to have been completed by the end of March 1967. The drive slowed down in procedure, however, and had not been finished a year or so later.

During this drive a local official was assigned to each village to

interview residents and study their records. He concerned himself with each person's background, his relationship with others, his school record, work experience, and activities during the period of Japanese control and during the Korean conflict. Social activities were also scrutinized. Apart from the special drive, each morning the head of a village team goes from door to door to check on residency. Any irregularity is reported to the secret police of the Ministry of Social Security.

Except high-level officials, who are identified by their garments, automobiles, and other appurtenances such as hats, which are worn by those above the level of bureau director, all students and those above 18 years of age must carry identification cards. Members of the armed services have a distinctive card maintained by the military and returned after discharge. The civilian identity card shows marital status, job changes, records of any moves, and similar information. When any change is necessary the card must be returned to the registration office for correction.

Besides an identification card, most residents are required to carry several other cards, showing Party membership, discharge from the Armed Forces, union membership, health certificate if in travel status, and the like.

There is evidence that the people find these restrictions onerous. One defector said that repatriates, particularly from Japan, by 1968 had become disillusioned with living conditions in North Korea. Some observers believe that letters from these repatriates to their relatives in Japan may have contributed to the sharp decline in repatriation that has taken place (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force).

Foster Upbringing

In order to permit women to work, a network of nurseries and kindergartens is maintained throughout the country. In 1964 the Communists placed the number of children being raised in these schools at 1.3 million. Some of them stayed for a week at a time and some for a month, so that they did not often see their parents.

In 1968 the regime announced that allocations for nurseries and kindergartens had increased by 23 percent. An estimate contained in a published report in the Republic of Korea was that, by 1968, the number of nursery homes totaled 23,251 with 877,000 children in attendance, and the number of kindergartens was estimated to be 15,218 with 790,000 in attendance. This report said that mothers were charged a fee. A Communist broadcast in 1968 said that nursery schools had increased 83 times in 3 years and kindergartens 14 times in that period, so that even mountain villages had these facilities.

It is in the nursery schools that training in Communism begins. Children are taught self-criticism at an early age and are required to report on any deviations from the Party line on the part of their parents. They join the Boy Scouts at the age of 9 and the Young Pioneer and Socialist Working Youth League at the age of 14 as preliminaries to ultimate Party membership.

CHAPTER 9
EDUCATION

Education is a monopoly of the State, which uses it for well-defined political, economic, and nationalist purposes dictated by the Korean Workers Party. These goals are entirely pragmatic; neither intellectual achievement for its own sake nor the enrichment of life through the advancement of learning is among them. Even though Communist leaders pay lip service to these values, they do so in the future tense. In 1968 "Socialist construction," "Socialist patriotism," and the making of "a new Communist man" came first. The regime clearly considered that it could not yet afford the necessary expenditure of human and material resources to provide a liberal education which did not serve concrete Party goals, such as creation of an army of skilled workers.

Because of the importance of education as a political, economic, and social instrument, the Government has given it highest priority. This emphasis is occasioned not only by the desire to attain immediate goals, but derives also from the fear of the revolutionary leadership that the youth, having had no direct experience with "capitalist exploitation," will not posses the fervor deemed by the leadership necessary to continue the Communist revolution or pass it on to future generations. This reflects an awareness by the leaders that goals of the revolution are unlikely to be achieved in their lifetime. Concern over the ideological training of youth was acute, despite the knowledge that by 1967 more than half the population had received its education under communism or had grown up under Communist system, and this proportion was increasing daily.

In addition to ensuring the continuity of the revolution through the indoctrination of the entire population in Communist ideology, there are other announced objectives of the educational system. The system intends to imbue the population with pride in its own history and culture and to intensify hatred of capitalism, imperialism, and other "isms" targeted by the Party. Other goals are the creation of a supply of skilled workers, technicians, and scientists to meet the regime's economic goals, and the development of cadres to assist in controlling southern areas after the unification of Korea has taken place on Communist terms.

A strong emphasis on working while learning, or the integration of theory and practice, permeates the educational system, and all students are required to engage in productive labor along with their studies, both in their specialties and in other areas, for nominal pay. This is a means whereby the regime is reimbursed for educational costs, and some analysts believe that the value of the labor is greater than the cost of the education.

As difficulties have been encountered in meeting such economic goals as the 5-year and 7-year plans, the emphasis on technical education in proportion to general education has increased to create a large number of technical and managerial personnel. This is consistent with the Party's proclaimed desire to avoid creating a white-collar class that has a general education and a blue-collar group of workers that has a technical education; this is asserted by the regime to be an evil associated with bourgeois capitalism.

Under the prevailing social system, as in the past, education is virtually the only means for social mobility and, as a consequence, the populace shows much enthusiasm for it at all levels. There are no other legitimate roads to power and affluence, since the accumulation of wealth is forbidden. The possession of artistic or literary talent is another means to achieve status, as are the Armed Forces, but in each case education also is necessary.

The structure of the educational system has been revised several times, the most recent reform having occurred on April 1, 1967. On that date "universal compulsory technical education" was instituted, and all children were promised 9 years of free education from the postkindergarten age of 7 to the working age of 16; special emphasis was given to scientific and technical subjects. Higher and normal school systems were revised at the same time. If Communist plans succeed, a further revision ultimately will extend the period of compulsory education by 2 additional years.

Higher education has been expanding rapidly, but its quality remained dubious in 1968 because of inadequate teacher training. Although the regime had been forced to rely on Japanese-trained personnel for its senior teaching staff during its earlier years, it did so reluctantly. For ideological and nationalistic reasons, most of these have been gradually displaced in recent years by teachers newly trained under Communist direction at home or abroad. Although their quantity is adequate, their quality is questionable.

An extensive program of adult education has been conducted at all levels, and the Communists claim that illiteracy has been eliminated since 1949, except for some regression during the Korean conflict. An estimated 2.3 million adults between the ages of 12 and 50, or 76 percent of that age group, were illiterate at the

end of the Japanese occupation. The regime has not defined precisely what it means by literacy.

Although some Communist countries have found that education may have a political backlash by developing a greater awareness of the advantages and freedoms offered by the non-Communist world, there is little evidence that this has occurred in North Korea. Nevertheless, because of the emphasis which the regime gives to *chuch'e* (national identity and self-reliance) in education and the preservation of purely Korean values which this entails, there are qualified observers who believe that ultimately these factors may modify the nature of the regime by pushing the Communist value system in an increasingly nationalistic direction.

BACKGROUND

The educational system as it had evolved by 1968 represented a complete break from methods of the past, which were based on Confucian thought, modified by Christian and Japanese influences. The Japanese, however, relied heavily on the Confucian pattern of learning by rote.

Under the Japanese, schooling was provided for students from all walks of life. In 1942 there were 1,372 elementary schools and 9,560 students in 43 middle schools. About 35 percent of school-age children could obtain an elementary school education. Under Soviet occupation, a new school system was established and rapidly expanded on the Soviet model, using Soviet textbooks and instructors trained in the Soviet Union or Japan. By the end of 1946 the number of elementary schools had risen to 2,482, with 18,505 teachers. There were 217 middle schools and 28 middle preparatory schools, the forerunner of technical high schools. Kim Il-sung University and three other institutions of higher learning were also founded in 1946. In 1949 the use of Chinese written characters in the schools was discontinued. By 1950, Communist sources report, almost all children of elementary school age, an estimated enrollment of 1.9 million, were attending school, and plans were being made to institute compulsory education. There reportedly were 3,882 elementary schools, with 27,380 teachers. There were 926 middle schools, 177 high schools, and 69 middle technical schools. The number of colleges had increased to 15, with 713 teachers.

The outbreak of the Korean conflict, which is said to have destroyed 90 percent of available school facilities, forced the postponement of any further educational expansion, although a school system of sorts was maintained. Most students and teachers were required to enter the Armed Forces. One estimate is that 850,000, or about one-half, of the students in North Korea at that time were mobilized. Others were required to perform such

tasks as espionage and guerrilla operations. Several thousand students were sent to the Soviet Union and other foreign countries to prepare for the postwar reconstruction.

The schools reopened in 1953 and were immediately adapted to the needs of national reconstruction. Four-year free, compulsory attendance at people's elementary schools was instituted in 1956; by then the physical facilities of the school system had been rehabilitated to the level prevailing before the Korean confiict, according to Communist reports. Between 1953 and 1956, 2 million students were attending 5,000 schools, and vocational education was stressed to meet the needs of the 3-year economic plan then in force. A new system of 3-year technical high schools and 2-year technical colleges was established, offering what was, in effect, apprentice training. Over 66,070 students were enrolled in 127 of these "colleges." These were abolished in a reorganization of the educational system starting in 1960.

New types of universities were also established for the training of engineers and managers. In 1958 compulsory 3-year middle school education was instituted, making the first compulsory 7-year school system in the Far East, and 2-year workers middle schools were created for adults. Tuition was abolished in 1959 through the 7 years of primary and middle school, and a system of scholarships for higher education was established. The Government announced that uniforms, textbooks, and school supplies would thereafter be supplied free. Expenses for student cultural life were also to be borne by the State. In 1968, for example, the higher education scholarships amounted to 15 wŏn (2.5 wŏn equal U.S.$1) per month for students in teachers or technical colleges, whereas liberal arts students received about 80 percent of that amount. Most students paid about 10 wŏn per month for dormitory food and lodging, leaving a sufficient sum to buy a few books and perhaps attend a motion picture once a month.

As the 5-year economic plan (1957–61) created new demands for technicians, the Government introduced further changes. In October 1959 it announced a major reorganization measure, to become operative in October 1960. This system would replace the previous system of 3-year senior secondary schools and 2-year technical colleges with one providing for 2 years each of technical schools and senior technical schools. To cope with the new requirements, the Ministry of Culture and Education was subdivided in 1960 into three separate ministries of Common Education, Higher Education, and Culture. The Government also announced at that time a plan for instituting a 9-year technical compulsory education effective in April 1962. The plan was formally endorsed by the Fourth Party Congress in September 1961 but,

because of the shortage of teachers and funds, it was not until 1967 that the 9-year program could actually be implemented.

Under the 1960 reorganization, schooling began with 4-year nursery and kindergarten training from ages 3 to 6. Beginning at age 7, the student entered a 4-year primary program, followed by a 3-year junior middle school. After finishing these years of compulsory attendance, he could go on to the technical and senior technical schools and to a university. Specialized education was given children and youths in technical schools, teacher's universities, and physical education schools. A separate system, which a talented pupil entered at age 7, provided 11 years of specialized training in music, ballet, the arts, drama, or languages. The physical education schools offered a 3-year program and could be entered after graduation from middle school; teachers' universities were open to those who had completed the technical school course. A system of night and correspondence schools and factory colleges for adult education paralleled generally the regular school system. Libraries and reading rooms were established throughout the country. Three universities—Kim Il-sung University, Pyongyang Medical College, and Kim Ch'aek Polytechnical Institute—offered a program leading to a doctorate. Kim Il-sung University offered the most extensive general education at that level; the other institutions of higher learning were more specialized. At the time of the 1960 reorganization, liberal arts subjects were drastically cut in the technical and higher technical schools.

The next major reform was that of 1967, which created a 9-year compulsory school system. As an indication of expansion to that time, the regime claimed that between 1956 and 1966 it had built more than 31,000 new classrooms.

FORMAL EDUCATION SYSTEM

Organization and Operation

Although the administration of the foraml education system is divided between two ministries, control is highly centralized within the Party, which establishes the basic policies for the system. The Ministry of Higher Education supervises all colleges professors and college management except for teachers' colleges, which are under the Ministry of Common Education. Songdo College of Politics and Economics in Kaesŏng and a Communist University (Kongsan Taehak) in Pyongyang and in each of the nine provinces are managed by the Central Committee of the Party and its provincial or municipal counterparts. These institutions train Party cadres (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Technical colleges are managed by the ministry in charge of

the substantive matter to which the colleges' specializiation is related. For example, medical colleges are supervised by the Ministry of Public Health. Each ministry is responsible for providing facilities and budgets for the colleges under its control.

Primary, middle, and social education, as well as teachers colleges, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Common Education. The Education Bureau of each Provincial People's Committee is in charge of teachers' training and management of technical high schools, high schools, and special schools within its geographic area. County People's Committees operate kindergartens and primary, middle, and technical schools. Principals and teachers are appointed and removed by the appropriate local government authorities.

In each school or group of schools there is a Party committee that is in a position to influence each decision made by school administrators; this committee screens both educational content and teaching methods. Student activities are guided and controlled largely by youth organizations, such as the Young Pioneers and the Socialist Working Youth League, within the student body of each school. In the past the efforts of these organizations to interfere with administration or teaching have been reprimanded by the Party.

Management of school facilities is divided into three types: those managed by the State; those managed jointly by the Central Government and cooperative farms, producers cooperatives, or enterprises; and those under the management of cooperative farms or producers cooperatives. The State-managed type is found mainly in financially depressed urban areas, and these are financed by the State; the second type may be in either urban or rural areas deemed by the Government to be affluent, with only a percentage of financing contributed by the State; and the third category is financed entirely by the farms or cooperatives. The number of schools in the third category has reportedly been steadily increasing and, on the basis of the trend, all primary and middle schools are expected to be functioning without State support by 1970. State-financed school facilities are said to be generally superior to those of the other categories, however.

Although the school principals are responsible for school administration, they have no policymaking powers. In the locally supported schools they are subject not only to direction from the supervisory cooperative farm or producers cooperatives, but also to policy guidance through Party and Government channels.

Control of all primary and middle schools is divided between administrative and political lines of authority. Overall administration is the responsibility of the County Education Division, which

receives its direction ultimately from the Ministry of Common Education through the Provincial Education Bureau. The division supervises the internal affairs of schools, school management and budget, and personnel administration. Party authority is exercised through the school "chapter" of the County Party Committee or through the principal, who in most cases is a Party member.

Common Education

The 1967 educational reorganization, which had been ratified by the Supreme People's Assembly in November 1966, merged the 3-year middle school then existing with the 2-year technical school to form a new, 5-year middle school that combined general and basic technical education (see fig. 6). At the same time, compulsory education was extended to require children to remain in school until age 16. Until that time primary and middle schools had shared the same physical facilities. Whether that will continue to be so under the reorganization was not known in 1968.

The 1967 plan called for one elementary and one middle school in each village (*ri*). The villages schools usually have a maximum capacity of 500 to 600 students, as compared with enrollments of up to 2,000 or more in city schools. The location of the elementary and middle schools was planned to bring schooling within a maximum of 4 kilometers (about 2.5 miles) from students' homes, even in remote villages.

The reform of 1967 also provided for the continuation of the adult education system in a slightly modified form. Adult education previously had four levels: workers schools, 2 years; workers middle schools, 2 years; and workers technical schools (evening), 2 years. The announcement of the 1967 reorganization did not discuss the adult education system, and there is some question as to whether the workers middle schools have been continued. The physical education schools which had previously existed were abolished. Evening and correspondence courses of the higher technical schools were expanded to 3 years.

Under the new system there were to be three ways to enter universities or other higher educational establishments: after 2 years of high school following the basic 9 years of schooling; after 3 to 4 years in a higher technical school, many of which are attached to large factories or are located at county centers for farmworkers; or after a 2-year course in a vocational training school plus a 1-year preparatory university entrance course. Very few students are selected for high school, which usually finishes general education before university for those who are not to be technically trained. The 3- to 4-year higher technical schools train technicians and junior-grade specialists. A student who goes on to col-


The graduate school for doctorate degree
The graduate school
University or College (4-6 years)
Teachers Colleges (4-5 years)
ADULT EDUCATION 1
Preparatory Course (1 year)
Senior Technical School (evening) (2 years)
Workers Technical School (Evening) (2 years)
Workers Middle School 2 (2 years)
Workers School (2 years)
Vocational School (1/2 year - 2 years)
High School (2 years)
Higher Technical School (3-4 years)
Specialized Schools (11 years)
Music
Ballet
The Arts
Drama
Foreign Languages
Middle School 3 (5 years)
Primary School (4 years)
Kindergarten
1 Age not relevant.
2 Official documents concerning the 1967 reorganization did not refer to this school; actual status not clear in 1968.
3 Provides general and basic technical education.
AGE (in full)
GRADE

Source: Adapted from *Korea Today*, No. 131, Pyongyang, 1967; Yang and Chee in "North Korea Today," New York, Praeger, 1963; *Pukhan Ch'onggam, 1945-1968* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945-1968), Seoul: Kongsankwonmunje Yŏnguso, 1968, p. 580.

Figure 6. North Korean educational system, 1967.

lege through any of these routes may expect a degree at about age 23.

The system of 11-year specialized schools was continued under the 1967 reorganization. Instead of following the ordinary course of instruction, students chosen for the specialized schools entered them immediately after kindergarten and continued to the university level, concentrating on music, ballet, the arts, drama, and foreign languages. They were then eligible for university entrance on a competitive basis. Competition was keen for acceptance into the specialized schools, and often there were as many as 20 applicants for each vacancy.

Three types of teacher-training institutions were provided to staff the new system. Middle school, high school, and higher technical school teachers were to be trained at 4- to 5-year teachers colleges. Four-year teachers colleges were assigned the task of training teachers for primary schools, and the regime announced that 3-year higher normal schools would be set up to train middle school graduates as kindergarten teachers.

Kim Il-sung University is responsible for training teachers for technical schools and for the universities. The Pyongyang Pedagogical University has a special role as the senior institute among teacher-training schools. It has postgraduate courses, research facilities, and a library, which is the central national library for educational publications and materials. Copies of all publications and materials relating to the study of education and textbooks are kept there in permanent custody for educational research purposes.

In April 1967 the Government announced that normal schools and colleges recently had been able to turn out more than 7,000 teachers to staff the program. It stated that "normal educational bases" had been set up in each province, although it did not define them. It also said that teachers trained since the end of the Japanese occupation totaled 80,000 by early 1966.

According to an official statement made in November 1966, at that time there were 9,165 schools for common education and nearly 100 institutes of higher learning with a total enrollment of 2.6 million students, including university enrollment of 156,000 (see table 11). The Government hopes eventually to have 227,000 students in 128 colleges and universities. In the common education group there were 4,064 elementary schools, 3,335 secondary schools, 1,207 technical schools, 467 higher technical schools, and about 90,000 teachers. North Korean propaganda has for some years claimed that one-quarter of the population was in schools, presumably including part-time students and those in adult education, factory colleges, and other special programs. North Korea, the authorities claim, ranks among the highest countries in the

world in the proportion of students to population and the amount of Government funds earmarked for education. The 1967 extension of compulsory education helped produce 190,000 new students that year alone.

There are various kinds of special schools outside the common education system, including the 11-year "Revolutionary Schools for Children of Martyrs and Heroes," a military school system, correspondence schools, night schools, and highly specialized factory schools. Various special institutes are supervised directly by the Cabinet, individual ministries, or the Party.

Table 11. Schools, Students, Graduates, and Teachers in North Korea, by Selected Years, 1946–67

Number of Schools

School	1946–47	1949–50	1953–54	1956–57	1960–61	1963–64	1966–67
People's School	2,482	3,882	3,399	3,777	4,145	3,992	4,064
Middle School	217	926	1,013	1,247	2,839	3,147	3,335
Technical School	.....	.....	.....	.....	885	1,218	1,207
Middle Professional School	28	69	83	117	132	.....	.....
Higher Technical School	.....	.....	.....	.....	82	466	467
College	4	15	15	19	76	96	98

Number of Students
(in thousands)

School	1946–47	1949–50	1953–54	1956–57	1960–61	1963–64	1966–67
People's School	1,183	1,474	1,391	1,508	957	994	.....
Middle School	73	353	292	445	1,031	839	.....
Technical School	.....	.....	.....	.....	276	327	.....
Higher Technical School	.....	.....	.....	.....	11	145	.....
College	3	18	11	22	97	214	156
College (for employed people)	.....	6	3	6	49	149	.....

Number of Graduates

School	1946–47	1949–50	1953–54	1956–57	1960–61	1963–64
People's School	119,000	196,114	175,207	240,608	317,489	235,714
Middle School	5,790	67,292	55,799	88,593	296,645	268,905
Technical School	.....	.....	.....	.....	17,342	125,436
Middle Technical School	348	3,849	3,789	4,969	84,606	23,645
Higher Technical School	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	9,091
College	.....	1,177	1,143	2,833	6,455	21,537

Table 11. Schools, Students, Graduates, and Teachers in North Korea, by Selected Years, 1946–67—Continued

Number of Teachers

School	1946–47	1949–50	1953–54	1956–57	1960–61	1963–64
People's School	18,505	27,380	27,955	33,193	21,744	22,132
Middle School	2,041	9,605	9,034	13,329	30,982	30,031
Technical School	.....	.....	.....	.....	9,317	12,144
Middle Technical School	402	1,381	1,472	2,050	3,208	.....
Higher Technical School	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	5,862
College	141	713	1,026	1,623	3,895	9,244

Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam, 1945–1968* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945–1968), Seoul: Kongsankwŏnmunje Yŏnguso, 1968.

The Premier and the Cabinet place great personal emphasis on the Revolutionary Schools. The most noted of these are the Man'gyŏngdae Revolutionary School in Kim Il-sung's birthplace, Man'gyŏngdae, which celebrated its 20th anniversary in 1967; and the Namp'o and Haeju schools, which celebrated their 10th anniversaries in 1968. A Communist broadcast explained that these institutions were intended to train orphaned children to be professional revolutionaries who could be "nuclear pivots of the Party, State, economic and public organizations, and the Army." Students in these schools are treated as aristocrats of the system, and they wear military-like uniforms. The Central Committee of the Party and the Cabinet sent congratulatory messages to the teachers and students of the Pyongyang Foreign Languages Revolutionary School and to the Pyongyang Commerical School in 1968 on their 10th anniversaries. Both were founded to train orphans of revolutionaries and other specially selected students.

Adult Education

The avowed purposes of the adult education system are not only to reduce illiteracy, although that is the first objective, but also to provide ideological and technical training. The Socialist Working Youth League committee or the Primary Party Committee selects those in State enterprises or on cooperative farms believed to be in need of general education and sends them to a workers school or workers technical evening school. The average number of persons receiving adult education on each cooperative farm in 1968 was reported as 100. Party members, members of social organizations, and officials of cooperative farms or factories are required to give lectures and examinations. In 1962 there were

about 12,000 elementary and middle schools for adult education, with 896,000 students and only 7,700 regular teachers.

In the first 12 months after the end of the Japanese occupation, teams to combat illiteracy were set up in all factories, mines, and villages, Communist publications report. Four months of each winter were designated for an anti-illiteracy campaign, and the Government says that illiteracy was wiped out "in the main" by 1949, but that the outbreak of the Korean war caused some people to become illiterate again.

The more recent adult education system was established by the Fourth Party Congress in September 1961 on the basis of Premier Kim Il-sung's decision that reorientation of the older worker was essential to make the "cultural revolution" succeed. Under the Scientific Knowledge Dissemination Federation, educational centers were set up in every province, district, city, county, and village, and on every collective farm. "Democratic Propaganda Class Rooms" were opened in libraries, factories, workers' settlements, and on cooperative farms (see ch. 16, Public Information).

As a result of the adult education program, by 1963 more than half the total number of new students entering universities were reported to be adult workers. Records are said to show that students with work experience are academically more successful than younger, inexperienced students. As the program developed, it broadened its objectives ideally to equip all workers with one vocational skill and general knowledge on the level of secondary school graduates or higher.

Correspondence schools, another aspect of adult education, are located at some colleges and senior technical schools. Although there is a qualifying examination to enter these courses, competition reportedly is not very keen. The senior technical school correspondence course is 2 years, whereas a college degree can be obtained in 4 years. Students in correspondence schools are required to be in residence for 2 months each year for lectures and examinations. The authorities provide time off and pay necessary transportation costs to meet this requirement.

Higher Education

About two-thirds of the students in higher educational institutions in 1966 were studying technical and engineering subjects. At that time the regime said the total number of graduates was 170,000. There were also said to be 250,000 graduates of technical schools, senior middle schools, and higher technical schools.

Before the 1967 educational reform, students who graduated from higher technical school were required to engage in productive

labor for 2 years before they were eligible for college. Exceptions were made for the children of high officials of the Party and those with outstanding records, but these were limited to a maximum of 5 percent of the total admissions. This limitation was abolished under the new system so that students were permitted to enter college immediately after high school, higher technical school, or preparatory school. About the same number of men as women were being admitted to teachers colleges, but men accounted for only 25 percent of the enrollment in educational colleges. Enrollment in liberal arts colleges was 60 percent male and in the various science fields, 20 percent male.

In mid-1968 the higher educational institutions included one general university, 12 engineering colleges, four medical colleges, seven agricultural colleges, eight teachers colleges, 11 educational colleges, nine liberal arts colleges, 10 Communist colleges, and 37 factory colleges. There were also two foreign language colleges, a college of music, a college of arts, a college of drama, a college of athletics, and a college of economics, although some of these apparently were divisions of other institutions. In 1968 the regime announced the founding of a pharmaceutical college in Hamhŭng offering a 5-year course in theory and practice.

Technical colleges were divided into specialized fields, such as the Chemical Industry College, Coal Industry College, Power Industrial College, and Mechanical Industrial College. Most were closely affiliated with factories or industries, and the head of the enterprise served as president of the college.

The factory college system was begun in 1960. These colleges are supervised by the Ministry of Higher Education and staffed with full-time teachers and part-time engineers and scientists from the factory or nearby research institutes. One college may serve several factories. Applicants are chosen from among the workers, who are required to pass entrance examinations equivalent to those given to applicants for other colleges. Students attend lectures 5 days a week in the day or evening according to their work schedules. The usual course is 5 years, with two terms each year. An examination is given after each term and, at graduation, is followed by a paper to be submitted within 6 months. If the paper is approved, the graduate then receives an engineering degree. By the end of 1965, the Communists claim, factory colleges had produced more than 6,300 graduates.

The Communist universities' enrollment is drawn from among Government and Party workers, whereas the Songdo College of Politics and Economics is specially designed to train governmental cadres, foreign trade specialists, and those from the south who, the regime hopes, can be used as administrators in the south when

unification takes place. It offers special courses in English and other foreign languages.

In May 1966 the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Central Party Institute, another particularly favored school attached to the Central Committee of the Party, was celebrated in the presence Premier Kim Il-sung and other top Party and educational leaders. The purpose of this institute, a Communist broadcast said in reporting the event, was to arm students with Party ideology, the Marxist-Leninist outlook, and the "revolutionary style of work" (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Another special school for high-ranking Communists is the People's College of Economics, previously known as the Government Cadres School. Officials formerly were sent to this school for 1 to 3 years according to their level of knowledge, and there was a special class at one time for those who had formerly lived in the Republic of Korea. More recently, this school has been converted into a 4-year cadre-training system teaching economics, bookkeeping, finance, banking, labor economics, and public accounting, with a total enrollment of 5,000 to 6,000.

Kim Il-sung University is at the apex of the general educational system, and admission to it is widely regarded as one of the highest honors to be attained by Communist youth. Like all schools in the educational system, it is coeducational. It is located on the outskirts of Pyongyang overlooking the Taedong River. Physics and international relations are said to be the most highly competitive and most popular of the university departments. Official sources have given various attendance figures ranging from 7,000 full-time and 5,000 part-time students in 1966 to 16,000 total enrollment reported in 1968. The number of graduates by 1966 was 15,000, on the basis of official reports.

In 1966, its 20th-anniversary year, the university's departments included mathematics and dynamics, physics, chemistry, biology, geography, history, economics, philosophy, law, Korean language and literature, and foreign language and literature. The institution also embraced 10 research institutes with 50 laboratories. The staff included more than 1,000 teachers and scientific research workers. During 1965 the university embarked on an expansion program and completed the first of four planned new buildings. It had 470 rooms, with 53,600 square yards of floorspace, and 160 laboratories. When the new program is complete, another 357,000 square yards of floorspace is expected to be added. The new campus includes about 70 acres, a Communist propaganda organ reported.

In their third and fourth years students at the university spend from 2 to 3 months in field training, described by the Government as involving the combination of theory and practice. The school

year consists of two semesters with 1 month of vacation in between, and this period is closely scheduled and supervised.

Postgraduate work of 4 years is offered at selected universities, with emphasis on research. The first 2 years consist largely of classroom lectures, and the last 2 years are taken up with laboratory work at the university or in research departments of industrial firms. A thesis is required for graduation, but it may not be written until after work experience following completion of the course. A similar requirement is imposed on candidates for bachelor's degrees. Many students who receive higher degrees are employed by the reserach institutes headed by the Academy of Sciences (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

In 1963 Premier Kim Il-sung and the Party's Central Committee issued calls for rapid development of research projects of all kinds. An official publication reported that the result was an increase in basic courses with practical experiments. It asserted in 1966 that ". . . our young scholars have attracted the attention of the academic world of physics by pioneering a new phase of research in the field of nuclear physics and integral calculus of probability." No details were supplied.

One evidence of the emphasis given to technical education is the requirement that even liberal arts students must have acquired at least one technical skill to qualify for graduation. The skill acquired must be equivalent to that of a middle-grade engineer. In addition to the students, schoolteachers, office workers, and Party cadres are also required to master varying degrees of technical skill.

An example of still another type of school is the Central Public Health Cadre School, under the Ministry of Public Health, which opened in 1968. The announcement of its opening stated that more than 60 heads of hospitals, sanatoriums, and disease prevention centers were enrolled. Divided into two classes, they were to study Party public health policy and "revolutionary traditions" for 1 year. Also in the course of study were techniques of hospital management.

Admission Procedures

The determination of which middle school or higher school graduates go on to higher schools or to college is based not only on scholastic record, but on other considerations as well. Applicants for admission are not permitted to send requests directly to the institutions of their choice. Instead, all application documents are sent to the education department of the People's Committee in the city or county in which they reside. They are screened by a committee for college applicants which is composed of Party cadres

and staff members of the administrative, social, and educational organizations of the areas concerned. This committee divides applicants among colleges according to the fixed quota of each college which has been set by the relevant provincial organization. Applicants are required to list five colleges or schools of their choice, and these preferences are supposed to be given consideration to the extent that the quotas permit. All high school graduates are permitted to apply for college admission, even though a large proportion will be rejected.

Recommendations by an employer or school and an evaluation of political attitudes by the chairman of the appropriate regional youth league are required to accompany an application. In addition to the preference of the student, his social origin (peasant, worker, or intellectual), family situation, "trend of thought," and general caliber are reviewed. Applicants must then take entrance examinations given by the schools to which they have been assigned. The result of this examination, the social status, and evaluation of political work in workplaces and social organizations are rated, with a value of one-third assigned to each.

Teaching Staff

The rapid expansion of the educational system, coupled with the unlimited demand for qualified technicians, scientists, and research personnel, has created a difficult problem for the Government in developing the necessary teaching staff. The problem has been complicated by the insistence of the Party that all teachers "revolutionize" themselves and become good Communists, since they are an important link between the revolutionaries in power and those destined to take over in the future. This has made necessary gradual replacement of Japanese-trained intellectuals who were virtually the only qualified educators available in the early years after the departure of the Japanese.

The authorities have taken several steps to improve the status of teachers, in the hope of attracting other qualified persons to the profession. In October 1967, for example, the Cabinet announced that the salaries of all teachers in the common education system would be increased by an average of 40 percent, with primary school teachers receiving an increase of 45.2 percent. Premier Kim Il-sung, at the same time, called upon the population to show greater social respect for teachers. In 1968 the regime announced the title of "Merited Teacher," similar to the special recognition awarded to writers, artists, and other intellectuals, which was to be awarded for distinguished service in education. It then pointed out also that teachers received various special benefits, govern-

mental and social, including 24-day vacations each year, or 10 days more than ordinary workers.

Republic of Korea sources estimated that in April 1967 about 25 percent of elementary school personnel either had not been educated under the Communist regime or had been graduated from the earlier teachers schools. An estimated 5 percent of elementary and middle school teachers were over 40. About 35 percent of teachers in middle school were not graduates of the 4-year educational college or the 4-year teachers college. Although most of the teachers in technical schools and senior high schools held qualification certificates, the quality of their training reportedly was low. The proportion of women teachers in the various schools was established by the Cabinet in March 1961 as follows: 85 percent in elementary school, 50 percent in middle school, 35 percent in technical school, and 25 percent in senior technical school. The shortage of women teachers, however, left the quota for women about 3 to 5 percent short of being filled in each category.

According to the same sources, in January 1967 there were about 9,000 professors in the institutes of higher learning. Of these, 6,000 held various academic degrees, and the others were professional technicians from factories. About 20 percent of the total were graduates of Japanese colleges or professional schools. Professors were divided into three categories: a Japanese-trained group, 20 percent of the total; a domestic group of those who received most of their education in North Korea after 1945, 65 percent; and a foreign-trained group, 15 percent, mostly educated in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Japanese group included not only those who studied under Japanese education, but also graduates from Republic of Korea institutions. By age groups, about half of the higher education teaching staff members were between the ages of 25 and 35; 35 percent, between 35 and 50; and the others, over 50.

Before the 1967 pay raise, teachers' monthly salaries ranged from 35 to 45 wŏn in elementary and middle school and from 40 to 55 wŏn in technical school, supplemented by seniority benefits. At the college level, the basic monthly pay ranged from 55 to 77 wŏn for instructors and from 80 to 180 wŏn for professors, depending on academic achievements (see ch. 20, Labor Relations and Organization).

Methods of Instruction

The education authorities stress elimination of the Confucian methods of learning by rote and emphasize instead full use of practical experiments in the laboratory, in the field, and in work experience. Excursion trips to military installations and old battle-

fields, industries, and other points of interest are among the techniques used. Speech and composition contests, debate meetings on scientific subjects, exhibitions of the arts, contests on new inventions and new designs, storytelling meetings, poem recital meetings, music auditions, art contests, athletic meets, and motion picture appreciation gatherings are among the devices used by the schools to keep students interested and occupied in practical ways. Students are also assigned to such group projects as rabbit raising, fire prevention, and assisting the public health services.

When the 1967 educational system was adopted, First Deputy Premier Kim Il told the Supreme People's Assembly that the time had come when further development was impossible unless the "old cramming" method of education was replaced with a "let-them-understand" method encouraging independent thought and practical application. Under the new system, he said, students should see and hear directly with their own eyes and ears, touch and make things with their own hands, "think and grasp truth by themselves," and put knowledge to practical application. He urged greater attention to educational science and research in order to develop better textbooks and improved methods of education and school operation.

Government publications urge teachers to use variety in their methods for different age groups, and they inveigh against "bureaucracy, formalism and style which puts office work before everything" on the part of the school administrators. Instead, the administrators are told they must meet with teachers and students, hold discussions with them, and observe classes in session.

Curriculum and Content

Content of the educational system is unlike the non-Communist West in two major respects—the heavy emphasis on Communist ideology and the greater amount of practical experimentation as well as productive work required. This is derived from the Party's determination to avoid the creation of generalists without practical experience or knowledge. Higher schools are also more specialized.

Studies to which the regime attaches the most importance were summarized by First Deputy Premier Kim Il in planning the 1967 educational reform. He accorded first priority to Korean studies combined with Marxist-Leninist principles. Other principal categories were knowledge of the world; scientific subjects, such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology; and social science subjects, which include primarily such Communist theories as class struggle and "laws governing social development."

The Chinese language is an optional subject in the 2-year high

school. Study of Russian is still compulsory in the school system. English is taught to the 11-year language students and in certain higher institutions, such as Kim Il-sung University.

Although ideology is taught as such, much of the content of the curriculum has Party teachings interwoven with other subject matter. For example, primary school students are given textbooks on the Korean language which contain articles extolling Kim Il-sung and his revolutionary exploits of the past. Communist thought on history, geography, mathematics, and athletics is included in study cources covering those fields. Editing of textbooks, course outlines, and curriculum is required to follow Party direction.

According to the 1966–67 catalogue for a 4-year college, an academic year consists of 35 weeks of lectures, divided into two semesters. Thirty-eight to 40 lecture hours made up a week. By graduation, students will have had from 5,400 to 5,600 hours, of which 1,200 are reserved for military subjects. One hour a day of physical training also is required.

The authorities state that the ratio between general and technical subjects was 92.5 to 7.5 percent in the junior and senior middle schools before 1959 and 27.6 to 72.4 percent in technical schools in the early days of the school system. By 1964 the ratio for higher schools (which had replaced senior middle schools) was close to 50 percent each, technical and general. General subjects included Marxism-Leninism. history, economics, geography, and Korean and foreign languages. Basic courses in technical subjects included mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. "Production courses" included drafting, mechanics, and engineering. Field training, physical training, and music were also included. Higher technical students had two sets of field training covering their first and second specializations. The regime said that a modern experimental farm for agricultural students had been established in every three or four counties.

Technical schools were divided into 21 departments before the 1967 consolidation with middle schools. These included metals, engineering, electricity, chemistry, geology and mining, printing, railroads, textiles, construction, agriculture, veterinary medicine, and fisheries. Higher technical schools offered 94 courses. Details of the internal structure under the reorganization have not been made public.

OTHER EDUCATIONAL TECHNIQUES

The Party and Government did not rely exclusively on the formal educational system to educate the populace. There are many other programs designed to inculcate Party loyalty, working zeal,

"revolutionary class consciousness," "Socialist patriotism," or hatred for the regime's enemies (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values; ch. 16, Public Information).

First Deputy Premier Kim Il stated in 1967 that school education, home education, and social education had to be combined. Not only individual homes, but also all agencies and enterprises, public organizations, and residential units would be required to maintain close contact with the schools, look after the extracurricular activities of students, and assist in their education under the reorganized educational program of the Party.

One of the most effective tools of the Government is the mass media (see ch. 16, Public Information). Newspapers, magazines, and the radio are used intensively and extensively to reinforce and broaden other forms of education.

The Party leadership has repeatedly called for increasing effort by all organizations to indoctrinate the population. For example, a 1967 editorial in the leading Party newspaper declared that the role and responsibility of Party committees at all levels needed acceleration. It was their task, the Party organ exhorted, to mobilize Party organizations, workers' organizations, schools and teachers at various levels, and all propaganda instruments, in order to improve political education. Such education, the newspaper stressed, must be adapted to the different ideological levels of workers, peasants, intellectuals, youth, students, and children. Strengthening of group activities was also emphasized. Labor unions, the Agricultural Workers Union of Korea, the Socialist Working Youth League, and the Korean Democratic Women's Union were called upon to participate fully.

This kind of organizational effort reaches the entire population. For the youth, the Socialist Working League and the Young Pioneers ensure that hours outside of school or factory are not wasted. Mothers are enlisted in the educational process by the Women's Union. For the workers, the labor unions play a role; for the peasants, the cooperative farms are the ideological tutors.

Through these organizations, an array of extracurricular activities is organized, and members are pressed to participate fully. All student vacation periods are carefully programmed. Special reading, keeping of diaries, and participation in sports, calisthentics, and artistic endeavor are scheduled. Other vacation activities are participation in "mobile agitation groups" or propaganda art and literature groups. Propaganda activity for public health, dissemination of sanitation knowledge, and eradication of rats and sparrows are among the programs. Young Pioneers are expected to be active in helping their parents in housekeeping and in studying Party works among their other vacation

activities. All students are required to maintain a communication network among themselves so that they can be mobilized by the authorities for any purpose during vacations.

Parents are told that they "'must realize that their children are not only their offspring; they are the sons and daughters of the Party and the Nation." Mothers are urged to work with teachers in the training of children by attending a mother's school. Women's Union organizations are directed to "systematically promote projects to heighten and expand the knowledge and experience of mothers through "experience exchange" meetings, symposiums, and lectures. Mothers are told also that they "must become Communists and set an example for their children."

Party influence in the educational system is carried on through both teachers and students. A Party chapter exists at schools where there are at least 3 Party members; otherwise, the school unit will merge with a village Party unit. All teachers must belong to a labor union, and those under the age of 27 are required to join the Socialist Working Youth League. Women teachers must participate also in the Women's Union, and all teachers are expected to be active in friendship associations between North Korea and other countries. Teachers must belong also to such associations as the "school criticism assembly" and various groups engaged in educational method research.

Students may join the Young Pioneers at age 9, and membership is compulsory from the third year of primary school. By the last year of middle school, all students must join the Socialist Working Youth League. Counselors for the Young Pioneers are selected from among teachers who are Party members, and they are assigned by the county or city branch of the league.

Some of the tasks assigned to the Socialist Working Youth League are: cultivating communism in students; injecting Communist teachings through political methods, lectures, and meetings; controlling and maintaining student discipline; mobilizing student labor for construction projects; and guiding and controlling the private life of students.

Students thus live a highly regimented life, with almost no opportunity to pursue personal interests and, at all levels, in return for their education, are required by law to serve extensive time on public works projects. The training which a student receives in his particular field is generally received in daylight hours; evenings and weekends are reserved for group labor, athletic events, study and, especially, political indoctrination meetings. About 90 percent of the students at the technical school level and above live in dormitories, where their life is regulated from 6 a.m. to 11 p.m., 7 days a week.

The labor required of students is not only for the purpose of repaying educational costs to the State; it is intended to teach the value of productive work and to eliminate any derogatory ideas concerning manual labor. Regulations issued by the educational authorities in 1958 and put into force in 1959 set a minimum of 2 months of physical labor each year for all students, beginning in middle school. College students in general must work at least 10 weeks; 4 of these weeks are allotted to industrial labor; 4 weeks allotted to construction; and 2 weeks, to agriculture. Added to the labor performed on school-operated projects, the total for liberal arts students becomes 12 weeks and for technical students, 14 weeks. Students in graduating classes of specialized schools work 5½ months, and those above the third year of 4-year specialized schools work 4½ months. After the second year the graduate of a 3-year course must work 2½ months. These requirements are in addition to military training. Although the law does not compel elementary and middle school students to perform compulsory labor, they are, nevertheless, asked to work whenever they are needed for rice seed planting, tree planting, and the like for at least 2 to 4 weeks each year.

The control exercised by the Socialist Working Youth League over college students outside of school hours is detailed. The league prepares daily, weekly, and monthly schedules for the students to follow. A typical weekly schedule prepared by a college chapter of the league designates Monday as the day of social service for mobilization of labor and propaganda activity; Tuesday for various meetings; Wednesday as culture day for motion picture showing and literary meetings; Thursday as sanitation day for cleaning, beautification, and inspection of sanitary facilities; Friday as the day for improving technical skill through field trips to factories and practice of production technique; Saturday as athletic day for participation in various sports activities; and Sunday as the day of rest, with the morning set aside for homework.

INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

Confronted in 1945 with an urgent need to provide higher education to a maximum number of students and with no established higher education system, Soviet occupation authorities turned first to foreign education as an initial expedient. Educational advisers were brought to North Korea to train teaching cadres, and Koreans were sent to the Soviet Union. There were 30 such advisers in 1949 and, by the end of that year, 622 college students had been sent to the Soviet Union for advanced education.

Republic of Korea sources estimate that more than 7,000 stu-

dents had been educated abroad from 1948 to mid-1966, about 5,000 of them in the Soviet Union (see table 12). They also state that North Korea agreed to send about 1,000 more students to the Soviet Union under the Soviet-North Korea Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Pact signed in May 1966; these students were expected to study subjects pertinent to the completion of the 7-year plan.

Table 12. Total Number of North Korean Students Overseas, 1948–66

Nations	Number	Fields of study
Soviet Union	5,000	Engineering and political science
Czechoslovakia	400	Engineering and automobile engineering
East Germany	400	Mechanical engineering
Poland	400	Engineering
Bulgaria	300	Engineering
Communist China	300	Textile engineering
Hungary	300	Medical and engineering
Mongolia	20	Agriculture and livestock
Rumania	n.a.	Engineering
Cuba	n.a.	Political science

Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Yoram* (Survey of North Korea), Republic of Korea, Ministry of Public Information, Seoul, Korea, 1968, p. 178.

Beginning in 1966, the Government entered into cultural exchange agreements with a number of nations in Asia, Africa, and South America, under which students were sent abroad under the heading of "cultural exchange." It said also that 300 students from North Vietnam and other "socialist countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America" were studying at Kim Il-sung University by the fall of 1966.

A major item in the education budget is the support of the school system maintained in Japan for Korean residents of that country. Since this school system, including the Chōsen University, is conducted along the same lines as schools in North Korea, teaching Communist ideology, including hatred of Americans and Japanese as imperialist aggressors, the Japanese authorities have sought to thighten controls over it. This has been resisted by residents whose sympathies lie with North Korea. It has also been resisted by North Korea, with active support from the Communist and Socialist parties of Japan and allied organizations. In late 1968 this political support had been successful in blocking the enactment of an alien school bill designed to enforce greater Japanese control, including the transfer of the authority to li-

cense foreign schools from the provincial authorities to the Central Government. The Socialist-supported Tokyo municipal authorities in April 1968 granted official recognition of Chōsen University in that city.

The proposed legislation has been the subject of bitter North Korean polemics against the Japanese Government for some years. If it were enacted, educaional objectives and curricula of foreign schools in Japan would be brought into conformity with those of Japanese schools, thus preventing the teaching of Communist ideology. The Communists have frequently made allegations of oppression, violence against Korean students and faculty, burning of schools, and other atrocities.

North Korean authorities said that by the end of 1967 the regime had contributed 6.3 billion yen (the official conversion rate is 360 Japanese yen to U.S. $1) to the support of the system in Japan, including about 1 million yen in 1967 alone. Another 1 billion yen was budgeted for 1968, and most of this apparently was paid by October 14, 1968, when the pro-North Korean General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan acknowledged the receipt of 345.8 million yen, the 29th remittance from North Korea. The General Federation put the total by that time at 7.3 billion yen.

The Communists stated that the Korean school system in Japan in January 1968 included 145 regular schools of all levels from primary to university and several hundred adult schools, youth schools, and economic institutes. Korean language, geography, and history were being taught, as well as technical subjects and Communist doctrine. North Korean authorities said the total enrollment was about 35,000 of the 600,000 Korean residents of Japan.

A Japanese publication had reported that a 1959 Government survey showed that the number of Korean children of elementary and middle school age in Japan numbered about 160,000 and there were 90,000 children of higher school and college level age. Of these, about 95,000 attended Japanese middle and elementary schools, and 14,000 attended the Korean schools certified by the Japanese Government. Another 13,000 attended uncertified schools at those levels. About 14,000 Koreans were attending Japanese higher schools and colleges, whereas 4,000 others were attending certified higher institutions, and 2,000 were at noncertified institutions of higher learning. The survey indicated that about 70,000 children of school age were not attending school. More recent estimates, one by an American who visited the Korean school system in Japan in 1966, are that up to 75 percent of school-age Korean children attend Korean schools controlled by

the North Korean General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan.

The Communist-affiliated Chōsen University in Japan was opened in Tokyo in 1956 with a claimed enrollment of more than 1,000. The North Korean regime said that more than 10 percent of the students in 1965 were receiving stipends and more than 50 percent held scholarships. The university had six major departments, including a normal school and a communications department. Engineering and chemistry were stressed, presumably with the hope that many would eventually settle in North Korea.

EDUCATIONAL DOCTRINE

The philosophy and goal of education were authoritatively enunciated by Premier Kim Il-sung in his 1958 statement entitled "On Communist Education." According to him, education must serve the Party and stress class struggle and "Socialist patriotism." In reviewing the two decades of Communist education in the north, the Party declared in 1968 that "the first mission of socialist education is to indoctrinate and cultivate new Communist revolutionary man" and "our schools are not places in which to transmit simple knowledge but are powerful bases of revolutionization" for the training of activists through a combination of study and productive labor. On other occassions the Party repeatedly stressed "the first and most important prerequisite" of teaching Communist ideology and the political thought of Premier Kim. The task of training students to "hate the enemy," meaning the Republic of Korea and the United States, continued to be a salient feature of North Korean education.

Much importance is attached to "revolutionizing" teachers, who are constant targets of exhortations by Party organs as to their responsibilities, and to the necessity for them to recognize that "Party ideology is the one and only ideology" that they are permitted to entertain. They must, they are told, fight against "poisons which can weaken the revolutionary ranks, against factionalism and localism which put undue emphasis on the family and other unhealthy countermovements."

The official teacher's organ stated:

> It is especially important that in the schools the organizations and the teachers should establish the habit of reporting to the Party organization concerning their regular work, and in all their activities they must conform to the Party indoctrination and Party policy.
>
> Through participation in organizations, our teachers receive help from the masses and are subject to mass control. At the same time, through organizations, the teachers are able to open a principled, ideological struggle against their own shortcomings, no matter how small, and against any contradictions.

Another educational publication observed that "... a teacher is

not simply one who transfers scientific knowledge or technology. He is one who indoctrinates and develops the students in the direction of Communism."

CHAPTER 10
ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

To a greater degree than some other revolutionary governments, the North Korean Communists have embraced the ancient culture of their country rather than discarding or suppressing it. By exploiting Korea's cultural heritage the Communists hope to achieve several fairly well-defined objectives which they consider essential to the success of their revolution. In carrying out this program, however, the Communists are highly selective, utilizing only those parts of the traditional culture which contribute to their objectives or which can be usefully adapted to do so. The program also involves tight controls on all forms of contemporary artistic and intellectual expression.

One major value which the Communists attach to the country's artistic and intellectual heritage is that it is shared with those in the Republic of Korea, forming a homogeneous basis for the ultimate reunification which the regime seeks. A second objective is to show that class struggle existed in Korea from earliest times, with feudalism, imperialism, and bourgeois nationalism being overcome only by the efforts of the Communists. A third objective is to identify the Communist revolution with the revered past in the minds of the peasants and workers whom the Party must woo to maintain its power. The Program also serves to support a Party contention that Koreans have developed an indigenous culture of their own distinct from Chinese, Soviet, and Japanese cultures even though influenced by them. Thus, the Party seeks to develop a national pride among a people whose self-confidence has been severely shaken by Chinese, Soviet, and Japanese conquests in the recent past (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups).

The Party also has a material purpose in desiring to increase the spirit of the Korean workers. It hopes to spur laborers and peasants to greater productive efforts, to greater zeal in resisting the country's avowed enemies, and to greater loyalty to communism. As a result of this Communist policy the traditional culture, dating back thousands of years, is gradually developing separate characteristics in North Korea.

In urging writers, artists, and other intellectuals to make discriminating use of the past, the Korean leaders emphasize histori-

cal evidence of class struggle and resistance against feudalism or imperialism. They consider it important, for example, to show that slavery and serfdom were part of the Korean past; the failure of the *Soviet World Encyclopedia* to mention this fact was a major point in the Government's sharp critism of the encyclopedia's version of Korean history. The Government also stresses the publicizing of ancient artifacts which support the concept of an independently developed Korean culture. For example, Government propaganda asserts that metalworking developed in Korea without outside help.

The Folk Museum in Pyongyang contains samples of Korean dress, furniture, and handicraft; earthenware of the Silla dynasty; porcelain, woodenware and cooking utensils of the Koryŏ period; white porcelain of the Yi dynasty; and farming and fishing implements of various periods. These are intended to show that the practice of collective work prevailed throughout history. Although modern painters are encouraged to use contemporary themes, Korean propaganda acknowledges the classical style and the long tradition of Korean painting with its "distinct technique and approach."

To some extent the regime has attempted to keep alive or revive some of the ancient handicraft, including the art of embroidery, which advanced markedly during the Three Kingdoms period. In Pyongyang there is said to be an Institute of Embroidery, where hundreds of embroiderers are employed. Virtually every issue of the Government's propaganda magazine in English contains a description of one or more aspects of Korea's ancient painting, music, dance, and handicraft.

The Kim Il-sung personality cult, which has developed increasingly in recent years, is very evident in the field of artistic and intellectual expression. All direction on the subject is attributed to Kim Il-sung's thinking, and his public utterances are emulated in detail by the pronouncements of lesser figures.

Art and learning traditionally have served both a moral and an educational function and have been important repositories of the values and traditions of the people. Although they have been in former times principally an upper-class preoccupation, all Koreans have shared an awareness of them as part of their national heritage. Artists and scholars often lived among the villagers and instilled in them a respect for learning and artistic creation. As the centuries passed the people developed also a rich folk tradition of their own. Poems, songs, and stories were handed down from generation to generation in the family and village. The tombs, pagodas, temples, and statues scattered throughout the country have helped to preserve the artistic forms, and the inherited skills

in handicraft have also contributed to a sense of a common cultural heritage among all Koreans.

Accepting this tradition of popular interest, Communist Party policy is to encourge mass participation in all cultural forms through cultural circle activities in each factory, collective, and community, in the Armed Forces, and in other organizations. These groups take part in such national propaganda activities as the annual All-Korea Art Festival. North Korean sources claimed 1 million literary and art circle members and 10,000 professional artists and writers in 1965. Most games and sports are similarly utilized.

Externally, the policy is supported by extensive cultural contacts with Communist and neutral countries. A number of organizations exist for this purpose; the so-called Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, founded on May 6, 1957, is one of the most important. Many bilateral "friendship associations" are fostered by the committee, and a continuous exchange of cultural delegations is conducted with Communist and neutralist countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Although North Korea has exploited the past, even greater emphasis is placed on contemporary artistic and cultural expression. In pursuing its policies, the Government has enlisted all creative, artistic, and intellectual talent under a rigidly controlled State system which has as its avowed purpose the development of a "new Communist personality." Just as Marxist-Leninist Socialist realism is the only standard for judging the usefulness of the old forms, ideological content is the primary criterion for evaluating contemporary works. The principle of art for art's sake is expressly renounced.

To assure conformity with the guidelines of Kim Il-sung and the Party in the arts and literature as well as in other forms of intellectual expression, the regime has established a system of rewards and punishment.

Because North Korea is a closed society it is difficult to appraise the reaction of writers, artists, and intellectuals to the controlled environment in which they work. It is possible that some dissidence exists on the basis of changes in the cast of characters in the cultural arena and the criticisms publicly voiced from time to time by Kim Il-sung and other leaders. When these leaders talk of the "cultural revolution," they do not praise the efforts made so far but invariably call for greater adherence to revolutionary principles.

THE CULTURAL HERITAGE

Although the Government claims to have unearthed relics from the Paleolithic era showing the existence of an indigenous people

many thousands of years before the Christian era, the zenith of Korea's artistic and intellectual achievements occurred from the seventh through the 12th centuries while Europe was moving through the Middle Ages toward the Renaissance. It was during the earlier part of this period that the pageantry and ritual of the Buddhist religion stimulated Korean creativity and provided the people with new artistic methods and goals. In its public criticism of the Soviet version of Korean history, the North Korean regime sought to deprecate the roles of the Chinese and of Buddhism in Korean cultural history, elements which the Soviets had stressed more than the North Korean Communists found acceptable.

Confucianism did not become a dominant cultural influence until the 13th and 14th centuries A.D. At first it also served as an important intellectual stimulus, but gradually it set loose influences which, in time, stultified both the artistic vitality generated earlier by Buddhism and the intellectual energy engendered by Confucianism.

From the 14th to the 17th centuries the Korean scholar class established its control over the court, developed a vested interest in the court's power and position, and increasingly favored a conservative, traditionalist attitude toward the search for truth and expression of beauty. A shift in emphasis from imaginative to moral and didactic aspects of art and learning constricted imaginative expression. Dogmatic reliance on the Chinese classics stifled curiosity and offered little stimulus for the introduction of new ideas and change. The Chu Hsi school of Confucian philosophy, which placed extreme emphasis upon conformity and orthodoxy, became supreme in Korea and vitiated much of the old vigor of earlier Confucianism (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). It became more important to live with nature according to established doctrine than to probe its content and mysteries. This formal a historical precedent for the kind of regimentation of artistic and intellectual life which the Communists have imposed on North Korea.

Visual Arts

The greatest achievement of Korean visual art, in which the Koreans had no peers after surpassing their Chinese teachers, was in ceramics. Delicacy, fine craftsmanship, and simplicity of design were distinctive characteristics of Korean ceramics (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

After the Japanese invasion at the end of the 16th century, many master potters and even entire pottery-making communities emigrated to Japan, where they had an influence on the development of Japanese ceramics that is still visible.

Korean gardening also influenced the art of gardening in Japan, and many famous Japanese gardens were patterned after Korean prototypes. A number of Koryŏ kings had been enthusiastic botanists. A royal garden with rare and exotic flora gathered from various parts of the Peninsula and from China was established early in the 12th century and was continued until 1419.

Metalwork, lacquer work, painting, and sculpture also flourished under Buddhist influence. Metal casting, particularly bell founding, acquired a distinctively Korean character. Huge bronze bells were one of the major achievements of the Three Kingdoms period. Lacquer work, one of the earliest industrial arts of the Orient, was encouraged in Buddhist monasteries; lacquered articles often were inlaid with ivory, jade, coral, or abalone; carved with modeled reliefs or engravings; and decorated in color, usually gold and silver.

The revival of Confucian scholarship in the 13th and 14th centuries stimulated the development of painting by creating a new interest in calligraphy and dexterity in the use of the brush. Religious, mythological, and more rarely, historical subjects were usually chosen for representation. The next greatest preference was for subjects from nature. Simplicity of form, dignity, and breadth of execution characterized Korean painting. After the turn of the 20th century Japanese and Western styles and techniques greatly influenced Korean artists, who became acquainted with such trends as impressionism, cubism, and nonrepresentational art.

Buddhist temples were the principal Korean contribution to architecture, although the Korean system of home heating by means of ducts under the floor was an innovation in design which spread to other parts of the world. In general, Korean architecture has been kept severely functional. Dwellings usually are one story, and lavish decoration has been reserved for the homes of the wealthy. The development of high-rise modernistic apartment houses has been a feature of State-provided housing for urban workers under the Communist regime.

Imaginative Literature

The imaginative literature of Korea, under Chinese influence, most often was found in poetry; much of it was composed in a romantic vein. The faithfulness of two lovers, for example, was a frequent and apparently very popular theme. Most of the poems were lyrical and short; there were no epics in historic times. In addition to the formal literature created by the upper classes, there is a substantial body of tales and songs told and sung by the majority of the people. It is principally these that have been used in the Communist effort to remold the culture.

The Formal Tradition

Out of the worship of Hananim (Heavenly Being) came the poem "'The Song of Barley," said to have been composed by King Kija (ca. 1122 B.C.) and sung by him with the farmers (see ch. 11, Religion). The earliest poem of which there is a record is "The Song of the Nightingale," composed by King Yari around the beginning of the Christian era. It is typical of Korean love poems which seek their symbols in nature and express only indirectly the romanticism which inspired them.

Throughout their long history the Koreans have held the scholar in reverence, and he was expected also to be a poet. He was obliged to compose poems for all occasions. In his writing he used metaphor and simile to a degree which seems florid and affected to the Westerner but is considered delightful by the Korean.

A distinctive position in traditional Korean literature is occupied by a type of poem known as *sijo,* a poetic form which began to be developed probably in the 12th century. It is composed of three couplets and is characterized by great simplicity and expressiveness. Many of these peoms reveal a sensitivity to the beauties of nature, a delight in the enjoyments of life, and a tendency toward contemplation, which together produce a sense of serenity and, sometimes, loneliness. The ephemeral nature of time, the pleasures of wine, and the importance of loyalty are other common themes.

Prose fiction began in the seventh century when a noted Korean scholar, Ch'oe Chi-won (sometimes called the Father of Korean literature), published the novel *Adventures Among the Kuen-lun Mountains,* a fanciful account of roaming among the great mountains in southern China. Kim Pu-sik, Confucian scholar and author of *Samguk Sagi* (Annals of the Three Kingdoms), the standard history of the Three Kingdoms, who was considered the greatest of the Koryŏ writers, also wrote a historical novel titled *The Story of the Long North Wall.* According to legend, Korea had its own smaller version of the Great Wall which extended from the Yellow Sea across northern Korea to the Sea of Japan. A number of others wrote novels of travel and adventure at home and in foreign lands. Many of these stories, however, were the works of scholars, written in Chinese script and limited to the few learned readers.

The 15th-century development of the Korean alphabet gave rise to a popular literature. Although ignored by scholars and the literary elite, historical works, poetry, travelogues, biographies, and fiction were written in the native alphabet and were circulated mainly among those with little education. Much of the prose fiction was written anonymously, partly because the Confucian scholars regarded anything not written in Chinese as trivial and partly because some of the fiction contained satirical attacks on social and political conditions under the Yi dynasty.

When Confucianism became the official State philosophy, novels and stories were given themes in the tradition of the Confucian ethic, the blessedness of filial piety. The moral was often inserted artificially. A voluminous amount of literature was produced in the 18th and 19th centuries, much of it stultified by Confucian orthodoxy which demanded a reiteration of timeworn platitudes.

The Folk Tradition

The rich and varied folk literature is even more closely related to religion than is the formal literature. There are three main kinds of tales—those derived from spirit worship, those in the Confucian tradition, and those reflecting the influence of Buddhism. Some of the stories draw their humor from obscene jokes.

Tales of the spirits were innumerable, since everything, animate and inanimate, was thought to have a spirit. Spirits of mountains, streams, rocks, caves, and animals, most of which were feared, are as much a part of Korean tales as fairies, goblins, and sprites are of Western literature. The turtle, the symbol of longevity, and the tiger, known in Korean lore as the awesome king of the beasts, appear most frequently in animal tales.

The Confucian tales, designed to illustrate and teach principles of conduct, are short, didactic, and relatively unimaginative. Right behavior is shown as necessary for success and is invariably rewarded. These tales are well known to the populace.

The Buddhist stories, longer and more involved, give a much wider range to the imagination and provide the opportunity for dramatic effect. Plots often are intricate and contain considerable detail about interplay in human relationships. There is, however, a common core—a monastery which serves as a refuge for the troubled hero, a place where the hero acquires the strength to go back to the world and to conquer, or a monk who intervenes in a miraculous manner to snatch the hero from certain defeat.

The Koreans also have a wealth of often-told myths and legends: tales of wonderful marksmanship, heroic daring, gigantic strength, subtle strategem, inventive genius, intrepid horsemanship, and hairbreadth escape. There are Yi Yu-song, whose body flattened bullets which fell harmlessly to the ground; Kwak Cha-u, "General of the Red Robe," who had the power to wrinkle the ground, make it contract, and then expand it to normal after he had stepped over it; and the myth of the founding of Tan'gun Chosŏn (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The classic love story *Ch'unhyang-chŏn* (Tales of Ch'unhyang), written in the native alphabet during the latter part of the Yi dynasty, is known to nearly all Koreans. Taking as its theme the love of a young nobleman and Ch'un Hyang, the daughter of a lowborn *kisaeng* (female entertainer),

it was especially popular among those who were critical of the sharp division which existed between the nobility and the commoners in the social order of the time. In the mid-1960's North Korea continued to make use of this love story in theatrical plays to show the existence of class contradictions in the country since ancient times. There are many tales illustrating the wisdom of magistrates; others, with the theme of winning fame and success, center on the great national examinations which were a traditional feature of Korean life (see ch. 12, Social Values).

These stories have been told and retold through the centuries to the great enjoyment of all. Any individual could be the storyteller, and the narration often assumed the aspects of a dramatic production with the narrator freely acting out the parts. In former times professional storytellers would read classical and folk tales to any individual or group which hired them. Such readings were then the closest Korean approximation to the theater in the West.

Music, Dance, and Drama

Since ancient times, music and dance have been an integral part of everyday life, with nearly everyone participating. The formal concert or dance performance was rare except in palaces. Distinctive Korean instruments have been produced for centuries without modification. The *chwago* (sitting drum) and the *hyang p'iri* (tartar pipe) antedate the Christian era, whereas the *kŏmungo* (harp), *hyang pip'a* (flute), and *taegŭm* (bamboo flute) were devised during the Three Kingdoms period. Small orchestras, composed of a few instruments and a drum, for centuries have accompanied folk singing and dancing. Larger orchestras, consisting of instruments such as the zither, harp, flute, a type of clarinet, drum, cymbal, and gong, were used in court circles where a special court or "gracious" music evolved.

Korean formal, or classical, music is considered capable of greater variety and complexity than is most Asian music. Westerners sometimes complain that it lacks definite rhythmic and melodic patterns, but its rules, although allowing considerable freedom, are precise. Muscial canons which would conform with Chinese conventions were developed under the early Yi kings. Proper music was held to perform a moral function by bringing an individual into greater harmony with the true nature of life, and formal musical theory was bound up with involved ideas on politics, religion, nature, and the universe. The instruments of the Korean classical orchestra were made of the chief elements of nature—wood, stone, and metal—and the full orchestra symbolically represented the sounds of nature in harmony.

Of Korean folk music the song is by far the most important

popular musical form; Koreans sing a great deal, at work in the fields, on the road, at feasts, parties, and celebrations, or in the home. It is said that when a dozen Koreans gather, it will be only minutes before singing begins. Many of these songs are traditional melodies readily distinguishable by the Western ear. A single fluid melody, sung to the accompaniment of strong irregular rhythms as women beat their daily wash, is a common sound in the countryside. This attribute of the people has enabled the North Korean regime to introduce and popularize many songs glorifying the Communist revolution and the leadership of Kim Il-sung.

The subjects of Korean songs are without limit. Romantic love is a popular theme, and some songs are political in inspiration. One of the most famous is "Arirang," which is said to have been composed in ancient times by a political prisoner awaiting execution and to have been sung by him as he trudged up the Hill of Arirang, the place of his execution just outside Seoul. The people learned "Arirang," and soon it was the traditional farewell of the condemned man. It has since been given many verses and versions, both as a love song and as an expression of Korean patriotism.

Informal folk dancing is deeply rooted in the Korean way of life. Men sometimes dance with women, but more often the men and women dance separately. As with singing, Koreans dance at every possible opportunity—during rest periods in the field, when entertaining friends, or when other opportunities arise. The ability to extemporize on such occasions is highly prized, and guests at parties are expected to perform. The dances are usually accompanied by a drum, and sometimes by a reed flute or other instruments.

There are also formal dances, such as the Devil Dance and the Lion Dance, some of which tell a historic story in the manner of ballet; others may be a sly commentary on human pomposity. They are normally executed by one performer who is accompanied by traditional instruments. Parts of the story not explicit in the dance may be bridged with dialogue. An emphasis on shoulder movement, which governs the slow, graceful arm rhythms, is characteristic of these dances.

Korea has little in the way of dramatic tradition apart from the dance, but there were mask plays in very early times, which might be categorized also as dances, and two kinds of puppet plays were in vogue during the Three Kingdoms period. Satire of monks and privileged classes predominated in the mask and puppet plays. The Korean puppet play is thought by some historians to have had its origins in India and to have been modified by Chinese influence. Later it was introduced into Japan, where it has continued to flourish until the present time.

Intellectual Expression

Intellectual expression from the 14th century onward was dominated first by an extreme form of Confucianism that was known also in China, followed by Japanese suppression and, for North Korea, Soviet occupation and Communist rule. Confucianism tended to suppress originality among intellectuals, limiting them to the reiteration of ancient concepts. Like present-day communism it cautioned intellectuals against dangerous thinking, and all statements had to be supported by quotations from the Chinese classics. The Five Classics *(Book of Changes, Book of History, Book of Poetry, Book of Rites,* and *Spring and Autumn Annals)* and the Four Books (*Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects,* and *Works of Mencius*) have been given a substantial amount of Korean commentary and interpretation.

Traditionally, Koreans have classified their formal literature, all written in Chinese characters, into four divisions: *kyŏng* (Chinese classics); *sa* (history); *cha* (special subjects, including religion, war, agriculture, medicine, astronomy, mathematics, geomancy, travel, fine arts, and fiction); and *chip* (collected writings). The most original Korean contribution to Far Eastern intellectual achievement was in the writing of history.

Usually the focus of Korean histories was on the king and his court rather than on the common people. Yet, in addition to official histories, which were written by statesmen and scholars and which culminated in enormous dynastic annals like those of China, there also was *yasa* (popular history), which was written under unique precautions against bias: at the end of each individual regin all documents were assembled by a commission of historians protected against interference; copies of the collection were then deposited and guarded for posterity in several widely separated mountain citadels as well as in the capital.

Geographical studies; encyclopedias of history, government, law, and culture; and biographies were also included under *sa.* Among the most important encyclopedias was the *Tong'guk Munhŏn Pigo;* 100 volumes were printed in 1770 and were later expanded to 250 volumes. This was during the period of the "practical learning" movement which the North Korean Communists emphasize as the start of a new trend in Korean intellectual expression (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The so-called practical school upheld the empirical method, stressed the study of natural science and mathematics, and challenged the validity of religion and superstitions. The Communists contend that this movement was consistent with their own approach to intellectual expression, insisting that all art and literary works should contain advanced

ideological content. Novels by Pak Chi-wŏn, poems by Chŏng Yak-yong, and paintings by Shin Yun-bok and Kim Hong-do are cited by today's Communist historians. Advocacy of land reform was another attribute of the movement in which the Communists imply a kinship.

Extensive writings on astronomy, mathematics, geomancy (the selection of appropriate or luck sites for graves, houses, and palaces), languages, and music; tremendous quanties of essays, biographies, State papers and letters; and inventions such as movable metal type (in wide use 50 years before Johann Gutenberg developed it in Germany) also testify to the energy once characteristic of the intellectual life.

THE SITUATION TODAY

Although the artist, writer, or intellectual has a relatively privileged status in North Korea, this depends on his conformity to the strict standards which are imposed upon him by the regime. Both the content and the amount of a writer's or artist's production are stipulated by the authorities (see ch. 16, Public Information).

The Controls

Kim Il-sung's overall precept for artistic and literary workers on November 7, 1964, has been reported as being that ". . . our new democratic arts must always contain a deep sense of ideology; the single proper standard in determining the value of a work is a deep sense of ideology combined with a high degree of artistry."

The organization through which the Korean Workers Party controls cultural activity is the General Federation of Korean Literature and Arts Unions, the parent body for all literary and artistic organizations in North Korea, under the chairmanship of Pak Ung-kul. Chapter 1 of the regulations of the federation says:

> The aesthetic theory of Marxism-Leninism should be the guide in creative activities, and Socialist realism becomes the only method of creative activities in the field of our literature and arts, which is socialism in content and national in form. In the field of literature and the arts we should oppose revisionism, overcome dogmatism as well as formalism, secure independence and fight sternly against all the bourgeois literary and artistic ideas of an antirevolutionary nature which does harm to party loyalty and the literature and arts of our class and people.

The following are subsidiary organizations under the General Federation of Korean Literature and Arts Unions: the Korean Writers Union, Korean Musicians Union, Korean Artists Union, Korean Players Union, Korean Motion Picture Workers Union, Korean Dancers Union, and Korean Photographers Union.

The writers' and artists' unions date from 1953; the others, including the parent General Federation in its present form, were organized in 1961. Before the Korean conflict cultural activities were under the General Federation of North Korean Literature and Arts Unions, which merged in 1951 with leftist literary and artistic organizations in the Republic of Korea and dropped the word "North" from its name. In 1953 the federation was divided into independent unions, but was reestablished at a meeting held in March 1961. When the federation was dissolved in 1953, the reason given was that writers and artists in North Korea had developed enough to act by themselves without the guidance of the federation. When it was reestablished, the purpose of the General Federation was said to be ". . . to renew pride and honor as 'Red writers and artists of the Party' and to make more glorious the literature and arts in the Ch'ŏllima era." The first federation chairman was Han Sŏl-ya, then leading Government writer, who has since disappeared from public view.

Each of the subordinate units has a central committee and branches throughout the provinces. Each is divided also into specialized committees. In literature, for example, subdepartments include the novel, poetry, drama, editorial comment, children's literature, foreign literature, and others. The Korean Artists Union has an oil-painting committee, a sculpture committee, a technical arts committee, and a criticism committee. Other intellectuals are also formed into organizations in accordance with Kim Il-sung's dictum that "the most important thing in revolutionizing of the intellectuals is to strengthen organizational life, including the Party organizational life."

Through the General Federation and its subordinate unions, themes are assigned to writers and artists, and each is required to submit an annual work plan detailing the type of material and the theme to be used. The individual plan is then revised in accordance with the overall plan established for the various unions. The number and character of novels, plays, short stories, motion pictures, newspaper editions, textbooks, and exhibitions are all planned in advance. After a work is finished it is judged by a joint review committee of the appropriate union and is also screened by the Cabinet's Publishing Bureau. Any objectionable matter must then be removed, and the Party conducts a second review. In the case of stage performances, after the script has been approved there must be a trial performance for a joint review committee of the Party and members of the union. When the writers have been assigned their quotas, time deadlines, and themes, they are sent into the field for work experience in the areas they are writing about, such as a factory or a farm.

The number of works to be produced is part of the overall economic planning. As in factory production, a writer is criticized if he does not produce the amount of material assigned within the time limit prescribed. This policy and the uniformity of current themes in all fields produce mediocrity in most cultural endeavors. The slightest trend of liberal thought is subject to purge, criticism, and discipline. Artistic expression without an ideological purpose is considered to be reactionary and bourgeois. Factional conflicts also limit the freedom of action of the writers. When the "domestic faction" was purged by Kim Il-sung, writers who had adhered to it were eliminated as reactionaries.

Most of the subordinate unions of the General Federation publish magazines for their membership through which the official themes and directives are conveyed. The Central Committee of the Korean Writers' Union has three such publications: *Chosŏn Munhak* (Korean Literature), dealing with adult literature; *Ch'ŏngnyŏn Munhak* (Youth Literature); and *Adong Munhak* (Children's Literature). Other publications are: *Chosŏn Misul* (Korean Fine Arts) of the Artists Union; *Chosŏn Ummak* (Korean Music) of the Musicians Union; *Chosŏn Yesul* (Korean Drama) of the Players Union; and *Chosŏn Yŏnghwa* of the Film Workers Union.

Although creativity and individual expression have been deliberately discouraged by the system, the writer or artist may enjoy a relatively affluent life and close association with the Party leadership as a compensation (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

A system of classification and decoration, which involves cash bonuses beyond base pay, has been developed as an incentive for writers and artists. The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly awards the titles of People's Artist and Meritorious Artist in the fields of literature, music, painting, musical composition, and film production and direction. Awards of People's Actor and Actress and Meritorious Actor and Actress are given to stage personnel. Those who are awarded these prizes receive from 150 to 180 wŏn (approximately 2.5 wŏn equal U.S.$1) per month above their basic classification salaries. A People's Prize is given for collective artwork and for achievements in science, invention, and architectural design.

Kim Il-sung has periodically given personal instructions to those engaged in the arts and literature, and these pronouncements have the force of law. In 1951 he advised writers and artists to inculcate in the people boundless loyalty to the leader, mass heroism, and increased fighting spirit against the enemy. Writers and artists, he said, were the "engineers of the human soul" and as such were expected to depict "the lofty patriotism and fighting spirit of the North Korean people."

In a speech on November 27, 1964, Kim Il-sung decreed that "... our arts should express the meaningful life and heroic struggle of the people who are living during the Ch'ŏllima period ..." (see Glossary). On December 16, 1967, he told the Fourth Supreme People's Assembly:

> What holds the most important place in the proletarianization of the whole society is the revolutionization of the intellectuals. . . . We should eradicate all the remnants of obsolete ideologies in the minds of the intellectuals, arm them with Communist ideas and thus develop them into revolutionaries loyal to the Party, the working class, the Fatherland, and the people.

Also in November 1964 the Central Committee of the Korean Writers' Union organized among various authors, such as novelists, dramatists, scenario writers, poets, and writers of children's literature, forums for the study of Kim Il-sung's instructions. The main topic of the forums was how to create works with the proper characterization of revolutionary heroes.

In an address at the Supreme People's Assembly on April 26, 1967, Pak Yong-sin, Minister of Culture, announced that during the previous year the Party and the Government had "consolidated material and technical foundations of our culture and arts" including the completion of new film studios and theaters. Also during the year, he said, the revolutionary museum, the central library, and other libraries throughout the country had collected and stored numerous cultural legacies and other cultural treasures. He reported that more than 100 films, 10 national operas and dance plays, a score of dramas, and hundreds of novels had been produced during the year, as well as more than 1,000 works of fine art. "Today," he noted, "these art works are playing an important role in educating the people in revolutionary thought. . . . Through theaters, museums, libraries, and other cultural organizations several hundred thousand people have been educated daily in the ideology of our Party."

The Minister seemed to take cognizance of some dissidence in artistic circles when he said that the nation had organized a "reliable legion of artists and men of culture" who were able to hold fast "under the personal guidance of Comrade Kim Il-sung when agitators for bourgeois esthetics advocated 'national culture and art for art's sake transcending classes.' " He added:

> When national nihilism and flunkeyism raised their heads . . . our men of culture and art established chuch'e in culture and art and could give better expression to the national characteristics by following Comrade Kim Il-sung's teaching that, on the basis of inheriting and developing our nation's precious cultural legacies, the progressive culture of foreign countries should be creatively assimilated and adopted.

The Minister promised that, in the future, men of culture and art would work harder to eliminate bourgeois influences and to

reproduce more and better artworks symbolizing the contemporary characteristics of the revolution.

Kim Il-sung emphasized, in an address to the Korean Workers Party Conference in October 1966, the importance he attaches to selective use of the old Korean culture in furthering revolutionary goals. He said:

> What is of weighty importance here . . . is to educate the working people to make a correct attitude toward national cultural legacies and national traditions which have formed through history. We must neither slide into a nihilist deviation of negating and obliterating everything of the past nor into a deviation of restoring past things uncritically. Only when backward and reactionary things are weeded out of the national legacies and all that is progressive and popular are adopted and improved critically, is it possible to build a new Socialist culture and mode of life and develop them all the more.

Writers and artists, the Premier has decreed, ". . . must arm themselves with the principle of contemporaneity—to carry forward our cultural heritage means that we must make it serve our present revolutionary task and the actual needs of our literature and arts." Carrying forward the cultural heritage, he added, ". . . should be combined with the education of the people in Socialist patriotism and the ideological work of rooting out dogmatism and establising national identity." He also warned against "praising the old feudal society with its stagnation and idealizing the old expressions unless critically selected."

An example of Communist modernization of ancient culture is presented by "The Song of Boatmen in Pupsungp'o," derived from a Korean folk melody. A Communist publication boasted that, with the introduction of harmony and counterpoint, the song had become a new and better one. The adaptation of watercolor technique to traditional painting is one of the lines laid down for artists.

That some independent thought continued in literary and artistic circles was suggested by First Deputy Premier Kim Il in a report to the Party's Central Committee plenum in April 1968 when he called for action to ". . . uproot all the unhealthy and counterrevolutionary ideas and poisonous elements, such as revisionism, left opportunism, flunkeyism, bourgeois ideas, feudal Confucian ideas, factionalism, provincialism, and familyism."

Trends and Personalities

Since the end of World War II literature and the arts have passed through at least five major phases and a number of minor ones which reflected purges resulting from factional struggles and Party line shifts. During the period before the Korean conflict, praise of the Soviet occupation and the Communist struggle against the Japanese under Kim Il-sung's partisans was a major preoccupation. During the Korean conflict most effort went into

stimulating efforts to achieve victory. After the conflict a series of purges intensified the efforts of writers and artists to demonstrate loyalty to the Communist Party. One major theme was reconstruction; others were anti-Americanism and good will toward Communist China and the Soviet Union. From 1960 onward the Ch'ŏllima theme dominated most cultural and artistic endeavors with the purpose of stimulating workers' and peasants' efforts by ideological rather than material means. Since 1964 the glorification of Kim Il-sung has become increasingly prominent in cultural output, and the Party has sought to avoid too close identification with the policies of either of North Korea's giant Communist neighbors.

Literature

From the end of World War II to the Korean conflict literary activities were carried on chiefly by writers, such as Han Sŏl-ya, who had been active in leftist literature before 1945. During the Korean conflict Han Sŏl-ya wrote short stories encouraging its continuation. Among other representative writers was Pak Ung-kŭl, who later succeeded Han Sŏl-ya as chairman of the General Federation of Literature and Arts Unions. After the conflict such works as "Poem of Irrigation on South P'yŏngyang Province" by Yi Yong-ak and "Unit Leader of Trade Union" by Yu Hang-im were popular. Writers such as Chŏn Se-bong, Kim Pyŏng-hun, Yi Sang-kwang, Pak T'ae-won, Pak T'ae-min, Yun Si-ch'ŏl, Sŏk Yun-ki, and Yi Chŏng-suk were still active in 1968 in the production of politically inspired works.

Although the novel as a literary form developed slowly in North Korea, production in 1963 was reported to be double that of 1962. Most novels of that year concentrated on the personality cult of Kim Il-sung and described his reputed activities against the Japanese in the 1930's. Examples were *A Flash* by Pak Tal, *Youth Frontier* by Im Ch'un-ch'u, and *Sunset* by Pak T'ae-min.

Poets who survived several post-Korean conflict purges included Tŭng Sŭng-t'ae, Ma U-ryong, and Pak P'al-yang. Full-length epics produced around 1962 included "History of the Jungle" and "The Torch of Poch'ŏngbo" by Pak Se-yŏng, "The Story Flowing on Taedong River" by Paek In-chun, and "For the Happy Future" by Yi Hyo-ŭn. Other prominent works of poetry in recent years have included those of Ham Yŏng-ki, Kim Kwang-sŏp, Pak Myŏng-to, Pak San-u, and Yi Ho-il.

The Communists ignored classical literature of the country until about 1955 when they began adapting selected works. Some classical works published in edited form are: *Collected Works of Ancient Folklore,* edited by Han Yong-ok; *Aesthetical Viewpoints of Classical Writers,* said to have been compiled by Yi Kyu-po,

Pak Chi-wŏn, and others; *Myohang Mountain Traveler Description* and *Selection of Traveler's Stories* by Pak Che-ka; and *Imjin Story* by Pak Chi-wŏn, which describes the achievements of Admiral Yi Sun-sin and others.

Foreign literature is carefully screened to ensure that it opposes feudalism and bourgeois society. Even Russian literature has been screened on this basis, although all Soviet literature was admitted freely during the occupation (1945–48) and for some time afterward.

Competent observers detect in current North Korean literature an increased emphasis on warlike themes. By 1968 works on the anti-American struggle, idolization of the People's Army, and experiences during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts were becoming more numerous.

Music

The Communists date the history of Korean music back 5,000 years to the Bronze Age. They have collected a number of ancient instruments which are on display in museums. They boast of 20 large orchestras, including the State Philharmonic Symphony, which plays both Korean and Western classical music and modern music with "revolutionary Socialist quality," of which militancy is asserted to be an infallible hallmark.

Musical trends have closely paralleled those of literature. From 1945 to the outbreak of the Korean conflict people were urged to sing melodies such as "Song of General Kim Il-sung," "Patriotic Song," and "The Soviet Army is Our Liberator." Many folk stories which told of class conflict in ancient times were presented as operas, for example, "The Story of Ch'un Hyang." During the conflict emphasis was on songs designed to promote a fighting spirit, and these were followed by reconstruction themes, enhancement of class consciousness, the Kim Il-sung glorification program, and peaceful unification.

Musicians are under orders to create works praising productive efforts made by people, attacking counterrevolutionary elements, and cultivating the spirit of patriotism and democracy. Subject matter includes the idolizing of the People's Army, the achievement of the economic plan, anti-Americanism, agitation of anti-Government demonstrations in the Republic of Korea, memorializing the anti-Japanese partisan struggle under Kim Il-sung, and tributes to the working class.

In November 1960 Kim Il-sung called for a change in the musical instruments in use, presumably to modernize them; evidence available in 1968 suggested that the regime had made some progress in this. Following an order from the Premier in March 1962, musicians concentrated on composing opera music. Some of the result-

ing operas were "Under the Bright Sunshine," which won a People's Award, and "This is Not a Legend."

A monthly Korean publication describes the procedure that was followed when Korean classical operas, which had been suppressed under the Japanese, were "rediscovered." New features and far-reaching changes, based on Socialist realism, were added to "Story of Ch'un Hyang," "Tale of Sim Ch'ŏng," and similar works. So-called feudal thoughts were first removed.

Painting

The Communists have exhibited classical-style paintings from earlier times, but modern artists are generally required to follow revolutionary themes, such as portraits of Kim Il-sung, battle scenes, and workers and peasants at their labors. At art schools works are judged in terms of revolutionary expression rather than by traditional standards. A limited number of prints are used to express revolutionary concepts, but the production of posters is in the forefront of art media for agitation purposes.

Sculpture

Since 1945 much of the time of sculptors in the north has been devoted to producing bronze statues of Kim Il-sung, just as statues of Buddha constituted the main focus of sculpture in the Buddhist era. Since the Korean conflict many statues have been produced of People's Army heroes and of symbols of the Ch'ŏllima movement. One large Ch'ŏllima statue was 3 years in production. Plaster busts of Kim Il-sung must be made for every Party history classroom, all schools, factories, and organizations. Some major works of sculpture are "People's Hero Tower" in Hyesan, "Comrade Kim Il-sung in the 1930's," which was created in marble, and "Childhood Period of Kim Il-sung."

Drama

Although drama did not figure largely in ancient Korean culture, the Communist regime has given it considerable weight in carrying out its cultural tasks. In the early period after liberation, low literacy, limited broadcasting facilities, a low rate of literary and motion picture production, and similar factors made dramatic productions a useful way of conveying the Party's message to large numbers of people.

During the Korean conflict the Communists tried to use drama to inspire awareness of the situation and to entertain the Armed Forces. Most theaters, however, were destroyed in the conflict, and only a limited number of dances, songs, and dramatic sketches could be produced. Activities were expanded by the construction of an underground theater at Moranbong in Pyongyang. The Na-

tional Art Theater was organized, and the National Children's Arts Theater was built, as were provincial theaters in Hwanghaenamdo and Yanggang-do. Most dramatic works were concerned with the conflict and justification of Communist policies. Prominent works were "Torch," "The Mt. Paektu," "Hong Kyŏng-nae," "Stone," "Story of Ch'un Hyang," "The Slave Rite," "The Tale of Sim Ch'ŏng," "People Guard the Nation," "A Woman's Way," and "Admiral Yi Sun-sin." The Korean Players Union met in April 1966 and announced that all creative work and art expression should be based on revolutionary tradition and should promote Communist thought.

As part of its program of resurrecting ancient art forms, the regime built the National Puppet Theater in Pyongyang in the early part of the 1960's to give a more formal setting to these productions which, previously, had been scattered throughout the countryside. Reports emanating from the Republic of Korea say the puppet-show revival has met with little public response and is maintained at a minimum level.

Dance

Theatrical dance in North Korea exists principally as one of the elements of musical dance drama. The Communists place special emphasis on classical dances ranging from solo to group dances, and these are the dances which are most popular with North Korean audiences. Many of the dances however, have been changed to incorporate a revolutionary meaning or to pay tribute to Kim Il-sung. There are reportedly about 1,000 dancers, professional and nonprofessional, enrolled in the Korean Dancers Union.

North Korean theatrical dance dates from 1949 when the National Dancing Drama was started. Some of the dance works produced by the Central Dancing Arts Organization are "Half Moon Castle Melody" (1949), "The Story of Ong'yŏn Pond" (1958), "The Red Flag" (1959), "The Immortal Song" (1961), and "The Daughter of a Partisan" (1962). Some of the classical dance works performed were "The Mother of Korea" (1951), "The Day of the Sun Rising" (1960), "The Molten Iron Is Flowing" (1961), and "Memory" (1963).

After Kim Il-sung's instructions of November 1964, male dancers started appearing, the better to interpret dances pertaining to revolution and war. Some male dance works are "The Red Heart" and "The Fighter of Nap'alsan."

Photography

Photography is a limited art form in North Korea, and there is no mass participation since the possession of cameras is se-

verely limited, and neither film nor photographic supplies are available to the general public.

The Central Photo Producing Bureau in the Ministry of Culture produces such photographs as the portrait of Kim Il-sung which appears on the wall of each organization, in the front row of marching demonstrations, on the streets, and in each home; there are many thousands of copies produced each year. Public photographic exhibits are the work of this bureau rather than private individuals. The bureau supplies pictures to various museums, memorials, exhibition halls, clubs, and propaganda halls. Other organizations permitted to engage in photographic activities are newspaper companies, publishing houses, and other mass communication organizations.

Performing Organizations

Writers, artists, dancers, and musicians are assigned to various performing organizations to help carry on their work. Among the principal performing organizations is the National Arts Theater, which stages operas; instrumental and vocal music and dancing are included. This theater has, on occasion, performed abroad. Others include the National Orchestra, National Dancing Theater, National Drama Theater, Pyongyang Theater, National Children's Arts Theater, National Puppet Theater, and National Technical Arts Theater. At the local level each province has at least one vocal and dance organization and one drama organization. Within the military organization the Korean People's Army Ensemble is assigned to the Army, and each small unit also has an ensemble. In addition, there are Navy and Air Force ensembles. The Korean People's Army Theater Group is organized for drama performances. The Korean People's Army Band is another military musical organization. Some Government Ministries conduct their own music and drama activities, including the Ministry of Social Security Ensemble, the Ministry of Social Security Drama Organization, the Ministry of Social Security Army Band, and the Ministry of Railways Art Theater. There also is a National Chorus and a Korean Classical Instrument Research Institute.

Exhibits and Museums

The regime has made full use of exhibits and museums, both in identifying itself with the past and in popularizing contemporary works. According to a report of the Eighth Annual National Fine Arts Exhibition in Pyongyang, nearly 800 examples of paintings, sculptures, graphic arts, art goods, industrial art, stage settings, and other items were on display. Many of the works had revolutionary, anti-Japanese, or anti-American themes or de-

picted reconstruction work. There were also, however, historical themes, landscapes, portraits, and traditional scenes, some based on legend.

A report on the 10th anniversary of the 1954 founding of the Korean Fine Arts Museum said that it displayed 2,000 pieces of fine arts relics covering primitive, ancient, medieval, and recent periods. About 26 display rooms were devoted to modern fine arts, including copies of old murals and portraits of Kim Il-sung, works eulogizing labor as well as military heroes, and other works with revolutionary themes.

The North Koreans have preserved many ancient relics and, in May 1967, they announced that they had unearthed in the Nangnang district of Pyongyang many relics from the Chosŏn period (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Some relics were reportedly of bronze and wrought iron.

THE INTELLECTUAL UNDER COMMUNISM

Although Communist publications devote much discussion to the importance of intellectual expression, this is invariably tied to admonitions concerning the priorities which must be accorded to the Communist revolution, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and the promotion of material values in society. Also, the thematic content of art and literature moves within a narrow range. The themes are as simple and few in number as those used for direct propaganda (see ch. 16, Public Information). At any given time they are applicable throughout the intellectual community so that there is inevitably an identity of content in all fields. Philosophical expression must be within the limits of works by Marx, Lenin, and Kim Il-sung. The impact of this restriction on intellectual expression, in general, may be readily inferred even though the limited view of North Korean life permitted to outsiders does not allow complete documentation.

The intellectual in other fields, such as engineering, scientific research, education, law, and medicine, must justify his existence by promoting the revolutionary goals laid down by the Communist Party. Independent lines of research and thought are discouraged or prohibited. Intellectuals must accept the materialistic view of history if they are to act or survive as intellectuals in the Communist society.

Indications in the mid-1960's were that the regime was keenly interested in the philosophical and scientific thinking of Yi Sukwang, founder of the "Practical Learning" movement, with its emphasis on putting knowledge to practical use (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The purpose apparently was to show that Korea had its own progressive thinker long before the emergence of

Marxist and allied philosophy in the West. There were 12 major social science theses or dissertations published in 1963–64 in North Korea, of which four were concerned with Yi's writings.

The principle laid down for all scientific research is that it should address itself to the most pressing and urgent concerns of the national economy and public welfare. One example of research activity which has received much publicity and attention in the north has been the study and development of Korean traditional medicine, which includes the use of herbs and acupuncture, the latter involving the insertion of needles into the body.

Communist sources report that North Korea's long-range plan for the development of science places emphasis on those branches which assist in strengthening the material-technical base. Accomplishments are claimed in the study of natural resources, discovery of iron ore deposits, and production of synthetic fiber and plastic products. A new method of smelting pig iron reportedly has been introduced, and scientists are said to be working intensively on utilizing domestic coal in industry. The regime also boasts of productive research in agriculture. A multitude of specialized scientific and research journals are published in North Korea (see table 13).

In October 1962 Kim Il-sung claimed the completion of research in "vinylon" (a synthetic fiber) by the country's scientists, ". . . solution of the problem of gasifying anthracite, research in semiconductors, the manufactures of an electronic computer, and the discovery of virus symbion."

Research and scientific activity generally were under the direction and control of the Academy of Sciences, which was established in 1952. Under the academy were research institutions for natural science, social science, and the humanities. In 1964 social science and the humanities were transferred to a new organization, the Academy of Social Sciences, but the natural science field remained under the Academy of Sciences, which was headed by Yi Kŭk-no.

Table 13. Selected Scientific and Technical Journals in North Korea

Title	Publisher	Frequency
Chaejŏng Kumyung (Fiscal and Monetary Affairs)	Ministry of Finance	Monthly
Chijil kwa Chiri (Geology and Geography)	Institute of Geology and Geography, Academy of Sciences	Every 2 months
Chijil T'amsa (Geological Exploration)	Ministry of Mining Industry	Monthly
Chŏllyŏk (Electric Power)	Ministry of Electric and Coal Industries	—do—

Table 13. Selected Scientific and Technical Journals in North Korea—Cont.

Title	Publisher	Frequency
Chosŏn Susan (Korean Fisheries)	Ministry of Fiseries	—do—
Chosŏn Uihak (Korean Medical Science)	Ministry of Public Health	—do—
Hwahak kwa Hwahak Kong'ŏp (Chemistry and Chemical Industry)	Hamhŭng Branch, Academy of Sciences	Every 2 months
Hwahak Kong'ŏp (Chemical Industry)	Ministry of Chemical Industry	Monthly
Iryongp'um Kong'ŏp (Daily Necessities Industry)	Ministry of Food and Daily Necessities	—do—
Kisul Kwahak (Engineering Sciences)	Engineering Institute, Academy of Sciences	Quarterly
Kogo Minsok (Archaeology and Folklore)	Archaeological and Folklore Research Institute, Academy of Social Sciences	—do—
Kŏnch'uk kwa Kŏnsŏl (Architecture and Construction)	State Construction Commission, Korean Architects Union	Monthly
Kŭmsok (Metal)	Central Metal Research Institute, Academy of Sciences	—do—
Kŭmsok Kongŏp (Metal Industry)	Ministry of Metal Industry	—do—
Kwahagwŏn T'ongbo (Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences)	Academy of Sciences	Every 2 months
Kwang'ŏp (Mining)	Ministry of Mining Industry	Monthly
Pangjik Kong'ŏp (Textile Industry)	Ministry of Textile and Paper Industries	Monthly
Saengmulhak (Biology)	Institute of Biology, Academy of Sciences	Quarterly
Sing'yo Kong'ŏp (Food Industry)	Ministry of Food and Daily Necessities	Monthly
Suhak kwa Mulli (Mathematics and Physics)	Institute of Physics and Mathematics, Academy of Sciences	Every 2 months

Source: Adapted from *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (One Korea Yearbook, 1967–68) pp. 544, 545.

Under the Academy of Sciences are the Institute of Physics and Mathematics, the Institute of Biology, the Institute of Geology and Geography, the Institute of Atomic Energy, the Central Institute of the Machine Industry, the Central Institute of Fuels, the Hamhŭng Branch of the Academy of Sciences (divided into three different institutes dealing with the chemical industry),

the Silicate Institute, and the Experimental Station of the Academy.

Under the Academy of Social Sciences are the Historical Research Institute, the Institute of Legal Studies, the Institute of Linguistics, the Institute of Literature, the Archaeological and Folklore Research Institute, and the Institute of Classical Studies. The Academy of Sciences for Agriculture, under the direction of Kim Kye-hyŏn, was given separate status in 1964, and the Academy of Sciences for Medicine was established in 1958 with Ch'oe Ung-sŏk at its head.

Three separate institutes were also established: the Institute of Educational Studies (1963), the Institute of Forestry (1964), and the Institute of Kyŏngnak (1964). The Institute of Kyŏngnak experimented in a specialized form of traditional medicine.

Kim Il-sung has been explicit about the necessity for "revolutionizing" old-line intellectuals while recruiting large numbers of new ones from among the working people. In his statements as well as in those of other leaders, there runs an undertone of suspicion of the old-line intellectuals who came from educated, well-to-do prerevolutionary backgrounds. Such suspicion is expressly denied, however, and it is the Party's policy to educate and remold these people to play a part in the revolution.

"Today we are confronted with an important task of continually revolutionizing the intellectuals," Kim Il-sung told the Korean Workers Party Conference in October 1966. To revolutionize and transform them into the intellectuals of the working class means to completely eradicate the residue of outworn ideas still remaining in their minds and equip them with the revolutionary spirit transforming them into active Communists. The Premier stated:

> True, the intellectuals are relatively more affected than others by the remnants of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas in their minds. But it is altogether wrong to distrust for this reason the revolutionary spirit of the intellectuals. To suspect and reject the intellectuals is a factionalist tendency. To underestimate their role is a tendency of ignoring science and technology. These tendencies have nothing to do with our party policy toward the intelligentsia.

Despite such protestations of confidence in the old-line intellectuals, Party publications contain numerous discussions of the need to remold them and to eliminate bourgeois tendencies from their thinking, which means particularly private enterprise and individualism. The Government has made it clear also that, once remolded, the intellectuals are expected to follow the Party and Kim Il-sung "without the slightest vacillation in any storm or stress." The Premier has insisted on thorough establishment of *chuch'e*

(self-reliance and national identity) in science and education as well as in the arts and literature.

All available indications are that the future for the prerevolutionary intellectual in North Korea is likely to be grim. According to a 1968 report from North Korea, Kim Il-sung has acknowledged that the

> . . . vestiges of old ideas that remain in human brains do not by any means disappear; they can be overcome only through consistent and prolonged indoctrination. As socialism occupies a position of full control throughout all realms of social life, including thought, morality and culture, all old things are more hard pressed.

CHAPTER 11
RELIGION

The Constitution of 1948 recognizes the "freedom of religious beliefs and of conducting religious services," but in 1968 there was no evidence that the people could enjoy such freedom. There was no indication that Buddhist, Christian, and Ch'ŏndogyo (The Teaching of the Heavenly Way) organizations, which the Government claimed existed in the north, could actually propagate their respective faiths. Indications were that frequent official references to religious organizations were intended for propaganda purposes, especially to assure the people of the Republic of Korea that the religious and cultural ties between the two parts of the divided Korean Peninsula still existed.

The Government continued to regard all beliefs not consonant with Marxism and the political thought of Premier Kim Il-sung as unscientific and as a useless relic of the feudal past. It has not promoted any other system of beliefs for fear that divided loyalty might interfere with the Party policy of sanctifying communism and the personality cult of Kim Il-sung. In its propaganda within the country, the regime appeared to favor Ch'ŏndogyo because of its origin in the reformist and antiforeign movement of the mid-19th century (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Fragmentary hints suggested, however, that some of the older people in remote rural areas continued to believe in the cult of spirit worship. Although officially disparaged as superstitious, the cult, which has neither coherent doctrine nor any distinct organization, appeared to have been tolerated partly because it is least likely to be organized for any political or social action and partly because it is accepted by many people as a natural pattern of living. The cult has never been regarded by the Koreans as a strictly religious practice in the Western sense of the word.

RELIGIONS UNDER COMMUNISM

Beginning in August 1945, the Government committed itself to Marxism, which regards religion as the enemy of both science and progress. Religion required a belief in and a submission to unworldly powers and, as such, officials asserted, hindered the

self-awakening needed for the fight to establish a Socialist state. To justify their position, religion was depicted as a capitalistic tool by means of which the people were held down and exploited. The regime maintained that the success of communism depended upon the wholehearted support of the people and that divided loyalties fostered by religion were a real and ever-present danger to their cause.

In the 1960's the workload requirements of the Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse) movement (see Glossary) and the compulsory attendance required at ideological sessions did not allow any spare time for outside activities (see ch. 20, Labor Relations and Organization). The Party had openly branded religion as reactionary and antirevolutionary and had banned religious services of any kind. Although there still were a small number of religious organizations, these were maintained mainly as a propaganda facade.

Such organizations included the Korean Ch'ŏndogyo Young Friends Party; Korean Buddhist League; Korean Christian Federation; and South Korean Christian Democratic League. Of these organizations the only body that received occasional official publicity was the Korean Ch'ŏndogyo Young Friends Party, which was organized ostensibly by the youthful followers of Ch'ŏndogyo. As the only indigenous religion, Ch'ŏndogyo has been identified since its inception in the mid-19th century as a reformist, nationalist, and antiforeign movement. This faith enjoys the tacit approval of the Government apparently because its past association with antiforeign activities is deemed to be compatible with the Party's avowed struggles against foreign powers, the United States in particular. In contrast, the Buddhist and Christian religions have rarely been publicly mentioned.

Nominally, the Government guarantees religious freedom. Article 11 of the Constitution states that, "Every citizen of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea enjoys an equal right in the fields of state, political, economic, social as well as cultural life, irrespective of sex, nationality, religious belief, job, property status or education," and Article 14 stipulates that, "Citizens enjoy the freedom of religious beliefs and of religious service." Despite these legal protections, religion has been subjected to continuous political restraint. The constitutional stipulations were designed to impress on the minds of the people of the Republic of Korea the ideas that religious and political freedoms were guaranteed in the north.

The first move in the suppression of all religion occurred in March 1946 in conjunction with the law on land reform. Included in the confiscation decree were all lands in excess of 5 chŏngbo (1 chŏngbo equals 2.45 acres) belonging to groups, including

churches, Buddhist temples, and other religious organizations. As a result, the economic foundation of organized religion was effectively destroyed. In August 1946 because of the nationalization of industry, the church lost control of all its remaining properties. The effect of this decree was to render the religious organizations financially powerless.

Before the Korean conflict some opposition had been shown to the regime's religious policies. In March 1948 adherents of Ch'ŏndogyo planned a demonstration to voice their disapproval of the Government's oppressive policies concerning religion. The plan was discovered, however, and nearly 3,000 persons were jailed. Some Ch'ŏndogyo followers formed a secret organization to plan a new political action; this, too, was discovered and led to further restrictions and increased surveillance.

In 1954 the Ch'ŏndogyo believers again exhibited an opposition to the regime's policies, this time to the collectivization of farms. The result was that their leaders were purged and replaced by men the regime could count on to follow the Party line. In 1968 Ch'ŏndogyo was ostensibly represented in the Supreme People's Assembly by the Korean Ch'ŏndogyo Young Friends Party, but this was merely a paper organization. It had neither members nor program and only a figurehead chairman.

The regime's policies toward religion hardened after the Korean conflict. Churches and Buddhist temples were confiscated and looted, and many were converted into warehouses, nurseries, kindergartens, or recreation places for use by the Party elite. Religious buildings that were destroyed during the hostilities were not allowed to be rebuilt, and only a few remaining Buddhist temples were preserved as historical monuments. None of the structures were to be used for religious purposes.

The Communists have not overtly exploited the authoritarian features inherent in Confucianism. Although concepts of loyalty to the central authority were encouraged by the regime, Confucianism itself was too intricately bound to the old feudalistic structure. The Party was selective in its choice of what it could use and what was to be eliminated; it wanted to destroy as obsolete all feudal and Confucian ideals, such as ancestor worship, the stress on filial duties, the reverence due elders from youth, the limited role of women in society, and the position of the father as the absolute head of the family.

The Party leaders wanted to save those elements of Confucianism which could be successfully incorporated into their system. Included among these were the ideas of a hierarchy in Government and the need for obedience to a central authority. Equally important, the leaders were also interested in the Confucian pre-

cept that each person must assume the obligations placed upon him by his position in society.

TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS

Confucianism

Confucian thought has provided the basic framework for much of Korean culture for many centuries. It was introduced to the inhabitants of the Taedong River basin area in the fourth century and spread from there to the rest of the country. It was not until the 14th century that it was adopted as the State doctrine and became deeply interwoven in the social and political institutions of the society (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Although leaders of the State at times performed priest-like functions, the Confucians did not form a church and had no religious hierarchy. Acceptance of the doctrine made one a Confucian and did not preclude other forms of belief as long as they were not contradictory.

The rules of conduct laid down by Confucius and his followers rested on a view of the world as a single unit, natural in organization, with a set of hierarchical relationships. The society of man must reflect the natural hierarchical order, and proper conduct, varying according to the sex, relative age, and social position of the individual, had to be maintained in order to preserve a harmonious social order. Society was based upon five social relationships, involving ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, and friends. The corresponding standards of conduct for these pairs are benevolence in rulers, loyalty in subjects; love in the father, filial piety in the son; righteous behavior of the husband, obedience of the wife; gentility in the older brother, humility in the younger; and candor as well as sincerity between friends.

The Confucian ethic operated for centuries to help preserve social order by reinforcing kinship ties and giving the individual a sense of continuity with the past and a link with the future through ancestor worship (see ch. 7, Family). The Confucian emphasis upon practical and harmonious social relationships, therefore, did not lead to the development of ideas of absolute good and evil, nor did it apply as effectively outside the family as within it.

There were certain areas of the country into which Confucianism penetrated much less effectively than others. In northern Korea, in particular, the people, although nominally Confucian, continued to pay more attention to the traditional spirit worship, produced fewer Confucian scholars, allowed more freedom to

women, and never developed the elaborate class distinction common to other parts of the country. These differences presumably resulted both from the greater distance of these northern communities from the centers of Confucian learning and government and from the fact that the mountainous terrain did not permit the development of relatively large, permanent villages with a fairly stable subsistence economy.

Buddhism

The influence of Buddhism upon the daily lives of the people, though pervasive, was neither as obvious nor as formal as that of Confucianism. Buddhism entered Korea by way of China in the fourth century, spread rapidly through the Three Kingdoms, and was accepted as the State religion during the Silla period (A.D. 673–935). It continued as an influential force until the end of the 14th century (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Although the religion was downgraded during the Yi dynasty (1392–1910), it was revived during the Japanese occupation, as a result of the official encouragement it received and the better training offered to the monks, some of whom were sent to Japan for study.

The basic belief of Buddhism is that all living things go through cycles of birth and death, gradually reaching higher forms through good behavior. The concept of good behavior is derived from the belief that the passions of the flesh cause desires which one must learn to control. Buddha's program for regeneration is called the Middle Way—between asceticism and self-indulgence—and is succinctly expressed in the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path. The Four Noble Truths are that suffering is universal, the cause of suffering is craving or selfish desire, the cure for suffering is the elimination of craving, the way to eliminate craving is to follow the Noble Eightfold Path in one's behavior. This path consists of right knowledge, right intention, right speech, right conduct, right means of livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration.

The variant of Buddhism which reached Korea is called Mahayana, or the Greater Vehicle, by its adherents. Buddha is worshiped as an eternal deity, and salvation may be attained through the intercession of *bodhisattvas*—virtuous men who voluntarily defer their own elevation to assist others—as well as through individual contemplation. This religion was especially popular among women, who were not well educated in Confucianism; the Buddhist doctrine of equality between men and women was also readily accepted by them.

Korean Buddhism absorbed many of the native beliefs about the supernatural from the folk cultures of both Korea and China. The

use of charms and magic was practiced by Buddhist monks. The monks were appealed to for protection against evil spirits, for insurance of domestic tranquility, or for the birth of sons.

Christianity

Christianity first became known to Koreans in its Roman Catholic form. It was introduced by diplomats returning from China in the 17th century. Because the new doctrine was accompanied by intellectual and scientific concepts current in the Western world, it became known as Sŏhak, "Western learning," and was embraced by a number of eminent scholars who saw it as a solution to the deepening social problems of the day.

Periodic persecution of Korea's growing number of Catholics took place in the 19th century. The last of these, between 1865 and 1868, resulted in the death of about 8,000 persons, or about half the total number of adherents. After Korea was opened to Western trade in 1876, however, freedom of religion was tacitly permitted, and in the new atmosphere the number of believers steadily increased.

Protestantism reached the country in the 1880's. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries Christianity had a great appeal for many people. Christian missionary activity was responsible for a considerable increase in literacy in the phonetic alphabet and for a noticeable change in women's position in Christian families.

During the Japanese occupation Catholic and Protestant groups at first continued to operate in relative freedom. Soon, however, their support of the nationalist cause and the participation of some church leaders in the independence movement antagonized the Japanese, who took strong retaliatory measures. Increased supervision of Christian activities eventually led to the recall of almost all Catholic and Protestant missionaries during World War II.

Ch'ŏndogyo

Opposition to Catholicism centered chiefly in the indigenous religious movement known originally as Tonghak, "Eastern learning." Founded in 1860 by Ch'oe Che-u, the movement developed during a period of social ferment and awakening nationalist sentiment, and from the beginning it had a specifically political and national orientation (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Its doctrine, borrowing heavily from other major faiths, stressed the dignity of man and egalitarian ideals, committing its adherents to work to end prevailing forms of social injustice in Korea and to liberate the country from foreign oppression. Although he acknowledged his debt to Catholicism and other religious traditions, Ch'oe Che-u

stressed his conviction that differences between religious concepts formed in the East and those in the West were inevitable and that Tonghak was the right way to faith for the Korean people because it developed from their own unique experiences.

Ch'oe Che-u was arrested by the Government in 1864 and executed as a heretic, an act which served to strengthen the Tonghak movement by giving its adherents a martyr around whom to rally. Although the Tonghak was forced underground, it spread rapidly among the peasants. In the final quarter of the 19th century, several Tonghak-inspired popular insurrections broke out, the last of which, in 1894, was crushed only after Chinese and Japanese troops were called in to assist Korean authorities.

Under the Japanese occupation Ch'ŏndogyo was tolerated by the authorities until 1919, when a number of religious leaders, including those of Ch'ŏndogyo, sparked nationwide demonstrations to support the independence movement (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The Japanese closed more than 30 Ch'ŏndogyo schools which had been centers of revolutionary sentiment.

Ch'ŏndogyo is a monotheistic religion stressing the unity of man and the universe. Man is at the summit of the evolutionary process, and his nature reveals the perfection of the universe, in which he is the ruler. Man and God are one, and there would be perfection here on earth if the unity were properly realized. Between men there should be no social distinctions.

Perfection of the world is to be sought first by changing a man's character, through a widening of his interests to include the whole world. Then, after civil changes are made, there will be everlasting peace in Korea and good will toward and among those outside it.

Ch'ŏndogyo places of worship closely resemble Christian churches. They contain tablets of the founder of the religion. The chief rituals are the reciting of the formula; the setting out of clean water, which is a symbol of the shedding of blood of the great teacher, Ch'oe Che-u; the attending of services on Sunday for the study of the doctrine; and the setting aside of a spoonful of rice daily for the church. In their services they sing hymns derived mainly from Chinese poems written by the founder and other leaders.

Spirit Worship

Before Buddhism and Confucianism reached the country, Korean religion had consisted of unorganized beliefs about the supernatural world. Although these beliefs were never given official recognition, they persisted as the only spiritual beliefs of most uneducated people, particularly those in the rural areas, and as auxiliary beliefs of nominal adherents of other religions. In times

of illness a shaman was still called upon. Even in Christian or Confucian families, a shaman was often brought in to supplement other forms of cures.

Beliefs

The Koreans believed in a large number of spirits, which varied from place to place and from time to time. There were spirits of the earth and the air, spirits of the waters and mountains, spirits of the living and dead, and spirits which resided in rocks and trees. Most were malevolent and therefore were to be placated; some were merely mischievous, such as the Tokkaebi, who spent their time playing pranks on mortals.

The spirit with the greatest power was Hananim, the Heavenly Being. In earlier times Koreans of many different religious inclinations accepted him as the sender of harvests and rain and as the force which controlled people's lives. It has been suggested that belief in Hananim involved a monotheistic concept. His name was later used by the Protestant missionaries to stand for the concept of the single, all-powerful God.

Below Hananim were the gods of the four directions and the zenith. Each was master of his domain, and each had a host of lesser spirits under his control. Rudely carved posts represented these gods, who were thought to protect the village from evil spirits. Below them were spirits of mountains, mountain passes, and valleys. On the top of most hills were sacred groves, which had shrines to honor the mountain spirit, pictured as an old man seated on a tiger. He was offered animal sacrifices by hunters, miners, and medicine dealers. Travelers offered sacrifices to the guardians of mountain passes; usually a piece of cloth or a stone was added to a pile near the shrine. The spirits of valleys were especially worshipped by the farmers who would throw them a spoonful of their noonday meal before starting to eat.

Each house had its own particular spirit and, when a new house was built, a special ceremony was held to appease the spirit. On all important occasions and when things went wrong, food was spread before this spirit, and prayer was offered.

Numerous precautions were taken to avoid the influence of these spirits. Roads were made crooked because spirits traveled in straight lines; the front door was blocked off at times to keep out illness; a little strawman was thrown into the road to get the disease in place of the householders; and children were given names which included the character for "dragon" so that lesser spirits would bring no harm to them.

Specialists

No organized system of beliefs or hierarchy of religious practi-

tioners developed out of these folk customs, but there were individuals, believed to possess special influence over certain spirits, who were called upon when intercession was necessary. The most important types of practitioners were shamans, diviners, and geomancers. The male shaman was called a *paksu*; the female, who predominated as the most powerful shaman, was known as a *mutang*.

Shamans became members of the profession in a psychic experience during which they established contact with the spirit of a dead shaman. Usually they were either the children or close relatives of a shaman. They cultivated the friendship of evil spirits in order to coax them to do their bidding. In addition to curing sickness by exorcising the spirit causing it, they quieted the ghosts of those who drowned and drove away spirits that molested a house.

The ritual for curing the sick took place at night and started with the sacrifice of a chicken, pig, or dog as a feast for the spirit. The *mutang* then danced to the sounds of drums, pipe, and rattle and gradually worked herself into a state of trance-like ecstasy. She teased, joked, and pleaded with the spirits to come to her. The performance could last for one night or more and, once the spirit had eaten, it could be persuaded to leave, and the sick person recovered.

The diviners did some curing, but they spent more of their time telling fortunes and giving advice on the basis of their reputed ability to see into the unknown. In order to get their information, they used little bars of metal, which were cast out of diceboxes, and books of spells and incantations, which they memorized. When they were curing the sick, they depended on their divining ability to determine where the evil spirit was located; after being located, the spirit could be exorcised. The geomancer was a specialist in locating propitious gravesites.

CHAPTER 12
SOCIAL VALUES

Since 1945 a new system of social values based on Marxism-Leninism has been introduced into North Korea. Old values have not been completely rejected, however; they were scrutinized selectively for retention or rejection, depending on their specific utility in the construction of a new Socialist order. In line with the Party goal of establishing a Communist state, social values were made dependent on political values and, thus, political considerations dictated the emergence of the new value system.

Another important component of the new system consisted of the teachings of Premier Kim Il-sung based on his revolutionary experiences. The regime called this component "the one and only ideology" (*yuil sasang*) of the Party, claiming that this ideology, which emphasizes the virtue of self-reliance in politics, the economy, and national defense, was first developed by the Premier in a successful endeavor to apply "creatively" Marxism-Leninism to Korean realities. Another equally important concept exploited by the regime was *chuch'e* (national identity and self-reliance) which, as used by the regime, was synonymous with *yuil sasang* (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Under the new system the first priority of loyalty and commitment demanded by the regime was to Kim Il-sung, the Party and its leaders, and the nation. The rationale for personal existence could not be explained in individualistic terms; the worth of a person was measured by the extent of his sacrifice and service for common good as dictated by the regime. The individual had no place outside the collectivity.

To impose its valves on the people, the regime conducted an intense education and indoctrination program through all the channels of communication at its disposal (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 16, Public Information). The regime condemned individualism as a bourgeois practice and posited a future tied to that of the Party. Indications abounded in 1968 that the ideological remodeling was not proceeding as smoothly as the Party had anticipated. There were continuing, numerous references to the backward mentality of the peasantry and the need for raising the level of social consciousness of the rural population to that of the urban workers.

SOURCES OF SOCIAL VALUES

The values upon which the new social order was based in 1968 were an amalgamation of the old and the new. The old ones retained by the regime had to do largely with the process of authority building. For example, the traditional pattern of respect for old people was honored by reminding the young that they should not smoke or keep their hands in their pockets in the presence of elders. The young are also told to remove either their hats when talking to their superiors and elders and to offer them seats on a train or bus.

The concept of paternalism was also given explicit sanction. The regime has sought to transfer the idea from the traditional context of family to Premier Kim Il-sung, the "benevolent father" of the Korean people. The Confucian concept of a social hierarchical order as a natural phenomenon, together with the ingrained reverence for authority, was redirected toward the Party and used to evoke the loyalty of the people to the regime.

North Korean leaders have accepted the primacy of Marxism-Leninism as their guiding doctrine. In recent years, however, they have also emphasized the importance of national heritage by increased attention to the study of Korean history, historical tales, folksongs, customs, and revolutionary and progressive antecedents. North Korean historians have been assigned the new task of reinterpreting Korean history from the standpoint of class struggle and finding progressive and revolutionary episodes that could be recognized as Korea's own contribution to the history of the world revolutionary movement.

Historical tales which dealt with young men volunteering for extra military duty against foreign invasions, for example, are extolled at propaganda meetings. Some 1,600 folksongs reflecting social awareness are said to have been discovered in the past decade. Historical themes reflecting "People's indignation at rulers who had oppressed them for centuries, contradictions of the class society, and the life and work of the industrious people" are popularized. Literary classics that carry reformist and anti-establishmentarian messages are also promoted. *Ch'unhyang-chŏn* (Tales of Ch'unhyang), a classic love story, which characterized the oppressive and rigid social conditions of the Yi dynasty, in 1968 continued to be an important theme for literary and performing arts purposes (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

As the regime explains it, the building of socialism and communism in the north would be aided measurably if the people were imbued with "Socialist patriotism" by "inheriting and developing the most progressive and revolutionary heritage of the people."

An authoritative Party journal stated in August 1966 that ". . . such a patriotism is not created overnight. It can be developed only when the people know their own country. . . . Without knowing one's past and present, one cannot have patriotism, national pride, or the sense of self-identity." The promotion of patriotism, especially since the mid-1960's, is an integral part of the Party's drive to popularize the concept of *chuch'e*.

Although patriotism is highly cherished as a component of the regime's value system, the Party has stressed that the love of the fatherland should not degenerate into "the error of simple restoration of heritage." Patriotism is tenable only if it is reinforced by socialism.

Kim Il-sung stated that ". . . a cultured man should know what to retain from the past and what to discard for the future when he thinks of following the footsteps . . . of our forefathers." In the 1960's the task of inheriting the past and relating it to the present appeared to be, however, a complicated undertaking for Party theorists and historians. History had to be reinterpreted from the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist historical materialism, with focal stress on class conflict and in ways deemed conducive to promoting the revolutionary cause. This effort meant distorting the popularly accepted history of Korea. One prominent example is the regime's treatment of a political coup engineered in 1884 by Kim Ok-kyun. Communist sources maintain that the coup, which actually resulted in the establishment of a 3-day pro-Japanese Cabinet in October, was the first progressive and patriotic movement in Korea which was "anti-feudal" as well as "anti-imperialist." By nearly unanimous accounts of independent historians, however, the coup, or the Kapsin political incident, as the North Koreans call it, was instigated and supported by Japanese nationals to enhance their influence in Seoul. North Koreans are completely silent on the Japanese role in this coup, however (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The attempt to link the past to the present has been most manifest in the Party's drive to exalt the role allegedly played by Kim Il-sung in anti-Japanese partisan campaigns of the 1930's (see ch. 16, Public Information; ch. 24, The Armed Forces). His revolutionary leadership experiences and the Party's constant exhortations based on them have been characterized as a set of political guidelines that are uniquely suited for Korean conditions. The basic message which the regime sought to convey to the people was that Kim Il-sung's revolutionary achievements were made possible through his policy of ideological autonomy without blindly emulating the experiences of foreign parties.

North Koreans regard Marxism-Leninism as a body of "general laws which must be followed by all nations trying to achieve rev-

olution . . ." as the highest expression of "all progressive ideas of the mankind." They emphasize, however, that Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma and that, since it cannot give concrete answers to all revolutionary problems, it must be interpreted flexibly "in historical and concrete terms." This reservation permits the regime to claim that "the program and policies of the Party are living examples of Marxism-Leninism as manifested in Korea."

Marxism-Leninism is invoked to justify the validity of a whole range of principles governing the social and political behavior of the population. These principles stress the primacy of collectivism over individualism, the dignity of manual labor, the classlessness of society, the vanguard role of the working class, the infallibility of the Party, the virtue of public ownership of all properties, the inherent superiority of socialism, the inevitability of conflict between communism and all other forms of political and social organizations, and the virtue of Socialist humanism. According to the regime, Socialist humanism is manifest in a spirit of sacrificing personal gain for the welfare of the entire society, in loving one's neighbors, comrades, class, and the Party and, most of all, in hating one's class enemies.

THE IDEAL MAN, LEADER, AND SOCIAL ORDER

The ideal man, according to the Party, was the "Socialist" or "Communist man." He was epitomized as the revolutionary combatant, the worker-soldier who stood with hammer in one hand and rifle in the other. Through self-criticism and examination he had rid himself of bourgeois thoughts and practices. The Party, in addition, defined such a person as one who volunteered for extra work and who accepted wholeheartedly the Marxist emphasis on the dignity of manual labor. The ideal man, however, would also cultivate side interests in the arts and literature so that he would present a well-rounded Communist personality.

Party propaganda glorified Kim Il-sung as the embodiment of ideal leadership. He was depicted as the revolutionary hero who, through the force of his personal leadership, had freed Korea from foreign domination and led it to a place of importance in world affairs. The qualities found in such a leader were warmth, firmness, perseverance, creativeness, revolutionary idealism, and an understanding of the needs and aspirations of the peasants. Furthermore, the ideal leader was not bureaucratic or arrogant, did not bow to foreign influence, and was a progressive Korean in thought and action.

The ideal social order, as doctrinally envisioned by the Party, was a classless society inhabited by "Communist man," one in which the need for the existence of a state withers away and

the distribution of wealth is handled on the basis of need rather than ability. For the present, however, the regime does not regard itself as having established "a perfectly triumphant socialist society." In September 1968 Premier Kim Il-sung stated that his country was still burdened by the persistence of "hostile classes" and by the continuance of "the corrosive action of old ideas." He also acknowledged that his regime had "as yet a long way to go to attain a high level of productive forces commensurate with socialist and Communist society" and that it had "not yet been able to make their people's life very bountiful and cultured."

According to a Party journal issued in late 1965, North Korea was "in the first period of socialist construction" because of its inability to satisfy "all the requirements needed for the eradication of the backwardness of rural areas." This statement, further elaborated by Kim Il-sung in a public speech in September 1968, referred to the "distinction between the towns and the countryside and class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry." The Premier lamented that these distinctions continued to exist because of the ideological, cultural, and technical backwardness of the rural population in comparison with their urban counterparts. He also declared that, as long as these distinctions persisted, the Party's goal of converting the north from "an industrial-agricultural society into an advanced socialist industrial state" would be delayed.

These official pronouncements had the effect of implying that the regime's efforts to promote the new value system were making less headway than it would have liked. They were expressions of frustration and impatience. The regime was not content with an explanation that the urban-rural distinction was a legacy of the past too deeply rooted for overnight transformation. It was blaming "the venom of bourgeois ideology infiltrating from the outside and the cultural penetration of the imperialists." It called for intensified vigilance against external enemies. North Koreans were told that enemies were everywhere, at home and abroad. The regime's intensified efforts to subvert the Republic of Korea and provocations against the United Nations forces and the United States forces partly satisfied the requirement for diversionary actions. All indications in 1968 were that the gap between the ideal social order and the actuality would be expressed in further efforts to tighten and expand the area of government control over the rural population.

LOYALTY AND COMMITMENT

In 1968, in a bid for increased popular support of its policies, the Party emphasized the concept of nationalism and called for

loyalty to the regime. By picturing pre-1945 Korea as exploited and a land of depredation, the regime drew attention to the improved conditions after that year. The infallibility of the leadership of Kim Il-sung and the Party was cited for the achievements and successes in raising the living standards of the people; the regime also minimized and denigrated the accomplishments of the Republic of Korea. Frequent reference was also made to the Communist nations and their backing of North Korea in its efforts to establish itself as a modern Socialist state. Behind all these appeals to the people loomed the constant threat of punishment for those who deviated from established Party policy.

Commitment to the policies and goals of the regime was expressed by joining the Party and engaging in Party-sponsored activities. In addition, commitment could be demonstrated by volunteering for extra duty or work without pay, writing essays, and meeting production quotas.

In 1968, 70 percent of the population was 29 years of age or less and had been brought up under Communist rule, but even the oldest of these had only the barest recollection of either capitalism or the oppression under the Japanese. The Party, therefore, faced the problem of arousing enthusiastic loyalty based on a set of circumstances about which three-fourths of the people knew very little. Classroom education, accordingly, was directed toward the teaching of the revolutionary principles and traditions of the anti-Japanese partisan group. To dramatize the reality of exploitation under capitalism and the Japanese, old land deeds and records were shown to the students, and meetings were held frequently with former partisan fighters who told of their revolutionary experiences.

The Party utilized all the channels of communication—fiction, drama, study groups, orientation sessions, work teams, official speeches, radio broadcasts, and newspapers—to socialize the people. Literature and the arts were developed according to the dictates of Socialist realism. Monuments commemorating important events in Korea history and museums housing collections and relics of "the revolutionary past," were extensively employed to dramatize the progressive heritage of the people. Indoctrination programs were also carried out through various organizations and social groups, including the Young Pioneers, the Socialist Working Youth League, the Armed Forces, the schools, and the family.

THE PLACE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY

In 1968 the individual, as such, had no status in the society.

Each person was regarded as a member of a team working toward the common interest. His rationale was to fulfill the assigned duty under the spirit of collectivism and cooperation.

Ideally, the individual was recognized only for this achievement for the group, and social status and mobility were directly linked to this achievement. The rewards for excellence in any field were official awards and citations and qualification advantages in housing, clothing, and food. In actual practice, family connections, friendships, and political links still had some influence in promoting individual advancement.

In 1968 the individual was seen not as being in control of his own destiny, but as being a contributor to the destiny of the people as a whole. To this end the Party sought to abolish the distinction between public and private life, and viewed self-interest as a bourgeois practice that had to be eliminated. Nevertheless, there was a continued gap between social awareness and activity. The Party realized that reliance on preaching and exhortation alone had failed to elicit the voluntary cooperation of workers, peasants, and students and that material inducements were needed to assure full cooperation.

SECTION II. POLITICAL

CHAPTER 13
THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

Continuity of national leadership and political authoritarianism remained characteristics of the Government in mid-1968. Although the Communist regime, in its theory and structure, represented a distinct departure from the ideals of the traditional society, in many ways it continued modes that were familiar to the Korean people, both from their early history and from the more recent Japanese occupation (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The formal governmental structure, as established in 1948, remained essentially the same. Constitutionally, the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, and the Procuracy were responsible to the Supreme People's Assembly, but the actual lines of authority were reversed, and real power continued to be placed in the hands of Premier Kim Il-sung. Although the Supreme People's Assembly was theoretically the "highest organ of state power," the source of its effective authority emanated from an extraconstitutional political body called the Korean Workers Party (Chosŏn Nodong Dang), headed by Kim Il-sung. For all practical purposes, as head of the Party and the Government, Kim Il-sung has been the source of law and its enforcer; he has ensured the perpetuation of his power and the Party through the use of secret police, coercion, and regimentation.

Highly centralized and totalitarian, the Government was officially described as "a transmission belt of the Party." It was based on the one-party system and ideological conformity, and its acts were accorded the outward manifestations of legitimacy through perfunctory endorsements from the theoretically representative Supreme People's Assembly and its local counterparts.

The focus of the regime was on the building of socialism, first in North Korea and eventually in the Republic of Korea as well once it had "liberated" that area in accordance with the policy for national unification (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values; ch. 15, Foreign Relations). There was an official commitment to modernize a backward traditional society within the framework of Communist ideology and strict state control of

the developmental process. Until unification, North Korea considered Pyongyang to be its temporary capital and cited Seoul as the national capital in the Constitution. Seoul continues to be the symbol of the North Korean desire for ultimate unification.

BACKGROUND

Traditional Korean concepts of government are embodied in Confucian teachings, which were the official doctrines of the Yi dynasty (1392–1910). Government is viewed not as a contractual arrangement between the governing body and the people, but as a natural institution designed to maintain a proper relationship among men in a hierarchical social order. The Confucian ethic teaches that "ruler and subject" represent one of the five natural relationships in the human community (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 11, Religion; and ch. 12, Social Values).

Government was regarded essentially as a "government of men;" ideally, virtuous men were to be respected and followed as models of wise conduct. The ideal ruler was primarily a teacher who was able to indoctrinate his subjects with the rules of proper conduct. He exercised his punitive powers only when his subjects could not be swayed by reason and instruction. He was charged by Heaven to regard the welfare of the people as a father would, and he was expected to cultivate virtue within himself.

The Japanese rule of Korea retained the authoritarian elements of government and added certain characteristics of colonialism. The foreign domination and exploitation resulted in almost total elimination of indigenous political forces and provided an advantageous setting for the introduction of Soviet rule in the northern half of Korea after the defeat of Japan in 1945. First the Soviet authorities and later the North Korean regime were able to maintain political repression by building on the adjustment which people had already made to police methods of administration.

By September 1948, when North Korea was officially established as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Il-sung had secured for himself a role of uncontested dictatorship through a series of manipulations (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values). The Constitution, formally ratified on September 8, 1948, gave perfunctory confirmation to the economic, political, and social reforms and controls that had already been established (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Constitution of 1948, still in force in 1968, serves less as

a set of principles governing relationships between the state and the people or between organs of power than as a political instrument designed to give the regime an appearance of dedication to democratic constitutionalism. It is one of the means by which the Government creates the illusion that the population actively supports the Government and by which it attempts to arouse public initiative in exposing shortcomings in existing practices, to generate public enthusiasm about various civic and economic tasks, and to elicit the support of the people in the implementation of Party and Government policies.

The Constitution was inspired by the Soviet model; North Korean legal theory and practice were also patterned after those of the Soviet Union. In 1958 Premier Kim Il-sung declared that "the law in our country is an instrument of state policy. Since our state policy is our Party policy, those who do not understand our Party policy cannot serve in the legal professions of our country."

The Constitution declares that state power belongs to the people, who exercise it through their representative bodies at various levels. It names the Supreme People's Assembly as the exclusive source of legislative power on the national level and the highest organ of state power (see fig. 7)

Forms of ownership of the means of production and of land are described in the Constitution. All productive means, economic organs, and natural resources are nationalized. Foreign trade is also under state control. The Constitution recognizes the rights of individuals to own medium- and small-sized industrial and business enterprises, certain resources, manufactured goods, houses, household utensils, income, and savings, all of which are defined in the law. Agricultural tenancy is abolished. Land may be owned by an individual, by an agricultural cooperative, or by the state. The Government is empowered to formulate and execute a single economic plan for the country.

The Constitution contains a number of provisions purporting to guarantee the citizens equal rights before the law regardless of sex, race, religion, technical or productive abilities, or degree of literacy. Freedom of religious worship, speech, press, and assembly and the right to elect public officials, as well as the right to be elected to public office, are enunciated. In addition, freedom of scientific and artistic pursuits, copyright and patent rights, as well as the rights to employment, rest, leisure, social insurance, free education, and equal pay for equal work, are guaranteed by the state. The privacy of correspondence is protected by law.

The Constitution further states that no person may be arrested except by court order or under authorization of a public pro-



Figure 7. The formal governmental structure of North Korea, 1968.

curator. All citizens are given the right to present petitions to or lodge complaints with the government, and constituents may petition for the recall of incompetent delegates elected to governing bodies. The rights and privileges of an illegitimate child as a citizen are equal to those of a legitimate child, and the state is to protect the sanctity of marriage and family. The Constitution also grants the right of asylum to foreign nationals prosecuted on grounds of having fought for "democratic principles, a national liberation movement, or for the interests of the working people or for the freedom of scientific and cultural activities."

Constitutional rights, so elaborately defined, are conditional on the behavior of the citizen. "Only by fulfilling his duties can [the citizen] be assured his full freedom and rights." Article 27 states: "Citizens . . . must abide by the Constitution and the law. It is the most heinous of crimes against the state to abuse the rights granted by the Constitution for the purpose of altering or undermining the lawful order provided for in the Constitution, and it is punishable by law."

Some of the rights and privileges actually serve as instruments of pressure to achieve specific political goals. The provisions relating to the family, for example, have helped to undermine the authority of parents and elders and have facilitated the intrusion of the state into the family as an institution (see ch. 7, Family). The right to recall delegates to the legislative organs on all levels is used as a disciplinary whip over the heads of local government bodies. Moreover, the right to vote assumes the form of an obligation not easily evaded by the ordinary citizen.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Supreme People's Assembly and Presidium

Under the Constitution, the legislative function is performed by the Supreme People's Assembly, a unicamereal body to be elected every 4 years on the basis of "universal, equal, and direct suffrage and by secret ballot" at the ratio of 1 deputy for every 30,000 people. In 1968 the Assembly numbered 457 delegates. In actual fact, no Supreme People's Assembly has ever yet had a tenure of less than 5 years, the extension of tenure being allowed by the Constitution "should extraordinary circumstances arise," and often for the convenience of the Party. The Supreme People's Assembly meets for 2 to 6 days of short sessions twice a year, and extraordinary sessions may be convened. The Assembly elects its own president and two vice presidents and organizes permanent or temporary committees as auxiliary bodies. Legislative bills are passed by the majority vote of deputies present.

The Constitution authorizes the Assembly to approve or amend the fundamental law and to formulate domestic and foreign policies. It also elects members of the Presidium of the Assembly, organizes the Cabinet, adopts laws and approves bills adopted by the Presidium while the Assembly is not in session, and approves the state economic programs. In addition, it approves the state budgets, establishes or changes administrative subdivisions, grants amnesties, elects judges to the Supreme Court, and appoints the Procurator General.

The actual powers of the Assembly are limited; it has never, as far as is known, rejected a measure submitted to it by its Presidium, which in turn is subservient to the Korean Workers Party. The Presidium is elected by the delegates to the Assembly and serves as a combined executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial body. The President of the Presidium acts as the titular head of state in relation to foreign states. In mid-1968 the Presidium was composed of a chairman (or president), three vice chairmen, a secretary general, and nine members. It was empowered to convene the Assembly, to interpret the Constitution and existing laws, to promulgate laws adopted by the Assembly, and to repudiate Cabinet decisions violating constitutional practice and other laws. It could appoint and dismiss Cabinet ministers on the recommendation of the Premier, ratify or revoke treaties with foreign nations, appoint or recall national envoys abroad, accept credentials and letters of recall from foreign envoys, confer medals and honorary titles, and grant amnesty. Like the Supreme People's Assembly, the Presidium is used to lend an aura of legality to the decisions of the Cabinet.

Cabinet and Executive Agencies

The Cabinet directs and supervises the implementation of the directives and decisions of various agencies and of the Party. It is authorized to overrule ministerial regulations or decisions and any instructions issued by provincial people's committees which in any way "contradict the Constitution, statutes, mandates, or Cabinet decisions or instructions."

The Cabinet, the highest decisionmaking body, convenes in two ways: in "general" session, attended by all members of the Cabinet; and in "executive" session, attended only by the Premier and Vice Premiers. Both meetings are presided over by the Premier. Cabinet decisions are made by a majority vote and are published with the signatures of the Premier and the Ministers concerned.

The Cabinet in 1968 was composed of the Premier (chief executive), the Vice Premiers, the Ministers, and the chairmen of the committee and the commissions. Heads of ministries and com-

missions are appointed and may be removed by the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly on the recommendation of the Premier, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Assembly. In carrying out their assigned duties, the Cabinet members are subject to daily supervision from the executive departments of the Korean Workers Party (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The executive establishment in 1968 consisted of 30 ministries, five commissions, and one committee. The ministries were: Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Social Security (Internal Security and Political Police), Foreign Trade, Metal Industry, Mining Industry, Electric and Coal Industries, Chemical Industry, First Machine Industry, Second Machine Industry, Building Material Industry, Fisheries, Forestry, Textile and Paper Industries, Food and Daily Necessities, Construction, Railways, Land and Marine Transportation, Communications, Finance, Labor, City Administration, Land Administration, Commerce, Procurement and Food Administration, State Inspection, Higher Education, Common Education, Culture, and Public Health. The commissions were: State Planning, Agriculture, State Construction, Material Supply, and State Scientific and Technical. The committee was Foreign Economic Relations.

Courts and Procuracy

Under the Constitution the judicial branch is divided into the court system and Procuracy, supervised by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procurator's Office, respectively. They are independent of each other, and the Procurator's Office in effect functions virtually as the fourth branch of the Government.

The Court System

The three-tiered court system is composed of the Supreme Court at the top, provincial courts in the middle, and the people's courts at the bottom. In addition, there have been such special courts as the military tribunals and the Transport Court, which was responsible for violations involving the state transport system. According to a 1968 Republic of Korea information source, the Transport Court reportedly has been dissolved.

A combination of judges and assessors try cases. All are elected through secret ballot by the people's assemblies at appropriate levels and may be recalled at any time by the bodies which elect them.

According to the Constitution any citizen who has voting rights can be elected to the office of judge or assessor, except those who served as judges or prosecutors under Japanese rule. Neither

knowledge of law nor practical legal experience is required for judgeship. Political consideration appears to be more important. Judges are usually Party members or are controlled by the Party. They are trained in legal and judicial procedures for 3 months before assuming office. Trials are usually open to the public. The Constitution requires judges to make their decisions "independently" and to be guided only by the law. The accused is guaranteed the right to defend himself and to have counsel, but there are only Government defenders.

The courts of first instance are those established at city, county, and district levels. Presided over by judges elected for 2-year terms by the corresponding people's assemblies, they can try civil as well as criminal cases. Assessors, who are vested with authority equal to that of judges, participate in the proceedings. Decisions are by majority vote of the one judge and two assessors. Provincial courts can also assume original jurisdiction over "important" civil and criminal cases, such as crime against state authority. They also hear appeals or complaints resulting from the decisions of the lower courts. In practice, however, appeals reaching the provincial courts are said to be infrequent.

The Supreme Court is empowered to supervise the operation of the lower courts, including the special courts, in the enforcement of civil and criminal law. Its judges are elected by the Supreme People's Assembly for a term of 3 years. The Court is expected to render judgments in accordance with the basic policies of the Government and the Party. In addition to being the highest court of appeal, it may assume original jurisdiction over cases being tried by the lower courts, and it may overrule decisions of the lower courts. The Chief Justice is authorized to preside over all appeals cases, which may be further appealed to the plenary session of the Supreme Court, convened once a year in February. The plenary session is attended by the Chief Justice, his associate justices, and the Procurator General. In addition to considering appeals, the plenary session hears cases considered too important for lower courts, usually those involving administrative crime by high officials.

Although not so stated in the Constitution, the court system is assigned the additional important function of political indoctrination. Penalties are set for "re-education" as much as for punishment. The courts are officially regarded as a means of educating the people "in new socialist discipline," as a forum for fostering, among other things, a law-abiding spirit, loyalty to the state, love for work, and respect for state and other public property.

Supreme Procurator's Office

The Supreme Procurator's Office, which is headed by the Pro-

curator General, and its subordinate bodies constitute an independent agency which maintains surveillance over all citizens, public and private, to ensure their observance of laws. They are also responsible for ensuring that directives of ministries and their subordinate organs conform with the Constitution, laws and decrees, and Cabinet decisions. The Procurator General and his subordinate procurators take civil and criminal suits before the courts in the name of the state. The Procurator General may appeal the decision of any court, including the Supreme Court. As a statutory member of the plenary session of the Supreme Court, he has the authority to issue directives to lower courts on judicial procedures. In the job of surveillance and in applying pressure on the people, the Procuracy cooperates with the Ministry of Social Security.

The Procurator General is appointed by the Supreme People's Assembly, and provincial, city, county, and district procurators are appointed by and responsible solely to the Procurator General. The local procurators are independent of other state organs.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

In mid-1968 local administration was based on a three-tiered structure. At the top were nine *to* or *do* (provinces); one *t'ŭkpyŏlsi* (special city), Pyongyang; two *chikhwalsi* (cities directly administered by the central government), Hamhŭng and Ch'ŏngjin; and one *chigu* (region), Kaesŏng, also directly under the central government. The middle tier consisted of 163 *kun* (counties), mainly in rural areas, including three among the less populated southern fringes of Pyongyang, and 15 *si* (cities). At the bottom were 163 *ŭp* (towns) which also served as administrative centers for the *kun,* 4,179 *tong* (wards) and *ri* (villages), and 166 *nodongjaku* (workers' settlements). Each village area with more than 400 resident workers engaged in industry, mining or fishing was reclassified as *nodongjaku* and administered separately.

People's Assemblies

Delegates to the provincial assemblies are popularly elected by secret ballot for a term of 4 years. Delegates to the lower level assemblies are similarly elected to 2-year terms. The Constitution stipulates that these assemblies are to direct and supervise all economic, public, and cultural activities, approve budgets, protect state and public property, maintain public order, and safeguard the rights of citizens within the various areas of jurisdiction. They "adopt appropriate decisions in accordance with laws, decrees, and decisions and directives of the Cabinet and ministry

level organs." Higher level assemblies may annul or revise decisions and directions of the lower level assemblies.

Regular sessions of the provincial, city, county, and district people's assemblies are held once every 6 months, and the assemblies of village, town, and workers' settlements convene in regular session every 3 months. The regular sessions are convened by the people's committees of the corresponding level, which are elected by and responsible to the people's assemblies. Local people's assemblies elect and recall their people's committees and courts. They also supervise subordinate organs and state-owned enterprises and cooperatives at appropriate levels. They may establish permanent or temporary auxiliary committees to assist in their functions.

People's Committees

Local people's committees are the local executive-administrative organs of the state and are dually subordinate to the people's assemblies of corresponding level and to the higher executive organs of state. The higher executive agencies are empowered to annul, suspend, or revise the decisions and directives of the lower people's committees.

A people's committee is composed of a chairman, a varying number of vice chairmen and committee members, and a chief secretary, all of whom are elected by the people's assembly. The elected officers appoint a varying number of "section chiefs and guidance members." The committees are to implement the Government's (Party's) policies, and directives regarding domestic trade, grain administration, procurement, education, culture, public health, planning, statistics, finance, accounting, labor, city and land management, public workers, and other welfare functions. People's committees carry out the duties of people's assemblies when the assemblies are not in session. After elections the old committees continue to function until the newly elected people's assemblies form their own local governments.

Apart from the hierarchy of people's committees, in December 1961 the Government established a Kun Cooperative Farm Management Committee in each county. Each committee was independent of other local organs and was directly subordinate to the Provincial Rural Management Committee, which was established in July 1962. The provincial committee, in turn, was answerable to the Cabinet but was supervised by the Agriculture Commission. In June 1962 the Government also set up a number of local industrial management bureaus, each in charge of several counties. They were responsible to the Local Industrial General Bureau which was established in each province. The provincial bureaus were supervised after January 1967 by two newly

created ministries concerned with consumer goods, the Ministry of Textile and Paper Industries and the Ministry of Food and Daily Necessity Industries.

There were indications that cooperative farm management had probably been reabsorbed into the hierarchical governmental administrative structure. There is evidence that the actual function of the *ri* people's committee has decreased in importance where the local cooperative farm management committees have increased their authority, suggesting the possibility, according to one source, that the *ri* people's committee "as a state power organ is now on the way to extinction."

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE KOREAN WORKERS PARTY

The Constitution spells out formally and the governmental structure reflects in detail a governing system which is actually powerless unless it is understood to have at its source the one element which is not specified in any formal way. As in other Communist states, the real political power in North Korea lies in the Korean Workers Party, an extraconstitutional body, and more exactly, with the Party's Central Committee and its Political Committee (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The Government and the Party make no secret of the actual interrelatedness of the two, of the controls exerted by the one upon the other, and of the true source of political power. The Government is viewed as the agency which enrolls and relates everyone with the Party: the administrative link between the Party and the people. The regime states that "state power organs serve as the faithful executors of the general line of the Party, are an indispensable means of effecting its policy and a powerful weapon of revolution."

Local government agencies are expected to explain and disseminate policies, decisions, directions, and orders of the Party and the Government to the people and to mobilize them in support of all official endeavors. Throughout the system, executive and administrative bodies carry out decisions of the Party, and representative bodies become rubber stamps which lend legitimacy to Party policies. This process makes more understandable the perfect record of the Supreme People's Assembly in passing bills submitted to it.

The Party is the unifier of national purpose and action from top to bottom of the government structure, and it is the key to the coordination between the various agencies of local administration, for there is no horizontal line of command linking all the local administrative organs (see fig. 7). Through its com-

mittees and departments the Party oversees administrative operations in addition to making policy. At the top levels Cabinet members are actually responsible to the Party. At the highest level Kim Il-sung in 1968 remained General Secretary of the Party, actual leader of the Government as Premier, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Throughout the whole governmental system key positions are filled by the most trustworthy Party members. Party control over governmental organs is thus assured through staffing with personnel who can be relied on to follow undeviatingly the directives from the Party's Central and Political Committees. To assure its absolute control of the government, the Party goes one step further. It maintains throughout the large bureaucracy a Party network, corresponding to the governmental structure, to watch over administration on the spot (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The role of the "democratic" election in North Korea, as in the Chinese Communist and Soviet-bloc countries, is to provide a means whereby assent is registered to the policy and program of the ruling minority group rather than to provide a forum for the expression of free choice.

The Constitution stipulates that all representative organs, from the Supreme People's Assembly down to the village people's assemblies, shall be elected through "free will" and secret balloting, based on the principles of "universal, equal, and direct suffrage." Suffrage, as well as eligibility for office, is extended to all persons at the age of 18 regardless of sex, racial or social origin, religion, residence, property ownership, or educational qualifications. Armed forces personnel can also vote and run for office. Persons can be deprived of electoral rights by court conviction; mentally handicapped persons and pro-Japanese elements are also disfranchised.

Candidates to the Supreme People's Assembly and its counterparts at the provincial, city, and county levels may be jointly nominated by the Korean Workers Party, by non-Communist organizations, and by individuals who attend nominating meetings at government offices, factories, enterprises, cooperative farms, labor unions, or military installations. The selection of the nominee is always predetermined by the Party organs. The proportion of Party members to non-Communist nominees is carefully regulated to give the appearance that elections are not dictated by the Communists.

A single-member constituency system prevails, and there is sel-

dom more than one candidate on the ballot for each constituency. Candidates usually are picked on the strength of outstanding achievements in their respective fields of endeavor. Well-known Party, governmental, and military figures and recipients of various "hero" awards are automatically assured of nomination.

Voting lists are prepared by the city, county, town, village, or workers' district people's committees. For the personnel in the Armed Forces, including the militia, the lists are prepared by the unit commanders concerned. Delegates to the Supreme People's Assembly are elected at the ratio of 1 to 30,000 people. Constituencies for election to the provincial (including Pyongyang, Hamhŭng, Ch'ŏngjin, and Kaesŏng), city, and county people's assemblies are established by the people's committees at corresponding levels. On the other hand, constituencies for the town and workers' district assemblies are conterminous with the administrative division of the areas concerned. Election committees, formed by the people's committees at each administrative level, are made up of representatives of various political, social, and cooperative organizations.

Campaigning usually takes the form of lecture meetings sponsored by each workshop or by "mobile agitator teams." At these gatherings group singing, the recital of poems, and other audio-visual demonstrations take place in support of candidates and elections. The press and radio invariably carry supporting slogans, and voters are constantly reminded of the virtues and correctness of the Party leadership and the superiority of socialism. The polls open at 6 a.m. and close at midnight.

Despite the many trappings and the protestations of popular participation, the electoral system actually is controlled completely by the Party. It approves the candidates and manipulates the presentation of a single-slate ballot, which theoretically may be either accepted or rejected by the voter. For many years the voter placed his ballot publicly in a white box to signify "yes" or in a black box to signify "no." In October 1962 the "black and white ballot election" system was dropped for a single ballot box, and the voter was then required to make a mark against the names of any candidates he opposed on the ballot before casting it. Even with the modified balloting system, the result was a 100-percent vote for the official slate.

NATIONAL SYMBOLS AND HOLIDAYS

National symbols reflect clearly the communistic nature of the state. The flag has a wide horizontal red stripe bordered above and below by narrow blue stripes, each of which is separated

from the red by thin white stripes, and the red stripe bears on its left side a five-pointed red star in a white circle. The flag is twice as long as it is wide. The state emblem depicts a hydroelectric power station, framed on left and right by stalks of rice, topped by a five-pointed red star emitting beams of light and bearing the inscription, "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The matter of an official national anthem has fallen into the category of a political issue. The regime has stated that it would have no official anthem until Korea was reunited. In the meantime, the song that serves as the functional equivalent is "Ae Kuk Ka," literally translated as "A Patriotic Song."

August 15, Liberation Day, and September 9, Founding Day of the Republic, are observed as national holidays. In addition, New Year's Day on January 1 and May Day on May 1 are celebrated nationally. Other days observed include February 8, Day of the People's Army, which was founded on February 8, 1948; April 25, commemorating the day in 1932 when Kim Il-sung and other Korean Communists organized the anti-Japanese partisan units; July 27, celebrating the "victory" in 1953 of the Korean people "in their Patriotic War against the United States"; and October 10, honoring the founding day of the Korean Workers Party in 1945. In addition, a variety of other occasions are noted in some fashion: January 17, the Socialist Working Youth League of Korea Day; March 8, International Women's Day; June 6, Young Pioneers of Korea Day; the third Sunday in September, Miner's Day; and many others of a similar nature.

CHAPTER 14

POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND VALUES

Political power in 1968 was a monopoly of the Korean Workers Party. Participation in the political process was limited to the forms and means the Party imposed. By allowing the existence of other parties it sought to maintain the illusion that democratic choices prevailed. It utilized for this purpose a few strictly controlled political groups which were vestiges of their former strength and eminence. It also used mass social organizations and election processes to support claims that its policies were sanctioned by the people.

The Party used the Government to execute its policies. It controlled all governmental activities and activities in every aspect of life through the intrusion of highly indoctrinated cadres and through the interlocking of the Party with other organizations by means of dual membership by top-level leaders.

Although the struggle for position and power within the Party at times had erupted into open factional strife, Kim Il-sung had succeeded in eliminating the most powerful of his rivals by the late 1950's. By mid-1967 he had further ensured his supremacy by gathering around himself a group of personal followers through quiet, small-scale purges and reorganizations within the Party's Central and Political Committees.

The Party had some 60,000 cells; they were located in every enterprise, organization, farm, school, office, military unit, and governmental organ. The country had always had the highest proportion of members to population of any Communist state. In 1968 its estimated 1.7 million members represented about 13 percent of the total population.

Members of the Party elite took Communist ideology as their guiding value. Premier Kim Il-sung was the sole arbiter of all doubts, questions, or disputes about interpretation of the ideology as it applied to North Korea. The Party sought to impose Marxism-Leninism as well as Premier Kim's own revolutionary doctrine on the people as their primary value and to remold each individual as a "new socialist man." Its effort was eased partly by the weakening of traditional values after the post-World War II

disruption of old social organizations that was further hastened during the Korean conflict.

An important feature of the new value system was the enhanced sense of national pride which was fostered by the regime. In encouraging pride of a distinct culture and national accomplishment, it elicited feelings of approval, since years of misrule, subjugation, and defeat had burdened the people with a residual sense of humiliation and inferiority. The Government attempted to identify feelings of national pride with loyalty to Premier Kim, the State, and communism. In that spirit it called on the people for prodigious efforts in the tasks of developing the nation and enhancing its independence from all foreign influences. It was the exploitation of these emotional and psychological resources which enabled the regime to promote the forced production levels of the Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse) movement (see Glossary) over a span of more than a decade.

The issue of unification of the whole country continued to preoccupy governmental leaders who in 1967–68 attempted to incite rebellion in the Republic of Korea by infiltration and by hostile propaganda activities. This militancy was preceded and accompanied by the growing influence of generals in the Party hierarchy. The policy of unification through peaceful means which had been highly publicized in earlier years was less often mentioned in 1968.

Other concerns were related to developments in the Communist world. Inter-Party accord or disagreement remained one of the determinants of political decisions in North Korea. In addition, the country's continued dependence on the Soviet Union for significant amounts of technical and military aid affected the conduct of its internal and external affairs (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

POLITICAL PROCESS

Korean Workers Party

The dominant political force was the Communist Party, which was officially known as the Korean Workers Party (Chosŏn Nodong Dang). All political activities were sponsored by the Party or required its sanction.

The Party did not derive its power from any formal role in the Government. No mention of it was made in the Constitution, nor was it given any standing in the governmental structure. Its role was that of backstage manipulator, supervisor, and coordinator; the Government functioned as the executor of the Party's policies.

The Party was initially advanced to its dominant position with the help of Soviet occupation forces, who introduced Kim Il-sung

as a national leader in October 1945. By the time the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed in September 1948, the Soviet authorities had aided in the suppression or elimination of many of Kim II-sung's rivals, and he was able to assume the premiership without major opposition (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Major Developments, 1948–68

When he became Premier in September 1948, Kim Il-sung was the vice chairman of the North Korean Workers Party, the ruling Communist organization in the north. In June 1949 this party absorbed the members of the defunct Communist organization in the south, called the South Korean Workers Party, and emerged as the Korean Workers Party under the chairmanship of Kim Il-sung. In later years, however, the Party, placed the date of its formation as October 10, 1945, when Kim Il-sung, under Soviet aegis, formally outlined a political blueprint for the north before a gathering of Communist activists (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Under the 1949 merger, Pak Hŏn-yŏng, leader of the Communist group, in the south held the vice chairmanship. The facade of unity was an uneasy alliance at best, however, since it had been Kim Il-sung's manipulations which had been mainly responsible for the decline in influence of Pak Hŏn-yŏng and his followers. As the original, Korea-based Communist Party dating back to the 1920's, Pak's group had had justifiable expectations of leading a Communist regime in Korea before the intrusion of the Soviet-backed exiles onto the scene. The advent of the Korean war suppressed the rivalries somewhat, but 3 years of warfare and near extinction also exerted strains on the alliance; they provided Premier Kim with the opportunity to shift the responsibility for failure to unify the country by force onto his rivals, actual and potential.

Mu Chŏng, a top military leader with pro-Chinese sympathies, was purged after a Central Committee meeting held in December 1950. He was charged with insubordination, unwarranted manslaughter, and the spread of defeatism. For defective Party organizational work in the northern part of Korea, Hŏ Gaui (Ho Ka-i), a leading Party figure who had pro-Soviet inclinations, was made the scapegoat in November 1951 because of his decision in June 1949 to accept indiscriminately all former South Korean Workers Party members into the Korean Workers Party and also for his partiality toward the urban workers as preferred Party members. Ho Gaui, a member of the all-powerful Military Affairs Committee and vice premier, had been a potential threat

to Kim Il-sung; he committed suicide after the November censure.

Ten key leaders of the former South Korean Workers Party, all followers of Pak Hŏn-yŏng, were blamed for the Party's dismal political record in the south. In August 1953 they were accused of having attempted to overthrow the North Korean regime through a wartime coup d'etat in collusion with United States agents and were summarily executed; for expediency, however, it was not until 2 years later that Pak Hŏn-yŏng was sentenced to death.

After the 1953 purges certain Party members became alarmed at Premier Kim's highhanded ways of dealing with dissenters. This prompted them to speak out against him after Premier Nikita Khrushchev, in February 1956, launched his attack on the cult of personality and one-man dictatorship in favor of collective leadership.

At the Third Congress of the Korean Workers Party, held April 23–29, 1956, the de-Stalinization issue was evaded by Premier Kim, although in his political report to the Congress he promised collective leadership for North Korea. As a tactical retreat, during and after the Third Congress, the usual rituals of Kim Il-sung worship were played down, and the focus of laudatory remarks shifted to the Party. Nevertheless, leading theoreticians like pro-Chinese Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, who was dropped earlier in January from the chairmanship of the State Planning Commission, and pro-Soviet Pak Ch'ang-ok, a vice premier, contended that more positive steps be taken to combat the cult of personality. At the Congress a number of Premier Kim's followers, including several military figures, were elected to the new Central Committee.

The anti-Kim campaign was climaxed at a Central Committee plenum, which convened on August 30, 1956 to hear his report on a trip that had been made to the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist countries in June and July. The anti-Kim forces attacked his anti-people's policies and dictatorial leadership. They further charged that workers' wages were too low, the peasants too harshly treated, and the salaries of military officers too high. They demanded that more concessions be made to improve the living conditions of the people with less emphasis on the development of heavy industry, the position taken earlier by the purged Pak Hŏn-yŏng group. Because of his control of a majority in the Central Committee, however, Kim Il-sung outmaneuvered his critics and succeeded in expelling them from the Party as reactionary and anti-Party revisionists. After the August 1956 plenum he launched an intensive antifactional campaign. This effort culminated in the ousting of Kim Tu-pong, an influential pro-Chinese figure, from the chairmanship of the Presidium

of the Supreme People's Assembly in August 1957 and his expulsion from the Party in March 1958. Five other prominent Party members escaped to Communist China.

After mid-1958, having completed the purge of all of his rivals, Premier Kim forbade the topic of de-Stalinization for any intra-Party discussion and promoted the glorification of himself as leader, while paying lip service to the idea of collective leadership. In addition, he instituted a campaign of self-criticism to instill the ideas of his personal rule. When the Three-Year Plan for postwar reconstruction was completed in 1956, he pushed on with his ambitious Five-Year Plan (1957–61), which stressed the development of heavy industry (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). Externally, with a confidence based on his newly consolidated strength at home, he began to assert the spirit of *chuch'e* (national identity and self-reliance) from foreign Communist powers (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

The Fourth Party Congress of September 11–18, 1961, reflected changes that had taken place since the Third Party Congress of 1956. The membership of the newly elected Central Committee indicated the extent of the changes, which served to enhance Kim Il-sung's control; 75 out of 114 regular and candidate members of the previous Central Committee had been dropped, and 96 new members had been added for a new total of 135. The Premier's report to the Fourth Party Congress included comments on the intra-Party struggle of the 1950's. In allusion to the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese opposition to him of 1956, he said "struggle at home was partly the result of a struggle abroad which influenced the anti-party factionalists and prompted them to oppose the Party policy to carry out the revolutionary tasks."

In the years after the Fourth Party Congress, major international events had their effect on developments in North Korea. The Seven-Year People's Economic Plan (1961–67), for example, ran into difficulties partly because of the curtailment of promised Soviet aid, which resulted from Pyongyang's temporary alignment with Peking in opposition to Moscow. North Korean concern about multiplying signs of a Soviet-United States detente, especially after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, led also to a decision to reinforce a defense buildup without relying exclusively on Soviet assistance. In addition, the climate of tension engendered by the intensification of the Vietnam conflict and the normalization of relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan in 1965-66 were instrumental in leading to a sharp rise in the allocation of national resources for military purposes (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations; ch. 24, The Armed Forces). The decision to develop military strength and heavy industry simultaneously was made

official at the Party Conference held in October 1966.

The Party Conference was the occasion for other important announcements. Among the most significant changes were the creation of a new inner council of power—a six-man Presidium within the Political Committee—and the reinstitution, after a lapse of 13 years, of a Party Secretariat. The two moves and the advancement of other followers of Kim within the Central and Political Committees constituted a further narrowing of authority to Premier Kim and his closest associates. The Premier at this time changed his Party title from Chairman to General Secretary. The new Political Committee contained only two men who were not long-time associates of the Premier. Among the missing members of the leadership was Kim Ch'ang-man, a former Political Committee member and a vice chairman of the Central Committee, said to have been pro-Chinese. He may have been dropped for disapproving of the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union at the expense of Communist China. Other changes in the membership of the Political and Central Committees included the addition of several high-hanking military figures (see table 14).

Furthermore, the October 1966 Party Conference was important for reaffirming the nation's independent stand as enunciated earlier in August 1966. Premier Kim summed up his regime's position vis-a-vis other Communist states succinctly at the Party Conference: " . . . we maintain independence and we cannot and will never dance to the tune of others" (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Table 14. Korean Workers Party Political Committee, North Korea, December 1968

Name	Additional Positions Held Concurrently
Regular Members	
Kim Il-sung	General Secretary, Central Committee of Workers Party (KWP); Premier; Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Chairman Military Affairs Committee, KWP; Marshal
Ch'oe Yong-kŏn	President of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly (Titular Head of State); Secretary of KWP; Presidium member, Political Committee; Vice Marshal
Kim Il	First Deputy Premier; Secretary, KWP; Presidium member, Political Committee; Major General (Retired)
Kim Kwang-hyŏp	Deputy Premier; Secretary, KWP; Presidium member, Political Committee; General (Retired)

Table 14. Korean Workers Party Political Committee, North Korea, December 1968—Continued.

Name	Additional positions Held Concurrently
Ch'oe Hyŏn	Deputy Chairman, Military Affairs Council KWP; General (Retired); Minister of National Defense
Pak Sŏng-chŏl	Deputy Premier; Minister of Foreign; Major General (Retired)
Kim Ch'ang-pong	Deputy Premier; General
Yi Chu-yŏn	Deputy Premier
Nam Il	Deputy Premier; General (Retired)
Yi Chong-ok	Deputy Premier
Pak Chŏng-ae	Vice President of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly
Kim Ik-sŏn	Minister of State Inspection
Yi Yŏng-ho	Vice President of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly; Lieutenant General (Retired)
Candidate Members	
Sŏk San	Minister of Social Security; Secretary, KWP; General
Hŏ Pang-hak	Member of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly; Secretary, KWP; Director, Liaison Bureau, KWP
Kim Yŏng-chu	Member of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly; Secretary, KWP; Director, Organization and Guidance Department, KWP
Yi Kuk-chin	Member of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly; Secretary, KWP
Ch'oe Yong-chin	Deputy Premier; General (Retired)
Chŏng Chun'taek	Deputy Premier; Chairman, State Planning Commission
Ch'oe Kwang	Member of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly; Chief of General Staff, Ministry of National Defense
O Chin-u	Member of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly; Director, General Political Bureau, Ministry of National Defense; General
Han Sang-tu	Chairman, Material Supply Commission
Hyŏn Mu-kwang	Minister, First Ministry of Machine Industry
Kim Tong-kyu	Member of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly; Director, Administrative Department, KWP; Chief Secretary, Pyongyang Municipal Committee, KWP
Chŏng Kyŏng-pok	Not available

Leadership

In the Party hierarchy the Central Committee constituted the first step to political influence and power. Those aspiring to the highest Party positions and those being tested for them were in-

cluded among the regular or candidate members of the Central Committee. In 1968 there were 78 regular members and 48 candidate members.

A narrower circle of power had long consisted of the members of the Political Committee of the Central Committee; after October 1966 it was more exclusively the Presidium of the Political Committee, headed by General Secretary Kim Il-sung. The Political Committee was enlarged after 1966 to accommodate several associates of Kim. By 1968 the six-man Presidium had been reduced to four: Premier Kim and three of his long-term associates— Ch'oe Yong-kŏn, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly; First Deputy Premier Kim Il; and Deputy Premier Kim Kwang-hyŏp. The two men who were dropped from the Presidium in early 1967 were Pak Kŭm-ch'ŏl, the fourth highest member of the Party hierarchy and head of the Party's Organization and Guidance Department from August 1953 to September 1961; and Yi Hyo-sun, the sixth ranking member of the Party and chief of the Party's Liaison Bureau from October 1961 to October 1966. This bureau has been charged with the responsibility for directing infiltration, espionage, and guerrilla activities in the Republic of Korea. The two men were demoted reportedly, in part, because of their poor leadership over the party's covert organizational activities in the Republic of Korea and, in part, because of their advocacy of nonmilitary means of unification.

The rampant factional strife that had troubled the Party in earlier years was replaced by 1968 with more unity than the Party had ever known. Although there was the possibility of latent factionalism over policy issues and alternatives at the highest levels of the Party, there was no overt evidence of threat to Kim Il-sung's leadership. It was generally held among qualified observers that only the backing of the Soviet Union or Communist China could pose such a threat and then only in the eventuality of a colossal leadership failure or an extreme swing by the Premier in the direction of revisionist liberalization.

There were freqeunt reports that Kim was grooming his younger brother, Kim Yŏng-chu, to succeed him. In charge of the Party's Organization and Guidance Department since September 1961, Kim Yŏng-chu gained prominence in October 1966 when he was advanced from the 40th to the 16th rank in the Party hierarchy and was named a candidate member of the Political Committee.

Organization and Membership

The Party hierarchy consisted of elected assemblies and their executive committees; the committees actually exercised Party power at all levels (see fig. 8). The highest organ of the Party was,



Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Ch'onggam, 1945-1968* pp.118-122; *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan 1967-1968* pp. 304-305.

Figure 8. Korean workers party organization, 1968.

in theory, the Party Congress, to be convened by the Central Committee every 4 years; up to 1968 there had been none since the Fourth Party Congress in 1961. Under the Party constitution, the Congress was empowered to hear, discuss, and approve the reports of the Central Committee, the Central Auditing Committee, and other central bodies, to adopt or revise the program and rules of the Party, to decide on the basic questions of policy and tactics, and to elect the Central Committee and Central Auditing Committee. Functions of delegates to the Congress were limited to registering assent to proposals that were submitted by the Central Committee, thereby according a democratic façade to the policy decisions of the leadership. The delegates were elected by members of provincial Party assemblies, including those of the municipalities of Pyongyang, Hamhŭng, and Ch'ŏngjin, and the region of Kaesŏng. Members of the provincial and the special city assemblies were, in turn, elected by members of city and county Party assemblies, which were elected by the Primary Party Assemblies.

In the interim between Party congresses, the Central Committee functioned nominally as the supreme policy making body and directed the Party and controlled its finances. It also had the power to call a Party Conference between congresses. The Conference could discuss urgent problems, recall any Central Committee member, and elect new ones. The Central Committee was required to hold its plenum no less than once every 6 months. The General Secretary and the seven secretaries were elected by the plenum as were the Inspection Committee and the Political Committee.

The Political Committee guided Party policy in the intervals between plenums. It controlled the composition and activities of the Central Committee, to which it was theoretically responsible. An innovation in October 1966 was the establishment by the Central Committee of an exclusive Presidium, or Standing Committee within the Political Committee; the Presidium members, elected by the Central Committee, were also members of the newly created Party Secretariat.

The Central Committee and its Political Committee were aided by the Central Auditing Committee and the Inspection Committee. The Inspection Committee enforced Party discipline, acting as a trial and appeals board for disciplinary cases submitted either by individuals or by provincial Party committees. It was separated from policymaking and operation, and it reviewed Party branches' performance as it related to Government.

The Party's daily work was handled by 13 executive departments: Administrative, Agriculture, Construction and Transportation, Culture, Heavy Industry, International, Light Industry and Commerce, Marine Products, Organization and Guidance, Plan-

ning and Finance, Propaganda and Agitation, Science and School Education, and Wages. It was through these departments that the Party supervised the policy implementation by the various Government ministries. In a real sense they represented a government within the Government.

Two other bodies with special duties under the Central Committee and its Political Committee were the Liaison Bureau and the Military Affairs Committee. The Liaison Bureau was concerned with subversive activities directed at the Republic of Korea and Japan. The Military Affairs Committee was created in December 1962 to direct the People's Army. In addition, there were bureaus that publish the Party newspaper and other Party literature. There was also a Research Institute of Party History, a Central Party Institute (Central Party School), and an Academy of Marxism-Leninism. To ensure its control the Party also maintained political bureaus at sensitive places of work, such as railroads.

The lowest Party organizations were the Primary Party Committees, organized in any area with more than 100 Party members. Below them were some 60,000 cells established wherever there were three or more Party members, such as a factory or enterprise, transportation establishment, construction office, machine tractor station, state or cooperative farm, Government office, military unit, or village. Each cell elected its own chairman and vice chairman. According to the amended version of the Party constitution in September 1961, cells with 10 or more members elected executive committees for a term of 1 year.

A cell with at least 100 but less than 300 members in a factory, cooperative farm, or other place of work could form a Party committee subject to endorsement by the city or county Party committee. The same rule also applied to cells with more than 300 Party members, but in such cases the formation of a Party committee had to be endorsed directly by the Party's Central Committee. A Party committee with more than 2,000 members of both regular and candidate standing might have the same authority as the city or county Party committee, subject to endorsement by the Party's Central Committee. It could organize or approve primary Party organizations, register Party members and candidate members, allocate the Party forces within its jurisdiction, scrutinize the implementation of Party decisions, organize and direct the study of Marxism-Leninism, manage its finances, and direct the work of Government bodies and social organizations.

The duties of cells were to explain the Party program to cell members; organize and mobilize them for productive effort; strengthen ties between the Party and the people; improve the people's political, economic, and cultural life; collect membership

dues; and organize and direct political education "in the spirit of loyalty to the Party, of patriotism and proletarian internationalism." Political classes, which were held at least once a week, were obligatory for cell members.

In September 1961, where the Fourth Party Congress was held, Party membership was reported at 1.3 million, or about 12 percent of the total population; this represented the highest ratio of Party membership, in relation to population, among the Communist nations. Of this figure, workers accounted for 57 percent; peasants, 27 percent; white-collar workers and students, 11.6 percent; and Party, governmental, military, and other personnel, 4.4 percent. The comparable figures for the first three groups in 1949 were 20 percent, 62 percent, and 13 percent, respectively. In 1968 total membership was estimated to have climbed to about 1.7 million, which was about 13 percent of the total population.

There were two categories of membership; regular and candidate. A 1-year trial membership was required, as were letters of guarantee from Party members of at least 2 year's standing. The minimum age for membership was 18; family background was an important qualification.

Party members of both categories paid dues according to their monthly incomes, on a scale ranging from 1 percent to 3 percent, except for peasants and students, who paid lower monthly dues. The greatest part of the Party's income—almost 60 percent in 1960—was derived from the profits of its publishing organizations. More than half of Party expenditures in 1960 were spent on the indoctrination and training of Party members; some of the remainder probably was spent on external propaganda and subversive activities abroad; and some went for other administrative expenses. Party education was aimed at making effective cadres of a large membership, which included some semiliterate and many poorly educated individuals.

Front Organizations

There were a number of social and political organizations which appeared to be autonomous but in reality were what the Party called "transmission belts for maintaining the ties between the Party and the masses." The primary condition for their existence was recognition of the leadership role of the Korean Workers Party.

Many of the social organizations were founded as early as 1945 as a means of mobilizing and controlling the people. Supported financially by the Party, they were active in every facet of North Korean life. Through them, such potential political forces as the students, workers, peasants, intellectuals, and religious groups

were subjected daily to Party discipline and surveillance. The front organizations were permitted no opportunity for autonomous concentration or growth of power.

Some of the well-publicized organizations were: the quasi-religious Korean Ch'ŏndogyo Young Friends Party, the North Korean Democratic Party, the Democratic Independence Party, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea (with nine affiliated unions), the Agricultural Workers' Union of Korea (known as the Peasants of Korea Union until June 1964), the Socialist Working Youth League (called the Korean Youth League until 1964), the Korean Democratic Women's Union, the Korean Students Committee, the General Federation of Korean Literature and Arts Unions (with seven affiliated unions), the Korean Christian Federation, the Korean Buddhist Federation, the South Korean Christian Democratic League, the Korean Red Cross Society, the Korean Democratic Lawyers Association, the Korean Journalists Union, the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan, the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, the United Democratic Fatherland Front, the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Korean-Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and a number of friendship societies with foreign countries.

Of these organizations, the General Federation of Trade Unions and the Socialist Working Youth League were particularly important to the regime. Although it was a labor union, the main function of the General Federation of Trade Unions was to promote the ideological indoctrination of workers. It was also used as an instrument to carry out the regime's economic policies and to raise labor productivity (see ch. 20, Labor Relations and Organization).

As a training ground for and, in its operational methods and organizational structure, a replica of the Korean Workers Party, the Socialist Working Youth League was an organization of prime importance in the political system. The Party accorded it a special relationship and exercised direct supervision of all of its local branches. The Youth League was reorganized in May 1964 to make it a "more powerful militant organization." It had an alleged membership of 2.7 million at the end of March 1964, or 99 percent of the total eligible youths in the north, and it maintained cells in the Army, factories, cooperative farms, and all non-Communist organizations (see ch. 9, Education). All young people between the ages of 14 and 30 were automatically assured membership regardless of their affiliations with the Party. In 1964 North Korean sources claimed that factory workers accounted for 27.1 percent of the total membership; peasants, 34.8 percent; and working intel-

lectuals, 4.9 percent. The remaining 33.2 percent, although not explained by the Youth League, presumably were students and Party and governmental functionaries, including those in the Armed Forces and secret police.

The Party often claimed that there were two other political parties: the North Korean Democratic Party and the Korean Ch'ŏndogyo Young Friends Party. These organizations originally had local organizations and programs of their own. The North Korean Democratic Party was nationalist when it was founded in November 1945 and potentially was the strongest party in the area at that time. It was quickly restricted in its activities by the Soviet authorities, whose oppressive measures caused many of its leading members to flee to the south. After 1946 its control passed to the Communists who had infiltrated the organization. Since 1946 this organization has never engaged in any independent activity; it has no local organizations.

The Korean Ch'ŏndogyo Young Friends Party, which was originally inspired by the indigenous religion called Ch'ŏndogyo (The Teaching of the Heavenly Way), had neither local organizations nor any mass following (see ch. 11, Religion). In 1958 the leaders of this organization were arrested on charges of anti-Communist activities and the party's local chapters were ordered to disband. To create the illusion of religious tolerance, however, the Government did not outlaw the organization entirely.

The United Democratic Fatherland Front was the organization most directly involved in North Korea's political and propaganda offensive vis-a-vis the Republic of Korea. Popularly called the Fatherland Front (Choguk Chŏnsŏn), it was established in June 1949 by various political and social organizations of North Korea and the Republic of Korea. Many were previously affiliates of the Democratic National United Front, which had been founded in 1946 in both parts of the Peninsula. The most important task of this body was said to strengthen "the united front under the leadership of the Korean Workers Party, to liberate [the south . . .], and to realize the peaceful unification and independence of the country."

The Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland was founded in May 1961 to take advantage of mounting sentiments for national unification which followed the student uprising in the south in April 1960. It has issued, with the Fatherland Front, a number of appeals, offering to send relief supplies to the south and proposing immediate steps concerning cultural and economic exchanges between the two areas (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Elections

The first elections in the north were held in November 1946, to form provincial, city, and county people's committees. It was reported that 4.5 million persons, or 99.6 percent of the electors, had chosen 3,459 delegates. A total of 1,186 persons, selected from among the 3,459 delegates, in turn elected, in February 1947, the North Korean People's Assembly. On July 9, 1948 this legislative body decided to hold an election throughout the north and the south to create an all-Korea Supreme People's Assembly, for which the country was divided into 572 constituencies, 212 in the north and 360 in the south, each representing 50,000 persons. In the first national elections (scheduled for every 4 years), held in August 1948, 99.97 percent of the electorate was said to have voted in the north. Twenty-five percent of the delegates elected, were members of the Communist Party; about 20 prcent were unaffiliated with any party.

The second national elections, scheduled for 1952 under Article 36 of the Constitution, were delayed for 5 years; because of the Korean war (1950–53), and again in 1956 because of the Three-Year Plan (1954–56) for economic recovery then in progress. In August 1957 elections were finally held in 215 constituencies in the north, an increase of three over those of 1948. The regime claimed 99.9 percent of the electorate voted, and of the delegates elected, 83 percent were Party members.

The third national elections were held in October 1962, rather than in 1961, presumably to allow for the convocation of the Fourth Party Congress in September 1961. The proportion of representation has been lowered from 1 delegate per 50,000 to 1 per 30,000, resulting in a reallotment of the constituencies from 215 to 383. A reason for the increase was to permit the participation of an increasing number of "meritorious persons" in the affairs of the Party, governmental, and production units as a means of boosting their morale. Of the 383 delegates, the Party members reportedly accounted for 97 percent. The claim this time was 100-percent participation in the voting and 100-percent vote for the slate of candidates that was presented. Sixteen percent of the delegates elected had a college-level education; 6.9 percent, high school; and 60 percent, "middle school" level, grades 7 to 9. Ninety-seven percent were Party members.

The fourth national elections, like the second and third, were not held on schedule. They were delayed for a year, because an important Party Conference was called in October 1966, and certain realignments in the Party took place then and during several months that followed. When the elections were held in No-

vember 1967, 457 deputies were elected, of whom again about 97 percent were Party members. The remainder were of miscellaneous affiliation, including the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan, which was represented in the Supreme People's Assembly for the first time. It had seven delegates, which made it the largest non-Party group there, an indication that the Party was increasingly interested in preempting the loyalty of the Korean minority in Japan (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). The Party announced 100-percent participation in the elections and, again, 100-percent vote for the single slate.

Local elections were held on five different occasions: in November 1946, March 1949, November 1956, December 1963, and November 1967. The announced results of the 1967 elections showed 3,305 delegates (747 women) in provincial people's assemblies. The city, county, village, and workers district assemblies had a total of 103,214 delegates, of whom 32,852 were women. There was 100-percent participation in the elections.

POLITICAL VALUES

The people's lack of experience with other modern political forms, their lack of contact with outsiders, and the official manipulation of information and suppression of intellectual speculation contributed to the regime's ability to establish its political ideology. Its achievements in providing universal education and industrial and technological development, as well as its cultivation of national pride and international recognition, elicited a measure of support, which was based, however, not so much on ideological fervor as on pragmatic interests.

Repeated statements by the political leaders indicated that the process of implanting a modern Socialist state in North Korea was not considered completed. The goal was the remaking of Koreans into "Communist men and women" who would be single-minded in their dedication to revolutionary creed and action. In 1968, after 20 years of uncontested persuasion and coercion, it was still necessary for the Communist leaders to exhort the people to adhere to the ideology and will of the Party. There were implications in some of their appeals that members of the younger generation, who had been indoctrinated all their lives, were not sufficiently enthusiastic in supporting the Party's policies.

Traditional Determinants

The traditional Korean political values were formed over centuries that included episodes of foreign intrusion and influence. The cultural unity which was achieved early in Korean history,

in part as a reaction to foreign encroachments, was accompanied by strong governmental and political centralism. There were no organized forces outside the Government to challenge the court or to bring about social and political change. The adoption of Confucianism as the State doctrine by the Yi dynasty (1392–1910) magnified these characteristics, and added a further authoritarian strain to the society. A strong, centralized bureaucracy was installed, supported by an elaborate examination system (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The Confucian principles stressed the political and social values of obedience and loyalty. Social order was characterized by hierarchical authority relationships, and authorities were expected to be benevolent but firm. Reverence for authority was conditional, however, on the virtuous behavior of officials, which was not common. Distrust and evasion of authority became an accepted feature of the common people's life. They felt that, ideally, authorities should not interfere in local and private affairs and that the least government was the best government.

New Value System

Communism continued the pattern of centralized power and authoritarianism. As in the past, its all-pervasive philosophy made political and social values mutually reinforcing and interdependent. In other respects there were elements of discontinuity. Unlike the Confucian-based system in which loyalty to the State and the family claimed equal and often conflicting demands on the individual, the Communist system sought to establish the overriding primacy of the Party as the ideological and institutional focus of the society. Past assumptions and beliefs about the politico-governmental process were relentlessly attacked by the regime in its attempts to induce and impose changes of a fundamental nature in a short span of time.

The ingrained feelings of national consciousness were tempered, in the early years of Communist rule, so as to present no problems to Soviet rule and no challenge to the Communist principle of proletarian internationalism. When the new state was proclaimed in 1948, authorities at first played down the past, but certain historical episodes relating to the anti-Japanese struggle were soon glorified and popularized (see ch. 12, Social Values).

The regime relied on Marxism-Leninism to rationalize the existence of a new social order in the north. It invoked the "scientific" validity of communism to support various doctrinaire contentions dealing with the dictatorship of the proletariat, the infallibility and vanguard role of the Party, the precedence of collec-

tivism over individualism, the perfectibility of Socialist man, and the inevitability of conflict between communism and capitalism. For practical application of these concepts to Korea's "national pecularities," the utterances of Premier Kim Il-sung and his revolutionary experiences were exalted as the Party's ultimate guidelines.

The Party stressed the importance of the Korean revolution to be undertaken through the "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism. Anything that it may have borrowed from other Communist leaders was not identified as such, but was recast into ideas that were credited always to the genius of Premier Kim. Publicly, the regime is constantly reminding the people to avoid any blind emulation of either of the neighboring Communist countries.

The Party's goal of establishing its ideology was all-inclusive: everyone was required to "breathe the same, speak the same, and act the same as the Central Committee of the Party." In 1967–68 it increasingly referred to what is called *yuil sasang* (the one and only ideology), declaring that Premier Kim's revolutionary teaching was "the one and only ideology of our Party." The term, first used in December 1962 when the regime resolved the policy of self-reliance in defense, is erroneously translated in some non-Communist sources as "unitary ideology." As used by the Party, *yuil sasang* implied a unique theoretical contribution by Kim Il-sung in the form of enriching the "Marxist-Leninist ideological and theoretical storehouse of treasures." The regime was also substantiating claims that Kim "purified" Marxism-Leninism.

Yuil sasang and the concept of *chuch'e* were interchangeably used by the Party in the 1960's. As early as 1955 Premier Kim emphasized the importance of national pride as a political as well as moral incentive to speed postwar reconstruction and to accelerate the country's development as a modern nation-state. Thereafter the spirit of *chuch'e* was evoked to support all official endeavors, and the *chuch'e* ideal became the foundation of domestic and foreign policies. Meaning literally "the subjective core," *chuch'e* stood for the idea of the very identity or individuality of the nation; it specifically referred to the so-called three "self" policies—economic self-reliance, political self-determination, and national self-defense.

The concept of *chuch'e* had great appeal in the country, for it struck a responsive chord among a people who, despite their ancient culture, had tended to deprecate their cultural achievements and heritage as compared to the Chinese. North Koreans were humiliated by their recent submission to the Japanese and then by their defeat in the Korean conflict. The leadership was cha-

grined by its dependence on outsiders during that conflict and by the State's near extinction because of its weakness.

Chuch'e was used to evoke positive thinking in every aspect of North Korean achievement. With the magic of the word the regime sought to overcome "every expression of backwardness and poverty taken over from the old society." Externally, it invoked the concept to justify its policy toward the world Communist movement and other Communist nations by asserting that the application of Marxism-Leninism to an individual country should be left to the discretion of the country involved. It was emphatic, however, that a Socialist country's autonomy should in no way compromise the principle of adherence to proletarian internationalism.

In 1968 it could not be readily determined to what extent the new value system and its attendant institutional practices were internalized in the north. The Party's indoctrination drive continued to be intense and directed against "unwholesome and anti-revolutionary ideological remnants" and other "hostile elements" said to be a small minority. The oblique admission of areas of disaffection implied that all the political values, attitudes, and aspirations of the ruling elite were not necessarily shared with enthusiasm by the masses. Party leaders were the first to admit that the task of ideological remolding would be a slow process. The harshness of the Communist rule and the paucity of material incentives the leaders were able to offer were bound to produce discontent.

POLITICAL ISSUES AND TRENDS

Issues

For all its effectiveness in terms of political stability and economic growth, North Korea continued to be troubled by many of the same problems it had faced for two decades. There was the continuing need to increase agricultural productivity and to raise the living standards and the ideological commitment of the peasants. Industry, particularly the development of heavy industry, still depend on too few sources of external aid and trade, as did military development. The economic sector as a whole suffered from a perennial shortage of labor and insufficient trained technicians. Consumer goods and services were minimal. The large bureaucracy did not respond with sufficient alacrity or imagination to the needs of the people or the demands of the leaders. Planning and administration among the manifold sectors of the Government and the economy did not always produce the required results. Some of the problems were those confront-

ing any regime engaged in massive developmental efforts in the country; others were inherent in the nature of communism.

The problems were met in part through a variety of slogans, "work" methods, and exhortations: the Ch'ŏllima movement, introduced before the start of the Seven-Year Plan, was the first device for forced productivity; it was promoted later in conjunction with the Ch'ŏngsan-ni and Taean work methods (see ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 20, Labor Relations and Organization). The psychological appeals and pressures of the forced production campaigns were made instead of material incentives that the regime could not offer.

The issue that remained dominant in the scale of priorities was the matter of Korean unification (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations; ch. 16, Public Information). The pursuit of unification remained steadfast over the years, although the content of policies varied, especially after the unsuccessful attempt at forceful unification by means of the Korea war. For a time, in line with its postwar tactics for peaceful unification, North Korea had suggested a transitional step of confederation with the south, but it always assured the country's military readiness so that it could return—or give the appearance of threatening to return—to forceful measures when it was tactically appropriate. After the Fourth Party Congress of September 1961, the regime began to call for the creation in the Republic of Korea of a Marxist-Leninist Party which would promote the revolution there as a prerequisite to unification. It increased the use of small-scale measures of violence below the Military Demarcation Line, especially after the Party Conference of October 1966.

In 1967–68, the country's preoccupation with the unification issue was evident in the volume of internal propaganda devoted to it, as well as in the increased scale of its provocative acts along the Military Demarcation Line and subversive acts below it. Externally, the regime demanded that it be invited unconditionally to participate in the United Nations discussions concerning Korea.

Many of the other issues were related to external affairs—for example, relations with Japan and with neutral nations—and particularly to the affairs of the international Communist system (see ch. 15, Foreign Reltions). Both ideological and political issues were generated by the Sino-Soviet dispute, and there were similar implications in the development during the 1960's of various degrees of autonomy among the smaller Communist states. The importance to the regime of the unity of the international Communist movement and its distaste for Czechoslovakian-style liberalization were indicated by its support of the Soviet policy during the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1968. The qualified nature

of the support, however, was a probable sign of its ambivalent feelings about the military intrusion of a great power on a smaller state. Nevertheless, the abstention of North Korea from publicly condemning the Soviet intervention had the effect of supporting the Soviet claim, as enunciated in November 1968, to its right to intervene in the affairs of any deviationist member of the "Socialist Commonwealth." That the regime was greatly dependent on the Soviet Union's recently increased volume of advanced military equipment and industrial development aid was a factor in its deliberations concerning all these issues.

Trends

A few political trends were discernible in late 1968. Realignments in the upper ranks of the Party and reorganization of Party policymaking machinery which took place at intervals since 1966 indicated that emphasis on military preparedness was likely to continue, motivated by the need for continued sacrifices at home, by fear of the growing strength and stability of the Republic of Korea, by desires for increased independence, by the ideological requirements for national unity, and by repeated failure to subvert the south through clandestine operations.

By mid-1967 Pak Kŭm-ch'ŏl and Yi Hyo-sun, who were known to have favored the primacy of economic buildup and the development of clandestine organizations and operations as the basic requirements for unification, had been removed from the new presidium of the Party's Central Committee. Other figures also considered by observers to be moderates and followers of Pak Kŭm-ch'ŏl and Yi Hyo-sun were also removed from their positions in 1967-68. Among these were Deputy Premier Ko Hyŏk, former chief of the Party's Culture and Arts Department; Hŏ Sŏk-sŏn, chief of the Culture and Arts Department when he was dismissed, former chief editor of the Party's daily newspaper, *Nodong Sinmun* (Workers Daily), and president of the Academy of Social Sciences; Kim To-man, head of the Party's Propaganda and Agitation Department; Pae Ki-chun, President of the Korean Central News Agency; Procurator General Yi Song-un; Kim Walyong, chairman of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea; and Hong Sun-kwŏn, Chairman of the Socialist Working Youth League. Others included Im Ch'unch'u, candidate member of the Political Committee and head of the Party's Liaison Bureau, a position that was mainly responsible for subversive operations against the Republic of Korea and Japan; Pak Yong-kuk, candidate member of the Political Committee and a Party secretary. As recently as October 1967, however, he retained his position as Director of the Party's International Department; Chŏng Chun-ki,

chief editor of *Nodong Sinmun*; and Hwang Chang-yop, President of Kim Il-sung University.

Many among those who were purged played prominent roles in propaganda, cultural, and organizational activities, a phenomenon not unlike the similar purge carried out in Communist China in the initial phase of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in 1965–66. Available evidence suggested that those who were eliminated had been opposed by a group of senior military officers who had insisted on militant approaches to settle the issue of national unification.

The ascendancy of the military in the Party's top councils was one aspect of a general situation that was becoming more marked in the country—the intensification of a martial atmosphere which prevailed throughout the society. Military preparedness and glorification of the Army had long been dominant propaganda themes, and Kim Il-sung, because of his guerrilla background, had tended to administer the country's affairs in the manner of a military campaign.

By 1968 the atmosphere of militarism was pervasive. A Japanese reporter who visited Pyongyang at the time of the Twentieth Anniversary celebrations in September reported the presence of large numbers of marching troops and a wartime feeling of tension. The report was consistent with the often repeated aim of the regime to turn the nation into an "impregnable fortress." A Party newspaper article in December 1967 explained that the Party's military line was to establish a "solid nation-wide defense system with the army as its core" and to arm the entire population.

Premier Kim's relationship with the military leaders was based in part on their long association. In the background also was the Korean war experience and the purge of the military figures that Kim had less reason to trust. The Party controlled the Armed Forces through its Military Affairs Committee. In 1968 the majority of important Army leaders were relatively high-ranking Party leaders (see ch. 24, The Armed Forces).

The trend emphasizing the cult of Kim Il-sung continued strong in 1968, extending to the glorification of his parents and grandparents. The propaganda apparatus was fully engaged throughout the 1960's in building the legend of Kim as the supreme partisan hero of early years and the image of Kim as the foremost Korean and the wisest Communist leader of the later era.

The immediate need for further solidifying the foundations of power through the myth building also reinforced the Party's task of indoctrinating the youth in Marxism-Leninism and the ideology of the Party. Realizing that in another decade the bulk of the

top Party leadership would have to be recruited from the current generation of youth, the regime also was exhorting the youth to study and carry on Kim Il-sung's revolutionary concept of creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to the "national peculiarities and historical conditions" of Korea.

The official concern that the overwhelming majority of the North Korean youth who had "never known exploitation and oppression nor experienced the ordeals of class struggle" were unable to understand the meaning of revolution was as real in 1968 as it was in the early 1960's. That the creation of a Socialist man molded in the image of Kim Il-sung was no easy task was aptly echoed in March 1968 in *Nodong Ch'ŏngyŏn* (Working Youth), organ of the Socialist Working Youth League. The publication stated "In building Socialism and Communism the most difficult and complex problem is the battle to take ideological fortress, in other words, in indoctrinating and training the people. . . ."

CHAPTER 15
FOREIGN RELATIONS

The foreign relations of the country were conducted with a view toward protecting and, if possible, enhancing the position and the power of Premier Kim Il-sung's Party-State system. In 1968 major foreign policy goals were the unification—under his rule—of the Korean Peninsula, the expansion of foreign contacts, and the strengthening of the nation's international position. Nationalistic tendencies were increasingly evident in the conduct of international affairs in the 1960's.

Foreign relations remained circumscribed by geography, economics, ideology, and politics. The regime displayed a measure of skill and determination in increasing its independence of action within the Communist circle of nations. Its policy of autonomy and independence, as it applied to foreign relations, was one which aimed at freedom to determine foreign policy without interference from the two Communist powers; it was in no way a policy designed for separating the nation from the Communist circle. It was, on the other hand, a policy which was in accord with Kim Il-sung's promotion of what he called the spirit of *chuch'e* (self-reliance and national identity) (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The Sino-Soviet dispute was both an opportunity and a discomfort for the regime; it was a factor in the increasingly autonomous status of the nation. The regime tried to gain as much as it could from each side, but it was also troubled by the presence of disunity among the Communist nations. Having been helped by both of the Communist giants, as the dispute intensified it tried to take a path which would not alienate it completely from either and which afforded it as much aid as possible from both.

In pursuit of his unification policy, the Premier persistently sought to subvert the Government of the Republic of Korea and to force the withdrawal of United States troops from the south. His regime conducted an unremitting propaganda war against the United States throughout the world. It did not extend its hostility automatically to other Western nations, but dealt with them on a less purely ideological and a more pragmatic basis; trade relations with Western countries were widespread, though on a

relatively small scale (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

Relations with the Eastern European Communist countries, for the most part, had followed the fluctuations of relations with the Soviet Union. One exception was Yugoslavia, which the regime did not include among the Communist countries and with which it maintained no relations. The regime sought to base its relations with the Eastern European countries, as it did with the Soviet Union and Communist China, on the principles which were contained in the Declaration of Twelve Communist and Workers' Parties (usually referred to as the Declaration of 1957). These principles included complete equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and comradely assistance. In 1968 Czech attempts at liberalization and the subsequent repression by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops strained somewhat the regime's ability to reconcile its positions on antirevisionism and noninterference, both of which were principles to which it had adhered.

North Vietnam and Cuba were key issues for the country in the 1960's. The two areas were especially symbolic in terms of the anti-United States stance of the regime, and they were important also in establishing the more autonomous line of action that Korea was pursuing. There was also a conspicuous effort to expand contacts with non-Communist "third-world" developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in part a reflection of intensified international competition with the Republic of Korea.

Relations with Japan remained problematical; there were no formal ties. Issues involving the Korean minority in Japan and the Japanese alliance with the United States remained unsettled and were used by Pyongyang as propaganda themes even more vigorously after the normalization of relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965. Trade relations between the two countries continued despite political difficulties.

Relations with the United Nations were unchanged in 1968. Once again the Korean problem was an item of unfinished business before the General Assembly, and charges of armed action taken by North Korea against United Nations Command troops were entered in the record, along with Pyongyang's protests against the United Nations allegedly "illegal" concern in its affairs. Relations with other international organizations were mainly concerned with Communist gatherings and Afro-Asian groups.

The intensive control exercised over the population by Communist authorities prevented any realistic appraisal of the attitude of the people toward foreign peoples and nations; foreign

policy formulation and execution remained the exclusive domain of the top Party leadership.

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Despite its long history as a national entity, Korea never played an independent role in international politics, and frequently it was an instrument of other nations' policies. It was long a tributary in the Chinese-centered family of nations. Later, after the decline of Chinese power, it was a protectorate and then a colony of Japan, which sought to control the northeast Asian mainland by using the Korean Peninsula as a springboard (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The circumstances of the Japanese surrender in 1945 ensured two conditions of North Korea's early existence: its complete subservience to its Soviet "liberator" and its forced rupture and separate development from the population south of the 38th Parallel, with which it was previously one national entity. The first condition has been modified; the second has hardened into a fiercely held irredentist spirit and policy. The attempt at forceful unification in the early 1950's failed in its immediate objective. Inadvertently, however, it served to weaken the nation's satellite status under the Soviet Union and opened the way to the development of a new sense of national identity.

The particulars of the decision to launch the Korean war have remained obscure to outsiders. By the time of the armistice in 1953, it was clear to all, including Premier Kim, that it was Communist China, and not the Soviet Union, that had come to North Korea's rescue at the time when its survival was at stake. In the postwar reconstruction period that followed, Communist China's aid surpassed that of the Soviet Union. The effect by the mid-1950's was that the north was no longer dependent solely on the Soviet Union. The regime chose to take advantage of its newfound opportunity for relatively greater freedom of action. Gradual diminution of Soviet aid also forced the north to adopt a policy of self-sufficiency.

With the goal of gaining control of the whole Peninsula still predominant, the regime set about correcting the weaknesses that the Korean conflict had revealed. The Premier was determined that the nation would never again be so completely dependent on an outside power. For the greater political independence he sought, he declared that it was first necessary to build a strong national economy. He also believed that, for the ultimate defeat of the Republic of Korea and the United States, alliance with a Communist power was necessary. Kim Il-sung was careful, therefore,

not to cut himself off completely from the Soviet Union or Communist China, even in the darkest days of controversy with either one.

Convinced that it must find added ties and sources of strength wherever it could, North Korea embarked on its policy of self-sufficiency, political autonomy, and self-defense. Kim Il-sung decided to build economic and military strength at home simultaneously with enlarging trade and diplomatic relationships abroad.

The regime's foreign policy was affected by the Sino-Soviet dispute and the mutations of secondary issues that resulted from the main conflict. Its nationalist disposition was evident primarily in its reiteration of the themes of equality and noninterference among the Socialist states; its arguments against deviation to the right (revisionism) and to the left (dogmatism) were proffered within this framework. Nikita Khrushchev's interpretation of "peaceful co-existence" and the developing Soviet-United States detente after the Cuban crisis in late 1962 were also viewed in terms of North Korea's national interests and its primary goal of unification.

Starting in 1962, the significant international events which elicited the regime's increasingly independent response were the Cuban missile crisis, the Sino-Indian border dispute, the partial nuclear test-ban treaty, the downfall of Khrushchev and assumption of power by a new leadership in the Soviet Union, the intensification of the Vietnam fighting, Communist China's cultural revolution, and the Czechoslovakian crisis. Its "independence" was manifested in two bold acts of its own in early 1968—the seizure of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and the attempted assassination of the Republic of Korea's President.

North Korea had grown from a weak, wholly dependent nation at the time of the armistice to a position in 1968 of increased economic and military strength, which was frequently asserted by means of threats and militant acts against its main avowed enemies to the south. The effect of its foreign policy could be seen in the attention paid to the country by both the Soviet Union and Communist China and in its gradually expanding ties outside the Communist world.

RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The exigencies of the surrender of the Japanese forces at the end of World War II determined the pattern of Korean affairs in the postwar period. What had been one people, one culture, and one nation was sundered at an arbitrary line of demarcation across

the Peninsula, and the development of qualitatively different political and social systems was fostered on the two sides of the line. A primary objective of each system since that time has been to effect the reunification and control of the country under its own terms. In addition, since each side has consistently claimed sovereignty over the entire Peninsula, the relationship between them has been a unique one.

The dominant motivation behind North Korea's policy toward the Republic of Korea Government has been to remove or weaken it as a rival for power. In 1968 there continued to be no diplomatic, postal, cultural, or trade relations between the two areas; there was only a suspended state of war.

Since 1945 the north has pursued its goal of unification by both peaceful and violent means. Although its peaceful formula for unification has varied somewhat over the years, a constant element has been its rejection of a solution based on free, direct elections supervised by the United Nations. It was prompted in part by Kim Il-sung's distrust of democratic electoral processes and in part by the fact that the population of the south has outnumbered that of the north about 2 to 1. From the beginning, its proposals for peaceful solution included conditions which would give it an advantage over the south and ensure its victory. Nevertheless, it continued to advocate peaceful means of unification until 6 days before its invasion of the south on June 25, 1950. The attempt at unification by force failed after devastating costs to both sides.

After the 1953 truce agreement the north reverted to the theme and tactics of peaceful unification, but its appeal in the south had suffered a setback as a result of its harsh behavior during the brief Communist occupation of the south. It was also faced with the resolute United Nations defense of the Republic of Korea and with United States support. Other statements since 1953 have called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the rejection of the United Nations role in a solution of the Korean problem in favor of a Korea-by-Koreans-only formula, the reduction of armies throughout the Peninsula, the holding of an international conference, and the establishment of a variety of economic, cultural, and political ties between the two areas. Premier Kim Il-sung's proposal in August 1960 for the formation of an interim north-south confederation has also been given prominent publicity by his regime. All of these proposals were designed to give the north a dominant position and to elicit a favorable response from the youth of the Republic of Korea and from among the nations of Asia and Africa.

On May 13, 1961, the regime established the Committee for the

Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland to take advantage of vocal student demands in the Republic of Korea for unification. After a new government was formed in Seoul through a military coup d'etat on May 16, Premier Kim's position hardened. In September 1961 he emphasized his desire to establish a Marxist-Leninist party in the south and to unite all "patriotic forces" so as to expel all foreign troops from the south. In an attempt to influence the students of the Republic of Korea, the north began broadcasting a so-called Marxist-Leninist University of the Air, and it started a program of inciting the people of the Republic to organize strikes and sabotage and to rise up against the Government.

Although the efforts of the north to mobilize the people of the south in an anti-American united front had no success, the Premier continued throughout the 1960's to press the policy of agitating for an uprising among them, on the one hand, and of appealing to their nationalistic sentiments, on the other. Realizing the futility of persuasion based on Communist ideological appeals, the Premier continued to stress the possibility of unification through subversion and overthrow of the Republic of Korea Government. Nevertheless, the theme of peaceful unification, if only for propaganda, was not completely discarded.

By 1966, as the Republic of Korea grew more stable, there were indications that the north had created a special training center for an insurgency force which would operate south of the Military Demarcation Line. Instead of individual agents being used, as previously, groups of five to 30 heavily armed soldiers were sent south for guerrilla warfare and sabotage. Publicly, however, the north ascribed the occasional terrorist activities of its agents to "southern revolutionaries." Kim Il-sung proclaimed "the first and foremost task" to be to "awaken" the people in the south, politically and ideologically; he acknowledged their prejudices against communism and the revolutionary struggle.

The heightened militancy of the north was in part a reflection of the increasing military influence after 1966 in the Government and the Party, as indicated by the inclusion of several senior officers in the Party's Political Committee, the most powerful decisionmaking body in Pyongyang (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values). In March 1967 a clandestine radio station called the Radio of the Democratic National Union for the Liberation of South Korea started broadcasting to the south. Subversive forays and infiltration into the south increased, culminating in North Korea's assassination attempt against the Republic of Korea's President in January 1968. There were reports also that the north was training 15,000 to 20,000 secret agents.

Statements by the Premier in late 1967 and throughout 1968 were designed in part to heighten tension in the south. A 10-point political program announced in December 1967 had as its second point preparation for the liberation of the south and termination of the artificial partition "in our generation" and "at the earliest possible date." Everything was to be subordinated to "the struggle to accomplish revolution in the south and unify the fatherland by giving support to the people of South Korea." The Premier's exhortation showed his concern that the prospect of unification under his terms was growing dimmer with the passage of time, partly because of the steady stabilization of the Republic of Korea Government and partly because of the increasing indications of the southerners' wariness toward Communist North Korea.

At a mass rally in September 1968 commemorating the 20th anniversary of his regime, the Premier said that preparations were continuing for the "supreme national task" of the "liberation revolution," which "brooks not a moment's delay." He asserted that it was ". . . a naive illusion to think that the people of the south can take power by some peaceful means without a violent struggle."

RELATIONS WITH SELECTED COUNTRIES

United States

In 1968 the Government's policy toward the United States remained uncompromisingly hostile and vituperative. Military representatives of the two Governments continued to meet at P'anmunjom in connection with the implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement that was signed in July 1953. The United States delegation on the Military Armistice Commission, however, met with the North Korean side as the representative of the United Nations Command and not of the United States Government (see ch. 24, The Armed Forces).

The Korean conflict sealed a state of hostility between the United States and North Korea, which endured with increasing implacability on the part of the north through 1968. Although the north admittedly suffered devastation at the hands of the United Nations forces and was forced to retreat from the south largely back to its original territory, northern leaders have always proclaimed that they were victors over the Americans. Furthermore, they saw themselves as the defenders of socialism in the Asian sector, protecting Communist China and the Soviet Union from United States aggression as well.

The leaders alleged that the United States was trying to build an alliance—a so-called North-East Asian Treaty Organization—for the purpose of defeating Communism in Asia; it would include the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Republic of China. They explained the normalization of relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in this light and fought it bitterly. In his September 1968 speech Premier Kim reiterated his old charges that "U.S. imperialism is the Korean people's sworn enemy . . . engaged in aggression against our country for over 100 years, ever since the intrusion of the U.S.S. *General Sherman* (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The Government of North Korea captured the U.S.S. *Pueblo* in January 1968. As of December 16, 1968, North Korean authorities still held the ship and its crew, which it refused to release without what they called an apology from the United States. The United States denied that the *Pueblo* was in North Korean waters when it was seized and demanded the release of the crew. Talks between the two sides continued throughout the year at P'anmunjom, the neutral site of the Military Armistice Commission.

The regime publicized incidents between the forces along the Military Demarcation Line, as part of its policy to provoke for propaganda purposes. The anti-American verbal assaults included exaggerated or, in most cases, fabricated accounts of incidents in this area.

Western European Countries

The policy of hostility was extended to the Asian allies of the United States, but not necessarily to its Western European friends. The regime was motivated in part by desires to increase its economic and industrial strength and to establish wider relations outside the Communist system where it could have alternate sources of supplies. Although formal diplomatic relations did not exist with any of the Western European nations, there were efforts through the years to establish contacts with many of them, trade contacts in particular.

Following the British lead in 1957 several Western European countries decided that they would conduct trade relations with North Korea on the same basis as they did with the Soviet Union. Although trade continued to be on a small scale, there were steady increases with some countries, and talks were held over the years with Western European representatives (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

Trade agreements have been concluded with the Netherlands and Great Britain. A trade mission was opened in Austria in

1964, but by 1968 it had been closed. A trade mission was opened in France in April 1967, and a permanent agency of the Committee for the Development of International Trade in France was introduced in September 1968. Many of the trade relations proceeded without benefit of formal agreement. Among the trading partners at various times were Australia, Belgium, West Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Finland. In addition to governmental contacts, trade with private Western business firms was carried out in Sweden, Denmark, France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Canada, and Hong Kong. The volume of trade with the West nevertheless remained inconsequential compared to that conducted with the Communist countries (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

The Soviet Union

Until the Korean conflict North Korea was wholly dependent on and subservient to the Soviet Union, to which it owed its very existence (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The war and the ensuing reconstruction period served to open up its relations with other Communist nations, Communist China in particular. The Soviet Union was no longer North Korea's only important Communist ally.

In the post-Korean war years relations with the Soviet Union were greatly influenced by the increasing discord between that nation and Communist China. The war experience shook the faith of the regime in the reliability of Soviet protection and aid and, although it continued to look to the Soviet Union for primary guidance for several years, it gradually adopted a more critical and independent stance in its relations with the Soviet Union. There were signs of dissatisfaction as early as 1956, at the time of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union when Premier Khrushchev denounced Joseph Stalin, but it was not until after several international events beginning in 1962 that the regime became critical of the Soviet Union.

In July 1961 Kim Il-sung went to Moscow to conclude the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, a military alliance to run for 10 years and to be renewable for another 5 years. Five days later he signed a similar treaty with Communist China. The conclusion of the treaties reflected his anxiety about the May 1961 coup, which had brought an adamantly anti-Communist Government to the Republic of Korea. Relations with the Soviet Union continued in outwardly normal patterns through the remainder of 1961 and up to the fall of 1962 on the basis of the 1961 and earlier cultural, trade, and aid pacts in force between them. The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 precipitated a turning point in the relations.

The settlement of the Cuban crisis was understood as a surrender on the part of the Soviet Union to the United States and as Moscow's abandonment of its duty to strengthen and support the principle of proletarian internationalism. The de-Stalinization program, the antipersonality cultism, the Soviet Union's public denouncement of Albania, signs of rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and the ambiguous Soviet stand during the Sino-Indian border dispute were taken as confirmation. In 1963 North Korea and Communist China were banned from speaking at the East German Communist Party Congress, a move attributed to the Soviet Union's influence. North Korea later denounced the Soviet-American sponsored partial nuclear test-ban treaty as a move calculated to deprive Communist China of nuclear power. In the meantime, North Korea received no further offers of Soviet aid.

In mid-1963 an article in the Party newspaper, *Nodong Sinmun* (Worker's Daily), emphatically reiterated its support of political and economic independence for all Socialist countries. An editorial later in the year charged that the Soviet Union had interfered and disagreed with North Korean economic development plans and policies, had expected North Korean subservience in return for its aid, and had plotted to overthrow the North Korean leadership. It implied that troubles with the Soviet Union were longstanding ones and called for "equality of fraternal parties." The Soviet Union was charged with displaying "big power chauvinism" and subverting the economies of smaller Socialist states to its own interests.

In 1964 the Korean Communists declared that ". . . no central discipline is applicable to the relations among fraternal parties." They said there could not be a higher party and a lower party. By late summer they had named the Soviet Union as the object of their public attacks. In September the Party newspaper told of earlier Soviet exploitation and plundering of North Korea. Kim Il-sung denounced peaceful coexistence as inapplicable to the Korean situation.

The downfall of Khrushchev in October 1964 prevented the complete rupture between the two States. The efforts of his successors and several international events led to improvement in the relationship.

The intensification of the Vietnam conflict in February 1965, which coincided with the visit of Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin to Hanoi in early February brought the two countries closer together. North Korea was pleased with Kosygin's public pledge to increase his Government's military aid to North Vietnam, a pledge which was much stronger than that voiced by former Premier Khrushchev. In February Kosygin also visited Pyongyang, where

he and Premier Kim met in an atmosphere of increased uneasiness created by the intensified warfare in Southeast Asia. The Soviet leader promised to resume and increase Soviet military and economic aid to North Korea; the two Communist leaders reaffirmed the 1961 pact; approval was given to some of the Premier's ideological arguments; and there followed a general strengthening of their relations.

Later in the year various trade and aid pacts and the exchange of high-level visits were agreed to. The economic aid was of great importance to North Korea in attempting to fulfill its Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67).

In August 1965, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the liberation of Korea, Soviet Deputy Premier Shelepin further pleased the regime by declaring that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved full equality of fraternal parties and independent roads to socialism. Their renewed friendship was supported also by the opening in June 1965 of the rail line between Ch'ŏngjin and Najin in Hamgyŏng-pukto Province. This line was connected to Soviet territory and, therefore, was of potential military as well as economic importance to both countries.

One effect of the rapprochement was the toning down of North Korean denunciation of "modern revisionism," a term used by the regime as well as by Communist China to express their disapproval of the Soviet Union's allegedly less-than-orthodox stance on Marxism-Leninism. There were other gestures of friendship, including increased featuring of each other's news in their respective newspapers. Differences between them, however, were not completely eliminated. Although it was to the interests of both to emphasize areas of agreement, some criticism continued to be expressed, and various international stresses served to point up some of the divergencies in their policies.

In the summer of 1967 Premier Kim Il-sung emphasized his continuing disagreement with the policy of "peaceful co-existence" in an article he wrote for a Latin American conference. His primary objective remained to gain control of all Korea, but the Soviet priorities were different. Moreover, in January 1968 when North Korea seized the U.S.S. *Pueblo,* there were hints, despite the announcement of Soviet support, that Moscow counseled prudence, seeing in the North Korean action a potential danger of military confrontation with the United States. In a similar vein, in 1968 the Soviet Union, which North Korea depended on for modern military equipment and military support, was not inclined toward a military solution of the Korean question and tended to interpret

the treaty still in force between them as strictly defensive in nature.

On the other hand, the Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia and subsequent Soviet justification of the act were not criticized by North Korea. In its international radio broadcast, Pyongyang denounced what it called the "reactionary lines and policies of restoring capitalism" in Prague and quoted TASS, the Soviet news agency, as saying that ". . . troops of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Democratic Germany, and Poland entered Czechoslovak territory . . . at the request of Czechoslovak Party and State figures for urgent assistance. . . ."

In October 1968, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between them, the two countries exchanged warm greetings. The Soviet Union was pleased with Pyongyang's strong stand against the Czech liberalization program, regarding the North Korean move as an endorsement of its declared position that ". . . sovereignty and the right of a nation to self-determination are abstract principles . . . [which] have to give way before a 'higher' principle. . . ."

Communist China

Kim Il-sung established diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists as soon as the latter came to power in 1949; he had had unofficial contacts with them for years before that. Although Communist China was relatively weak compared to the great powers, it was an important element in Korean affairs from the start because of its proximity, size, and cultural and political influence. A contributing reason was that Kim Il-sung had started his revolutionary career in Manchuria with the Chinese Communists. The world views of the leadership of the two new Communist States had much in common in 1949.

By its intervention in the Korean conflict Communist China prevented the almost certain defeat of North Korea. It thereby magnified its influence with the Korean Communists for many years to come. As relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China deteriorated, North Korea, not wishing alienate either, was torn between loyalty to the patron to which it owed is creation and to the ally to which it owed its survival. The Chinese ties were reinforced by the presence of its troops in North Korea until October 1958 and by the expenditure (surpassing the Soviet Union's) of impressive amounts of material, training, and manpower in the postwar reconstruction period—even to the extent of going into debt with the Soviet Union to aid North Korea.

During the postwar decade, when the North Koreans concentrated on rebuilding their shattered nation and on increasing

their economic and military strength, they continued to receive Communist Chinese help and to try out some Chinese approaches to economic and social problems. They frequently agreed with the Chinese on international issues. In late 1958 the two regimes issued a joint communique stating their opposition to "revisionism." They also agreed in their opposition to Premier Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful co-existence," and they were equally in accord regarding the "inevitably of war, the evils of imperialism, and the need for violent revolution."

In July 1961 Premier Kim signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with Communist China soon after concluding a similar pact with the Soviet Union. His act was apparently designed to discourage any ideas of attack by the newly installed military Government of the Republic of Korea. The military coup in the south may also have made him uneasy about Khrushchev's "peaceful co-existence" line and, hence, sympathetic to the militant posture of Communists China. He supported the Chinese position in 1962, in the Sino-Indian border dispute and during the Cuban missile crisis, and their argument for nuclear power in 1963; he continued to voice many of the same virulent antirevisionism and anti-American sentiments that the Chinese Communists consistently expressed. He openly supported the Chinese in their disputes with the Soviet Union in 1963 and 1964.

An old border dispute between the Chinese and Koreans over Mount Paektu (Pai-t'ou, in Chinese) was settled amicably at the time of Liu Shao-chi's goodwill visit to Pyongyang in September 1963. Communist China is reported to have recognized North Korean sovereignty over much of the 100-square-mile area involving Mount Paektu; this was a major concession to the Koreans.

In June 1964 North Korean and Communist China cosponsored the Asian Economic Conference in Pyongyang, emphasizing the theme of self-reliance to the assembled participants from 34 countries and organizations, most of them from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The conference helped to push Preimer Khrushchev closer to his decision to read both Peking and Pyongyang out of the international Communist community.

North Korean-Soviet relations improved under the new Kosygin leadership in October 1964. Premier Kim's faith in Mao Tse-tung's tactics was probably shaken by the Chinese failure to support the Indonesian Communist uprising beginning on September 30, 1965. Chinese displeasure with the growing warmth between Pyongyang and Moscow began to manifest itself.

At about the same time, North Korea began to emphasize its disapproval of "dogmatism," by which it meant the doctrinaire Communist Chinese ideological stance, and to speak out less vocally

against "revisionism," meaning the Soviet line. It looked with disfavor both on Communist China's refusal to join the Soviet-proposed international united front in support of North Vietnam and on Peking's alleged delay in the transshipment of Soviet arms and equipment through China to North Vietnam. By the end of the summer of 1966, relations with Communist China were noticeable cooler. In August *Nodong Sinmun* published an editorial entitled "Let Us Defend Our Independence," which staked out an independent position for the regime in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Newspapers of North Korean and Communist China were otherwise silent on news items concerning each other.

In February 1967 Red Guard posters appeared in Communist China, alleging that Premier Kim had been arrested by the Army. Pyongyang denounced the charges as "intolerable slander." In response, the Chinese displayed another poster, signed by Korean war veterans, which called the Premier a "revisionist" and "Khrushchev's disciple." It further claimed that he sabotaged the Vietnam struggle, that he was ungrateful for Chinese aid to Korea, and that he slandered the Chinese cultural revolution. North Korea denied all the charges and warned about the danger of unfriendly acts by the Chinese. It also installed along sections of its border with Communist China loudspeakers which broadcast complaints about the Red Guards.

Communist China supported the January 1968 seizure by North Korea of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*, but it delayed its announcement of approval almost a week. On the occasion in September 1968 of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean State, large-scale celebrations were held in Pyongyang, at which Communist China was represented only by its chargé d'affaires instead of by a delegation, and Peking sent only a very short, formal message of greeting to North Korea.

Other Communist Countries

In 1968 Pyongyang maintained diplomatic relations with all Communist countries except Yugoslavia. Outer Mongolia and the East European Communist countries were among the first to recognize North Korea, and they extended economic aid, especially during the reconstruction period after the Korean conflict (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). Relations with Albania tended to follow the fluctuations of relations with Communist China; those with the other East European countries, except Yugoslavia, during the post-Korean conflict decade, largely shifted according to the state of relations with the Soviet Union.

A special grievance held by Pyongyang against Yugoslavia was

its abstention from the United Nations Security Council vote on June 25, 1950, which adopted a resolution calling on North Korea to cease hostilities and to withdraw its invading forces from the Republic of Korea. Anti-Tito propaganda was unremitting and sometimes vicious.

North Korea felt a special affinity with Rumania when it objected to Soviet attempts at economic domination in 1963 and 1964, and they have since frequently shared a sense of common cause in upholding the autonomous rights of smaller countries in the Communist system of nation-states. They were not in agreement, however, about the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In contrast to North Korea's endorsement of the Soviet move, Rumania, which supported the liberal leaders in Prague, appeared critical of it.

Relations with Czechoslovakia were good until 1968, when Pyongyang became uneasy about the developments in Czechoslovakia. The Kim Il-sung regime condemned the Czech experiment with liberalization as "revisionist." At the 20th anniversary celebration in Pyongyang in September 1968, of the Communist countries with which North Korea had relations, Czechoslovakia and Albania had no representative. Albania, a staunch supporter of Communist China, had criticized the Soviet invasion and, hence, North Korea as well.

North Vietnam recognized North Korea in January 1950. The two have pledged mutual cooperation. In March 1965 Kim Il-sung volunteered material aid and troops if requested by Hanoi. He objected strongly to the participation of Republic of Korea troops on the side of the Republic of Vietnam.

North Korea in May 1965 recognized the so-called National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam—the political arm of Communist insurgents—as the only legitimate representative of the people of the Republic of Vietnam and authorized it to station a permanent mission in Pyongyang. It concluded with North Vietnam a number of agreements pledging military and economic aid: in July 1965, January 1966, September 1966, December 1966, and August 1967.

Kim Il-sung has urged his people to study and emulate the example of the North Vietnamese conduct of war. In 1967 and 1968 he promoted the idea that his policy of increased harassment tactics below the Military Demarcation Line were a prelude to a Vietnamese-style conflict in Korea. His actions and announcements in this period, though motivated by his own national interests, were designed to aid his North Vietnam allies as well. The Premier, in a December 1967 speech, reaffirmed his Government's support

for North Vietnam and its readiness to fight side by side with the North Vietnamese if it were asked.

Japan

The ambivalent character of the relationship with Japan was still strong in 1968. Although there were no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, there were many contacts. Antipathies which built up during the Japanese occupation of Korea contended with an awareness of natural and longstanding ties between them, particularly economic ones. Rivalry with the Republic of Korea was a large factor in North Korean relations with Japan, for the matters of recognition and legitimization of the regime were involved, as was influence over the large Korean minority in Japan.

The North Korean policy toward Japan has been a combination of hostility to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party administration, ad hoc arrangements, and de facto relations for specific objectives, and the fostering of trade and economic ties which would benefit its drive for greater economic self-reliance and independence from solely Communist sources. Japan, similarly interested in promoting trade with North Korea, proceeded under the slogan, "Separation of Trade from Politics." As a result, trade expanded despite difficult political conditions, and Japan was consistently among North Korea's largest non-Communist trading partners. In addition to visiting businessmen, there were some Japanese correspondents, union officials, and left-wing members of the Japanese legislature who made trips to North Korea; there were also nongovernmental cultural exchanges. Pyongyong has periodically sent a number of technicians to Japan for training.

The primary issues between the two countries—the Korean minority in Japan, the rapproachment between Japan and the Republic of Korea, and the Japanese friendship with the United States—tended to overshadow their more cooperative contacts. The regime was against the rearmament of Japan and it also hoped for its eventual communization.

Behind the Premier's persistent charges of "revival of Japanese militarism," there was a fear expressed officially in the early days of the State's existence. The first session of the Supreme People's Assembly in September 1948 set the tone of policy with a statement about Japanese aggression and a demand for "the execution of the decision of the Potsdam Conference with regard to the demilitarization and democratization of Japan." Democratization, to the Premier, meant communization.

The regime has developed close ties with the Japanese Communist Party. It also controlled the General Federation of Korean

Residents in Japan (Zainichi Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai—commonly abbreviated as Chōsōren), an organization which it claimed represented the entire 600,000 Koreans living in Japan and which it utilized to influence both the Korean minority and Japanese policy. It has also used the Japan-North Korea Trade Association, a private organization sponsored by Japanese businessmen, to further its political and economic aims. The association sought to block the Republic of Korea-Japan normalization talks, to facilitate the entry of North Korean technicians into Japan, to secure loan terms, and to obtain reentry permits for Korean residents in Japan visiting North Korea.

In February 1955, taking advantage of a deterioration in relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, North Korea proposed the possibility of establishing normal relations with Japan. It suggested formal diplomatic ties in 1957. Although formal relations did not materialize, an agreement for the large-scale repatriation of Koreans from Japan was successfully negotiated in 1959, and the first sizeable groups were returned by the end of the year (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force).

The agreement of 1950 was extended, but the number of Koreans requesting repatriation dwindled after the first 2 or 3 years. The repatriation program became a political issue when Japan allowed the agreement to lapse without renewal in November 1967. North Korea, while protesting the end of the repatriation program, also attempted to induce the Japanese Government to lower its restrictions on the free travel of Koreans between the two countries. In 1968 these were still live issues between them.

The regime's interest in the repatriation program was based on its manpower needs as well as on propaganda advantages that accrued from the choice of thousands of Koreans, often made under pressure, to settle in the north. Premier Kim's political program, announced in December 1967, reaffirmed his interest in the Korean minority. He demanded that the Japanese authorities lift travel restrictions against the Koreans and that North Korea be granted full control over the education of Koreans in Japan.

In 1968, in its propaganda concerning the *Pueblo* incident, North Korea included Japan in its anti-American statements. It repeated the collusion charges against Japan, saying that it was preparing for war under a joint operation system that included the United States and the Republic of Korea. It brought up an old resentment against Japan that it had "offered itself as a supply base during the Korean War."

Third-World Countries

There were several motivations behind the policy of seeking

wider contacts among the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Ideologically, Premier Kim had a reason for encouraging revolutionary tendencies throughout the world. Politically, it was to his interest to make as many friends and gain as much international recognition as possible in the contact with the Republic of Korea. Tactically, he was determined to expand the extent of functional cooperation with the third-world nations so that he could become less dependent on any one of the Communist centers of power.

In pursuit of these objectives, the regime expanded, especially after mid-1961, its relations with third-world countries on many levels: on official diplomatic levels in countries where this was possible; through trade and cultural channels, both governmental and private, in countries which were not prepared to establish diplomatic ties; and by individual contacts in places where there was governmental indifferences or opposition to any kind of relationship.

In Asia the Government had diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Indonesia. Relations with Indonesia had been closer before the defeat of a Communist coup in October 1965. Consular ties were maintained with India, Burma, Ceylon, and Pakistan. The Indian relationship weakened after the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962 because of North Korean support of Communist China. The developing relations with Pakistan after 1966 were another strain on the ties with India which, nevertheless, continued in 1968.

The new African nations were an especially attractive object of Pyongyang's attention, for they represented United Nations votes which, in the North Korean view, might eventually number enough to tip the balance of contest with the Republic of Korea in its own favor. Although many of them were small and weak and of little economic value to the regime otherwise, North Korean communications media were regularly filled with news items about exchanges of visits and messages with the African states. Prominently featured were Mauritania, Zambia, Tanzania, Mali, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Burundi, Somalia, and—until the fall of Kwame Nkrumah—Ghana.

The Middle Eastern and North African Arab states were similarly wooed, especially after 1963. An added element of motivation in relations with them was in the possibility of appealing to their anti-American feelings. The regime further enhanced its relations with the Arab countries by its own hostile policy toward Israel. It had relations on various levels with Syria, Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, and Yemen. Trade missions had visited Jordan and Kuwait.

The regime expended considerable propaganda efforts to enlarge its relations in Latin America, but its successes were negligible. Cuba, which it courted assiduously, remained the only Latin American country with which it had formal relations. Visits were exchanged with Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, and Venezuela. At different times there were also talks with Colombia, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Peru.

Despite its isolated position in the world, North Korea evidently saw itself as a model to be emulated by the developing countries because of its former colonial experience, because of its emergence as a viable polity, and because of its revolutionary theories. In addition, the Korean Communists occasionally extolled their leader as an inspiring model for the nation-building areas of the world. To all of them, the Premier spread his message of economic self-reliance, along with anti-Americanism and anticolonialism.

RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Outside the Communist world, the country's contacts with international groups was limited but, as a result of its post-Korean War decision to expand its foreign contacts, its participation in multinational organizations increased. In 1961 it claimed membership in about 50 international organizations. Although it was not a member of the United Nations, its relationship with that organization was of continuing significance.

The Government has declared its support of the principles of the United Nations Charter, but it accused the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) of being a "shield for United States aggression." In 1948 the General Assembly recognized the Republic of Korea Government as the only legal Korean Government. In 1950 the United Nations had gone to war to prevent the Communists from gaining control of the south by force of arms and had fought their armies to a standstill truce.

The unsolved Korean problem was an annual item on the United Nations agenda. Each year since the War the United Nations has passed a resolution extending UNCURK's tenure and asked the north to cooperate. North Korea, for its part, called for the cancellation of the "illegal" resolutions and discussions, the withdrawal of United Nations forces from the Republic of Korea, and the dissolution of UNCURK. It claimed that the Korean issue was an internal affair and that the United States used the United Nations to disguise a policy of colonialism in Korea. In 1967 and 1968 it formally requested in a letter to Secretary General U Thant

that the United Nations invite a North Korean delegation to participate in discussions about Korea.

North Korean representatives participated in a limited number of apolitical multinational undertakings, such as the International Geophysical Year and the International Red Cross, although they have refused to cooperate with the latter organization in any meaningful way. Although its athletes competed in many regional and Communist-sponsored international meets, they had not participated, for political reasons, in any World Olympics competition. The Government sent teams to both the 1964 and 1968 Olympic meets, but they left without participating. In 1964 the International Olympic Committee banned them because they had previously competed in the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO). In 1968 the team withdrew from the games because the Olympics authorities designated them as representing "North Korea" instead of "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

North Korea participated actively in a wide range of Communist, neutralist, and Communist-front international organizations and conferences. Among them were the Asian, African, and Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), the Bandung Conference (Council of Asian People's Solidarity), the Council of World Peace, the Afro-Asian Conferences, the Afro-Asian-Islamic Conference, and the Sofia Youth Festival. It cosponsored with Communist China the Asian Economic Conference in Pyongyang in 1964. It was an observer at the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance and participated in the Communists' Joint Institute for Nuclear Research and Organization for the Collaboration of Railways.

MECHANICS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was charged with the formal conduct of foreign relations, but it was neither the principal maker of policy nor the sole agency for its implementation. The Constitution provides that the Supreme People's Assembly "establish basic principles of . . . foreign policies;" that the Presidium ratify or annul treaties, appoint or recall Ambassadors and Ministers, and receive the letters of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives; that the Cabinet "conduct general guidance in the sphere of relations with foreign states and conclude treaties with foreign states;" and also that it control foreign trade (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Actual decision making lay with the Party's top leadership, particularly with Premier Kim Il-sung, in 1968 the unrivaled leader in foreign as well as domestic affairs.

The Ministry, however, was the central implementing body

for foreign policy. Organizationally, it had several bureaus for geographical areas and several other bureaus to attend to treaties, protocol, documents, and finance. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was a leading figure in the top Party echelons. In the early years key ambassadorships in other Communist countries were held by members of the Party's Central Committee, but that was less true in 1968.

Other agencies which were utilized in conducting foreign relations included a multitude of friendship societies with foreign nations, the Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Korean Committee for Asian and African Solidarity, the Korean National Peace Committee, the Socialist Working Youth League, the Chōsōren, and various trade and cultural missions.

In 1968 the Government maintained more than 30 ambassadorial and consular level missions abroad. There were about 30 foreign missions in North Korea.

CHAPTER 16
PUBLIC INFORMATION

The development of mass media communications, which suffered a serious setback during the Korean conflict, was resumed after the armistice. By the 1960's the communications network had been rebuilt on a scale greater than that established by the Japanese during their occupation of the country. Information channels were increased, and activities were expanded to accommodate the governmental need to control and condition the populace and to direct it toward the implementation of the policies of the Korean Workers Party.

Propaganda continued to serve as a major political instrument. As in other Communist countries, the propaganda apparatus was large and highly organized, and was completely controlled and directed by the Communist Party. The Party's activities permeated practically all aspects of life—the arts, the educational system, labor unions, professional organizations, and the Military Establishment. All information available to the people was Party or Party-approved propaganda.

Party decisions and directives on political, economic, and social matters were revealed to the people in the two principal newspaper, the Party daily, *Nodong Sinmun* (Workers' Daily), and the Government daily, *Minju Chosŏn* (Democratic Korea); theoretical writings for Party cadres appeared in the Party's periodical, *Kŭlloja* (Workers). The latest available figure for the total annual circulation for all newspapers in the country was given in late 1963 as about 245.9 million.

A highly publicized Government campaign is alleged to have resulted in the achievement of widespread literacy, with a corresponding increase in the readership of newspapers, books, and periodicals. A radio broadcasting network capable of reaching almost the entire population was developed, and television was begun on an experimental scale in the Pyongyang area. In addition, films, literature, the theater, and arts, as well as various kinds of meetings and gatherings, have been utilized as important channels of indoctrination; they have served only secondarily as sources of entertainment or enlightenment.

Principal themes that were stressed in the 1960's were related

to Premier Kim Il-sung's declared policy of enhancing the spirit of *chuch'e* (self-reliance and national identity). The themes were expressed in a number of slogans and movements which were aimed at increasing economic strength and defense capabilities. The building of the personality cult of Kim Il-sung continued unabated. Korean unification and denunciation of the United States were other dominant issues that were stressed (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values; ch. 15, Foreign Relations; and ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Information programs directed abroad were mainly to the Republic of Korea, but there was also an important effort made on behalf of the Korean minority in Japan, and there were lesser efforts aimed at a few other areas. Attention was increasingly paid to the new nations of Africa and to certain Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern states. Some Communist and non-Communist information programs were directed at North Korea from foreign sources, principally from the Republic of Korea.

BACKGROUND

Before the 1880's information was distributed by limited and primitive means. Government policy deliberately restricted contacts with the outside world almost entirely to China, and these contacts affected only the highest levels of Government and society. A mounted courier system was used for communications among the Central Government, provincial and local units, and the people. The couriers also posted public edicts and announcements on bulletin boards in cities, towns, and villages, where they were read by the few literate persons and then passed on by word of mouth.

News of local events was exchanged at the market, in the teahouses, or in friends' homes. News from the capital and other parts of the country was brought by travelers, peddlers, and traveling players. The many Confucian schools also served as focal points for news distribution; students and scholars read the posted notices to the people.

Small editions of Chinese and Confucian classics; scholarly, historical, and philosophical Korean works; and poetry were published in Chinese (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Some light fiction was printed in the native phonetic alphabet. The reading public was small, since only a small proportion of the population could read the native alphabet and even fewer knew the several thousand Chinese characters that were necessary in order to read (see ch. 5, Language and Communication).

The opening of Korea in 1876 introduced Western ideas and

practices. The first newspaper, *Hansŏng Sunbo* (Hansŏng News), was established in 1833. Several others, notably the *Tong'ip Sinmun* (Independent News), an organ of the Independence Club, of which Syngman Rhee was a junior but zealous member, began publication within the next two decades (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The Japanese established telephone, telegraph, and mail services between the branches of Government. Under their administration mass communications developed. By 1940, 34 newspapers, seven daily news reports, and 16 magazines were published in Korea in the Japanese language for Korean as well as for Japanese readers. Eight newspapers and four magazines had been published in Japanese by Koreans under close Japanese supervision. Two of these newspapers, *Dong-a Ilbo* (Eastern Asia Daily) and *Chosŏn* Ilbo (Korea Daily), were dailies. They supported the cause of Korean independence as strongly as constant restrictions and censorship allowed and became symbols of the fight for Korean independence. In addition, about 419 periodicals of minor local importance were published in Japanese and 19 in Korean.

In 1941 all publications in the Korean language were outlawed. Since only an estimated 15 percent of the people could read Japanese, the circulation of newspapers was thereby reduced largely to urban areas and to Government employees. A few Korean newspapers were printed in Shanghai and other cities abroad and smuggled into Korea; some clandestine printing also was done.

The Japanese established a Government-controlled radio network which was connected with the system in Japan, but few Koreans owned receiving sets. A substantial number of motion picture theaters, which showed mostly Japanese films, were in operation. A number of libraries were opened, but the books were either in Japanese or in Chinese script.

The Japanese introduced mass media principally to indoctrinate the Koreans in Japanese culture and aims. Their success was limited, but greater opportunities for education during the period of Japanese control led to an increased knowledge of new ideas and techniques and a desire for further information (see ch. 9, Education).

CONTROL MECHANISMS

By 1948 Party and governmental control over all information activities within the country had been completed. Since then the object of the control has been to exclude all but official views on the one hand and, on the other hand, to formulate public opinion and mold new social values on which people would be moved

to act. Information-propaganda programs have been the principal means of achieving these ends. The Party, mainly through its Propaganda and Agitation Department, has been the prime agency of supervision of indoctrination programs, the formal Government information activities, and cultural enterprises.

The Propaganda and Agitation Department established a system of links with Government agencies and social organizations which enabled it to direct and coordinate the propaganda emanating from the Party. In addition, other departments under the Party's Central Committee maintained supervision over specialized activities.

Various Government agencies have implemented Party propaganda directives. Responsibility for domestic activities, in large part, has rested with the Ministry of Culture; its bureaus for Arts, Films, Music and Dance, and Mass Culture have handled important aspects of the program. Other aspects have been under the supervision of other Government agencies, including the Publications and Press Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the bureaus for wire and wireless communications of the Ministry of Communications, and the Education and Culture Bureau of the State Planning Commission. The Ministry of Social Security appeared to exercise control over large areas of information activities through its specialized agencies and its Propaganda Department; all publishing houses and newspaper companies were directly under its control.

The Cabinet exercised overall management of much of the mass media through several organs attached to it: the Publishing Bureau, the Central Broadcasting Committee, and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). In addition, one of its subordinate agencies published the authoritative governmental daily newspaper, *Minju Chosŏn.*

One of the major undertakings of the Party in its effort to enlist popular support was carried out at the local level. The local government agencies were instructed to function as cultural indoctrinators and as accelerators of the so-called technical, cultural, and ideological revolutions. In addition, Party propaganda cadres were assigned to local "democratic propaganda classrooms" and various social organizations.

The regime also utilized the educational system from the lowest to the most advanced levels to instill in the younger generation feelings of intense patriotism and an ardent desire to emulate Communist models (see ch. 9, Education). In addition, the Party and the Government sponsored mass organizations, to one of which every young person and adult was urged to belong.

Through their tight control of varied communications channels

as well as ostensibly voluntary organizations, the authorities had almost unlimited means of disseminating information among the people. The information-propaganda apparatus was totally and centrally directed, audience participation was largely guaranteed, and the dissemination of material utilized all media. The regime was able to subject the population to an unrelenting barrage of exhortation and persuasion intended to inspire them to devote their lives to Party goals. In 1968 budget requirements forced the Government to economize on the cultural areas of its indoctrination efforts, but it in no way relinquished control over any aspect of the programs or diminished its zeal to condition the minds of people at home or to influence people abroad.

COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS

News Agency, Newspapers, and Periodicals

In 1968 the press carried the reports released by the Korean Central News Agency, usually abbreviated as KCNA, a subsidiary agency of the Cabinet and the sole distributor of news. Some articles in newspapers and periodicals were provided by their own staffs, but the bulk of the material used was from the KCNA.

The news agency published on a daily basis a news bulletin in Korean as well as English-language and pictorial news bulletins. In addition to printing *Korea News* in Russian and English versions every 10 days, the KCNA compiled the *Korean Central Yearbook* (Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam), which covered major developments in political, economic, and cultural fields. It exchanged news service with the Soviet TASS, the Communist Chinese New China News Agency, and the press of other Communist countries. It also received the bulletins of the Japanese Kyōdō news agency.

All newspapers and periodicals were published by either Government, Party, or front organizations (see tables 15 and 16). The Cabinet's Bureau of Publications subjected each addition to prepublication review and censorship. Articles were expected to conform to the standards of form and content specified by the Party. Formats were established for the writing of articles and for the organization of publications. Journalists were disciplined in the Party's ideology and policies and were trained to write in a style which always emphasized the benefits of Party practice and Kim Il-sung's leadership. Although written under narrow limits of freedom, each article was then screened: first, internally by publication officers; next, by the Cabinet's Publication Guidance Inspection Bureau; and finally, by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Party.

Table 15. Selected North Korean Newspapers

Title	Publisher	Frequency
Choguk Chŏnsŏn (Fatherland Front)	Fatherland United Democratic Front	Weekly
Choguk T'ongil (Fatherland Unification)	Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland	Twice a week
Inmin'gum Sinmun (People's Army News)	Organ of Ministry of National Defense	Daily
Kisul Kyŏngje Sinmun (Technical-Economic News)	League of Industrial Technology	Twice a week
Kŏnsŏl Sinmun (Construction News)	Commission of State Construction	—do—
Kyot'ong Sinmun (Transport News)	Organ of Ministry of Railways	Daily
Kyowŏn Sinmun (Teachers News)	Ministry of Common Education; and Education, Culture, Health, and Civil Servants Trade Union	Twice a week
Minju Chosŏn (Democratic Korea)	Organ of the Central Governmnet	Daily
Munhak Sinmun (Literary News)	Korean Writers Union	Twice a week
Nodong Ch'ŏngnyŏn (Working Youth)	Socialist Working Youth League (for youth between 14 and 30)	Daily
Nodong Sinmun (Workers Daily)	Organ of the Central Committee of Korean Workers Party	—do—
Nodongja Sinmun (Workers News)	General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea	Every 2 days
Nongmin Sinmun (Peasants Newspaper)	Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Workers Union of Korea	—do—
Powi (Guard)	Organ of Ministry of Social Security	Daily
Pyongyang Sinmun (Pyongyang News)	Organ of the Pyongyang People's Committee	Daily
Sang'ŏp Sinmun (Commercial News)	Ministry of Commerce	Twice a week
Sonyŏn Sinmun (Children's News)	Socialist Working Youth League (for children between 9 and 13)	—do—
Susan Sinmun (Fishery News)	Ministry of Fisheries	—do—

Source: Adapted from *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (One Korea Yearbook, 1967–1968), pp. 544, 545; and *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam, 1945–68* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945–1968), p. 616.

Table 16. Selected North Korean Periodicals

Title	Issuing Organization	Target Group	Frequency
Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse)	Kunjung Munhwa Publishing House	Party cadres	Monthly
Chŏngch'i Chisik (Political Knowledge)	Korean Workers Party Publishing House	Party cadres	Twice a week
Ch'ŏngyŏn Saenghwal (Youth Life)	Socialist Working Youth League	Members of Socialist Working Youth League	—do—
Chosŏn Misul (Korean Fine Arts)	Korean Artists Union	Union members	Quarterly
Chosŏn Munhak (Korean Literature)	Korean Writers Union	Union members	Monthly
Chosŏn Yesul (Korean Drama)	Korean Dramatists Union	Union members	—do—
Chosŏn Yŏsŏng (Korean Women)	Democratic Women's League	Primary members of Women's League	—do—
Hwasal (Arrow)		Propaganda and agitation workers	—do—
Kodŭng Kyoyuk (Higher Education)	Ministry of Higher Education	Teachers	—do—
Kukche Saenghwal (International Life)	Kuchesaenghwal Publishing House	County level Party cadres	Twice a week
Kŭlloja (Workers).....	Central Committee, Korean Workers Party	Party cadres	—do—
Kyŏngje Chisik (Economic Knowledge)	Korean Workers Party	Party cadres and government officials	Monthly
Kyŏngje Yŏngu (Economic Research)	Social Science and Economic Research Institute	Economists	Quarterly
Namjosŏn Munje (Problems of South Korea)		County level Party cadres	Monthly
Saesedae (New Generation)	Socialist Working Youth League	Students	—do—
Samch'ŏlli (Three Thousand Ri)	Kunjung Munhwa Publishing House	Foreign consumption	—do—
Sŏndŏngwŏn (Agitator)	Sondongwon Publishing House	Agitation workers	Twice a week
Sonyŏndan (Pioneer Corps)	Socialist Working Youth League	Young Pioneers members	Monthly

Table 16. Selected North Korean Periodicals—Continued

Title	Issuing Organization	Target Group	Frequency
Taejung Munhwa (Mass Culture)	Kunjung Munhwa Publishing House	Foreign consumption	Monthly
Yŏksa Kwahak (Historical Science)	Social Science and Historical Research Institute	Historians	Every 2 months

Source: Adapted from *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (One Korea Yearbook, 1967–68), pp. 544, 545; and *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam, 1945–68* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945-1968), p. 616.

Each edition of a newspaper was planned in detail far in advance of the date of publication. Editors followed instructions from the Party regarding the placement of articles, choice of type size, and length of time to feature news stories. Newspapers were almost all the same in appearance and content. The first and second pages usually contained the Party leaders' speeches or Party policies and directives. The third page featured provincial and departmental news. International news, which was largely about the Republic of Korea, appeared on the fourth page. An exception was the usual placement on the lower part of the first page of items about the "friendly" relations said to be enjoyed by North Korea with other countries. The emphasis throughout was on a few main themes: glorification of Kim Il-sung; support of revolutionary activities and Party policies; achievements of economic planning and exhortation to further accomplishments; unification; and denunciation of the Republic of Korea and the United States. Advertising sections formerly were unknown; by 1968, however, a few advertisements had begun to appear in *Pyongyang Sinmun,* devoted to such items as film schedules and consumer articles in the category of toothpaste, shoelaces, and nail clippers.

The press was a major instrument in linking the people with the authorities. Its responsibilities for indoctrination and political education prevailed over any requirements for entertainment. All the leading newspapers were published in Pyongyang. There were also provincial nwspapers as well as a substantial number of regular newssheets issued by factories and State farms in various parts of the country. Thirty general newspapers and 475 workshop newssheets were published throughout the country.

The most influential newspapers were *Nodong Sinmun,* daily organ of the Korean Workers Party; *Minju Chosŏn,* another daily organ, sponsored by the Government; *Nodong Ch'ŏngyŏn* (Work-

ing Youth), principal publication of the Socialist Working Youth League; and *Nodongja Sinmun* (Workers' News), organ of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea. Party directives for the nation's teachers appeared in *Kyowŏn Sinmun* (Teachers' News).

Periodicals were published under the same restrictions as newspapers and fulfilled the same functions for the Party. There were many scientific and technological journals, and almost all important occupational groups and several social groups were served by at least one journal (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Among the major Korean-language periodicals were *Kŭlloja* (Workers), the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Party, and *Kyŏngje Chisik* (Economic Knowledge), considered the most authoritative commentary on Party economic policy. In addition to the large number of other scientific, technical, and popular magazines in Korean, there were a number of magazines in other languages intended for readers abroad.

Radio and Television

Radio was a principal mass communications medium, particularly in the more remote villages and among people who were not literate. The Government's efforts to extend wired broadcasts to every village home and to provide sufficient parts and maintenance had a continuing high priority. Foreign broadcasts were also deemed important in the struggle to spread communism to the Republic of Korea and the rest of the world. There were two State-controlled broadcasting services originating in Pyongyang—one domestic (First Broadcasting Station) and one foreign (Second Broadcasting Station). Both were under the administration of the Ministry of Communications, but their programing was managed by the Cabinet and the Party's Central Committee, respectively.

The Central Broadcasting Committee of the Cabinet directed the broadcasting network of more than 10 stations. The principal one was in Pyongyang, and regional stations were located in all provinces. Provincial, county, and local committees for wireless and wired broadcasting operated the stations under the supervision of the Central Broadcasting Committee. The domestic network was destroyed during the Korean conflict, but it was rebuilt in 1955 with Soviet help, and the Pyongyang station was later strengthened to more than double its previous power, bringing it to 300-kilowatt strength.

Nearly the entire population could be reached by radio, although there were relatively few individual wireless receivers.

The main part of the domestic network was a wired broadcasting system. Loudspeakers were distributed in towns and rural areas, in private residences, in farm cooperatives, and on public streets. Where necessary, power was provided by tractor motors or 1- or 2-kilowatt electric motors. By the latter half of the 1960's the total number of wired receivers had been well over 1 million, according to official sources. A campaign to expand and improve the wired broadcasting system included the requirement that a receiver be installed in each house, the listening fee to be deducted from the resident's wages. At least 98 percent of rural communities had wired broadcasting facilities by 1968.

Dials on individual radio receivers were fixed to the single Government station, except for a few privileged listeners among the Party elite. The Namp'o Communication Machinery Factory produced two models of wireless radio receivers, and additional sets were imported from Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The regime sought to improve the quality as well as the quantity of domestically produced sets. In 1968 the number of wireless sets was estimated at 150,000 to 175,000.

Most program content consisted of material relayed from the Pyongyang broadcasting station. A few locally originated programs were added as needed to cover matters of particular interest in an area. Programs included news, weather, music, drama, literary recitations, some light entertainment, letters to families in the Republic of Korea, analyses of international affairs, diatribes against the Republic of Korea, and glorification of Kim Il-sung and the Party. There was some exchange of programs with the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other Eastern European and Asian countries.

Fragmentary information indicated that the development of television had advanced by 1968 at least as far as the experimental stage. In April 1968 First Deputy Premier Kim Il stated that "as for the rural areas, we must sharply increase the supply of household goods and cultural goods . . . including . . . radio and television receivers. . . ." There was an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 television sets in Pyongyang in 1968, mainly in the possession of the Party elite. Most sets were brought into the country by Korean repatriates from Japan. According to a North Korean assertion in May 1968, television sets were for sale in a Pyongyang shop.

The development of television had begun under a scientific and technical cooperation agreement signed between Pyongyang and Moscow in July 1961. Two months later television equipment was asserted to have been domestically produced. The Soviet Union

had also promised to help Pyongyang produce television equipment and construct a television station. North Koreans claimed to have started the first television broadcasting in August 1963. For advanced training, technicians were sent to the Soviet Union and Japan. According to the Australian leftist Wilfred G. Burchett, who visited North Korea in the spring of 1967, a television transmission tower was nearing completion in the northern outskirts of Pyongyang. Indications were that, in mid-1968, telecasts were being made within the limited area of Pyongyang for a few hours one or two evenings each week. The Kaesŏng television transmitter, which was announced for construction in early 1964, was abandoned apparently because of financial as well as technical problems.

Films

The development of the motion picture under the Communists had departed sharply from earlier Korean experience with films. Where motion pictures previously had been a highly popular source of entertainment as well as a developing art form, since 1946 films have been almost exclusively an instrument of propaganda.

From 1946 onward the number of films, mobile film teams, and film theaters were increased almost every year to accommodate bigger audiences and more frequent showings. The Government claimed in 1967 that .5 million people every day were being educated in Party ideology through films. Budget cuts in the same year, made because of increased defense and industrial expenditures, resulted in fewer new productions (140 as compared to 215 films produced in 1964), but increased efforts were made for more efficient distribution of films to every kind of audience, from villagers and workers to intellectuals and students. Some films were imported from Communist China and the Soviet Union.

By 1967 a new, modern documentary film studio had been completed. Previously the average annual production of documentary films had been about 150; nondocumentaries had averaged 20. Documentary films were shown free of charge to the public. Nondocumentary feature films, ostensibly for entertainment, were never without ideological content.

In the 1960's the State repeatedly stressed the importance of instilling "national character into our films." It also urged producers to learn from "progressive" foreign film makers. The Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse) movement (see Glossary) was a dominant theme in the 1960's; producers were instructed to choose real-life workers as heroes of their films. War themes were also favorite subjects.

The National Film Studio had been started in February 1947.

By mid-1968 film production centers included the Korean Art Film Studio, which produced in technicolor and wide screen as well as small screen and black and white; the February 8th Film Studio, built about 1962 and controlled by the Army; the new Documentary Film Studio; and the Scientific Film Studio, devoted to glorifying economic achievements as well as depicting scientific and technical subjects. The Films Bureau of the Ministry of Culture managed the greater part of the film industry. Film workers belonged to the Korean Motion Pictures Workers Union, an affiliate of the General Federation of Korean Literature and Arts Unions (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Books and Publishing

Although simple visual and oral materials had advantages as mass media, books and other written materials were considered important. Certain official items were distributed free of charge. All published material conformed to Party precepts and had to undergo prepublication censorship by the Cabinet's Publishing Bureau as well as by the Korean Writers Union. Regulations of the General Federation of Korean Literature and Arts Unions emphasized the paramount importance of Marxism-Leninism as a guide for writers and artists.

Literary works were produced according to a planned schedule of production, an estimate of their number being determined by the authorities. Writers fulfilled the literary production plans on assignment. There were two principal publishing companies: the Korean Workers Party Publishing House and the Foreign Languages Publishing House. In addition, there were about 30 other publishers, most of them for specialized publications.

The types of books published have included essays, short stories, plays, literary criticism, textbooks, children's books, poetry, and novels. A large proportion of all titles was devoted to Kim Il-sung and, beginning in 1964, there was an intensification of the personality cult of Kim Il-sung. The anti-Japanese partisan struggle of the 1930's, Marxism-Leninism, and attacks against the United States and the Republic of Korea were other subjects that appeared frequently. In the 1960's the Ch'ŏngsan-ni work method and Ch'ŏllima movement, in connection with labor heroes, were stressed. Scientific and historical subjects were included on the publishing lists most years.

In the early years of the regime Soviet works were published indiscriminately, but the North Koreans gradually became more selective in choosing from the Soviet literature. They have also published pro-Communist works from other foreign literature.

Traditional Korean works were at first ignored, but the Government began, after 1953, publishing distorted versions of history and classical literature as part of their efforts to rationalize the Party programs and policies as a reflection of certain allegedly progressive features of national heritage (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Theater and the Arts

The theater, dance, music, art, and folk art were used in an undisguised way as channels of dissemination to further both long-term and short-term aims of the regime. The arts were an instrument for conditioning the people in Communist precepts year in and year out and, in 1967–68, for example, the arts were also expected to inculcate the desired attributes of nationalism and modernism. State-subsidized provincial and local theaters and arts groups were active throughout the country (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). State libraries, parks, and museums, with their collections of political works and their revolutionary-theme exhibits, were additional recreation sites which functioned as centers of indoctrination.

Organized Gatherings and Word of Mouth

Word-of-mouth communication retained much of its traditional importance as a communication channel, although the great increase in literacy, the expansion of mass media, and the emphasis on combining labor with study had undoubtedly lessened its significance. Information originated, to a large extent, among the upper levels of the Party and the Army and usually was spread among the people through meetings of political and social organizations.

The technique of compulsory meetings served several purposes in addition to political indoctrination: to further the illusion of popular democracy, to enlist individual responsibility for achieving official goals, and to inculcate social values as a personal value system. Induction of the people into mass groups, unions, and cooperatives was accelerated after the Korean conflict, the widespread destruction of which helped to reorganize the country's social groups. The changes opened new channels of communication for the Party. District people's committees were instructed to organize mass "cultural" programs around discussion meetings, research groups, and study circles.

With the Party's Propaganda and Agitation Department at the apex, there developed a network of public and special groups—ostensibly nongovernmental—which ultimately exposed almost

everyone to personal contact with information disseminators. Clubhouses, village meetingplaces, lecture halls, and factory study rooms were regularly filled with captive-type audiences.

Some gatherings were informal, even though mandatory; for example, on the occasion of the broadcast of an important official speech, local residents were assembled around a public loudspeaker to listen and, at its conclusion, to be questioned as a test of their attentiveness. The same techniques were used for lecture and discussion programs which members of the many social organizations were forced to attend, and at working places where particular newspaper articles were required objects of study, discussion, and examination. Various circles at factories and cooperatives ostensibly for the popularization of literature and the arts, were encouraged and sponsored by the Party. Propaganda lecturers who appeared before groups were carefully screened by the Party and the sponsoring organizations. Discussion groups sometimes became self-criticism sessions, the aim of which was persuasion to orthodox dogmas and discipline. Mass rallies were held regularly in which thousands of people joined in shouting prepared slogans. Workers were expected to make up lost production time "voluntarily."

In rural areas the institution of cooperatives enabled the regime to reach the entire farm population in the network of "study rooms" (also called history study rooms) and through Party policy study groups, which were guided by agitators and "conversation leaders." It was their duty to speak to work teams during their rest periods and to explain Party policies. Concentrated guidance groups from the Central Committee went out to the cooperatives to perform similar functions.

The study rooms were not confined to rural areas; every institution—factory, school, or cooperative—had one of these rooms for the specific purpose of encouraging the study of Kim Il-sung. His selected works were required reading, and there were adulatory lectures about his life and character.

The so-called democratic propaganda classrooms were another institution established to facilitate communication between the rulers and the people. About 30,000 of them were scattered throughout the country in libraries, factories, and residential areas. The Party conducted political instruction in them with the help of lecturers and every form of mass media. Nightly meetings were attended by scores of young people and adults.

PRINCIPAL THEMES

The Party has tended to stress certain themes in its propaganda

efforts. A basic slogan of the 1960's, "Let Us Think and Act as the Party Does," expressed a reiterated theme, the need for a unitary ideology, accepting "no other ideas but Comrade Kim Il-sung's." This ideological theme was tied to another, the drive for self-reliance through the spirit of *chuch'e* which, in turn, was a concept underlying other important themes of the 1960's. These included increased production through participation in the Ch'ŏllima movement and by means of the Ch'ŏngsan-ni and Taean work methods, and the need to strengthen the economy and defense simultaneously (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Special importance was attached to the Ch'ŏllima movement and the *chuch'e* slogans. The Ch'ŏllima movement was considered not only a means of forcing greater production, but also a medium for remolding the personality; that is, "transforming people into Communist men," in the words of the Premier. *Chuch'e,* in addition to setting the country on a more autonomous political and economic course in relation to the Soviet Union and Communist China, was significant as a development which instilled national pride in a formerly subjugated people.

In 1968 the propagandists repeatedly referred to official pronouncements on the necessity to "proletarianize and revolutionize" the population, by which they would eliminate "passivism" and "conservatism." This was part of the theme which stressed the struggle against so-called counterrevolutionary ideas, such as revisionism, feudalism, factionalism, provincialism, and "familyism."

An overriding theme has always been the glorification of Kim Il-sung. The personality cult of the Premier was intensified after 1956 and, by 1968, it had reached incredible levels of homage. He was depicted as benevolent, infallible, and omniscient; histories were rewritten to sanctify his prewar revolutionary exploits, and study shrines were were dedicated to him.

Other longstanding issues that continued high in propaganda were Korean unification and denunciation of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japanese "militarism." Expressions of solidarity with North Vietnam, Cuba, and certain Arab States were corollaries to the theme which made the United States the number one enemy, the "occupier" of the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. Propaganda claimed a continuous resistence by the people of the Republic of Korea to the "occupation" and the "puppet" regime. It also made appeals to the loyalties of Koreans living in Japan, and it publicized selected aspects of their activities to the people of North Korea. A worldwide theme was anticolonialism, especially as the basis for appeals for friendly relations with the new Afro-Asian countries.

Sometimes a militant spirit accompanied the unification theme, and sometimes peaceful means were stressed. A warlike theme, especially evident after mid-1967, was frequently stressed alone; military preparedness and a martial attitude were encouraged along with the creation of an atmosphere of fear of the possibility of imminent war. The capture of the United States naval vessel *Pueblo* was a thoroughly exploited subtheme in the war clamor and in the anti-American charges, as was the long-repeated distorted version of the Korean war which taught the North Korean people that the Republic of Korea and the United States attacked North Korea in 1950 and were defeated by "the heroic Korean People's Army."

The third congress of the Korean Journalists Union, held in July 1968, was lectured on the importance of developing all of the themes generally and, in particular, of amplifying and spreading Kim Il-sung's political ideas.

PROPAGANDA DIRECTED ABROAD

The Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, a Cabinet agency, had important responsibilities regarding propaganda directed abroad. It managed the numerous exchanges which took place between North Korean labor, youth, cultural, and women's groups and those of foreign nations; supervised the Friendship Associations organized with various countries; and worked closely with the Pyongyang Second Broadcasting Station on its international service. South Koreans and the Korean residents in Japan were the principal target groups for foreign propaganda activities.

Radio was the most important means of reaching foreign audiences. An especially notable increase in foreign broadcasting was made between 1964 and 1965, particularly to the Far East areas. Between 1965 and 1968, 1 hour a day of Indonesian was added to the languages, and Chinese- and Russian-language broadcasts were each reduced by 1 hour a day. Programs in Korean beamed to the Republic of Korea and Japan were by far the highest percentage of the international service broadcasts, totaling more than 220 hours weekly. Beginning in April 1962, a special 2-hours-a-day program, "The Marx-Lenin University on the Air," was directed to the students of the Republic of Korea with the aim of converting them to communism. A clandestine station, South Korean Liberation Radio, was founded in early 1967 in hopes of inciting the people of the south to antigovernmental activities. It purported to broadcast from within the Republic of Korea, but it actually operated from North Korea.

In 1968 the international service broadcast daily in Korean to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, as well as to Japan and the Republic of Korea. In addition, it transmitted daily: 5 hours in English to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia; 7 hours in Japanese to Japan; 2 hours in Chinese to Southeast Asia and Communist China; 2 hours in Russian to the Soviet Union; 2 hours in French to the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia; 1 hour in Indonesian to Indonesia; and 2 hours in Spanish to Latin America.

Publications in English, Russian, French, Japanese, Spanish, Indonesian, and Chinese were printed by the Foreign Languages Publishing House and circulated in various countries abroad. The contents of the periodicals echoed the principal propaganda themes, with special emphasis on unification and with many articles on the friendship between North Korea and the nations of Africa and the Middle East.

The periodicals included *Korea,* an illustrated monthly published in Korean, Russian, Chinese, English, Japanese, and French; *Korea Today,* a monthly in English, French, Spanish, and Japanese; and *New Korea* a monthly in Russian and Chinese. The pictorial monthly, *Tŭngdae* (Light House), in Korean, was directed especially to Korean residents in Japan, and it was also sent to Korean residents in other foreign countries. Its aim was to lure overseas Koreans to North Korea by depicting a high style of life that actually was beyond the reach of all but a handful of top-level Party members. Very few North Koreans knew of the existence of this secretly published magazine. English-language newspapers included the *Pyongyang Times,* a weekly of about eight pages, which was started in 1965, and *The People's Korea,* begun as a weekly but published daily in 1968.

Other specialized publications were printed in foreign languages by such organizations as those devoted to foreign trade, students and youth, and labor unions. Special documents on topics the Party deemed important were also published in foreign languages as needed.

Publications of ostensibly nongovernmental origin were also circulated, including facsimiles of Republic of Korea newspapers and of several highly respected Western newspapers and magazines which, on their inside pages, contained North Korean propaganda. Foreign-language books, postcards, picture albums, postage stamps, and records were advertised and distributed by the Korean Publications Export and Import Corporation. North Korean publications were banned in the Republic of Korea, but some pamphlets were printed and circulated clandestinely; others were dropped from balloons.

Propaganda to Japan has concentrated chiefly on Korean residents in that country, apparently with the dual aim of encouraging the emigration of such persons to North Korea and of capitalizing on pro-Communist sentiment among them. Radio broadcasts have been of some importance in this effort, but less so than activities channeled through the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Chŏsŏren), an organization established in May 1955 to assist the efforts of North Korea in political, economic, and propaganda areas; it may include from 30 to 60 percent of the nearly 600,000 Koreans in Japan. Chŏsŏren was largely responsible for the "voluntary" decision of some 80,000 to 90,000 Koreans in Japan to emigrate to North Korea (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

In addition to direct mail, several methods were devised to distribute propaganda material around the world. Distribution networks were established with headquarters in Japan and Hong Kong. Some pamphlets were floated in fishing waters south of the 38th Parallel. Many shipments were sent through the Soviet Union and France. Unsolicited mailings were made to individuals and to institutions such as schools, research centers, and university libraries, even in the United States.

In addition to radio and printed material, films and performing groups played a minor part as communications media to audiences abroad. They were used to mark special occasions, such as "Victory Day" in North Korean embassies, as well as to display on other occasions facets of the country's culture and achievements. In 1968 a film about the incident involving the capture of the United States naval vessel *Pueblo* was given particularly extensive display to foreign groups abroad and to foreign visitors in Pyongyang. Exchange of delegations with many countries, especially in Africa and the Middle East, was a growing aspect of communicating propaganda abroad in the 1960's.

MATERIAL FROM ABROAD

In exerting control over public opinion, the Government used extensive means to prevent the people from being exposed to undesirable information from abroad. Relatively few persons from non-Communist nations entered the country, and even repatriates from Japan were subjected to an intensive "thought reform" campaign to lessen the danger of their influence on the minds of the indigenous population. Contacts with the Communist world came through the exchange of cultural delegations and North Korean representation at some meetings of world Communist organizations. In the 1960's the formation of friendship groups with certain non-Com-

munist nations increased, and cultural and trade exchanges also brought some Koreans into more frequent contact with outsiders.

Some radio broadcast from Communist countries could be heard by listeners in North Korea. The Soviet Union broadcast in Korean 5½ hours daily, and Communist China broadcast 2 hours daily. Non-Communist radio broadcasts intended for North Korean audiences emanated from Republic of Korea, Japanese, United States, and United Nations sources, but it was doubtful whether they were heard by any persons other than officials of the Party and the Government.

The Republic of Korea's 6 hours of daily broadcasts to the north included 1 hour of relay of Voice of the United Nations Command programs. The transmitting station was actually located on Okinawa but its main administrative office was in Seoul. The Voice of America broadcast to the Far East, by way of relay in Seoul, 1 hour daily in Korean; it included a great deal of news of the Communist world in certain portions of its programs. In addition, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai-NHK) transmitted 1½ hours daily in Korean to the Peninsula.

SECTION III. ECONOMIC

CHAPTER 17

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

Available data indicated that the economy in 1968, for the most part, was self-sufficient except for the need to import such strategic items as fuel oil, rubber, coking coal, and precision instruments. The economy was not dependent on external assistance for solvency.

The economic system is inspired by the Soviet model. The means of production are socialized, and priorities and the allocation of national resources are centrally determined by the State. Nevertheless, North Korea has not blindly followed the Soviet precedent, nor any similar one existing in the other Socialist countries. In the process of Socialist transformation, it has attempted to modify and adapt the foreign model to suit Korea's own national idiosyncrasies.

Ownership of the means of production falls into three categories. By far the most important is the "property of all the people" or "public property," composed of State-owned and operated industry, mining, electric power systems, transportation, communications, banking, state farms, and domestic and foreign trade.

The second group is classified as "cooperative property" and is regarded as a less advanced form of ownership than "public property." This group to which the Socialist principle of distribution is applied, consists of collective farms and a smaller number proportionally of fisheries and producers' cooperatives.

The third category, although mentioned infrequently in public statements, consists of the limited area of plots privately farmed by individual families. They may sell their produce directly through the "peasant markets," which are held regularly at scheduled dates throughout the country, or indirectly through cooperative farms or marketing agents of the State.

North Korea has a bureaucratized economy with central State planning as the cornerstone of the system. The direction and emphasis of economic development are set by the Party. The system is managed by a sizable number of technical and managerial specialists who are employees of the State. Excessive ambitions, re-

gional and local self-interest, and inefficient accounting have often presented problems; failures have not infrequently been covered up with statistical manipulations.

Planning miscalculations in connection with the current Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67) were responsible in part for the extension of the completion date of this plan to 1970.

Large-scale industrialization of North Korea began after the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement. From the beginning, priority has been given, at the expense of agriculture, to the development of heavy industry as the prerequisite for a self-supporting economy.

Since about 1960, however, agriculture has been developed with increased emphasis. Grain output rose substantially in 1961–63, and self-sufficiency has been claimed in foodstuff production since then. A large-scale, light consumer goods industry has also been developed (see table 17). After 1968 local industry was given greater responsibilty for consumer goods production and, in the mid-1960's, more than half of all consumer goods were produced by locally operated enterprises (see ch. 18, Agriculture; ch. 19, Industry).

Table 17. Growth of Industrial Output in North Korea, by Producer and Consumer Goods for Selected Years

	1946	1949	1953	1956	1960	1963	1964
Total Industrial Output	100	337	216	615	2100	3200	3700
.....	.....	100	64	183	635	936	1100
.....	.....	.....	100	285	990	1500	1700
.....	.....	.....	.....	100	348	512	597
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	100	147	172
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	100	12
Producer Goods	100	375	158	640	2300	3300	3700
.....	.....	100	42	171	617	870	1000
.....	.....	.....	100	405	1500	2100	2400
.....	.....	.....	.....	100	361	509	585
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	100	141	162
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	100	12
Consumer Goods ...	100	288	285	598	2000	3100	3700
.....	.....	100	99	208	689	1100	1300
.....	.....	.....	100	209	695	1100	1300
.....	.....	.....	.....	100	332	517	619
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	100	161	186
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	100	12

Source: Adapted from *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam, 1965* (Pyongyang), as cited in *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (Tokyo), p. 834.

Special emphasis has been placed on machine building as the key to mechanization of the economy and development of economic independence. Mechanization has also been stressed, partly to counter the shortage of labor (see table 18). This shortage remains acute particularly in agriculture, which has lost large numbers of workers to the growing industrial establishment (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force).

Three national economic plans have been implemented since 1954. The first, the Three-Year Plan for the Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy (1954–56), was directed at reconstruction and rehabilitation. The succeeding Five-Year Plan, which began in 1957 and was completed in 1960, 1 year ahead of schedule, was the first of a projected series of long-term economic development plans. Both the Three- and Five-Year Plan periods were characterized by rapid industrial growth. The Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan was started in 1961. Industrial growth continued, but at an unexpectedly slower rate, necessitating the extension of the completion date to 1970. The need to increase defense capabilities was the reason given by the regime.

In the decade after the Korean war, North Korea received a large amount of economic and technical aid from the Communist bloc; this assistance was largely instrumental in restoring the country's industrial base, which was almost totally destroyed during the conflict. It has received an equivalent of US $1.37 billion in the form of grant-type assistance, canceled loans, loans, and credits (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

Table 18. Index of Growth in Industrial Output of North Korea, by Subsectors, Selected Years, 1946–65

	1949	1953	1956	1959	1960	1963	1965
Electricity	151	40	130	203	234	287	.....
Fuel	301	34	240	563	659	858	.....
Mineral extraction	398	301	561	1200	1400	1500	.....
Metallurgical	388	41	567	1300	1700	2500	2800
Machine building and metal processing	535	663	2100	8300	9900	16200	26900
Chemicals	310	67	288	1100	1300	2600	2800
Textiles	685	1000	2100	6400	7200	10700	14300
Timber and timber processing	173	137	307	579	566	752	.....
Stationery and miscellaneous	616	556	2200	10600	15000	24800	.....

Source: Adapted from *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yongam, 1964* (Pyongyang), as cited in *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (Tokyo), p. 832; and *Korea Today*, No. 1, 1967 (Pyongyang), p. 35.

Foreign trade represents an important link in the economy as the major source of foreign exchange; prime importance is attached to trade with the "fraternal" Socialist countries. More than 80 percent of North Korean trade is carried on with the Soviet Union and Communist China. Trade opportunities are also sought with non-Communist nations, Japan in particular.

Nearly all the economic data on North Korea are derived from official Communist sources. In many cases, information is incomplete and often subject to question. Since 1966 the regime has not made public the annual economic statistics usually released in mid-January. This presumably was because of underachievements in the key sectors of the economy in 1964–65. Economic information published since 1966 has been limited to the achievements of individual production units, such as work teams, factories, or cooperative farms.

MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS

The North Korean economy showed a major structural change from agricultural dominance in 1946 to industrial dominance by the mid-1950's. Although the northern half of Korea was characterized as more industrialized than the southern part in 1946, it was, nevertheless, overwhelming agricultural. In 1946 agriculture accounted for 59.1 percent of the north's gross national product as compared to industry's 23.2 percent. Of the combined agricultural-industrial output (82.3 percent of the gross national product), agricultural production comprised 71.8 percent to industry's 28.2 percent (see table 19).

By 1963 industry was contributing 62.3 percent to the gross national product, compared to agriculture's 19.3 percent. In 1965, the latest period for which data are available, industry accounted for 78 percent of the combined industrial-agricultural output to agriculture's 22 percent.

Industrial growth was rapid in the decade after 1953. In the Three-Year Plan period gross industrial output value reportedly grew at an annual average rate of 42 percent and under the Five-Year Plan at an average 36.6 percent rate. Growth slowed, however, in the Seven-Year Plan period, averaging 14.3 percent annually from 1961 through 1965.

Major changes occurred within industry as North Korea pursued its goal of developing a self-sustained economy. Under Japanese rule the primary emphasis was on production of raw materials and semifinished products for export to Japan. In 1944 the ore mining, metallurgical, timber and timber products, and marine products industries accounted for 60 percent of the gross in-

Table 19. Composition of the Gross National Product of North Korea, by Sectors, Selected Years, and Industry to Agriculture Output Ratios [1]

[in percent]

	1946	1949	1953	1956	1960	1963	1965 [2]
Industry	23.2 (28.2)	35.6 (46.7)	30.7 (42.5)	40.1 (60.0)	57.1 (70.8)	62.3 (76.3)	(78.0)
Agriculture	59.1 (71.8)	40.6 (53.3)	41.6 (57.5)	26.6 (40.0)	23.6 (29.2)	19.3 (23.7)	(22.0)
Transportation and communications	1.6	2.9	3.7	4.0	2.2	2.8	.....
Capital construction	.....	7.2	14.9	12.3	8.7	9.8	.....
Commodity circulation	12.0	9.4	6.0	10.8	6.0	3.8	.....
Other	4.1	4.3	3.1	6.2	2.4	2.0	.....
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	.....

[1] Shown in parentheses.

[2] Composition of gross national product for 1965 not available.

Source: Adapted from *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam, 1965* (Pyongyang), as cited in *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (Tokyo), p. 829; and *Korea Today*, No. 1, 1967 (Pyongyang), p. 35.

dustrial product. In 1956 they accounted for only 23.9 percent, and, in 1960, the last year of the Five-Year Plan their share decreased to 15.8 percent (see table 20).

By contrast, the machine-building and metalworking industry's share of the gross industrial output rose from 1.6 percent in 1944 to 17.3 percent in 1956, 21.3 percent in 1960, and 31.4 percent in 1967, the original completion date of the Seven-Year Plan. By 1967 the industry was reported to be meeting almost all domestic needs.

The textile industry's share in the gross industrial product also increased significantly. In 1944 it was 6.0 percent of the total; in 1963, an estimated 18.6 percent. Similarly, the processed foods and luxuries industries' share rose from 7.8 percent in 1944 to an estimated 13.7 percent in 1963.

Important changes took place within individual industries, notably the chemical industry. In 1944 the chemical industry was geared to produce chemicals and explosives to meet Japan's wartime needs and to provide agricultural chemicals and fertilizers. The production of synthetic fibers, resins, and rubber has become a significant element in the industry's present output. Chemical fibers accounted for 36 percent of the total volume of fibers used in 1965.

Table 20. Composition of Gross Industrial Output of North Korea by Subsectors, for Selected Years

[in percent]

	1944	1946	1949	1956	1960	1961	1962	1963 [1]
Electric power	1.4	3.4	1.6	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Fuel	3.8	4.6	4.1	1.8	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2
Ore mining	15.7	6.7	8.1	6.1	4.0	3.9	3.1	3.2
Metallurgical	13.3	9.5	11.0	8.6	6.8	3.9	6.1	7.4
Machine building and metal working [2]	1.6	5.1	8.1	17.3	21.3	22.7	22.0	25.6
Chemical	10.1	10.1	9.5	4.0	5.4	6.1	7.0	6.3
Pharmaceutical	0.2	0.3	1.0	1.5	4.0	.....	.....	.....
Building materials	2.5	1.0	2.5	4.8	5.9	.....	.....	5.7
Textile	6.0	5.5	11.4	18.4	16.8	.....	16.8	18.6
Glass and ceramics	0.7	0.8	0.4	1.2	1.7	.....	.....	.....
Timber and timber products	20.0	12.4	6.4	6.1	2.9	.....	.....	2.9
Pulp and paper manufacturing	1.5	3.2	2.2	2.5	2.6	.....	.....	2.2
Printing and publications	0.2	1.9	1.2	2.1	1.8	.....	.....	.....
Stationery and magazines	0.9	0.9	1.6	3.1	5.8	.....	.....	6.6

Table 20. Composition of Gross Industrial Output of North Korea by Subsectors, for Selected Years—Continued

	1944	1946	1949	1956	1960	1961	1962	1963[1]
Tanning and shoemaking	0.8	0.2	1.4	2.4	1.5	.....	.....	1.3
Rubber	1.8	0.3	2.3	1.4	1.2	.....	.....	.....
Marine products	11.0	2.7	6.2	3.1	2.1	.....	.....	.....
Processed foods and luxuries	7.8	27.2	19.4	13.2	14.4	.....	15.5	13.7
Oil and fats	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.7	0.2	.....	.....	0.2
Total	100.0	96.2	98.6	99.0	100.0	(3)	(3)	(3)

[1] Estimated.
[2] 1967 percentage given as 31.4 percent.
[3] Percentages for 1961-67 incomplete.

Source: Adapted from Chung, Joseph S. (ed.), *Patterns of Economic Development: Korea,* 1965 (Detroit), pp. 110, 111; and *Pyongyang Times,* No. 41, September 12, 1968 (Pyongyang), p. 8.

The shift in emphasis has been particularly marked in the metallurgical industry. In 1944 steel production was 30 percent and steel products 22 percent of the total pig iron output. In 1963 the ratio was 88 percent and 66 percent, respectively, and the range of finished steel products was reported to have been greatly expanded.

Gross industrial output reportedly grew at an annual average rate of 49.9 percent from August 1945 to the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. From 1954 through 1965, the midpoint of the Seven-Year Plan, an annual rate of increase of 28.1 percent was claimed. Gross industrial output in 1965 was 1500 percent of the 1944 level and 4200 percent of the 1946 total.

Producer goods have had higher relative importance than consumer goods in the gross industrial output, with the exception of the Korean war period, when the emphasis was reversed presumably because of damage to heavy industry.

In 1949 the ratio of producer goods to consumer goods was 58.6 percent to 41.4 percent. In 1953 the ratio had changed to 37.7 percent for producer goods and 62.3 percent for consumer goods. By 1956, however, producer goods output had again moved ahead, accounting for 53.9 percent as compared to consumer good's 46.1 percent.

During the Five-Year Plan producer goods output grew at an average annual rate of 37.8 percent, consumer goods at a rate of 35 percent. In 1960 producer goods comprised 55 percent of the gross industrial output and consumer goods, 45 percent.

The originally planned output ratio for 1961, the first year of the Seven-Year Plan, was 61.3 percent for producer goods and 46.1 percent for consumer goods. The heavy to light industry imbalance which developed in the latter part of the Five-Year Plan led to de-

emphasis on heavy industry at the beginning of the Seven-Year Plan, and the actual proportion of producer goods to consumer goods output in 1961 was 53 percent to 47 percent. This ratio was maintained through 1962 and 1963. Consistent with this deemphasis, annual growth rates from 1961 to 1963 were 12.1 percent for producer goods and 16 percent for consumer goods.

The socialization of the economy was completed in 1958. The changeover in the private industrial sector began in 1946 with the nationalization of former Japanese-owned industry. It included almost all of the larger industrial establishments, and in 1946 the socialized sector already accounted for 72.4 percent of the gross industrial product. Its share rose to 90.7 percent in 1949, and 98.0 percent in 1956 (see table 21).

The private sector's contribution to the gross industrial output declined rapidly, as private manufacturers were absorbed into cooperatives under the provisions of a 1947 decree. The industrial output by the private sector in 1946, 27.6 percent, declined to 9.3 percent in 1949. At the end of the Korean war in 1953 it had dropped to a mere 3.9 percent of the total, and by 1958 was less than 1 percent.

Table 21. Industrial and Agricultural Output of North Korea, by Socialized and Private Sectors, Selected Years, 1946–63

(in percent)

	1946	1949	1953	1956	1958	1959	1960	1963
Industrial:								
Socialized	72.4	90.7	96.1	98.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
State	72.4	85.5	86.2	89.9	87.7	89.5	89.7	91.2
Cooperative	—	5.2	9.9	8.1	12.2	10.5	10.3	8.8
Private	27.6	9.3	3.9	2.0	0.1	—	—	—
Small commodity	4.4	1.5	1.0	0.7	0.1	—	—	—
Enterprises	23.2	7.8	2.9	1.3	—	—	—	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1946	1949	1953	1956	1960	1963
Agricultural:						
Socialized	—	3.2	8.5	75.0	100.0	100.0
State	—	3.2	8.5	9.6	16.1	16.0
Cooperative	—	—	—	65.4	83.9	84.0
Private	100.0	96.8	91.5	25.0	—	—
Small commodity	94.5	91.4	89.6	24.3	—	—
Enterprises	5.5	5.4	1.9	0.7	—	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Source: Adapted from *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam, 1964* (Pyongyang), as cited in *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (Tokyo), pp. 831, 837; and Chung, Joseph S. (ed.), *Patterns of Economic Development: Korea*, 1965 (Detroit), pp. 82, 83.

As private industry was absorbed, the contribution of industrial cooperatives arose from 5.2 percent in 1949 to 12.2 percent in 1958. There was a decline to 8.8 percent in 1963. This appears to be the result of the conversion of various cooperatives into State-managed central and local industrial enterprises.

Socialization of agriculture began in a small way in the pre-Korean war period. The socialized sector's early contributions to the gross agricultural output were minor, 3.2 percent in 1949 and only 8.5 percent in 1953, but it rose sharply to 75 percent in 1956. By 1959 it had accounted for 100 percent.

The socialized sector of agriculture and industry contributed 19.1 percent to the gross national product in 1946. Its share rose to 47.6 percent in 1949 and to 50.5 percent in 1953 (see table 22). The small rise during the Korean war period was in part because of the involuntary curtailment of industrial production and the correspondingly greater share accounted for by privately owned agriculture.

State-owned enterprises accounted for 45.1 percent of the gross national product in 1953 as compared with 5.4 percent by cooperative-owned enterprises. The private sector produced 49.5 percent, of which 33.1 percent was contributed by agriculture, 10.6 percent by private commerce, and 2.9 percent by private enterprise. The proportions changed rapidly as the agricultural cooperativization program advanced. The socialized sector's contribution rose to 89.0 percent in 1956 and 100 percent by 1959. Since 1959 a decline in the contribution by the cooperatives has taken place. In part this is explainable by the reduction in number of industrial cooperatives through conversion, and in part by the great rise in industrial productivity compared with agriculture.

Table 22. Composition of the Gross National Product of North Korea, by Socialized and Private Sectors

(in percent)

		Socialized Sector			Private Sector	
Year	Total	Total	State Owned	Cooperative Owned	Small Commodity	Enterprises
1946	100	19.1	18.9	0.2	60.9	20.0
1949	100	47.6	43.7	3.9	44.2	8.2
1953	100	50.5	45.1	5.4	46.6	2.9
1956	100	89.0	60.2	28.8	8.7	2.3
1959	100	100.0	68.1	31.9	—	—
1960	100	100.0	69.1	30.9	—	—
1963	100	100.0	74.0	26.0	—	—

Source: Adapted from *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* (Tokyo), p. 831.

MACHINERY OF PLANNING AND CONTROL

The most important agency for economic planning is the State Planning Commission. Its senior officials, highly qualified professionals, provide continuity in the conduct of the economy, and they appear to wield influence and power not taken lightly by Party specialists in ideology.

In early 1964 the planning machinery, until then highly overcentralized, was reorganized at all levels of the economic system. Newly introduced was a "unified and detailed planning system" designed to encourage a more realistic and scientific approach on the part of planners and to stimulate creative initiative by the producing enterprises. Planning committees were established in provinces, special cities, cities, and counties under the unified direction of the State Planning Commission. All existing planning units in ministries and local administrative bodies were incorporated into the appropriate planning committee. The 1964 modification was intended in part to reinvigorate the sluggish economy. Related decentralization measures were also taken at that time. They involved the reorganization of the banking system to facilitate the flow of construction funds to local production units, the transfer of retailing functions from the Ministry of Commerce to local administrative organs, and the establishment of Provincial Light Industry Committees and County Local Industry Management Committees (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade; ch. 23, Financial and Monetary System).

Local committees were given greater latitude in the planning process, but the State Planning Commission continued to retain the power to fix sectoral priorities and to decide on matters relating to geographical balance and the location of key industrial plants. The local authorities are responsible for specific planning connected with production, material supply and transport, labor requirements, capital construction, and commodity circulation. Their responsibility also includes the collection of statistics, the transmittal of the plan—once it is approved by the Commission—to the production units in each local planning jurisdiction, and the operational supervision of each project to its conclusion. Provincial committees are also responsible for coordinating the planning work of county committees within their respective jurisdiction and for submitting unified plans for their respective provinces to the State Planning Commission.

The interlocking network of the planning system permits the State Planning Commission, ultimately the Cabinet and the party's Central Committee, to keep in constant touch with the situation in all sectors of the economy through reports channeled upward to

successively higher units, and laterally to the main planning bodies for final transmission to the State Planning Commission. Orders are issued laterally and downward through the same channels to effect corrective measures (see fig. 9).

Under the reorganization all statisticians were brought into a centralized system to ensure uniformity, objectivity, accuracy, and methodological refinement. This change was to cope with numerous official complaints about the quality and reliability of statistical data.

The technical problems of Socialist economic planning do not appear to have been given serious attention. There is a dearth of published technical works by North Korean economists and planners, and little is known of their planning techniques. The impression gained by the outsider is that planning is often handled on a trial-and-error basis.

To smooth the bureaucratized planning and management of the economy and to spur productivity, a profit-sharing operation, called an "independent accounting system," was introduced in the early 1960's. This system already was in use in some other Socialist countries. The new scheme grants a degree of independence and initiative to operating enterprises, in which managers and workers are held accountable for raising productivity for the most economic or productive use of resources in order to fulfill quotas. More efficient utilization of resources through innovative improvements, for instance, could result in meeting planned quotas at less than planned production costs. The outcome is the yield of so-called unplanned profit, part of which is divided among the manager and the workers.

Although this system of income distribution has offered incentives to efficiency and increased productivity in many instances, it has also shown, not infrequently, that the quality of products was sacrificed to meet quotas, a practice tolerated because of the lack of competitive products. Another side effect has been the selective concentration on producing goods that can be manufactured more efficiently.

BACKGROUND

The Legacy of Japanese Rule

Around 1900 the accelerating pace of Japan's industrialization, a rapid rise in its population, and the expanding food needs deepened Japan's interest in Korea. Emigration from Japan to Korea was increasing. Many of the emigrants were traders and shopkeepers, whose activities resulted in further expansion of commercial ties between the two economics. In early 1904 a con-



1 Reinstated in September 1966 as a major economic control organ; responsible for eliminating waste, inefficiency, and irregularities in the far-flung production system; its mode of operation little known.

2 Responsible for ensuring financial discipline and supervising fiscal aspects of national economic plans.

——— Command line

———→ Provincial and county planning committees report to corresponding People's Committees and issue instructions to their administrative bureaus and divisions.

═══→ Party's policy direction and guidance.

Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Ch'onggam, 1945-1968* pp. 316-317.

Figure 9. North Korean economic planning and control system, 1968.

frontation with Russia, which had been developing as it advanced its own economic and political interests in Manchuria and Korea, exploded into the Russo-Japanese War. The war ended in 1905 with Russia's defeat and led eventually to Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Japanese investment in Korea was at first preponderantly in agriculture and mining. It was not until the 1920's that capital investment in industry began to rise. Industrial development was designed to support Japan's own heavy industry; raw materials and semifinished products were shipped to Japan for final processing and reexporting. Industrial locations were developed strategically along coastal areas for easy connection with the Japanese home islands. Transportation facilities, rail and port, were developed also throughout the country to serve Japanese needs.

Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 brought further subordination of the Korean economy to that of Japan. The Korean Peninsula served as the land bridge between Japan and Manchuria, and its material resources were also utilized for industrial development in southern Manchuria. The ascendancy of the Japanese military in the 1930's also brought on large capital outlays to develop Korea's war potential, especially in the northern half, which is richly endowed with iron and coal deposits and hydroelectric resources.

In 1940 the north's estimated share of heavy industry production was 86 percent of the total for Korea. By 1944 it was producing 92 percent of the total electric power, 88 percent of the fuel, 78 percent of the mineral output, 98 percent of the metallurgical output, and 82 percent of the chemical output.

At the end of World War II the north had a developed base for the industrialization of its economy. Its industrial installations included several iron and steel plants, nonferrous smelters, cement plants, an oil refinery, and the large chemical complex at Hŭngnam-Pon'gung. Other facilities included iron and coal mines and several large hydroelectric plants, especially the Sup'ung, Changjin, Pujŏn and Hŏch'ŏn stations. The north was deficient in light industry, as its share of the estimated value of all Korean light industry output in 1940 was only 26 percent, and in one important heavy industry sector, machine building, which had not been developed in Korea by the Japanese.

The Korean railroad system in 1945 was well developed. Although it was designed for the transshipment of goods between the Asian mainland and Japan, main lateral lines also connected the major industrial centers in the north.

Beginning of Socialist Transition

A deterioration of industrial and transportation facilities took place in the country as World War II was approaching its end. After the Soviet Union's entry into the war and its advance into northern Korea, industrial installations were severely damaged by the Japanese. Steel plants were made useless by allowing furnances to cool; factories were damaged through sabotage; and many mines were allowed to flood. In 1946 an economic plan was set up by the Communist regime of Kim Il-sung to restore the damaged plants and mines to operating condition. Extensive repairs combined with key reform measures effected that year laid the groundwork for Soviet-inspired economic plans that started in 1947.

Socialist reform measures, including the land redistribution program of March-April 1946 and the nationalization of Japanese-owned industries in August of that year, were intended to be gradual and did not aim at the immediate establishment of a full-fledged, State-controlled economy (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The private, small business sector was left untouched; its continuance was tolerated because, in official assessment, the people were not yet emotionally prepared for radical transformation. Restrictions against the private economy were gradually introduced. Producers' cooperatives, first organized in September 1947, began to absorb the private handicraft sector. For eventual socialization of agriculture, several state farms were first organized in 1948 as pilot projects.

One-year plans were developed for 1947 and 1948. The emphasis in both was on reconstruction and increased production of chemical fertilizers and raw materials, especially coal and metals, for export to the Soviet Union. The development of consumer goods industry was given minimal attention.

The Two-Year Plan drawn up for 1949–50 differed in intent from the previous plans; it sought to construct new factories and expand existing ones in order to pave the way for the development of an economy meeting the needs of both the Soviet Union and North Korea. In addition to technical assistance, a loan for the plan was pledged by the Soviet Union. This plan was interrupted in its second year by the Korean War. The total industrial output for the first year was claimed to have been 340 percent of the 1946 level, and the national income was said to have doubled.

POST-KOREAN WAR REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Economic gains from 1946 through 1949 were almost totally lost to North Korea as the result of the Korean conflict. Heavy

industrial establishments turning out pig iron, steel, electrical equipment, chemicals, chemical fertilizers, cement, and smelting works for lead and copper were reported completely destroyed. Power production in 1953 was 26 percent of the 1949 level; fuel, 11 percent; metallurgical output, 10 percent; and chemicals production, 22 percent. The value of gross industrial output in 1953 was only 64 percent of the 1949 amount.

Agriculture also declined during the war. Grain production fell to 2.3 million tons in 1953, a decrease of about 12 percent from the 1949 level. Private farming continued to dominate this sector, with individual peasants controlling 95 percent of the cultivated area and accounting for 92 percent of the total agricultural output.

Still another problem was an acute labor shortage. War casualties and migration to the Republic of Korea were estimated at about 2.1 million persons. One result was an influx of women into industry. In June 1950 women accounted for 16 percent of the labor force in State-owned industries; by June 1953 they constituted 35 percent (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force).

Rehabilitation Under the Three-Year Plan (1945–56)

The general outline for postwar recovery was announced in August 1953, only 10 days after the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Priority was assigned to the development of heavy industry; light industry and agriculture were to be developed simultaneously, but severe austerity was implied. Premier Kim Il-sung justified this plan on the basis that without heavy industry and a strong machine-building capacity his regime could not overcome the technical backwardness of the economy and eliminate other harmful forces inherited from the Japanese era. He was later challenged by some high Party officials who argued that the Premier's policy contradicted the Socialist principle of balanced economic development (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Postwar rehabilitation and development were carried out in three stages. A brief first stage, completed by the end of 1953, was to ensure the conditions necessary for the start of a rehabilitation plan in 1954. The second stage was the restoration of industry to the 1949 production level under the Three-Year Plan for the Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy (1954–56). This plan was adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly in April 1954 and made retroactive to January. The third stage, ". . . to lay the foundation of Socialist industrialization . . . " was scheduled to be inaugurated in 1957 under the Five-Year Plan (1957–61).

The Three-Year Plan was declared fulfilled in the industrial sector in 2 years and 8 months. Completion, however, failed to re-

store some important sectors of industry to the prewar level. In 1956 electric power generation was only 86 percent of the 1949 level; coal, 93 percent; and chemical fertilizers, 48.7 percent. Steel production was reported above both the 1949 and pre-1945 levels, but it lagged behind the demands of the expanding machine-building industry. The result was an imbalance among power, coal, and steel industries, a phenomenon still in evidence in 1968.

Investment in capital construction in 1954–56 was equivalent to about US $320 million, of which almost half went into industry. More than 80 percent of the investment in industry was in heavy industry. Large amounts, in particular, were invested in power, coal, machine building, metal, and chemical fertilizers. Other large amounts were put into the textile and building materials industries.

The gains made under the Three-Year Plan were attributed to the ". . . enormous economic and technical assistance rendered by the brother countries." In 1954 foreign aid constituted 33.4 percent of general State revenues. In 1955 it was 21.7 percent and in 1956, 16.5 percent. North Korea claims full credit for having made effective use of this aid and for having developed the capacity to launch the succeeding Five-Year Plan with its own funds. This claim was based on the policy of applying foreign aid mainly to the building of heavy industry. The explanation was that attainment of a self-supporting economy would never have been possible if the aid had been used to import consumer goods and if capital investment had been diverted to light industry.

One effect of the war destruction was the modernization of production equipment. Older, damaged Japanese-made machines were replaced by relatively modern equipment from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other Communist countries. The prewar emphasis on production of raw materials and semifinished goods was also corrected in the reconstruction process.

A major goal of the Three-Year Plan was to redistribute industry geographically to bring enterprises closer to raw materials and coal and to tap new resources. A start had been made during the war years on new industrial centers in Chagang-do and P'yŏngan-pukto. Efforts were concentrated on turning the Chagang region into a new machine-building industrial zone. Chagang, previously undeveloped, is a relatively more mountainous area in the northern interior. In exploiting the region's untapped industrial potential, its economic resources must have been given

due consideration, but it appeared also that the machine-building industry played a large part in the country's defense.

Major industrial installations inherited from the Japanese period, although generally in ruins at the end of the Korean war, still represented established bases upon which to rebuild new plants. The older industrial regions in Hamgyŏng-pukto, the Hŭngnam-Wŏnsan area, and in the western part of the country continued to be expanded as primary industrial regions.

The Three-Year Plan period witnessed a transformation in agriculture. At the end of the Korean conflict, damage to farms, lack of labor and draft animals, and pauperization of many peasants were serious problems for the regime. The perennial food problem, which was compounded by the war, required a radical corrective measure. Cooperativization was begun in 1953. To minimize the possibility of violent opposition from the peasantry, however, the Government was cautious at the outset. Nonetheless, by the end of 1954, nearly 32 percent of the farming families had joined cooperative farms, compared with only 1.2 percent in 1953. In the plan's final year, 81 percent of the farm families were in cooperatives.

Cultivated land in cooperatives increased proportionately under the program. The socialized area increased from 0.6 percent in 1953 to 31 percent in 1954 and to 80 percent in 1956. The number of cooperative farms increased from 806 in 1953 to 10,098 in 1954 and to 15,825 at the end of 1956.

In the Three-Year Plan period the socialization of private handicraft in industry and private commerce was also emphasized. Private enterprises and traders were under increasing pressure to join producers cooperatives (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade).

Development Under the Five-Year Plan (1957–61)

The Five-Year Plan is professed to have been formulated by North Korean planners without any foreign participation. Foreign aid, which had been a major factor in the previous plans, accounted for 12.2 percent of State revenues in 1957, but it dropped sharply to 4.5 percent in 1958 and was only 2.6 percent in 1960 (see ch. 23, Financial and Monetary System).

Its stated goals were to lay the foundation for Socialist industrialization through intensified technical innovations, to develop heavy industry, to solve the problem of shortages in food, clothing, and housing, and to complete the socialization of agriculture, private enterprises, and commerce. The Five-Year Plan was declared completed by the end of 1960, 1 year ahead of schedule.

The Government asserts that the 260 percent increase in the gross industrial output value projected for the plan period was actually achieved by the end of June 1959 and that plan targets for all major industries had been met by the end of 1960. The increase in the total value of industrial output from the 1956 level was said to be nearly 350 percent.

Between 1957 and 1960 the output of a majority of industrial products is said to have doubled and, in some cases, more than tripled. According to non-Communist information, however, actual achievements fell short of stated plan targets. Power generation in 1960 was 93.7 percent of the goal; steel production, 94 percent; rolled steel, 95.3 percent; chemical fertilizer, 85.4 percent; and production of tractors and automobiles, 90 percent and 90.3 percent, respectively.

The Government claimed impressive achievements in the output of consumer goods—an increase of 330 percent between 1957 and 1960. The increase was made possible partly by the extensive decentralization of light industry in June 1958 which permitted a more effective utilization of local resources and of the female labor force; the effectiveness of this program contributed to a sharp increase in the production of processed goods and daily necessities. A nationwide program to set up at least one local factory in each county and town was started. The program was pushed in great haste, although there was a shortage of technicians and of mangement skills. Poor planning also occurred, and some projects were abandoned partly completed. Nevertheless, within the year, over 1,000 local factories were reported built, using local funds almost exclusively.

The decentralization resulted in greater local responsibilities for planning and accounting, elimination of inefficiency and waste of resources, and better utilization of manpower. The new measure partly improved the balance in growth between agriculture and industry and between light and heavy industry. By the end of 1960 local industry was accounting for 33.9 percent of the gross industrial output as compared to 13.3 percent in 1956, and 39 percent of the total consumer goods production as compared to 18 percent in 1956. Its contribution to total State revenues also increased, from 9.2 percent in 1958 to more than 21 percent in 1960.

The transformation of agriculture begun in the Three-Year Plan was completed in August 1958; all farm households had been organized into "agricultural cooperatives," and all, including private garden plots, had been taken over by the cooperatives. After 1962 cooperatives were called cooperative farms (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Cooperativization of the agrarian sector was

preceded in June 1958 by the complete socialization of the remaining private enterprises and commerce (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade).

Technological reconstruction of agriculture, defined as the development of irrigation, electrification, and mechanization, was started under the Five-Year Plan to improve the food supply and to lessen the amount of food imports. Irrigation was stressed; between 1957 and 1960, 47.4 percent of the State investment for construction in agriculture went to irrigation works.

Electrification of rural areas was pushed to provide motive power for such tasks as water pumping, threshing, and fodder processing, as well as lighting, both to increase labor productivity and to substitute for labor drawn off for industry. Mechanization had the same aim but was slowed by the lack of advanced engineering industry. It was not until 1958 that tractors were first domestically produced.

The continued high concentration of effort on industrialization in 1957 and 1958 and labor shortages in rural areas led to the curtailment of the raw material supply for industry. By 1959 the expanding manufacturing sector was unable to secure the materials to keep operations at a high level, and a serious recession occurred.

To remedy the situation, investment in agriculture was boosted in 1959 to 13.2 percent of the State investment in productive construction; it had been 5.1 percent in 1957 and 7.9 percent in 1958. Industry's share was reduced to 49.9 percent, compared with 57.9 percent in 1957 and 54.6 percent in 1958. In 1960, 12.3 percent was invested in agriculture and 45.9 percent in industry.

Mechanization of agriculture was also speeded up. The problem of low productivity still limited agricultural production; however, in 1960 average labor productivity in agriculture was about half of that for the economy as a whole. As an incentive to spur production, the small private garden plots were returned to the peasants in 1960, and the peasants were permitted to sell their surplus produce through the peasant markets (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade).

In 1958 the Government launched a mass-production movement named after the legendary Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse—see Glossary) to accelerate construction, surpass production quotas, and better production time. The movement initially involved only factory workers but, as competition between work teams developed, its scope was enlarged to encompass all sectors of the economy.

In addition to a speedup in work tempo, this continuing movement has the stated aim of encouraging innovation by the worker

and developing new ideas or better methods at all levels and in all areas of operation. It is directed also at eradicating the widespread feeling that machines are mysterious.

It is difficult to assess in either absolute or relative terms the cumulative effect of this movement upon economic development in North Korea. There is little doubt that it contributed materially to the attainment of many production goals toward the end of the Five-Year Plan, especially in heavy industry.

The stimulation of innovation by the Ch'ŏllima movement is of considerable significance. Inventions and innovations submitted for consideration in industry rose from 22,300 in 1957, the year before the start of the movement, to more than 53,400 in 1960 and to over 60,000 in 1961. In 1965 more than 100,000 creative suggestions were reportedly introduced in production and construction. The great value attached to the Ch'ŏllima movement is clear from the continuous emphasis given to it by all domestic propaganda media and from the repeated reference to it in statements by the Party leadership.

THE ECONOMY UNDER THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN (1961–67)

The economy by the end of the Five-Year Plan is said to have been advanced from an agricultural-industrial one to the industrial-agricultural type. During 1957–60, a restructuring of industry had occurred, new construction had been carried out, and general industrial recovery to the pre-World War II level had been reached. With the start of the Seven-Year Plan in 1961 North Korea began a program aimed at full-fledged industrialization. The plan was intended to transform the economy from the industrial-agricultural type to a fully socialist industrial one.

The new plan continued the previous policy of developing light industries and agriculture, while guaranteeing the priority increase and expansion of the heavy industries, and the overall development of sciences and culture. Priority development of heavy industry was reaffirmed, but planning authorities acknowledged that serious structural imbalances in 1961 required modification. They divided the Seven-Year Plan into two stages, 1961–63 and 1964–67. In the first stage, a radical improvement of the standard of living and an overall technical innovation were envisaged. These twin goals were to be achieved by developing light industry and agriculture, by raising the technical level of all workers and the number of scientists and technicians, and by making more effective use of heavy industry. In the latter half of the plan period, a further expansion of the heavy industry sector was to be resumed.

The total State capital investment in the Seven-Year Plan was set at 7 billion wŏn (about U.S. $2.8 billion). Additional construction by the cooperative farms was projected at about 800 million wŏn (about U.S. $320 million). In the first 3 years investment would go mainly into chemical and light industries, fishing and agriculture, and the machine-building industry. In the latter 4 years the emphasis was on coal, power mining, metal, machine building, chemical and "other key industries." Fifty-eight percent of the total State capital investment was earmarked for industrial construction; 75 percent of this was to go into heavy industry and 25 percent into light industry.

Goals and Assumptions

The Seven-Year Plan projected an increase in the gross value of industrial production between 1961 and 1967 of roughly 320 percent over the 1960 level. Production of producer goods was to rise 320 percent and consumer goods, 310 percent. The average annual increase in gross industrial output value was expected to be 18 percent.

Among the major industrial targets, first priority was given to the expansion of electric power and coal output; thermal power generation was to be increased from 4.6 to 32 percent of the total output, to offset periodic problems in industrial production created by the drop of hydroelectric power generation during the dry season.

A rapid increase in coal production was considered vital, the output at the beginning of the plan being insufficient for any further industrial development. A 2-million ton annual capacity oil refinery was also included, to be built with Soviet assistance. The first stage, with a capacity of 1 million tons, was to be completed in 1967.

Also considered important was the establishment of a metallurgical combine, to have an annual capacity of 3 million tons of steel when completed in 1970. The Kimch'aek Iron Works was selected as the base for the combine, the production level of which was to reach 1.8 million tons in 1967.

Emphasis was to be continued during the plan period on increasing the output of local industry, the output value of which was expected to rise 320 percent over the 1960 level. In particular, efforts would be made to meet the growing demands for processed foods caused by the increased employment of women in industry and in fulltime farmwork and a consequent reduction in the home output of staple foodstuffs. An active campaign was to be waged to enlist dependent family members in home work teams to pro-

duce daily necessities, the total production of which was to be increased 420 percent.

The Seven-Year Plan was predicated in part on continued economic aid from the Soviet Union and Communist China. Failure to secure expected aid, therefore, adversely affected the implementation of the plan. North Korea has indicated that, at least in the early stages of the plan, it anticipated substantially more aid from the Soviet Union, which supplied only $56 million between 1961 and 1965. Aid deliveries were $1.23 million in 1961, and they increased each year until a high of $18.7 million was reached in 1964; the total dropped to $13.15 million in 1965. A loan of unstated size was also made to North Korea in July 1961. In each of the 5 years, however, Soviet aid represented only a fraction of North Korea's total State revenues. From 1961 through 1964 Communist China supplied a loan of $150 million.

There were two reasons for the failure to receive adequate Soviet assistance: the Soviet disagreement with the North Korean goal of economic independence and the Sino-Soviet conflict. There is evidence that the Soviet Union Government objected to North Korea's Five-Year Plan because it emphasized heavy industry. This divergence in outlook became more pronounced in 1960, when Premier Kim Il-sung's next long-range industrial development plan was under consideration. At that time the proclaimed objectives of the Soviet-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance included the coordination of new output plans for 1961–65 for the Socialist nations of Eastern Europe and measures by which raw materials, fuel, power, capital construction, and transportation of the Socialist nations could be more effectively mobilized. North Korea was not a member of the council, but North Korean public statements in October 1963 hinted that it was under Soviet pressure to cooperate with the council's goals.

The Sino-Soviet dispute also compounded North Korean difficulties. Premier Kim's strong position on the autonomous development of industrial Socialist countries, and disagreement with "revisionist" policies of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, led in 1962–64 to the support of Communist China and an open attack on the Soviet concept of an "integrated economy" of the Socialist nations (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Shortage of funds and the overly ambitious targets set by planners who were impressed by the high rates of growth achieved under the previous plans concerned the Government in the early 1960's. Official claims showed general advances in production for 1962 and 1963, although there were some reverses and decreases. Reported totals were uneven for 1964 and incomplete for 1965,

perhaps because targets were not met, or perhaps because resources were diverted to defense and armament production.

As a result, the completion date for the first stage of the Seven-Year Plan had to be extended to 1964. The annual growth rate for 1961–65 was reported at 14.3 percent against the projected annual rate of 18 percent. The growth gap was caused by the delay of progress on projects for which Soviet assistance had been expected. These projects included the expansion of the Kimch'aek Iron Works, construction of thermal powerplants at Pyongyang and Pukch'ang, construction of a 2-million ton capacity oil refinery, provision of financial aid and technical assistance for metallurgical and extractive industries, and provision of technical aid for fabric production.

Extension of the Seven-Year Plan

After the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964 and Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin's visit to Pyongyang in February 1965, official relations between the two countries improved steadily (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). In March 1965 *Pravda* reported that the Soviet Union was giving North Korea the "necessary means" for the continued growth of its economy. Nevertheless, at the end of 1965 the Soviet infusion of aid failed to overcome the wide gap between the plan targets and accomplishments.

Indications in 1968 were that the production of key items in 1965–66 lagged behind the original plan targets. In 1965 the output of iron ore was 70.4 percent of the year's goal; steel products and marine products were 63 percent and 77.4 percent, respectively, of the target. In 1966 power generation was 73.5 percent of the target; coal, 87 percent; pig iron, 68.5 percent; steel, 59.1 percent; textiles, 79.5 percent; and grains, 68.5 percent.

In April 1966 the regime announced the intention of convening a Party Conference in October 1966. At the Party Conference First Deputy Premier Kim Il announced that the time limit for fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan would be extended to 1970. The stated reason was the need to divert more resources and manpower to strengthening national defense capabilities. Strategic measures already taken for defense and the building up of a stockpile of materials and supplies were also cited as contributory factor (see ch. 24, The Armed Forces).

The new emphasis on defense was not the sole determinant, however. The failure of agriculture to make any substantial increase in the slow rate of industrial growth in the early part of the plan had indicated as early as 1964 that the major targets would not be reached by 1967.

Inefficiency in resource allocation, waste in production, and what the Govenrment calls "departmentalism" (bureaucratic indifference) were among other probable reasons. Specific instances of these problems are rarely cited by the authorities, but their persistence is implied in repeated exhortations to achieve more efficient allocation of manpower, materials, and facilities; reduction of material consumption; and elimination of hoarding. In his report to the Party Conference of October 1966, Deputy Premier Kim Il alluded to the existence of these problems.

Information concerning accomplishments is fragmentary. The industrial growth rate for 1967 has been reported at 17 percent against an expected rate of 12.8 percent for the year. The projected rate for 1968 was 24 percent above the 1967 level. Progress toward meeting major targets by the end of 1970 has been reported, indicating that the production of coal, chemical fertilizer, major nonferrous metals, and timber will reach the goal by the end of 1968.

CHAPTER 18
AGRICULTURE

The Government has completed the collectivization of farm production through a system of some 3,800 cooperatives. The cooperatives are not limited to the rural economy but embrace all sectors of North Korean society and represent the basic unit of political control (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups). In addition to heavy investment by the ruling Korean Workers Party in fertilizer production, land reclamation and irrigation projects, coercive methods have been a major factor in the improvement in agricultural production. Availability of tractors, motor-driven plows, and other modern equipment, and a successful program of rural electrification are additional constructive innovations. Large inputs of foreign aid from the Soviet Union and Communist China immediately following the Korean war also contributed to prompt rehabilitation of the agricultural sector which, like North Korea's industrial plant, had been massively disrupted.

Since 1962 particular attention has been given to improving the livelihood of the farm population. This action may represent official concern over peasant aggressiveness in demanding an increased share of material benefits in return for their labor (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

In the drive for food self-sufficiency, a major policy objective of the Communist regime, special attention has been given to increasing the production of cereals. As in the Republic of Korea, rice is the major crop. The principal rice growing areas are in the river plains and reclaimed tidal lands, particularly in the western provinces of P'yŏngan-pukto and P'yŏngan-namdo, in Hwanghae-pukto and Hwanghae-namdo, and in the western half of Kangwŏn-do.

Wheat, corn, and grain sorghums are extensively cultivated in upland areas where the growing seasons permit. Cotton, tobacco, potatoes and other vegetables, and fruits are also grown in areas unsuitable for rice cultivation.

In 1968 only about 20 percent of the land was arable. The country's terrain is generally rugged and hilly, and intensive labor has always been the lot of the North Korean peasant.

Timber (larch, spruce, pine) is a major resource, although the forests were seriously depleted during the Japanese occupation. The current long-range economic development plan provides for intensive programs to restore the forests, as well as to rehabilitate the once-flourishing fisheries industry.

Official production data on grain and other agricultural products are seldom published except in terms of percentage increases. The regime has claimed annual grain production of approximately 5 million tons during the 1960's, a level that would provide a rate of per capita output about one-third higher than that of the pre-World War II period. The grain production target of the current plan has been variously reported as 5 to 7 million tons.

The north has imported grain in recent years (347,000 tons of wheat in 1966), continues to ration it, and has made only sporadic and minor rice exports to the Soviet Union and Communist China. This places in question official claims regarding production and self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, grain production of 5 to 7 millions tons annually would not appear impossible if the regime continued its concentrated efforts in land reclamation, mechanization, chemical fertilization, and regimentation of the rural population, and implemented a program to augment rural manpower by 200,000 persons (as announced in 1964). This program apparently reflects the Government's concern regarding recurrent labor shortages in the agricultural sector (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force). Students, white-collar workers, and women are actively recruited during peak planting and harvesting seasons.

According to the most recent sources, as of October 1963, 42.8 percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture (including forestry and fisheries), as compared with 75 percent in 1946. In 1963 agriculture's contribution to the gross national product was 19.3 percent; it was 72 percent in 1946. This sharp decrease reflects the customary socialistic emphasis upon industrialization at the expense of agriculture.

Agriculture's disproportionately small contribution to the gross national product reveals shortcomings in labor productivity. This situation casts doubt upon official data which regularly purport to show impressive gains in agricultural production. The imbalance between the rural and urban communities is acknowledged by spokesmen of the regime, and the correction of this situation was a primary objective of the Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67).

BACKGROUND

Although the economy of North Korea before World War II had been predominantly agricultural, the northern half of the

Korean Peninsula was dependent upon the southern half for much of its food. The north produced about 35 percent of the Peninsula's total food output, but only about 12 percent of the northern labor force was engaged in nonagricultural industry which, for the most part, consisted of mining and semifinished manufacturing. Ores and manufactures were taken to Japan for processing and finishing. The artificial division of the Peninsula in 1945 at the 38th Parallel caused serious food shortages in the north, which were compounded by the Soviet occupiers' drive for industrialization (see ch. 19, Industry).

Japanese policy between 1910 and 1945 was to increase Korean agricultural production for the benefit of Japan. In order to introduce Western agricultural techniques and to insure maximum collection of harvests, the Japanese built large estates owned by their development companies. Smaller holdings were assigned to farmers from overpopulated Japan.

By 1938, 80 percent of the Korean peasants were tenants of the Japanese. The percentage of tenancy was greater in the south than in the north. Under the tenancy system, as much as 50 percent of the crop was paid in rent. In addition, the average tenant was often in debt to the landlord and was required to pay high interest. Frequently he had to sell his crop unharvested in the field for what the landlord would pay.

Nearly two-thirds of all farm households cultivated less than 2.4 acres each, and half the plots were smaller than 1.2 acres. In areas where intensive cultivation and double cropping were practiced, an average of 3.6 acres was considered adequate to support a family, but in the infertile upland areas a holding of 7.4 acres was considered desirable for a family. The average holding per farm family was above the Japanese average, but lower soil productivity, lack of subsidiary occupations, and few opportunities for alternative employment kept the Korean peasants in poverty.

The Japanese introduced row planting for rice, new rice varieties, modern farm tools, and commercial fertilizer. Plants for manufacturing commercial fertilizers were set up at Hŭngnam and, by 1945, they were producing 95 percent of the amount used in the country.

The resulting increase in agricultural productivity was siphoned off to Japan. Between one-third and one-half of the annual rice crop was exported, leaving inadequate supplies to meet Korean needs and causing a marked decrease in Korean rice consumption. The Japanese imported coarse millet from Manchuria, which, with domestic barley and wheat, constituted the basic diet of the Koreans. For reasons of taste as well as status, however, rice was the preferred food, along with meat.

While Japan invested heavily in installations and equipment designed to increase Korean agricultural productivity, the pressure of its own domestic requirements and, finally, preparations for and participation in war led to many uneconomic practices. Under the program of "cotton in the north, rice in the south," specialization of production was fostered at the expense of a diversified agriculture. Moreover, during the latter part of the occupation, reforestation and conservation efforts failed to keep pace with extensive cutting. Livestock raising was not actively sponsored by the Japanese.

Before 1945 Korean fish consumption also decreased. The Japanese introduced modern fishing equipment, including power-driven vessels, but most of the catch went to Japan. During World War II the vessels were not maintained and, when the Japanese left in 1945, they took many of the better ones with them.

CLIMATE AND SOIL

North Korea is a mountainous land with warm, humid summers of relatively short duration and cold, dry winters which, in the northernmost provinces, last for as long as 5 months. The climate, frequently compared with that of the northeastern United States, varies markedly according to the elevation. In some coastal regions, particularly in the eastern areas bordering the Sea of Japan, temperatures are ameliorated by ocean currents. In most sections as much as half the average yearly rainfall (upwards of 30 inches) occurs from June to August, a situation which is advantageous to rice paddy culture, provided that reservoirs, dams, dikes, or other means are available for water conservation and flood control (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

Arable land was estimated in 1968 to be 20 percent of the total area, as compared with only 15 percent in 1964. This expansion apparently has been accomplished through the regime's land improvement efforts, including irrigation projects and programs to bring new land into production by reclaiming land from the sea, hillsides, and former wastelands. The alluvial nature of the soil is not, however, conducive to high agricultural productivity without intensive labor, large inputs of chemical fertilizers, and controlled irrigation. The top soil is thin and poor, and the land in general is deficient in plant nutrients and organic matter.

The forests, which cover about 70 percent of the total area, are largely coniferous, with spruce, pine, and fir predominating, although a wide variety of trees and plantlife exists. The forests were seriously depleted in the late years of the Japanese occupation, but concentrated efforts in reforestation appear to have

achieved some success in restoring this natural resource. In recent years modest amounts of timber have been listed sporadically among North Korea's exports.

From 1946 to 1963, 317,000 acres of unproductive land were brought into cultivation, an increase of 7 percent, a rate that has accelerated greatly in more recent years, according to official reports (see table 23). The proportion occupied by rice paddies rose from 21 percent in 1946 to 29 percent in 1963 and reportedly reached 32.3 percent in the following year. Land devoted to vegetables and other dryland farming declined proportionately.

Table 23. Utilization of Arable Land in North Korea, Selected Years, 1946–63

	1946	1956	1960	1963
Total arable land (1,000 acres)	4,577	4,653	4,687	4,894
Percentage distribution:				
Paddy land	20.9	25.9	26.7	29.2
Dry land	79.1	74.1	73.3	70.8
Total arable land	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Adapted from *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68*, p. 838.

COOPERATIVIZATION AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

"Cooperativization" is the term the Government uses for the control and collectivization of agriculture. Cooperativization of all farm households was completed by August 1958. The drive to collectivize the land, undertaken in the aftermath of the Korean war, served the purpose of maintaining political and economic control. It was also an efficient method of ensuring grain collection, since the regime was able to deal with larger units instead of with individual peasants.

The program of collectivization had been preceded by a land reform program instituted by the Soviet Army occupation forces in 1946. By a decree of March 5, 1946, over 2.5 million acres of land, more than half the total farmland, were confiscated without compensation from former Japanese owners, religious organizations, Korean owners of large holdings, or others judged to be "traitors" (collaborators or sympathizers with the Japanese). The land was distributed to 750,000 farm households whose ownership was restricted by prohibitions against disposal of the land by sale, rental, or mortgage. The devastation of the Korean war, which resulted in the death or flight of an estimated 50,000 farm

families and severe damage to at least one-fourth of the total arable land, invited governmental financial and other assistance which quickly resulted in State control.

The cooperatives represent the basic unit of society through which political and economic control is exercised by the State (see fig. 10). Production quotas are assigned and other controls are administered by management committees at the provincial level, which are, in turn, supervised by agrotechnicians appointed by the Central Government. Individual peasants are organized into work brigades or teams which receive daily orders. Through the cooperatives the people are instructed as to what to sow, the amount and type of fertilizers to use, the yield that is expected, and its disposal. Virtually no decisions are left to the individual. Peasants often are called upon to volunteer for special projects, such as road repair, school construction, and other public works, in addition to the regular work on the cooperative. A part of each day is given to inspirational lectures and other indoctrination activities.

The peasant is paid both in kind and cash, in accordance with the amount of labor he contributed to the cooperative. Before paying its members a cooperative must meet its quota deliveries to the Government—a system by which the Government is able to maintain close control over rural income and consumption. Since grain may be marketed only through State-operated stores, Government control is virtually complete over such crucial features of North Korean economic life as the production, pricing, and distribution of grain.

In deference to the peasant's traditional attachment to the land and in order to enlist maximum support for the regime's endeavors, each farm family has been allowed to maintain, since 1960, a small vegetable plot, fruit trees, chickens, or bees in the farmyard. In 1960 the Government also initiated a measure designed to eliminate in stages the agricultural taxes-in-kind being paid by the cooperative farms. The announced purpose of this measure was to improve the cultural and living standards of the rural population. In April 1966 it was officially announced that the taxes-in-kind system had been completely abolished by the end of 1965 (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

The amalgamation and consolidation of numerous small farm cooperatives into one cooperative at each *ri* (village) level took place between August and October 1958. By the end of October the total number of cooperatives had been reduced from 16,032 to 3,843; as of 1960 the number was further reduced to 3,736. Under the new organization the average cooperative in 1960 comprised about 300 farm families responsible for, on the average,



Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Ch'onggam, 1945-1968* pp. 316-317, 341-342.

Figure 10. Organization of farm cooperatives in North Korea, 1965.

1,147 acres; this compares with an average of 64 families cultivating 257 acres before 1958 (see table 24).

Table 24. Selected Data on North Korea Farm Cooperatives

	1957	1958	1960
Number of cooperatives	16,032	3,843	3,736
Total number of households in cooperatives (1,000 households)	1,025	1,055	1,111
Farm households per cooperative	63.9	274.5	297.4
Percent of total population in cooperatives	40.0	49.9	44.4
Area cultivated by cooperatives (1,000 acres)	4,126	4,388	4,383
Cultivated area per cooperative (acres)	257	1,142	1,147

Source: Adapted from *Korea: Patterns of Economic Development*, Joseph S. Chung (ed.), p. 62.

By Cabinet decision in December 1961, a Cooperative Farm Management Committee was established in each *kun* (county) in order to maintain tighter control over the enlarged cooperatives. Each county committee reported to its Provincial Rural Management Committee and was responsible ultimately to the Cooperative Farm Management-Guidance Bureau of the Agriculture Commission in Pyongyang. It also coordinated its activities with the County People's Committee as well as the County Planning Committee (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy).

The county management committees are comprised of agricultural and technical experts; directors of county-level agricultural, fisheries, and forestry organizations, and the credit cooperatives; and the chairmen of the village cooperative farms. The highly trained technicians of the *kun* committees work directly with the foremen of the cooperative work brigades in minutely planned monthly work schedules. They serve as liaison between the cooperatives and the machine-tractor stations, planning and directing seed selection and fertilizer application and implementing maintenance, construction projects, and credit requirements. The management committees also exercise control over the accounting procedures dealing with labor reports and harvesting records, upon which the remuneration of the cooperative and of the individual peasant is dependent.

The *kun* committees are thus charged with guiding and controlling all aspects of the work of the *ri* cooperatives, and represent the channel of communication between the rural and urban communities. The management committees are not restricted to

farm production matters; their leaders are authorized to guide all technical, economic, ideological, and cultural activities of the rural population.

Following the Soviet pattern, there are state farms on which the workers receive a wage, do not share in the profit, but may have the right to maintain a small garden plot. The state farms are regarded by the Government as a system of production more advanced than that of the cooperative farms (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups). They operate as model farms, experimenting with new techniques and disseminating the results of their research among the cooperative farms. Livestock husbandry also is primarily conducted on the state farms. At the end of the Korean war, there were 27 state farms under the jurisdiction of the Central Government and 118 subordinated to provincial authorities. By the end of 1962 official reports indicated that the central authorities operated 31 state farms, including livestock farms and orchards, and the provincial governments, 151. By the end of 1964 the Central Committee had also established 163 machine-tractor stations throughout the country.

There has been a trend toward consolidation and enlargement of state farms; in 1960 the average state farm encompassed 730 chŏngbo (1 chŏngbo equals 2.45 acres), compared with less than 500 chŏngbo for the average cooperative farm. Although this trend could be expected to continue in accordance with the Socialist pattern, according to the latest information available, in 1960 the state farms covered only 6 percent of the total cultivated land and contributed about 16 percent of the total production. Some students of North Korea believe that rapid development of the state farm system will continue to be inhibited by the peasants' lack of enthusiasm; in 1968 there was no firm indication of any official measure designed to transform the cooperative farms into state farms.

FARM PRODUCTION

The Government claimed to have produced 5 million tons of grain during 1962, as compared with an annual average of 3.6 million tons during 1958–60. In ensuing years annual average grain production of about 5 million tons has been proclaimed; the 7-year plan target, originally set at 7 million tons, was later changed to 6.6 million tons, and has more recently been designated as from 5 to 7 million tons. No complete breakdown was made available among the various grains produced, but the traditional pattern suggests the ranking order as rice, corn, millet, barley, and wheat. In the early 1960's wheat production amounted

to only 85,000 tons, but the crop was important because of its utility in making soy sauce and other dietary staples. In 1964 per capita output of grain in North Korea was estimated at 430 kilograms (1 kilogram equals 2.2046 pounds) (see table 25).

Table 25. Selected Agricultural Production Data, 1957–70

Commodity	1957	1962	1965	1970 (Plan Target)
Rice[1]	1,593	1,900	2,500	n.a.[2]
Other grain	1,677	2,500	2,000	n.a.
Total	3,260	4,400	4,500	5,000–7,000
Livestock:[3]				
Cattle	694	820	690	n.a.
Hogs	n.a.	1,400	1,200	n.a.
Sheep	n.a.	123	151	n.a.
Chickens[4]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Horses	25	25	25	n.a.
Fish and other marine products	564	840	785	1,200
Lumber[5]	1,000	1,581	1,670	n.a.

[1] 1,000 metric tons.

[2] n.a.—not available.

[3] 1,000 head.

[4] 1965 estimate: 1,000 per poultry farm worker.

[5] Cubic kilometers.

Source: Adapted from *Korea: Patterns of Economic Development*, Joseph S. Chung (ed.), *FAO Production Yearbook* (1966); and various North Korean sources.

Sizable quantities of wheat are imported from Communist countries, as well as from France, Greece, Australia, and other free-world countries, belying Government claims of food self-sufficiency. In 1966 wheat imports totaled 347,000 metric tons. On the other hand, modest quantities of rice have been exported to the Soviet Union and Communist China in recent bumper crop years. Fish and other marine products are regularly exported, mainly to Hong Kong; in 1966 such exports were valued at $1.7 million. Food exports may reflect trade and political considerations and exigencies, rather than real surpluses in the domestic market (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

Vegetables, especially sweet potatoes and soybeans, are widely grown and are in sufficient supply to provide an estimated per capita annual consumption of 300 to 350 kilograms.

The regime has been giving special attention to fruit production—orchard areas increased by 60 percent between 1961 and

1966—as well as to such industrial crops as tobacco, cotton, flax, and rape. The timber cut is estimated to have increased by 67 percent in 1965, as compared with 1957. In spite of greatly accelerated domestic demands for lumber, modest quantities are being exported (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

The agricultural sector has made substantial gains. Although official claims and plans for a sustained annual agricultural increase of 10 to 12 percent are generally regarded as exaggerated or overoptimistic, available data and information (admittedly incomplete and not fully confirmable) bear out an annual increase of 7 to 8 percent during 1953–64.

Heavy Government investment in fertilizer production, mechanization, irrigation, land reclamation and electric power has contributed to impressive gains in agricultural production. There are indications, however, that a point of diminishing returns may have been reached; for example, grain production, of central importance in agriculture, appears to have stabilized since 1961 at about 4.5 million tons.

There are natural limitations to the amount of unproductive land that can be reclaimed for agriculture, regardless of investment and effort. In 1964 the regime announced plans to expand the ricegrowing area from 624,000 hectares (1 hectare equals 2.471 acres) to 700,000 hectares by the end of 1967. The success of this program has not been confirmed, although progressive victories are annually announced; 18,000 hectares were allegedly added to the ricegrowing area during 1965.

Much credit for economic advance, particularly in agriculture, is attributed by the regime to the Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse) movement (see Glossary). The title is based on a legendary story of a Chinese horse able to leap 1,000 *ri* (257 miles) in a single stride. A 15-day working visit by Kim Il-sung to Ch'ŏngsan-ni in February 1960 was officially said to demonstrate that productivity could be increased when Party cadres and Government officials led workers and peasants personally at the lower production levels. All workers and peasants have been urged to maximize their efforts through Ch'ŏllima work brigades as tangible proof of patriotism. In addition, the regime devised a complicated system of competition designed to insure discipline, to intensify ideological indoctrination, and to induce cooperation through awards and penalties. The system also recognized the necessity for satisfying basic human needs, resulting in increased emphasis on living conditions and increased consumer goods production, at least in the beginning years of the 7-year plan commencing in 1961 (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

TECHNICAL ADVANCES

Mechanization

Since the complete cooperativization of farming by August 1958 and especially since the consolidation of the cooperatives into larger units in October 1958, important strides have been made in the mechanization of agriculture. The growing labor requirements of the industrial sector, resulting in a reduction in rural manpower, also spurred farm mechanization.

The state farms are highly mechanized and, in 1961, were reported to own 17 percent of the total agricultural machine motive power, including tractors, trucks, and other automotive vehicles and electric motors and generators. About half the total motive power was owned by the farm cooperatives, and the remaining third was made available to the cooperatives from the state machine-tractor stations. The State-operated stations, 163 in 1964, controlled over three-fourths of the tractors which, according to official sources, numbered about 21,800 (in terms of 15-horsepower units) at the end of 1965. Other large machines for planting and harvesting, as well as for technical assistance, are supplied to the cooperatives on a reimbursable basis through these stations. The tractor stations apparently perform an important role of linking rural and urban communities and the cooperatives and the Central Government.

In 1965 tractors were available at the rate of slightly over one per 100 hectares; in 1958 the ratio was 0.14 to 100. About 40 percent of the motive power utilized on cooperative farms was still provided by draft animals, as compared with only 13 percent on the State-operated farms.

A target of the 7-year plan is to provide 70,000 15-horsepower tractors, as well as trucks and other farm machines in large quantities by the end of 1970 (see ch. 19, Industry).

Fertilizers

The major fertilizer plant at Hŭngnam was destroyed during the Korean war, and reconstruction, apparently with Soviet assistance, was completed in 1956. Inorganic fertilizer production received high priority in the 3-year plan (1954–56), and 1956 production reportedly was 195,000 tons. In the course of cooperativization the Government used fertilizer distribution as a lever to encourage individual peasants to join the cooperatives. By 1962 North Korea had been an exporter of fertilizer, having produced 779,000 tons, of which about 630,000 tons were delivered to rural areas.

According to official sources, 300 kilograms of chemical fertilizers were available in 1965 for every hectare of farmland. At the Hŭngnam plant a project was underway in 1967 for the gasification of anthracite coal for use in the production of synthetic ammonia; completion of the project was expected to boost the production of chemical fertilizers, which is said to have reached over 950,000 metric tons in 1965. The regime hoped to produce 1.7 million tons by 1970.

Rural Electrification

The country's rushing mountain streams provide great potential for hydroelectric power, which was substantially developed during the Japanese colonial period. Power generation was expanded from 5.1 billion kilowatt-hours in 1956 to 13 billion kilowatt-hours in 1965; the goal of 17 billion kilowatt-hours was envisioned by the end of 1970.

A plentiful supply of electric power has made possible extensive systems of irrigation which, in 1965, were reported to cover 20,000 to 30,000 kilometers of channels controlled by 1,200 reservoirs and 10,000 pumping stations. Irrigation was asserted to be available to over 650,000 hectares of paddy fields. In October 1966 First Deputy Premier Kim-Il claimed that electricity was supplied to 96 percent of the rural villages and to 81.3 percent of all farmhouses.

FISHERIES

Concentrated on the east coast, fisheries are one of the greatest potential sources of food and foreign exchange; the east coast in the mid-1960's accounted for nearly 80 percent of the total marine products. During the Korean war, the fishing industry had been almost totally destroyed; by 1956, however, the production of fish and other marine products had surpassed the level that existed before 1950 by nearly 10 percent. Recovery was aided mainly by the Soviet Union, which helped to build a modern canning factory at Sinp'o on the east coast with an annual capacity of 4,000 tons.

Marine production of 785,000 metric tons was reported for 1965, of which the fish catch was estimated to be 600,000 tons. The 7-year plan projected a target of 1.2 million tons for 1967. The 1965 production figure represented a decrease of 55,000 tons from the 1962 level; the decline was attributable, in part, to Soviet reduction in aid for fishing industries, beginning in 1963.

Under the earlier 5-year plan (1957–61), Tasa-do Island, in the estuary of the Yalu River, was to become a west coast center for deep-sea fishing. The project was completed in 1961 with the

construction of harbor facilities, salting installations, refrigeration plants, and ship-repair shops. Salt fields, important for fish preservation, are located on the west coast. A Japanese source indicated in February 1968 that North Korea was building, in 1967, a 3,700-ton refrigeration ship.

Since the surrounding waters abound in a wide variety of species, such as mackerel, anchovy, tuna, and pollack, as well as crustaceans and edible seaweed, it may be that fishing operations are largely confined to nearby waters. The development of deep-sea fishing, as envisaged in the 7-year plan, was delayed, apparently because of financial limitations compounded by the sharply reduced Soviet aid. It was not until 1964 that the regime could initiate serious efforts in that direction. In January 1965 North Korea purchased an 8,000-ton refrigeration-processing vessel from the Netherlands.

Addressing the Central Committee Plenum on April 22, 1968, First Deputy Premier Kim-Il stressed the need for fishing boats of 3,500 tons and more, and stated that a prototype of a 3,000-horsepower ship would be constructed to serve as a model for production the following year.

In 1966 North Korea exported fish and fish preparations valued at $1.7 million to free-world countries, principally Hong Kong. Some were exported to Communist China (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

LIVESTOCK

North Korean agriculture is not conducive to a flourishing livestock economy. The scarce plains and flatland areas are more economically utilized in grain and other food production for human consumption, and the steep and largely barren hills are unsuitable for large-scale grazing. With human food requirements so pressing, the raising of large quantities of feed grains and other animal feedstuffs has not been given high priority.

Despite Government claims of significant advances in livestock husbandry, in the interest of improving the nutritional levels of the populace, available data indicate that progress has been negligible. Fish continues to provide the main source of protein in the diet; for the average citizen, meat is consumed only on special occasions, such as weddings and funerals, in accordance with time-honored custom.

According to estimates of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 1965 meat production was 20,000 metric tons, which would provide less than 4 pounds per capita annual consumption. The same source estimates that milk production in recent years has been only 54,000 metric tons.

FORESTRY

Forests have been and remain a major natural resource. At least 70 percent of the total land area is mountainous, with an estimated 148,800 cubic kilometers of timber, or 62 percent of the total on the Peninsula (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

The forests are similar to those in Manchuria and mainland China and produce a wide variety of trees and plantlife. Predominant trees are larch, oak, alder, and the coniferous species such as pine, spruce, and fir.

Despite severe overcutting during the late years of the Japanese colonial period, the growth since 1945 has been large, and timber appears sporadically as an export commodity despite heavy domestic demands for construction. The Government began, in 1959, special conservation and reforestation efforts; in December 1960 a separate Ministry of Forestry was created and, in 1964, forestry bureaus were established at provincial levels. Hyesan, on the Yalu River deep in the northern interior, served as the center of conservation efforts, reportedly with several airplanes adapted for fire control and spraying pesticide.

CHAPTER 19
INDUSTRY

In 1968, industry had been completely socialized for 10 years, in parallel with the collectivization of agriculture (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Private enterprise, which had been of only minor importance after the nationalization measure of 1946, had disappeared from the economic scene by the end of 1958 (see ch. 21, Domestic Trade).

The industrial sector was organized into the State-owned enterprises and producers' cooperatives, the latter being confined largely to handicrafts, marine processing, and other small-scale operations. According to a 1964 Communist source, the State enterprises as of 1963 accounted for 91.2 percent of gross industrial output, and the cooperatives contributed the remainder. The industrial sector as a whole accounted for about 62 percent of the gross national product, as compared with 23 percent in 1946. It also employed approximately 42 percent of the labor force, in contrast to only 12 percent in 1946 (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force).

The industrial development has been facilitated, apart from the customary Communist emphasis on heavy industry at the expense of agriculture, by the Government's effective utilization of substantial aid from other Communist countries and its rich endowment of minerals and other natural resources, and by its rigid control of the labor force through rewards and punishments. In addition, the country has been free from the severe population pressures which afflict many other developing nations. The shortage of skilled labor, although a present problem, may facilitate technological advances, including automation, that could have beneficent impact upon the economy in the long term (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force). Indications in 1968 were that the regime was receptive to innovation.

Intensive stress on industrialization, particularly heavy industry, brought about imbalances in the economy which the Government was forced to recognize at the beginning of the Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67), which was extended to 1970. Hence, during the first 4 years of the plan, greater attention was paid to agriculture and consumer goods than had

originally been planned. As a result, industrial growth, although substantial, lagged behind the planned targets in most sectors. The overall annual industrial growth rate was claimed to be 14.7 percent during 1961–64. For achievement of planned goals by 1967, an unprecedentedly high annual increase of 23 percent would have been necessary during 1965–67. The Government announced an actual gain of 17 percent for 1967 and predicted an increase of 24 percent for 1968.

Since about 1965, North Korea has ceased to publish complete data on mining, electric power, and other industrial production. It is necessary therefore to formulate estimates on the basis of percentages of increases over previous periods of target achievement, index numbers, or other fragmentary information.

BACKGROUND

Before 1945, 33 percent of the population lived in the northern half of the country. Reflecting more favorable endowment of natural resources as well as Japanese development efforts, North Korea accounted for the following percentages of total Korean production: iron and steel, 95 percent; hydroelectric power, 90 percent; chemicals, 85 percent; coal, 80 percent; iron ore, 97 percent; and gold, 63 percent. In addition, the north produced 35 percent of total food output, 35 percent of machinery, and 20 percent of textiles and other consumer goods.

The pre-World War II characterization of the north as "industrialized" and the south as "agricultural" is valid only in a relative sense. At the end of the Japanese colonial period, the north remained a predominantly agroforestry economy; only 12 percent of the labor force was in nonagricultural employment; the southern half, although also predominantly agricultural, led in production of machinery, textiles, food processing, and most consumer goods.

Under the Japanese, very few Koreans held management positions or were trained in advanced industrial skills. For the most part, the output of mines and factories was exported to Japan for processing and finishing. Nevertheless, especially as the pressures of wartime requirements mounted, the Japanese laid the basis for industrialization, concentrating particularly on heavy industry and chemicals. This base was effectively used and expanded during the Soviet occupation in the early postwar period and later by the indigenous Communist leadership. Japanese ownership of all key industrial enterprises made easy the implementation of nationalization, and all semblance of private ownership of industry had vanished by the end of 1958.

The emergence of North Korea as an industrial-agricultural economy by the mid-1960's followed reconstruction of the industrial plants twice within a decade. The moderately developed industrial plants inherited from the Japanese were in a state of obsolescence and disrepair, and the minerals and forestry resources had been exploited and depleted by the pressures of war. This situation was compounded by acts of sabotage and destruction, including the flooding of many mines, on the part of the Japanese before their forced abandonment of the country. Economic life was further disrupted by the severance of relations with the southern part of the country and with Japan, which necessitated seeking new sources of capital, managerial and technical skills, and essential imports, as well as new markets for exportable goods. A fair start toward rehabilitation had been made, with substantial assistance from the Soviet bloc, when the Korean conflict brought about the virtual destruction of North Korea's industry.

ROLE OF INDUSTRY IN THE ECONOMY

The rapid industrialization of the economy under the socialistic system has been a major aim of the ruling party. Highest priority was assigned to heavy industry, although light industry and agriculture were to be developed simultaneously. By August 1958 the collectivization of the economy was completed, and a significant degree of industrialization had been attained, but at the cost of great sacrifice on the part of the people.

This policy has resulted in drastic changes in the structure of the economy. The relative positions of industry and agriculture have been reversed, and industry (manufacturing, mining, power, and basic construction) accounted for 72 percent of the gross national product in 1963, when the latest information was available, as compared with 23 percent in 1946, or 48 percent in 1949; the contribution of agriculture in these years was 19 percent and 41 percent, respectively. Industrial employment had increased progressively, employing 42 percent of the total labor force in 1963, as compared with 12 percent in 1946.

The most rapidly growing industry is machine and metal processing; in 1963 it accounted for nearly 26 percent of total industrial output, compared with about 2 percent in 1944 (see table 26). Textiles production, shoemaking, food processing, and publishing have also recorded notable gains. Concentration on these industries, especially in manufacturing machines, reflects the Government's drive toward economic self-sufficiency.

On the other hand, relative declines occurred during the 1960's in such categories as mining, forestry, marine products, fuel, and

Table 26. Estimated Contribution to Gross Industrial Product in North Korea for Selected Years, 1944–63

(in percentages)

	1944	1949	1956	1960	1963
Total[1]	100.0	100.0[1]	100.0[1]	100.0	100.0[1]
Producer goods:					
Building materials	2.5	2.5	4.8	5.9	5.7
Chemicals	10.1	9.5	4.0	5.4	6.3
Electric power	1.4	1.6	0.7	0.3	0.2
Fuel	3.8	4.1	1.8	1.3	1.2
Machinery and metal processing	1.6	8.1	17.3	21.3	25.6
Metallurgy	13.3	11.0	8.6	6.8	7.4
Ores	15.7	8.1	6.1	4.0	3.2
Total	48.4	44.9	43.3	45.0	49.6
Consumer goods:					
Food processing	7.8	19.4	13.2	14.4	13.7
Forest products	20.0	6.4	6.1	2.9	2.9
Glass and ceramics	0.7	0.4	1.2	1.7	n.a.
Marine products, processing	11.0	6.2	3.1	2.1	n.a.
Oils and fats	0.7	0.2	0.7	0.2	0.2
Pharmaceuticals	0.2	1.0	1.5	4.0	n.a.
Printing	0.2	1.2	2.1	1.8	n.a.
Pulp and paper	1.5	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.2
Rubber	1.8	2.3	1.4	1.2	n.a.
Stationery, magazines	0.9	1.6	3.1	5.8	6.6
Tanning, shoemaking	0.8	1.4	2.4	1.5	n.a.
Textiles	6.0	11.4	18.4	16.8	18.6
Total	51.6	53.7	55.7	55.0	44.2

n.a.—not available.

[1] Totals may not add because of rounding.

Source: Adapted from *Korea: Patterns of Economic Development* (Joseph S. Chung, ed.) Detroit: 1965, pp. 110, 111.

electric power. Production in all of these categories increased substantially in absolute terms, even though they represent a declining proportion of the expanded industrial gross output; these relative declines in terms of total output may reflect the diminishing returns to be expected of continued exploitation of these areas.

Until 1961 allocation of State investment funds was overwhelmingly in favor of heavy industry, representing upwards of 80 percent of total industrial investment. Of the large-scale grants from

the Soviet Union after the Korean conflict, about three-quarters had been allocated to industrial investment. In the first 2 years of the Seven-Year Plan investment in consumer industries, particularly textiles, was sharply increased, reflecting official recognition of the need to give attention to improving the living conditions of the populace (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY

Japanese ownership of all key industrial enterprises made easy the implementation of the nationalization policies of the Soviet occupation in 1946 and, later, those of the Kim Il-sung regime. Token acceptance of private ownership was initially accepted, largely for propaganda purposes. By August 1959, however, socialization of industry had been completed in parallel with the collectivization of agriculture. Private enterprise has been absorbed into either cooperatives, which are largely confined to small-scale operations, or the State-operated enterprises, of which the latter predominated. By 1963, the State enterprises had accounted for 91.2 percent of industrial production, whereas the producers' cooperatives contributed the remaining 8.8 percent (see table 27).

Table 27. Structure of North Korean Industry for Selected Years, 1946–63

Sector	Percentage of Gross Industrial Product				
	1946	*1949*	*1956*	*1959*	*1963*
Gross Industrial Product	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Socialist sector, total	72.4	90.7	98.0	100.0	100.0
Central and local enterprises	72.4	85.5	89.9	89.5	91.2
Cooperatives	0.0	5.2	8.1	10.5	8.8
Private sector, total	27.6	9.3	2.0	0.0	0.0

Source: *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68*, Tokyo: 1967.

State Enterprises

State enterprises comprise more than 90 percent of all industrial enterprises; the producers' cooperatives account for the remainder. The State enterprises are directly controlled either by the Central Government authorities or by the local authorities at the provincial, county, or municipal levels. By far the predominant type of organization is the State-managed enterprise.

Centrally Managed Enterprises

Large-scale enterprises, managed by appropriate ministries of the Central Government, embrace the fields of mining and development of other natural resources, banking, transportation, state farms, and the major manufacturing and marketing firms.

Each enterprise is headed by a Government-appointed manager who is invested with full authority for the operation and whose responsibility is to meet at minimum cost the quantitative and qualitative standards set by the Government. Rewards or penalties are assigned on the basis of actual performance in meeting these requirements. Every manager, engineer, and technician is an employee of the appropriate controlling ministry.

Despite the broad scope of central controls and supervision over plant operations, the individual manager performs an important function in the administration of industrial operations. His estimate of the production capacity of his plant is an essential element in the formulation of the national economic plan. When the plan is finally approved and production quotas assigned to each plant, the possibility of exceeding planned production or of lowering costs of production rests largely on the performance of the manager.

Fixed capital and an initial working fund are allocated by the State. Although under certain conditions an enterprise is permitted to borrow from banks, all working costs, including labor, are expected to be met by sales (see ch. 23, Financial and Monetary System). The State supplies supplementary operating funds whenever justified by a change in the master plan of targets, categories of output, and so forth. Individual enterprises are held strictly accountable for their use of manpower and other resources.

Locally Managed Enterprises

The local enterprises are supervised by State-appointed managers who are in turn guided by both Provincial Light Industry Committees and County Local Industry Management Committees. They are engaged mostly in food processing and in production of other daily necessities, such as simple household utensils, underwear and socks, shoes, grain. These enterprises also include production of alcoholic beverages. They are also encouraged to engage in machine repair, cement production, and ironworking wherever needed resources are locally available.

Development of the local sector was instigated in 1958 because of the Government's decision to decentralize industry in the interest of expanding food and other consumer production by bringing productive means closer to the sources of raw materials, labor, and markets. Another consideration was that the small-scale local

mills and factories, with low levels of mechanization, could be erected and operated with little financial investment on the part of the Central Government. Still another purpose was to stimulate agricultural output and to make the amenities of living increasingly accessible to the rural population (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). In 1967 it was estimated that at least 2,000 local factories of varying sizes were in operation.

In 1963, the last year for which information is available, the local industries produced 59 percent of consumer goods and contributed an estimated 30 percent to the total industrial output, the centrally managed sector accounting for the remainder in both categories. In late 1968 it was yet to be determined whether the local sector could maintain the 1963 level of production because of the Government's reversion in 1966 to the goal of development of heavy industry as the key to accelerated industrialization in conjunction with the reinforcement of defense capabilities (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Producers' Cooperatives

Small-scale production, such as handicrafts, food processing for local consumption, and cottage-type production, is organized into producers' cooperatives at the *ri* (village) and *kun* (county) levels, in much the same manner as the cooperative farms (see ch. 18, Agriculture). The fisheries industry is also organized into cooperatives.

Whereas the number of fishery cooperatives has remained relatively stable at about 175 since 1958, when cooperativization was completed, the number of producers' cooperatives declined from 819 in 1958 to 556 in 1962. In the latter year the average number of workers per cooperative was 150, indicating the small scale of their operations. The trend appears to be continuing as more of the larger cooperatives become absorbed by the State enterprises, particularly the locally managed State enterprises. In 1963 the contribution of producers' cooperatives to gross industrial product was less than 10 percent.

MINERALS

Before and during World War II, the Japanese systematically explored and exploited North Korea's considerable underground resources. Although they introduced modern mining methods, the pressures of war resulted in intensive mining, even in cases in which scarcity or inaccessibility of the minerals would not under normal circumstances warrant extraction. Lack of proper main-

tenance and deliberate sabotage at the time of forced departure left the mining facilities in a state of disrepair at the war's end.

North Korea possesses commercially important reserves of coal (mainly low- to medium-grade anthracite and much smaller quantities of low-grade bituminous), iron ore of from 30 to 40 percent iron, graphite, tungsten, zinc, lead, copper, manganese, cobalt, pyrite, barite, phosphates, gold, and silver (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Miscellaneous mineral deposits include antimony, beryl, bismuth, chrome, mineral sands, alum, asbestos, boracite, kaolin, silica, and many others. In world production North Korea ranks among the first five in tungsten, graphite, and magnesite (see table 28).

Table 28. Selected Data on North Korean Minerals Production

(1,000 metric tons unless otherwise indicated)

Ore	1949	1961	1963	1965
Copper	5	6	8	12
Gold[1]	n.a.	160	160	160
Silver[1]	n.a.	640	640	640
Iron ore	3,332	3,550	3,860	5,900
Lead	21	50	50	60
Tungsten concentrate	8	5	4	4.4
Zinc	20	9.0	100	105
Apatite	38[2]	150	200	200
Barite	5[2]	55	70	80
Flourspar	37	30	30	30
Graphite	46	65	70	70
Magnesite ore	34	200	800	900
Magnesite clinker	n.a.	100	385	400
Pyrite	246[2]	300	400	450
Salt	n.a.	392	450	500
Talc and soapstone	n.a.	15	20	20
Zinc	15[2]	90	100	105
Coal:				
Anthracite	4,005	7,500	9,700	14,900
Bituminous	n.a.	4,000	4,000	4,000
Coke	n.a.	900	1,200	1,600

[1] 1,000 troy ounces.
[2] 1944 data.

Sources: Adapted from *Korea: Patterns of Economic Development*, Joseph S. Chung, ed., Detroit: 1965; *The Pattern of Asia*, Norton Ginsburg, ed., Englewood Cliffs: 1958; *Minerals Yearbook, 1965*, IV, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Washington: 1967.

Oil was reportedly discovered in the late 1950's, but no information is available regarding production. The country is totally

dependent upon imports for its crude oil, which comes mainly from the Soviet Union. An oil refinery with an annual production capacity of 2 million tons was reportedly under construction at Unggi with Soviet assistance.

The Government has given special attention to rehabilitation and expansion of mining in order to guarantee continuing supplies of raw materials for domestic industries, especially heavy industry, and a source of foreign exchange earnings. Investment in the mining sector in 1965 was claimed to be 72 percent higher than in 1964, when it represented 12 percent of total capital construction funds.

Major emphasis appears to have been placed on coal and iron ore production since the midsixties. In the first half of 1965 the coal mines were newly equipped with 45 excavators, 500 vehicles, 90 trams, 200 mine cars, 100 air compressors, 200 winches, and 3,600 rock drills. Some 130 small- and medium-sized mines were opened up and, by August 1965, the number of small mines of about 10,000 tons annual capacity was reported to have doubled.

Modernization of mining has included the erection of large ore dressing, concentration, and smelting facilities. These include an iron sulfide separation plant, with a capacity of 20,000 tons, located at the Sunhŭng iron mine; a plant at the Puyun nickel mine, capable of concentrating 280,000 tons of nickel ore annually; and a plant at the Mandŏk copper mine, with an annual concentrating capacity of 560,000 tons of ore.

Information is not available concerning specific targets for mining production, except for coal, which was 25 million metric tons, and iron ore, which was 7.2 million metric tons. By 1965 iron ore production had achieved 82 percent of the goal, but coal output was only 55 percent of the planned figure (see table 28).

Exports of minerals and metals were estimated at about 15 percent of total value of exports in 1965. The leading purchasers were the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Japan. Japanese procurement of iron ore increased notably—from 26,399 metric tons in 1963 to 407,524 metric tons in 1965 (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

MANUFACTURING

Iron and Steel

At the end of the Korean hostilities in 1953, production of iron and steel had come to a virtual standstill as a result of bombing damage inflicted upon the existing plants: the Kangsŏn, near Pyongyang; two at Ch'ŏngjin; and the Puryŏng ferroalloy plant in Hamgyŏng-namdo.

Reflecting the regime's determination to build an industrialized economy, high priority was assigned to the iron and steel industry, and prompt rehabilitation was undertaken. By 1956, the prewar production levels had been exceeded, and plant capacity was being steadily expanded.

Despite an abundance of iron ore and electric power, North Korea has yet to meet all its needs for iron and steel, and it is obliged to import some of its requirements for steel products, ferroalloys, and chromite to supplement domestic production. In 1965 pig iron production had attained 70 percent of the current plan goal of 2.3 million metric tons, but ingot and rolled steel output stood at only 57 percent of the 1967 target of more than 4 million metric tons (see table 29).

Table 29. Selected Data on Manufactures in North Korea, 1961–1967

(in 1,000 metric tons unless otherwise indicated)

Commodity	1961	1963	1965	Plan Target 1967
Iron and steel:				
Pig iron [1]	930	1,159	1,600	2,300
Steel ingot	776	1,022	1,230	2,300
Rolled steel	536	762	1,080	1,700
Ferroalloys	20	25	35	n.a.
Sulfuric acid	273	321	n.a.	650
Chemical fertilizers	682	853	n.a.	1,700
Caustic soda	26	43	n.a.	100
Carbide	141	191	n.a.	530
Cement	2,263	2,530	2,610	4,300
Plate glass [2]	4,193	5,230	n.a.	10,000
Lumber [3]	1,321	3,740	4,050	n.a.
Paper products	59	71	n.a.	250
Textiles, cloth [4]	187	227	318	500
Soy sauce [5]	103	130	n.a.	183
Bean paste	121	143	n.a.	173
Electric power [6]	10,418	11,676	13,260	17,000

n.a.—not available.

[1] Includes granulated iron, or luppe.
[2] 1,000 square meters.
[3] 1,000 cubic meters.
[4] 1,000 meters.
[5] 1,000 kiloliters.
[6] Million kilowatt-hours.

Source: *Minerals Yearbook, 1965*, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Washington: 1967; *Korea: Patterns of Economic Development* (Joseph S. Chung, ed.), Detroit: 1965. Supplemented by official North Korean data.

In 1965 more than 20 major varieties of rolled products were produced, and the larger plants were being geared for further technological progress in production. Negotiations were conducted with a prominent Austrian steel firm, Vereinigte Oesterreichischa Eisenund Stahlwerke A.G. (VOEST), for construction of a $30-million plant, with an annual capacity of 600,000 tons of steel. Preliminary indications were that the new plant would be located at Musan in the northeast, an area which has large iron ore deposits and good railway connections to Communist China, the source of North Korea's coking coal.

Machine-making

Production of industrial and agricultural machinery and equipment has been newly undertaken since World War II. Under the Japanese, the products of North Korean heavy industry had been taken to Japan for final processing and use in manufacturing, except for minor quantities which supplied the small machine-making industry of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. Cut off from these sources of supply, the regime has given high priority to the buildup of the machinery industry as a prerequisite to the establishment of a modern industrialized State.

In the years immediately following the Korean hostilities, State investment in the machinery industry consistently amounted to about 25 percent of the total amount invested in heavy industry; aid from other Communist countries was also heavily concentrated in this area. A number of new factories were constructed in 1954–56 for production of construction equipment and equipment for rehabilitation of the devastated industrial plant.

Machine-making, including metal processing, has thus grown rapidly. The annual growth rate was 46.9 percent in 1954–56; 45.9 percent in 1957–60; and 17.7 percent in 1961–63. Representing only 8 percent of the gross industrial product in 1949, this sector in 1963 accounted for 26 percent.

Textiles

Most raw cotton must be imported because the climate and soil are not suitable for producing millable cotton in sufficient quantities to meet domestic needs. This situation has led to intensive development of synthetic fibers, which by 1966 had accounted for more than one-third of the total output of fiber. Raw materials for synthetic textiles production, such as coal, wood, and reeds, are abundant. Silk and wool are also produced and have become increasingly important export commodities; in 1966 such exports to non-Communist countries amounted to $2 million.

The three largest textile plants are the Pyongyang cotton works, with 11,500 employees; the vynalon plant at Hamhŭng, with 6,500; and the Pyongyang silk works with 5,500. The major textile producing center is the capital city of Pyongyang. Other textile centers are located at Sinŭiju, Kaesŏng, and Kusŏng. At the local level, widely scattered small-scale production accounts for about 20 percent of total production. Most of the products are made from readily available raw materials, such as hemp and flax. Silk products are largely exported, whereas cotton and synthetic textile products are domestically consumed.

The Seven-Year Plan calls for production of 1.65 billion feet of textile products by 1970; production of 1.05 billion feet in 1965 was 64 percent of the goal. In recent years the textile industry has ranked second only to machine-building in terms of contribution to gross industrial product, representing from 17 to 19 percent of total industrial production.

In addition to raw cotton imports, some special requirements, such as jute yarn and manmade fibers, must be imported. In 1966 non-Communist countries supplied $1.3 million worth of such materials, as well as $1.2 million in raw cotton (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

Chemicals

Before World War II North Korea produced the bulk of the Peninsula's supplies of chemical fertilizers. Following the destruction of most of the plants during the Korean war, the industry was rehabilitated and expanded with Soviet assistance. It was not until 1960, however, that the production levels of either pre-World War II or pre-Korean war were regained.

Adequate supplies of fertilizers contributed to gains in agricultural production, particularly during the 1960's (see ch. 18, Agriculture). Fertilizer output rose from 561,000 million metric tons in 1960 to more than 950,000 million metric tons in 1965. The current development plan sets a target of 1.7 million metric tons (see table 29).

Work was underway in 1965 for expanding various existing fertilizer plants, including the huge Hŭngnam factory, which employed about 10,000 workers, and several new facilities were under construction. The new plants included ammonia works at the Aoji Chemical Factory and at the Pon'gung Chemical Factory and a nitrogenous fertilizer plant at the Ch'ŏngsu Chemical Factory. The nitrogenous plant at Sunch'ŏn was also being expanded. The Government claimed that all the new equipment was domestically produced. Production of raw materials for the chemical fertilizer industry, such as phosphate and pyrite, was maintained at high levels.

The chemicals industry in general has been growing rapidly; the growth rate was 27 percent annually from 1961 to 1963 and 78 percent for pharmaceuticals from 1957 to 1960. In 1967 the Government claimed that 10 plants were manufacturing pharmaceuticals and miscellaneous chemical products, including plastics. On the basis of available information, the Government's claims of self-sufficiency appear credible for fertilizers, medicines, and such industrial chemicals as dyes, caustic soda, and sulfur.

Miscellaneous Manufactures

Based on its diversified natural resources and in response to the national objective of economic self-sufficiency, North Korea produces a wide variety of manufactured goods. Support of the Military Establishment, for example, has given rise to the manufacture of arms and ammunition. A Republic of Korea source reported in 1968 the existence of 19 major armaments manufacturing facilities, mostly underground; they produced small arms such as rifles, machineguns, mortars, hand grenades, and ammunitions. It may be assumed that the supply of equipment and replacement parts for the country's large Armed Forces constitutes a sizable industry.

The regime has commenced production of trucks and other automotive vehicles, tractors, excavators and other heavy construction equipment, and electric motors and engines. Concrete production data are fragmentary, but indicate that considerable progress has been made, even though absolute quantities are still modest and, in most cases, far short of the planned goal for 1970 (see table 30).

Table 30. Miscellaneous Manufactures in North Korea, 1960–1963, and Planned Targets for 1970

(in units)

Item	1956	1960	1963	1970 (Plan)
Automotive	0	3,125	4,022	10,000
Tractors	0	3,002	3,033	12,000
Electric motors	8,817	40,588	50,040	n.a.
Electric transformers	5,527	5,971	5,817	n.a.
Electric locomotives	0	0	15	30
Excavators	0	39	151	300

Source: *Ekonomisuto*, February 13, 1968; and *Korea: Patterns of Economic Development* (Joseph S. Chung, ed.), Detroit: 1965.

Great stress has been placed on tractor production. The current economic development plan calls for the availability of 70,000 tractors by 1970, with annual production in that year alone of 12,000, a goal reduced from the original planned goal of 17,100. In 1965 a total of 21,800 tractors was available. Annual production data since 1963 have been released only in terms of percentage increases. In 1964 the production target was 4,200 tractors; it is not known whether that goal was reached. The Kiyang Tractor Plant is the largest manufacturing works. Production of trucks is apparently far from adequate for domestic requirements; in 1966 trucks at a total value of $2.7 million were imported from non-Communist countries.

Electric motors, transformers, and electric locomotives are also produced to meet growing industrial and transportation requirements. The largest plant is the Taean Electrical Appliance Plant. Except in the case of electric locomotives, no plan target has been published.

The railway system was rehabilitated, with assistance from other Communist countries, following the end of the Korean war. Rolling stock for subsequent replacement and expansion is apparently produced domestically, but information concerning the nature and size of the industry is not available. Imports of railway equipment amounted to only $57,000 in 1966.

Cement, glass, and ceramics production is important to the industrial construction that has taken place. There were six sizable cement plants in 1965 and probably many small facilities; total production was about 2.6 million metric tons (see table 30). Cement is regularly exported to the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Such consumer products as radios, clocks, and sewing machines are domestically made, but on a very small scale, and estimated output in 1963 was, respectively, 10,000, 116,000, and 34,000 units; in all cases this was less than 20 percent of the plan target for that year. The manufacture of pulp and paper, printing, and output of periodicals show high rates of growth, but are of only minor importance in terms of industrial output.

ELECTRIC POWER

Before 1945, North Korea's hydroelectric power resources were highly developed to support the industrial buildup undertaken by the Japanese. By 1944 generation of 8.1 billion kilowatt-hours had supplied from 85 to 90 percent of the entire Peninsula's power availabilities. In addition, transmission lines had carried power into the Japanese-operated industrial complex in southern Man-

churia. The Yalu River along the western border and its tributaries extending into the interior had supplied most of the hydraulic power resources; industrial complexes, especially chemicals, and plants for the primary or secondary processing of raw materials had been developed in areas accessible to the power projects.

During the first years after World War II, Soviet-occupied North Korea continued to supply power to the southern half of the Peninsula, but this supply was cut off in May 1948 in retaliation against the elections conducted in the south in that month (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The electric power industry was also affected by the disruption of Korean industry that followed the evacuation of Japanese managers and skilled workers at the end of World War II, as well as by the accumulated wartime deterioration of the physical facilities. Reconstruction of the power industry was undertaken during the Soviet occupation, but the facilities were severely damaged during the Korean hostilities. It was not until 1960 that production regained, with Soviet assistance, the levels of the Japanese colonial period.

In 1954–56 the power industry was the largest recipient of industrial investment, receiving 14 percent of the total. During the 5-year period (1957–61), it received 12 percent, outranked only by the mining industry which received 16 percent. The continued importance of this sector was underscored in September 1968, when Premier Kim Il-sung declared that ". . . we should direct primary attention to giving strict precedence to the power and mining industries;" he did not specify, however, what percentage of the investment was earmarked for the power industry.

The rehabilitated and newly constructed hydroelectric facilities are designed to support a complex of related objectives, besides furnishing power and lighting. Reservoirs and dams are important in water conservation and flood control; electric pumping stations service the country's greatly expanded irrigation system, which has contributed materially to agricultural output (see ch. 18, Agriculture). The sale of electric power to Communist China provides a source of badly needed foreign exchange earnings.

Although power production is mainly hydro-based, thermal electricity is becoming increasingly important because of the increased power demands of the industrialization movement and as a means of counteracting hydropower deficiencies during dry seasons. In 1963 it was estimated that thermal power accounted for 5.2 percent of total output, as compared with less than 2 percent in 1956. The Government's policy after 1958 to decentralize industrial production, at least to a moderate degree, may be another factor since it is probably more economic to install small thermal plants to

serve locally controlled industries in remote or mountainous areas than to extend transmission facilities from a distant hydroplant. Finally, it may be that the more advantageous of the damsites have already been exploited.

Soviet aid has been important in the recent expansion of thermal electric power, as it had been in the post-Korean war reconstruction of hydro works. Thermal plant construction figured in North Korean-Soviet Union technical cooperation agreements signed in July 1961 and in June 1966. In the middle and late 1960's work was either completed or underway on many small- to medium-output thermal facilities in widely scattered sections of the country and on at least two sizable plants. Of the latter, a plant in Pyongyang, with installed capacity of 500,000 kilowatts and actual generating capacity of about 388,000 kilowatts, was nearing completion in 1967; a plant at Pukch'ang, of 600,000 kilowatts installed capacity, was under construction and scheduled for completion by 1970. Construction of a 400,000-kilowatt plant at Unbong was undertaken with the promise of assistance from Communist China, but in 1968 construction appeared to have been suspended, probably from lack of the expected Chinese financing.

The largest hydroelectric installations are those at Sup'ung, Puryŏng, Kŭm'gang, and Kanggye, a plant on the Changjin River and another on the Hŏch'ŏn River. These six plants supply a total of 2.1 million kilvolt-amperes.

Although electric power production increased from 10.4 billion kilowatt-hours in 1961 to 13.3 billion kilowatt-hours in 1965, a gain of 27 percent, its relative position in terms of contribution to gross industrial product is minor and remains at from 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent of total. The annual growth rate, 6.7 percent during 1961–65, which is the latest data available, lagged far behind the overall industrial rate of about 15 percent. Preliminary data indicated that growth was even slower in 1966, but no firm figure were available as of late 1968. If the plan target of 17 billion kilowatt-hours is to be attained by 1967, a growth rate of 14 percent will have to be achieved during each of the remaining 2 years. The plan target was originally set at 20 billion kilowatt-hours; it appears that even the revised goal may prove overly ambitious.

HANDICRAFTS

It appears likely that commercial production has by now largely replaced the traditional production by part-time or off-season occupations of peasants and fisherman and their families of even such simple handicrafts as straw bags for storing and transporting grains, straw mats and shoes, rope, fishing nets, clay utensils, bam-

boo household items, simple farm implements such as plows or sickles, and similar products. Decline of home production has been expedited by the monetization of the economy, which has displaced the traditional barter exchanges held in the village square. Peasants and fishermen must work in mills and factories to earn money with which to buy daily necessities. In addition, the Government's efficient organization of labor by coercive methods probably leaves little spare time even in off-season periods for the average peasant or fisherman to pursue the traditional handicraft arts.

CHAPTER 20
LABOR RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

The most influential labor organization in 1968 was the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea. Divided into nine subordinate industrial and commercial unions by occupational sectors, it claimed a total membership of 1.72 million in 1962. A member of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions since 1947, it has participated in many international Communist labor programs. The other large union was the Agricultural Workers Union of Korea, which had a membership of over 2 million.

As in other Communist countries, labor organizations gave the regime a key weapon in carrying out its economic policies. The unions were instrumental in the ideological indoctrination of the workers and in assisting the Government in raising production by obtaining the maximum contribution from each worker. As union membership was compulsory, the threat of expulsion for failure to meet productivity standards or for other reasons was an effective means of control.

The welfare of the workers is considered only to the extent that productivity goals are met. The critical labor shortage, however, has forced the Government to give increasing attention to improving safety provisions and working conditions. Discontent among agricultural workers over their lower standard of living in relation to their urban counterparts has forced the regime to pledge publicly to raise rural living standards (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

To spur production, the Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse) movement (see Glossary) has become a national symbol. It corresponds to the Stakhanovite movement in the Soviet Union during the 1930's. Under the Ch'ŏllima movement the labor force was organized into work teams of four to over 100 persons, and the payment of an individual's wage was conditional upon the fulfillment of his work team's production quota. By such a system the Communist regime hoped to foster the spirit of collectivism and mutual cooperation. It was found, however, that patriotic appeals for higher production had to be supplemented with a reward system.

To improve working relations between the managerial-Party cadre groups and the workers, the Taean work method was upheld

as a model of industrial labor relations. By this method, which calls for cooperation and exchange of ideas between supervisory personnel and the workers, the Party intended to raise production and efficiency by giving the workers a sense of participation in the planning and fulfillment of the regime's goals. A similar type of program for the rural areas is known as the Ch'ŏngsan-ni method.

LABOR BEFORE 1945

Before the arrival of the Japanese in 1910, Korean labor was engaged almost exclusively in agriculture. There existed a feudal type of distinction between the landlord and the peasants who worked for him, in recognition of the deep social cleavage between them, but a mutually advantageous relationship existed. In exchange for loyalty and deference on the part of the peasant, the landlord, although under no legal obligation to aid or protect his tenants, might grant special favors and render assistance at critical times.

In addition to the peasants, there existed a small group of artisans organized into guilds according to their craft or trade. The guilds functioned as control organizations, and many were strong, monopolizing their respective occupations, maintaining rigid discipline, and upholding standards of workmanship. The guilds also performed certain social welfare functions (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups).

The traditional pattern of obeisance to authority was carried over into the era of Japanese rule (1910–45). Industrial and commercial development began during this period, absorbing numbers of workers from the countryside. The new industrial and commercial labor force was recruited primarily from younger sons of farming families, who were forced off the land by the large population increase and by the land development policies of the Japanese (see ch. 4, Population and Labor Force). In the new industrial enterprises the Japanese reserved almost all managerial posts for themselves, and few Koreans held technical positions or gained administrative experience. The Japanese did, however, establish an apprentice system in larger industrial establishments, and an increase in literacy resulted from expansion of the educational system (see ch. 9, Education).

By 1938 over 1 million Koreans were at work in pursuits other than agriculture. Children under 16 comprised approximately 10 percent, and women composed about 30 percent of the industrial labor force; most of the women were employed in the textile in-

dustry. At the same time, cottage industry declined in the face of competition from inexpensive Japanese imports.

In order to facilitiate the movement of labor into the newly established enterprises as well as into their geographical locations, the Japanese established employement agencies. Municipal employment agencies existed in Seoul, Inchon, Pusan, and Taegu, and a small number of private agencies were opened. The police also played an active role in the recruitment of labor. During World War II, when the Japanese found it necessary to mobilize Korean labor to meet the greater demands of wartime production, the registration of Koreans by level of skills was begun.

Working conditions were bad during the Japanese occupation. The average workday for the Korean industrial worker was 10 hours, although there was much variation between industries; heavy industry demanded the longest hours. Discrimination existed in wage scales; the relatively few Japanese workers in Korean industries received about double the pay of Koreans, partly because of the generally higher educational qualifications of the Japanese.

In response to industrialization, an indigenous labor union movement began. Between 1919 and 1931 a number of labor and social organizations were established; these became a focal point of popular participation in the anti-Japanese resistance movement. The first labor organization, called the Korean Cooperative, was founded in 1920. In 1924 Korea's first general labor federation, the General Union of Laborers and Farmers was founded with 40,000 members. For a while the Japanese tolerated the Korean labor organizations, and they attained some minor successes in collective bargaining.

A number of politically inspired strikes against Japanese rule caused the Japanese to ban Korean labor unions in 1931. The first organized strike was called in 1925 by the workers of the Seoul Electric Company. More notable was the 3-month general strike in Wŏnsan in the autumn of 1928; this was not a campaign for higher wages but was directed again the exploitative aspects of Japanese capital. A wave of sympathy strikes spread throughout Korean industries and even to Japan, culminating in 1930 in an uprising among the tenant farmers of Hamgyŏng-pukto against their Japanese landlords. The following year another general strike was called, to hamper the Japanese campaign in Manchuria. It was unsuccessful, and the Japanese suppressed the Korean labor unions. To maintain labor discipline the Japanese substituted an organization of their own, the Patriotic Labor Front, which included both industrial and agricultural workers and which was controlled directly by the Japanese Army and police.

The remnants of the Korean labor unions went underground, where they joined other resistance elements, including the Communists. The almost exclusively political nature of the underground struggle for independence reinforced the political orientation of the Korean labor union leaders.

The mass of the workers, harassed and driven by the Japanese to meet increased wartime production demands, however, had little or no experience in participation in free trade unions. The workers accepted the leadership of Communist labor organizers who emerged as Soviet forces occupied North Korea.

LABOR UNIONS AFTER 1945

For several months after the withdrawal of the Japanese, short-lived workers' committees assumed management functions in the factories. In November 1945 a conference of labor unions was held in Soviet-occupied North Korea. At this meeting the North Korean Labor Union was formed under Communist leadership. In 1951 this organization was renamed the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea after merging with the Communist-controlled General Council of Korean Trade Unions, which had been organized in the south in November 1945 but outlawed in 1949. In 1968 the General Federation continued to control the North Korean labor movement.

Objectives and Activities

The labor union's function is to facilitate labor administration rather than to protect the workers' interests. The union is also an instrument of the State, serving to maintain discipline over the labor force and to guarantee the fulfillment of production quotas.

The labor unions have two basic missions: the indoctrination of the working class in Communist attitudes and concepts and the responsibilty for ensuring the attainment of production quotas. These goals are closely interrelated, for Communist belief dictates that a true Marxist-Leninist must subordinate his personal interests to the welfare of the collective and produce to the limit of his capacity. The unions, therefore, have been charged to "cultivate the laboring masses in ideas of Marxism-Leninism, thereby bringing them closer" to the Party, and to "love work and protect national and social properties, to oppose individualism and display the spirit of collectivism." Such exhortations are delivered at local levels by Party cadres and work team leaders and channeled through the daily newspaper of the General Federation of Trade Unions, *Nodongja Sinmun* (Workers News).

Ch'ŏllima Movement

The Ch'ŏllima movement typifies the use of a traditional symbol of achievement to spur production and to hasten the transformation of North Korea into an advanced industrial-agricultural state. Although inspiration for this campaign came from the Chinese Communists' "Great Leap Forward" of 1958, the regime recognized that it could not count on substantial outside aid from the other Communist nations and that further economic growth would have to be largely self-generated (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations). The Ch'ŏllima drive was first announced in January 1958, but it had little effect until March 1959, when the labor force was organized into work brigades and teams that were to engage in competitive efforts to increase production.

The Ch'ŏllima campaign was aimed not only at industrial and agricultural workers but also at organizations in such fields as education, science, sanitation and health, and culture. In addition to work teams (as few as four individuals can form a team), units eligible for a Ch'ŏllima citation included factory workshops, entire factories, and such self-contained units as a ship or a railroad station. By the end of 1965 there were over 26,000 work teams with a total of 980,000 workers who had earned the Ch'ŏllima rating. Of these, 442 teams had won the award twice. There were 48 offices and six teacher units that held the Ch'ŏllima title, but only one factory.

Qualifications for becoming a Ch'ŏllima work team were based on considerations of both ideology and productivity. Such a work team must study the self-proclaimed revolutionary traditions and the current policies of the Party, resolutely carry out its programs, and constantly indoctrinate those showing less zeal for socialism. The Ch'ŏllima work team must exceed its production quotas while maintaining a high quality of work. Such a team must have a good record in the economical use of raw materials and electricity and in utilizing equipment efficiently. If these standards are not maintained, the work team may lose its Ch'ŏllima rating.

Applications for Ch'ŏllima status must be successively approved by labor union committees at the plant or enterprise level, at the country level, at the provincial or special city level, and by the central committee of the relevant labor union. Investigations of the work team under consideration occur several times during this process.

The regime presents the Ch'ŏllima movement as voluntary competition among the working class for the common welfare but, in reality, it is controlled and manipulated by the authorities. When one work team within a factory or enterprise receives the Ch'ŏllima

award, other teams are under pressure to raise their production level also. It is to the regime's interest, therefore, to ensure the selection of a Ch'ŏllima work team in a great number of plants and enterprises, as an object of emulation by the other workers. The concept behind the movement is that the workers can be motivated to greater effort by appeals to idealism, reinforced by an incessant stream of exhortation and propaganda.

The Ch'ŏngsan-ni Method

The Ch'ŏngsan-ni method stresses the importance of direct contact between high-ranking Party personnel and the workers, for only in this way could the policymakers obtain firsthand knowledge of the production problems and personal aspirations of the workers. The name is derived from the Ch'ŏngsan-ni cooperative farm in P'yŏngan-namdo, where Premier Kim Il-sung and other members of the Central Committee spent 15 days instructing the workers in February 1960.

The Party leadership claimed that the discontent and unsatisfactory output of the workers at Ch'ŏngsan-ni were because of the incorrect tactics of low-ranking Party functionaries who expounded abstract Marxist theories and slogans which failed to motivate the unsophisticated workers. Instead, the Party leaders claimed, the workers needed specific guidance in solving production problems and required the promise of readily available material incentives. The Ch'ŏngsan-ni method, therefore, called for high-ranking Party officials to make periodic visits to enterprises and cooperatives to ascertain for themselves the problems and needs of the workers. The high-level cadres were to point out defective work in a constructive spirit and to provide practical solutions for production problems.

By publicizing the Ch'ŏngsan-ni work method, the Party was tacitly admitting that bureaucratism was still a problem in the 1960's and that significant numbers of people were largely unmoved by Marxist promises of the Socialist paradise of the future if they were not supported by an immediately discernible rise in living conditions. The regime was obliged to place emphasis on consumer goods production during the first part of the Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67) and to pledge that living conditions in the rural areas would be raised to equal those of urban centers (se ch. 8, Living Conditions).

The Taean System

The so-called Taean work method resembles the Ch'ŏngsan-ni method in that management and supervisory level personnel are

expected to go down to subordinate levels to offer assistance and request advice. The name comes from the Taean Electrical Appliance Plant, which Kim Il-sung visited in December 1961 and praised as a model of a well-managed enterprise.

The Taean system, oriented mainly toward industry, is based on the Communist technique of making the workers feel that they are participating in the managerial operations of the plant. Managerial personnel hold conferences with the workers to hear their ideas for improving production efficiency and increasing output. In such discussions the basic production guidelines, as established by the relevant planning committee, are not subject to discussion, but only ways to best implement the fixed goals. The purpose is to suggest to the workers that they play a vital role in the worthwhile economic goals of the State and that their ideas and advice are appreciated, which contrasts with their inferior status under Japanese management before 1945. Official publications claim that, because of the Taean system, workers better understand the significance of their work and that creativity and a sense of responsibility toward their work are encouraged.

Organizational Structure

Labor union organization appeared to follow the pyramidal arrangement common in Communist countries, with reliable Party officials placed in key positions at all organizational levels. Committees at the enterprise level comprised the base of the pyramid, with county, provincial, and special city committees at succeeding levels, and the General Federation of Trade Unions at the apex. The governing body of the General Federation was a central committee, including a chairman, six vice chairmen, the chief editor of Federation publications, and the heads of three departments—wages, personnel, and culture and education.

In 1968 the General Federation had under its control nine affiliated industrial unions: Metal Working and Chemical Industry Workers Trade Union; Machine-Building Industry Workers Trade Union; Fishing Industry Workers Trade Union; Transportation Workers Trade Union; Power and Coal Industry Workers Trade Union; Construction and Forestry Workers Trade Union; Light Industry and Commerce Workers Trade Union; Communications Workers Trade Union; and Education, Culture, Health, and Government Employees Union. Membership in the relevant union was compulsory for persons employed in these sectors of the economy, and dues were automatically deducted from wages.

Little information is available on the internal operations of the General Federation or its component units. It appears that the industrial unions are highly centralized organizations. The Trans-

portation Workers Trade Union, for example, is theoretically governed by its supreme executive organ, the union convention, held twice a year. The actual governing body is the executive committee, whose members the convention is instructed to elect.

The Agricultural Workers Union of Korea

The Agricultural Workers Union of Korea is considered by the Government as a separate labor organization and is not affiliated with the General Federation. It was formed in June 1964, succeeding the dissolved Peasants Union of Korea, and had a membership of 2.3 million in 1964. In addition to farmers, the organization included laborers, technicians, and white-collar workers, who were assigned to factories, workshops, and administrative offices that were concerned with the rural economy.

The union's twofold purpose was to organize more effectively the agricultural labor force and to serve as a vehicle for the ideological indoctrination of the peasants. By associating the workers with the peasants, the Party intended that the workers would lead the backward peasantry into the acceptance of Socialist revolutionary attitudes. The Agricultural Union was proclaimed to be the bond that connected the Party to the agricultural workers.

The Agricultural Union has an extensive organizational structure. Local units of less than 100 persons are found on cooperatives and state farms, in factories and enterprises dealing with the rural economy, and in farm villages. If the membership is 100 or more, a committee is organized. Committees are formed in an ascending hierarchy, rising through the district, county, city, and provincial levels to the central committee at the national level.

WORKING CONDITIONS

Labor Legislation

Working conditions are, theoretically, subject to the Labor Law of June 24, 1946, and to subsequent regulations and provisions. The Labor Law set the working day at 8 hours for workers, 6 to 7 hours for those in dangerous work, and 6 hours for minors. Youths under 14 years of age may not work. No one may work more than 250 hours annually overtime. Adults are to have a 14-day paid vacation a year, and youths 14 to 16 years of age are to have 30 days. Women are to be granted 77 days for maternity leave in addition to their regular vacation. Other social welfare regulations include social security benefits, State-operated rest homes, guaranteed housing for workers, and free hospital service (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

In reality, the provisions of the 1946 Labor Law are ignored by the regime. The Government drives the workers as hard as possible without a breadown in morale or efficiency. In 1968 it was stressing the concept of the 480-minute workday, meaning that every minute of the 8-hour workday was to be utilized for productive purposes. Managers and Party cadres were cautioned not to schedule lectures or conferences during regular working hours.

According to a Republic of Korea source, the average laborer works about 14 hours a day, or more if necessary. A peasant works an average of 15 hours a day, and an office worker, from 12 to 15 hours. Fishermen are expected to work at least 300 days per year, even though seasonal bad weather makes this goal almost impossible. Peasants and fishermen are used for other work during the winter months. Despite the long hours, no one has ever received overtime pay. The Party claims that extra working hours are not imposed but are voluntarily assumed by the work force out of patriotic fervor. Instead of the 11-week maternity leave provided for by the Labor Law, the average woman is not likely to get more than 1 week before and 1 week after parturition. Likewise, no worker is granted his legal 2-week vacation. Vacations are only permitted for the relatively few workers who, because of extremely high productivity, are awarded the titles of "model" or "hero" worker. Work projects can be assigned on weekends and legal holidays.

The Party requires that university students work 10 weeks a year; high school students, 8 to 10 weeks; and middle school pupils, 40 days. Longer working periods may occur if "voluntary" labor is required. Even children are organized for such tasks as weeding, raising rabbits for food, and processing coal.

Job Allocation

There is no free labor market, and an individual's personal job preference receives limited attention. The regime emphasizes the placment of school graduates in sectors where optimal use can be made of their abilities.

About 3 months before graduation from a middle school, a student who is not planning to continue his education is required to submit a personal history and school record to the Labor Division of his city or county. The Labor Division will then assign him to a factory, mine, fishery, or farm where the labor demand is most pressing. The same procedure is followed with high school, technical school, and university graduates, but with the addition of a letter from the Socialist Working Youth League that evaluates his attitude and loyalty toward the Communist regime. A favorable evaluation is necessary to secure any sort of administrative position in the Government or Party structure. University

graduates with the highest degree of political reliability are selected by the Ministry of Higher Education for membership and office in the Communist Party. The better students are assigned to academic and research work, and the rest are placed in technical and production fields. To change jobs, one must obtain a letter of approval from the Labor Division of his city or county.

Wages

Industrial

Wages for industrial workers are geared to a classification system based upon the arduousness of the work and the degree of skill involved. Classifications run on a scale from the third to the eighth levels; the seventh and eighth levels are reserved for those in dangerous occupations. Most workers are in the fifth and sixth levels; the wage for the third level is so low that it is difficult for one to live unaided. The Government states that the wage schedules for the third and fourth levels are purposely set low to encourage workers to acquire more skills and, thereby, gain promotion to a higher level.

Wage schedules are drawn up by each industrial sector. In 1959 there were 32 industrial sectors employing a total of 38 different wage schedules. The widest range between the highest and lowest wage grades was in the chemical, metal, power, and machine industries, where a skilled worker could earn over twice the base rate. In the production of staples such as clothing, a highly qualified worker's wage was only 1.7 times more than the basic wage. Within the same economic sector, good or bad working conditions can affect wage rates.

Wages are dependent upon the performance of an individual's work team as a whole; a worker who satisfies his own production quota will not be paid unless his team's work assignment is also achieved. There is great pressure on each individual to meet his own quota, so as to avoid censure from others of his work team. By such a system the regime hopes to further its twin goals, the spirit of collectivism and increased productivity.

Wages were reportedly paid in cash, but were often accompanied by subsidiary benefits such as food allowances or free or heavily subsidized housing. Some of the larger factories maintained dormitories that also served meals for unmarried workers. Other commodities such as cloth, soap, or shoes often were also included.

To spur incentive and to promote efficiency, a reward system was effected. A work team can win a reward for excellence in several categories: exceeding plans (that is, completing a construction project ahead of schedule); improving efficiency in the

use of equipment; and operating equipment without accidents or damage. An individual can be rewarded for constantly exceeding his production quota. The reward is set by the particular industry. The chemical industry gave 10 to 20 percent of the worker's basic wage as a reward, based upon the complexity of the chemical work involved. The mining and coal industries awarded the work team a certain percentage of the excess value produced.

Agricultural

Because agricultural labor encompasses a variety of chores of varying degrees of difficulty, a payment system was devised that was based on workdays which could be more or less than the actual number of days worked. Workdays were determined by a grade system by which 1 day of difficult work earned 1.5 workdays, and 1 day of very light work equaled one-half of a workday. Three intermediate grades were worth 1.25, 1, and .75 workdays, respectively. Farmers were expected to amass at least 350 workdays per year, but this total was almost impossible to attain, since it was difficult to earn many points during the slack winter months. The purpose of this system, according to the Government, was to thwart slackers who would have spent all their time performing light tasks.

The peasants' income is decided at a yearend general meeting of the cooperative. The quantity and quality of each work team's labor are assessed, as well as its total number of workdays. After all costs for such items as fertilizer, irrigation, equipment rentals, and social welfare are deducted, the rest is divided among the work team on the basis of the number of workdays earned. The peasant may be paid in both cash and crops and may receive a portion of both in advance. By an incentive method called the "work team preferential treatment" system, all produce over 90 percent of planned goals can be distributed among members of the work team.

Wages of other members of cooperatives are directly dependent upon the productivity of the farmers. A kindergarten teacher in a cooperative, for example, is credited with from 100 to 108 percent of the average number of workdays earned by the farmers. The keeper of the cooperative store is also awarded a certain percentage of the average number of workdays credited to the peasants. This percentage varies directly with the volume of business handled at the store.

Other Occupations

The elite of the labor force have been the technicians, engineers, managers, and skilled workers. Managerial personnel earn roughly two to four times as much as an average industrial worker. Others

who are well paid include Government officials, doctors, and university professors, especially those teaching Communist theory. By contrast, teachers in elementary and middle schools earn no more than the average industrial worker (see table 31).

Table 31. Wage Scale in North Korea by Selected Occupations, Mid-1960's

Occupation	Monthly Salary (in wŏn *)
Workers:	
Textile mill (female)	28–53
Industrial (average)	30–52
Office (clerks)	35–70
Fertilizer factory	40–90
Iron and steel mill	50–110
Public employees:	
Division head (county level)	50
Bureau head (provincial level)	100–120
Bureau head (national level)	120–150
Cabinet Minister	230–270
Managerial:	
Manager (of small enterprise)	80–100
Manager (of intermediate enterprise)	120–150
Manager (of large enterprise)	150–180
Professional:	
People's school (elementary) teacher	35–45
Average actor or actress	59–81
University professor	60–190
Physician	85–120
People's Actor (highest classification)	200

* Approximately 2.5 wŏn equal US$1.

Source: Adapted from Yoo, Wan-shik, "The Ch'ŏllima (Flying Horse) Movement," *Korean Affairs*, No. 2, 1963, pp. 168, 169; and *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam, 1945–1968* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945–1968), p. 411.

Forced Labor

Forced labor is not publicly sanctioned by the Government but, according to fragmentary indications, it is widely practiced in order to "reeducate" political offenders and to reform ordinary criminals on State projects. Its use, however, is not extensive enough to contribute significantly to the national economy.

From 1910 to 1945 the Japanese used forced labor for many of their projects in Korea. During the latter part of World War II they conscripted, in part by force, approximately 2 million Koreans for labor in Japan and on Japanese-held islands in the Pacific.

Short-term conscripted labor is traditional in Korea, and it is used extensively in North Korea. In the past each farm family had to contribute its share of work to the maintenance of communal roads, bridges, or other public works, mostly in areas near their own villages. The work period required was usually 1 day a month. In 1968 the Government required that men take part in joint work over 230 days a year; women, over 180 days; and pregnant women or those with infants of less than 1 year, at least 130 days a year.

Correctional labor may be imposed upon those who are convicted for minor crimes. Such labor, ranging in length of service from 1 day to a maximum of 1 year, is performed at specially designated sites. The prisoners are compensated, although up to 25 percent of their earnings may be taken for the State budget. Labor performed in the correctional center is not to be considered in the calculation of an individual's pension. A person sentenced to a maximum of 4 months' imprisonment could substitute correctional labor on a ratio of 3 days' labor for each day of confinement.

CHAPTER 21
DOMESTIC TRADE

The process of socializing commerce and industry, initiated in 1946, had been completed by the end of 1958. It resulted in Government controls and centralized planning of all phases of commodity distribution and exchange. As a result, domestic trade was reorganized and carried on under either State or cooperative management. Outside the planned economy were a number of peasant markets playing a major role as supply channels for farm produce to the urban populace, but they, too, were dominated by the State and by the cooperative farms.

Although retail stores steadily increased in number, the authorities frequently expressed the view that their performance had not measured up to desired standards. Official acceptance of the peasant market system in the 1960's appeared to have been motivated in part by the inadequacy of the State-controlled distribution sector.

In mid-1968 price control and regulation was a function of the Central Government. Wholesale and retail prices were generally standardized, although variations were permitted under certain conditions. For example, peasant markets, though they were not free from Government supervision, were permitted to set their own prices according to conditions of supply and demand and operated on a limited basis as outlets for surplus farm produce.

Equally important in the development of domestic trade, the transportation system, which had been virtually destroyed during the Korean war, has been rebuilt and improved. The railroad network formed the basic system for freight transportation, and lines have been constructed and extended from centers of raw materials to industrial sites. River traffic, which supplemented the railroads was limited by the seasonal factors of flood, drought, and ice (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

DOMESTIC TRADE BEFORE 1945

Domestic trade in pre-liberation Korea was a relatively unimportant part of the economy. It was carried on in the rural areas mainly by itinerant merchants and artisans, with village markets

serving as hubs of local commerce. In large villages the marketplace, permanent and well defined, usually was surrounded by shops; in small villages it was a courtyard or merely a widening in the road. In larger towns with 10,000 or more inhabitants, shops were more numerous.

The growth of domestic trade was slow, partly because artisans produced for the benefit of the ruling *yangban* class and only secondarily for marketplaces, and partly because the artisans and merchants were socially discriminated against under the Confucian-oriented social structure (see ch. 6, Social Structure and Ethnic Groups). Moreover, beginning in the last decade of the 19th century, Korean artisans were hard put in the face of competition from machine-manufactured, imported Japanese goods, and their guilds, which for several centuries had monopolized the production and distribution of whatever commodities were in circulation, gradually lost their economic importance.

During the Japanese occupation, the ever-increasing commodity imports from Japan helped to raise the volume of retail trade; however, due to the minimal purchasing power of the perennially indigent farmers, the greater turnover had little impact on the rural economy and, therefore, did not increase the interdependence of commerce and agriculture or of the urban and rural sectors of the economy. The inertia of agrarian economy contributed further to the resistance to innovations, and the farmer went about the age-old pattern of farming and of satisfying his economic needs through the village or town market.

The market, the principal economic link between the rural and urban populace, drew people from 5 miles around, and occasionally from 10 to 15 miles. Each village or town had a different market day, since many of the merchants and artisans traveled from one place to another, offering their wages by the side of the main street. Foodstuffs were distributed from small stalls which stocked the staple items of the Korean diet, such as rice and other cereals, fish, vegetables, fruits, and eggs. Other goods were sold through small specialty shops.

For most of the farmers, the markets were the only outlet for such homemade goods as straw mats, straw sandals, and woodwork, plus whatever produce he could spare to trade for such necessities as salt, tobacco, farm tools, and occasionally cosmetics and cotton and woolen fabrics. Chemical fertilizer, although highly desirable, was beyond the reach of most farmers.

In addition to the tradesmen in market towns, itinerant peddlers served each village directly, making their rounds once or twice a year. They included shoe repairers, who visited about once every 2 months; stone carvers, who roughened the village

grinding stone or assisted in the building of a mill; carpenters, who made and repaired the individual Korean serving tables, which represented the finest woodworking to be found in a village; gourd repairers; umbrella makers; men who made and repaired sieves; and those who collected snakes for medical uses.

DOMESTIC TRADE SINCE 1945

Transition to Socialism (1946–58)

Starting with the Soviet occupation at the end of World War II, about 12 years elapsed before all retail commodity circulation came under direct or indirect Government control. This period was marked by a series of State advances into the field which reduced the private sector of the system from 96.5 percent at the end of the Japanese occupation to virtually zero by 1958 or soon after, although a flourishing peasant market was continued outside the regular State distribution system (see table 32).

Table 32. North Korean Retail Trade for Selected Years

(in percentages)

	1946	1949	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1960	1963
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Combined State and cooperative trade	3.5	56.5	67.5	71.9	84.6	87.3	87.9	99.2	99.4
State	0.1	27.9	32.0	39.1	50.6	53.9	48.8	78.8	80.2
Cooperative	3.4	28.6	35.5	32.8	34.0	33.4	39.1	20.4	19.2
Private commerce	96.5	32.3	27.4	22.5	10.3	7.7	12.1[1]	—	—
Peasant market	—	11.2	5.1	5.6	5.1	5.0	—[1]	0.8[2]	0.6

[1]Part of this figure may include peasant market, for which information is not available.

[2]A comparison between State-cooperative and private trade for the 1958–1959 period has not been made public by the Government, presumably because of the elimination of the private sector (rural and urban), during that period. The peasant markets reappeared in 1960, the same year in which the individual tools and garden plots of collective members were returned to them.

Sources: Adapted from *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–68* Tokyo: 1967, p. 842; "Cooperative Trade," *Kyŏngje Kŏnsŏl,* No. 2, Pyongyang: February 1958, p. 67; Ryu, Hun, *Study of North Korea,* Seoul: 1966, p. 262,

The system of State stores which the Soviet occupation authorites introduced in 1946 encountered brisk competition at the outset from the private sector, a fact which no doubt hastened the elimination of the latter. Government officials complained openly about embezzlement, waste, and inefficient retail methods of State

stores. Further, goods were entering black markets, and speculation and profiteering were having a serious inflationary impact. Employees of State stores were said to regard customers with bureaucratic indifference, contributing to their uneconomical operation.

Probably because of the shortcomings, the Government continued to tolerate private business and commerce until 1954–55. Although there had been restrictions on such commerce, these went largely unheeded, and the Government, exhausted by the Korean war, apparently did not feel itself politically strong enough to enforce them. Black market operations were becoming an impediment to Socialist planning. By the end of 1954 the volume of goods handled through permitted private commerce was 28 percent of the total volume. Since this did not count unreported transactions between private parties, the actual total of private trade was probably higher. Private commerce included, among other items, dealings in foodstuffs, clothing, Chinese medicines, and cosmetics, as well as such service trades as operation of barbershops, beauty shops, and restaurants.

One of the first steps in the transformation of the economy was taken under Soviet direction in August 1946 when the law on the nationalization of important industries was promulgated. At that time 72.4 percent of the output of the industrial sector was brought under Government control, 27.6 percent remaining in the hands of private capital. Between 1946 and 1949 the output of the Socialist sector increased to 90.7 percent, whereas that of the small private businesses and industries decreased to 9.3 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage of retail trade carried on by State and cooperative stores had risen to 56.5 percent.

Beginning in 1949, there was a continuing increase in Government takeover and control of industry and trade. In April 1955, because the country was struggling to rehabilitate the war-damaged economy with minimal dissipation of resources, a campaign was instituted to eliminate embezzlement, waste, theft, acceptance of bribes, and tax evasions. The effort was directed toward both State and private business. Many persons were accused, tried, found guilty, and sent to labor camps.

The attempt to bring private commerce under complete control began in October 1955. At that time the Government encouraged private businessmen to join the State-operated commercial sector by employing various tax schemes, including an income tax, a commodity tax, and a business tax, as well as by imposing rigid price controls. Moreover, in an effort to stamp out the black market, a strict accounting system was initiated so that the movement and disposition of goods could be more easily traced.

The Government stepped up its campaign in April 1956. Private businesses were required to obtain new licenses to continue in operation, as well as licenses to handle designated commodities. The approval required for production of consumer goods by the private sector, including kinds and quantities, was extended also to marketing. Prices for private retail sales were also fixed at this time.

By 1957 more than 98 percent of the industrial output was in Government hands, and over 87 percent of the total retail trade was carried on by State-run and cooperative stores. A sweeping reorganization of the economy was ordered in June 1958 by the Party's Central Committee. All private enterprise was incorporated into cooperatives, and domestic trade was reorganized accordingly. A Socialist economic system had come into full sway (see ch. 19, Industry).

Distribution Control (1958–68)

The Government had three basic reasons for the decision to take over distribution of consumer goods: to divert more resources to heavy industry, to reduce the level of consumer spending, and to maintain the balance between the industrial and nonindustrial sectors. There was also an underlying political reason arising from the intraparty battle over the relative weight to be given to consumer goods, a battle that split the Party in the period leading up to the takeover of private business. Premier Kim Il-sung realized that he must control retail trade if he hoped to impose his basic economic policy (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The basic Party policy laid down in 1958 therefore continued to govern the economy through 1968, although there was a major reorganization of the retail distribution system announced by the Cabinet in June 1964. Under the revised system, wholesale trade was separated from retail trade and subjected to the central control of the Ministry of Commerce, which was also directed to take over the administration and technical guidance of commerce in general. The provincial people's committees were made responsible for control over wholesale trade within the provinces and for administration and guidance of retail trade. Control over retail trade was placed in charge of the municipal and county people's committees.

Preliminary plans for the sale of finished goods were drafted by one of the administrative offices in the Ministry of Commerce and integrated with the overall plan compiled by the State Planning Commission. The final distribution plan was transmitted by the Ministry of Commerce to the provincial wholesale commerce control bureaus and the municipal and county offices for implementa-

tion on the retail level. Through this chain of command, the Ministry of Commerce allocated commodities to each retail store, fixed most retail prices, and set forth the specific items to be kept in stock and the time period within which they were to be sold. The allocation of specific commodities among the retail outlets varied according to the location, population, and general character of the community.

State Commerce

State stores, in principle, are owned jointly by all the people and are operated by the Ministry of Commerce, local government organs, ministries in charge of heavy and light industries, and various other ministries, including the Ministry of National Defense. These establishments are engaged in both wholesale and retail operations in cities and industrial areas.

At the time of the 1964 reorganization of the economy, immediate authority over retail commerce, which had been exercised by the Central Government was transferred to the municipal and county people's committees, which thereupon organized local commerce divisions for the control of trade. The separation of State retail operations from those of wholesaling was carried out in the belief that the local organs could be a better judge of supply and demand situations in their respective areas.

The functions of improving the exchange and distribution of commodities from one part of the country to another, as well as the mobilization of locally available resources, were supervised by the provincial purchasing agencies. Accordingly, purchasing agents were sent throughout each province to buy needed goods and supplies and to have them transported to designated wholesale centers. These wholesale centers were built near retail outlets so that supply lines were short and transportation delays minimized.

Since 1948 the Government also has operated a wide variety of special stores, originally taken over from the Japanese, confiscated from "national traitors," or acquired from private businessmen. They sell books, newspapers, stationery, furniture, porcelain, metal products, sports equipment, imported commodities, and other items of various kinds. In the 1960's a number of consumer goods such as gabardine, knitwear, vinyl raincoats, fountain pens, mechanical pencils, pottery, and candies were sold in these stores, but they were either rationed or priced out of the reach of the ordinary worker. The special commissary in Pyongyang was one such outlet where ample supplies of foodstuffs and luxury items could be purchased by top Party members who were not subject to the rationing restrictions placed upon the common people (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

Cooperative-run Commerce

By the end of May 1946 the Party had set up the first consumer cooperatives. These cooperatives were actually reorganized local associations and welfare clubs which had originally been formed by the people for the purpose of circulating needed commodities and had only later been taken over by the Government.

Until the Korean war, these consumer cooperatives operated networks of retail stores and supply centers. After 1953, however, the Government began to take over much of this business in the cities and in workers' settlements. As a result, the operations of the consumer cooperatives were limited to the rural areas.

Moreover, upon the completion of the cooperativization of the rural economy and the termination of all private enterprise in 1958, the operations of the consumer cooperatives were transferred to the cooperative farms. In the same year the peasants' individual tools and garden plots were also taken over by the cooperatives. In an avowed effort to bring the production and consumption sectors closer together, the Party permitted the agricultural and fishery cooperatives to sell their products directly to the consumer. In effect, they superseded the peasant markets which had been in operation for many years. The Government did not publish any statistics on private economic activity for 1958 and 1959, probably because of the lack of peasant produce for sale, as well as the discontinuation of other forms of private enterprise. In 1960 the regime returned the individual tools and garden plots to the peasants so that they were again able to sell their individually produced products, either through the cooperative or in direct trade; the authorities, in fact, encouraged them to do so (see ch. 8, Living Conditions).

The cooperative farms, meanwhile, conducted a two-day business: they operated stores and restaurants; supplied members with textiles, footwear, and other manufactured goods procured from Government channels; and at the same time provided the outlet for grain, agricultural products, and sideline handicrafts of members. Notwithstanding the semi-autonomy of the cooperative enterprises, the prices of all their goods and services were nationally controlled.

Peasant Markets

By 1964 the peasant markets had made considerable headway. A 1965 report said there were more than 400 large and small peasant markets in existence, which would mean an average of at least two in each county; however, the Government has said little publicly about them since that time, and there was no definite information as to their role in the economy by 1968. Since

the peasant markets appear to have been accepted reluctantly by the regime as a necessary expedient, the leadership, presumably, is not anxious to talk about them publicly.

The markets have been rationalized as a means of bringing the urban and rural societies closer together, one of the hoped-for milestones on the road to a classless society, but they were undoubtedly allowed to grow primarily as an economic safety valve. Admittedly poor distribution and laggard manufacturing by the State system, producing unfulfilled demands for consumer goods, greatly concerned the Party leadership. The peasant markets helped to remedy these deficiencies and, thus, to check inflation and black marketing that otherwise might occur. They also served the political purpose of blunting the dissatisfaction of both urban and rural workers with the workings of the economic system.

As authoritatively described in the mid-1960's, the peasant markets were not free markets in the accepted non-Communist sense, although they were outside the regular State distribution system and did function, to some extent, on a supply and demand basis. They provided a direct meeting ground between producer cooperatives and consumers or retail outlets and, to a limited extent, between individuals. For the rural cooperative farm member, this meant profits over and above his share of cooperative receipts from sales to the State. For the urban worker, the peasant market provided goods which might not be available at certain times in the State stores because of poor seasonal and geographic planning or for other reasons. Often the goods in peasant markets were of better quality than those provided by State stores.

In the peasant markets urban workers were able to buy surplus poultry, rabbits, beef, pork, mutton, fish, eggs, milk, vegetables, vinegar, and seasonings. Many of these items were not available under the ration system at State store prices (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). Peasants, in turn, could purchase hardware and stationery supplies, for example, and could use State-operated barbershops, restaurants, and hotels located in the market area.

In 1964 Government officials were urged to take an active interest in the operation of the peasant markets. They were told that development of the markets could contribute to the living standards and that official indifference would hinder the mobilization of needed resources. Realizing that in the long run it could maintain control better by joining rather than by attempting to suppress the markets, the Government decided to reinforce the effectiveness of the markets and, at the same time, expand the role of controlled marketing channels in these places. Therefore, the authorities established within the markets State foodstores which would buy the surplus products of peasants and resell them

to urban workers. These stores also stocked manufactured goods which peasants could buy with the proceeds of their sales. Cattle pens and storage facilities were built. The number of direct sales stores run by cooperative farms in the markets was substantially increased.

By these measures the Government cut distribution costs, among other expenses, since the cost of transporting goods to the markets was largely borne by the peasants and cooperative farms. Individual peasants were urged to remain at work on their farms and let the cooperatives and State stores handle the exchange for them in the urban and rural areas. In many cases, especially for those far removed from the nearest market, they had little choice since they could not leave their work without losing part of their already limited share of receipts from cooperative farm operations.

In addition, the Government adjusted its own standard prices for commodities to meet local market conditions. It also called for establishment of regular market days throughout the country. In cities and in workers' settlements free markets were to be open daily, but in county seats and farming areas they were scheduled for Sundays and holidays so as not to interfere with work schedules. Mobile sales units and even credit sales were planned.

On the other hand, the Government was aware that in other Communist countries the development of peasant markets had gradually led to other inroads into the forward path of Socialist economy; it warned officials about the possibility of speculative activities in these markets, which would result in losses to both producers and consumers. It urged them to exercise vigilance and to ensure that "a high cultural . . . moral standard" was maintained in the operation of these markets.

PRICE REGULATION

In 1968 both wholesale and retail prices in the regular distribution system had been standardized and were a major feature of the planned economy. Official reports stated that the people could purchase essential goods at uniform prices anywhere in the country, even in the most remote areas.

Wholesale

Commodity wholesale prices were figured on the basis of the cost of the raw materials and the cost of production, including taxes, plus the planned profit to be realized which, for local enterprises, ranged from 3 to 6 percent. In addition, the cost of trans-

porting the finished products from wholesale centers to retail outlets was to be borne by the wholesale organs.

Retail

Retail prices were decided upon by combining the wholesale price with the profit to be made by the store plus the tax on commerce. The commerce tax was based upon various circulation expenses which included depreciation allowances, storage fees, wrapping expenses, transportation fees, and wages. Circulation expenses were higher for those commodities which were difficult to transport and store, such as foodstuffs and perishables.

In order to take advantage of varying local conditions, in 1962 the State had somewhat relaxed its retail price-setting regulations on certain goods. For instance, under carefully controlled and stipulated conditions, prices could be agreed upon between authorized buyers and sellers; these were called "retail prices by agreement" and were valid for only 1 year. This price-setting mechanism was used mainly when dealing with products manufactured from raw materials purchased at retail prices.

TRANSPORTATION

Damage to the transportation facilities during the Korean war was particularly severe, and in 1953 reconstruction required heavy investment outlays. Communist countries provided a large portion of their capital goods grants in the form of transportation equipment. The restoration of rail transportation received the highest priority, since the greater part of the goods imported from the Communist nations entered the north by rail. Marine transportation appeared to have recovered more slowly, and rehabilitation of major ports was conducted under both the Five-Year Plan (1957–61) and the Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67). In 1968 foreign ships called at such ports as Namp'o on the west coast and at Ch'ŏngjin and Hamhŭng on the east coast.

Railroads

In the Korean conflict the north lost 70 percent of its locomotives, 90 percent of its locomotive sheds, 65 percent of its freight cars, and 90 percent of its passenger cars. The postwar rehabilitation program, in addition to restoring destroyed trackage, called for the restoration of 519 bridges and for a substantial amount of tunnel work and support-wall construction. As a result of this and other continuing repair work, including the electrification of several lines, approximately 6,500 miles of track were

in use in 1968, and normal traffic was restored to much of the country.

The major line on the west coast was the Kyŏng-Ui line, which connected Sinŭiju, at the mouth of the Yalu River, with Kaesŏng via Pyongyang. On the east coast was the Wŏlla line, running from Wŏnsan to Najin. The materials moving south along this latter line included lignite, lumber, ore, ferrous metals, fishery products, and ceramics; those going north were anthracite, iron ore, fertilizer, grain, and salt (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

The only through railroad from east to west was the P'yŏng-Wŏn line between Wŏnsan and Pyongyang, on which there was heavy freight traffic. The materials transported from east to west included lignite, chemical fertilizers, fishery products, and lumber, and carried in the opposite direction were such materials as anthracite, salt, grain, and machinery (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

Ports and Waterways

In comparison with the railroads, water transport played a relatively minor role in the national transportation system. In 1961 the marine sector accounted for 0.4 percent of the passenger traffic; in 1963 it contributed only 1.1 percent to the total volume of all transported goods. Although approximately 85 percent of all shipping vessels were sunk during the war, the Government, in deciding to concentrate upon rail transport, only called for the building of 146 new small vessels with a total tonnage of 9,350 tons and the raising of 255 tons of sunken vessels in its Three-Year Plan (1954–56).

Although shipping did not contribute heavily to the total national volume, important supplies were moved up and down the coasts. For instance, coal, cement, timber, and construction materials were transported along the east coast, and salt and iron ore were carried along the west coast.

Shipping was heavier on the east coast than on the west where the sea was relatively shallow; the sea off the east coast was sufficiently deep to accommodate ships of the 10,000-ton class. In the late 1960's, however, work still had to be done on the harbor and port facilities at Wŏnsan, Tanch'ŏn, Ch'ŏngjin, and Hŭngnam to allow vessels of this size to dock.

On the other hand, most navigable rivers were on the west coast, including the Yalu, the Taedong, the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn, the Yesŏng, and the Chaeryŏng. These rivers were important both industrially and commercially, and regular freight service was maintained on them during the warm months. Seasonal factors, though, played an important part in water transport as the rivers

in the north are frozen from November to March. It was reported that during these months snowsleds were used on the upper Yalu to transport materials. Periods of flood and drought also affected river transport.

Roads and Airways

Although many roads were rebuilt after the war, motor transport continued to play a supplementary role in the movement of freight and passengers. In 1962 trucks carried only 5.9 percent of all freight; although this was over four times as much as in 1949, it was still far less than that transported by rail. Moreover, although motor vehicles accounted for approximately 28 percent of passenger traffic in 1960, the railroads carried more than 71 percent, water transport being of small importance.

Motor travel was mainly confined to arterial connections between transportation points, such as railroad sidings and terminals and ports; in addition, travel in the mid-1960's was limited to trips of no more than 18.5 miles in order to conserve gasoline. In principle, any travel or shipment over this distance limit was to to by rail; however, exceptions were made for travel in the interior of the country where there were no railroads. Seasonal factors also entered into the utility of using motor transport; early snows in the winter and rainfall during the other seasons often made mountain roads impassable.

In April 1960 civil aviation was placed under Air Force control, ostensibly to streamline its operations, but also reflecting, perhaps, the increasingly militaristic posture of the country. International air service was maintained among Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow, with three flights weekly, but indications in 1968 were that service between Pyongyang, and Peking may have been suspended because of the deteriorating political relationships between the two countries (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Sunan airport, about 10 miles north of Pyongyang, served as both an international airport and as a facility for the military and civilian sectors. The road from Sunan to Pyongyang was surfaced with concrete and served as a high-speed arterial highway linking the capital with the airport. In addition to Sunan, other major civilian airports were located at Pyongyang, Hamhŭng, Ch'ŏngjin, and Wŏnsan.

CHAPTER 22
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The primary role of foreign trade is to aid the Government in the establishment of what it terms an "independent national economy" by offering finished products on the world market at competitive prices, rather than to remain in its colonial role as a supplier of raw materials. To achieve this transformation, foreign trade is completely controlled by the Government and geared to national economic planning.

As North Korea does not release for external consumption information about the volume and value of its foreign trade, statistics are based upon data published by its trading partners. Total trade for 1967 was estimated at US$500 million. This is a tentative figure, however, as reliable information was not available regarding the value of trade with Communist China. In 1965 a British source suggested that Communist China had supplanted the Soviet Union as North Korea's most important trading partner. Fragmentary non-Communist reports hinted that North Korean trade with Communist China was about equal to that with the Soviet Union from 1964 through 1966. The extent that North Korean-Communist Chinese trade may have been affected by internal turmoil in Communist China arising from the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was not clear in 1968.

After the end of the Korean war the country was dependent upon aid from the Communist nations in order to restore its shattered economy. Economic aid was closely coordinated with the country's national development plans. Many of the aid agreements had time limits coinciding with plan dates, and a number of agreements referred specifically to particular projects involved in the plans. The bulk of aid agreements expired at the end of 1957, but North Korea subsequently received additional grants and aid from the Communist states.

During the 1960's the volume of foreign trade increased rapidly. Although North Korea continued to stress trade with Communist countries, it was also developing trade with non-Communist countries in order to achieve a measure of independence from the Soviet Union and Communist China and to obtain freely convertible foreign exchange. By 1968 North Korea claimed that trade

relations had been established with over 70 countries, but in many instances relations were sporadic and of little economic significance. The bulk of trade was conducted with a limited number of countries. The Soviet Union and Communist China were North Korea's most important trading partners, accounting for about 77 percent of its total trade turnover in 1967. Japan accounted for about 55 percent of North Korean dealings with non-Communist nations in 1967.

Intensive efforts have been made to expand and diversify the number of commodities available for export. In 1959 North Korea was primarily an exporter of raw materials, chiefly of mineral ores. As the level of industrialization rose, ores were converted into semifinished products, such as pig iron and rolled steel, and then exported. Beginning in 1960, machine tools, electric motors, and transformers were also available for export. As manufacturing capabilities improved, a shift occurred in the composition of imports from machines, factory installations, and consumer goods to raw materials, fuels, and highly specialized machinery that were beyond domestic production capabilities.

PRE-1945 TRADE

During the Japanese occupation (1910–45), Korean foreign trade was monopolized by Japan. Until the outbreak of World War II, Japan and its empire took more than 93 percent of Korea's exports and supplied over 94 percent of its imports. Korea accounted for a quarter of the total value of Japan's foreign and colonial trade.

Korea's export trade during the Japanese period was predominantly of foodstuffs and raw materials; imports were chiefly of manufactured goods. Over half the total value of exports consisted of agricultural and marine products, including rice, soybeans, tobacco, and fish. After foodstuffs, the most important export items in value were minerals, including copper, iron, lead, gold, tungsten, and zinc ores; coal, graphite, barite, and fluorite. Processed and semiprocessed goods for export included ginned cotton, silk and cocoons, fertilizers, chemicals, dyes, drugs, cloth, oils, fats, and waxes; the last three were largely derived from the fish catch.

Imports consisted mainly of textiles, both raw materials and cloth, supplied almost exclusively by Japan. Minerals, ores, metals, and machinery necessary for industrialization were next in importance. Much food had to be imported to compensate for the highly regarded Korean rice which the country was forced to export to Japan. Korea had to accept, as a substitute, Manchurian

millet and, toward the end of World War II, Vietnamese rice, which Koreans regard as inferior.

Korea constantly ran an unfavorable balance of trade because its output of industrial and consumer goods could not match the value of the imports it required for food and rapid industrialization. The debits also included the returns on the large Japanese investments and the interest on Korea's national debt, which was held largely by Japanese nationals in Japan. Of lesser importance were remittances to Japan by Japanese workers in Korea and pension payments to Japanese residents formerly employed in Korea.

The gap in the balance of trade and payments was partly filled through shipments of gold and silver, direct Japanese investment in Korea (both governmental and private), and external loans of the Japanese colonial administration. Additional credit items included Korean remittances from overseas expenditures by foreign governments and religious organizations and direct grants made by the Japanese Government in Tokyo to its colonial administration in Seoul. The Japanese developed Korean ports capable of handling large-scale foreign trade, but shipping and auxiliary services remained primarily in their hands.

FOREIGN AID AND LOANS

Available data on the total amount of foreign aid and loans received from the Communist nations are incomplete and often contradictory. Based on North Korean, Soviet Union, Republic of Korea, and Japanese sources, the total for the years between 1949 and 1962 is estimated at the equivalent of $1.37 billion. Of this total, $557 million, or nearly 41 percent, came from the Soviet Union; one source put the Soviet total at $550 from 1949 to mid-1964. Communist China provided $517 million, or about 38 percent; other Communist nations contributed $296 million, or 21 percent of the total.

The Soviet Union

Before the Korean war North Korea turned to Moscow to obtain the goods and services needed to implement its 2-year economic program (1949–50). A 10-year pact on mutual economic and cultural cooperation and three economic protocols were signed in Moscow in March 1949. In addition to a trade-barter agreement covering 1949 and 1950 and a special agreement on technical assistance, the Soviet Union granted a long-term loan of 212 million rubles (5.3 rubles equaled US$1 at that time) for the purchase of Soviet goods in excess of the agreed volume of barter.

After the hostilities ended, the Soviet Union expanded its aid to rebuild the war-devastated economy. In September 1953 a grant of 1 billion rubles ($250 million at 4 rubles to the dollar) was announced; the funds were to be coordinated with the Three-Year Plan (1954–56). Existing debts to the Soviet Union incurred under the 1949 pact were scaled down substantially. The 1953 agreement specifically mentioned a number of projects: the restoration of the Sup'ung hydroelectric plant on the Yalu River and metallurgical, chemical, cement, textile, meatpacking, and fish-packing plants. Also included were railroad rolling stock and equipment, agricutural machinery, fertilizers, horses, pedigreed livestock, fishing boats, and hospital and educational equipment.

In August 1956 the Soviet Union gave North Korea 170 million rubles ($42.5 million), which were dispensed over a 2-year period and were intended to aid the country's Five-Year Plan (1957–61). An additional 85 million rubles ($21.25 million) were granted in 1960 for the purchase of Soviet-made goods. In October 1960 the Soviet Union waived 760 million rubles ($190 million) in existing debts and lent North Korea 140 million rubles ($35 million), repayments to be made over a 10-year period beginning in 1967. In December 1960 a long-term trade and technical assistance agreement was announced. This agreement covered such specific projects as the expansion of the Kimch'aek Iron Works, thermal powerplants at Pyongyang and Pukch'ang, and a petrochemical plant at Wŏnsan, and the construction of linen and woolen textile plants. The projects listed in the 1960 agreement were intended to support the North Korean Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67). Work on some of these projects had been suspended for a while, because of the cooling of political relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union during 1963–64 (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

According to a Soviet source in 1968, the Soviet Union "built, modernized, and restored" more than 50 industrial plants and other projects since the post-World War II years. The source asserted that Soviet aid was instrumental in contributing 25 percent of North Korea's pig iron production; 10 percent of steel; 50 percent of cement; 30 percent of coke; 85 percent of nitrogen fertilizer; 15 percent of cement; 30 percent of flax, cotton, and silk; 100 percent of woolen products; and 40 percent of electric power. The Soviet source also stated that, between 1968 and 1973, 18 new projects would be completed with Russian assistance. These included the thermal powerplant at Pukch'ang with a 600,000-kilowatt capacity and an oil refinery with an annual capacity of 2 million tons at Unggi, less than 15 miles from the Soviet border. The completion of these projects would increase North

Korea's power output by 25 percent. The oil refinery project was already underway in August 1968.

Communist China

During the Korean war Communist China provided quantities of material and many troops. Soon after the war, in November 1953, North Korea and Communist China signed the 10-year Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation, by which Peking waived all debts (estimated at $72 million) incurred by the North Koreans during the hostilities and granted 8 trillion (old) yuan ($325.2 million) to be disbursed over a 4-year period.

The Chinese Communists announced that they would supply coal, cloth, cotton, grains, building materials, communications equipment, agricultural tools, other consumer goods, locomotives, and passenger and freight cars. They also pledged to help with railroad reconstruction, to send technicians to North Korea, and to accept North Korean workers and technicians in China for training. In 1958 Communist China lent an additional $10 million for a hydroelectric plant and $42.5 million for textile mills and papermills. In October 1960 Communist China announced a long-term loan of 420 million rubles ($105 million) to finance a number of projects, including plants for the manufacture of tires, radios, and cement.

Other Communist Countries

The total known aid to North Korea from other Communist states between 1945 and December 1962 was $296 million. Much of the aid was given to assist the north with its post-Korean war recovery program and, to a lesser extent, with its Five-Year Plan. Both general and specific commitments were made. Rumania agreed to build a cement factory. The East German regime undertook the major share of the reconstruction and development of the city of Hamhŭng, as well as a number of other projects. Outer Mongolia sent meat, leather goods, and various species of livestock. Agreements for scientific and technical cooperation were signed with Hungary in September 1953, with Czechoslovakia in December 1954, with Poland in May 1956, with Rumania in January 1959, and with East Germany in April 1960.

TRADE ORGANIZATION AND OBJECTIVES

Organization

As in other Communist nations, foreign trade is planned and conducted by the Government. From 1948 to 1952 the Ministry

of Commerce managed both domestic and foreign trade but, in order to deal more efficiently with the large amount of aid from other Communist countries during the Korean war, a separate Ministry of Foreign Trade was established in October 1952. In 1968 foreign trade was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Foreign Economic Relations Committee, and the Foreign Trade Bank.

The Foreign Economic Relations Committee, a Cabinet-level agency, is responsible for initiating trade relations with countries with which North Korea has no diplomatic relations. The committee also arranges for participation in international trade meetings and trade fairs and serves as a liaison body between foreign business firms and the domestic State-owned trade corporations. In 1968 there were 10 trade corporations, each of which specialized in one or more types of commodities, such as machinery, minerals, chemicals, or foodstuffs. Some of the corporations had branch offices in countries with which steady trade relations were maintained.

Foreign trade is conducted by means of governmental agreements or by transactions between the 10 trade corporations and foreign private firms. No tariffs are imposed upon goods imported under Government-level trade agreements. Approval by the Ministry of Foreign Trade is necessary for all transactions. By such control, only trade that aids the development of North Korea's planned economy is permitted. Financial transactions are handled by the Foreign Trade Bank (see ch. 23, Financial and Monetary System).

Objectives

The regime has utilized foreign trade too in the transformation of North Korea from an exporter of raw materials to a modern industrial state, exporting finished products. In 1968 imports were mostly capital goods, machinery, oil, and other products for enlarging the industrial base, whereas imports of consumer items—mostly foodstuffs—were being held to a minimum. To reduce the necessity for importing equipment not produced in sufficient quantities at home, efforts were being made to expand the internal manufacture of such equipment. The regime was able to achieve some success in this regard. The objective was to develop the export of more costly manufactured items and to limit imports to less expensive crude oil and raw materials for industrial processing. This pattern was expected to create a favorable balance of trade and build up quantities of foreign exchange. To make its manufactured goods more attractive on the international market, the regime began in 1958 to improve the quality, standardization, and packaging of commodities intended for export. In 1960 en-

terprises involved in the manufacture of goods intended for export became eligible for Government subsidies.

PATTERN OF FOREIGN TRADE

Overall trade has shown a steady upward trend, the regime claiming that the volume of exports in 1964 was three times that of 1956. Although trade with non-Communist countries increased by more than 500 percent since 1960, trade with Communist countries still accounted for 86 percent of North Korea's exports and 89 percent of its imports in 1967.

The total value of North Korea's trade in 1967 was estimated at about $500 million, of which about 87 percent, or $434.2 million, was derived from trade with Communist countries (see table 33). The Soviet Union and Communist China, with a combined

Table 33. North Korea's Overall Trade, 1960 and 1964–67

(in millions of dollars)

	1960	1964	1965	1966	1967[1]
EXPORTS:					
Communist countries:					
Soviet Union	74.6	80.6	82.2	92.3	107.9
Communist China[2]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	87.8[3]
Other	n.a.	21.3	21.3[4]	25.8	25.8[4]
Subtotal	—	182.5	185.7	210.4	221.5
Non-Communist Countries[5]:					
Japan	—	20.3	14.7	22.7	29.6
Other	5.7	3.0	7.9	11.1	9.1
Subtotal	—	23.3	22.6	33.8	38.7
TOTAL	n.a.	205.8	208.3	244.2	260.2
IMPORTS:					
Communist countries:					
Soviet Union	39.1	82.8	89.7	85.7	110.1
Communist China[2]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	81.2[3]
Other	n.a.	19.6	19.6[4]	21.4	21.4[4]
Subtotal	—	185.2	199.0	192.8	212.7
Non-Communist Countries[5]:					
Japan	1.1	11.3	16.5	5.0	6.4
Other	4.4	7.4	17.3	21.4	20.7
Subtotal	5.5	18.7	33.8	26.4	27.1
TOTAL	n.a.	203.9	232.8	219.2	239.8

n.a.—not available.

[1]Total trade turnover is estimated at $500 million. This figure is based upon an annual increase of $40 million to $50 million in trade value from 1963 to 1966.

[2]Firm data not available. Based on an unconfirmed British report that Communist

Table 33. North Korea's Overall Trade, 1960 and 1964–67—Continued

China might have replaced the Soviet Union as the principal trading partner of North Korea by the mid-1960's, and also on another unconfirmed Japanese estimate showing the 1966 turnover to be about $450 million. The value of trade for 1964–66 is tentatively assumed to be roughly equal to that between North Korea and the Soviet Union.

[3] $6.6 million surplus based upon 1966 figures. Disruptive effects of Chinese Cultural Revolution may have distorted trade balance in favor of North Korea to a greater degree than is indicated here.

[4] Assumed unchanged from previous year, as annual trade protocols have reflected no significant deviation from established patterns.

[5] Not adjusted for insurance and freight; an overstatement of North Korea's exports and an understatement of imports possible. The amount (percentage) of these charges depends on proximity—from zero in case of common borders to more than 10 percent of the exports and imports, the average assumed by the International Monetary Fund.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Analysis Division, *Export and Import Statistics on Trade between Communist Areas and Free World Countries* (mimeographed annual summaries), 1960–1967; Economic Intelligence Unit, August 1965, p. 13; and *Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan, 1967–1968,* Tokyo, p. 425.

total of $387 million, were North Korea's principal trade partners. A 1967 trade turnover of nearly $36 million made Japan North Korea's foremost non-Communist trade partner. Trade with all other non-Communist countries reached almost $30 million, the newly developing nations accounting for about $2 million.

The regime has pressed for the continued diversification of commodities available for export and has claimed to have expanded the variety of export goods over five times between 1956 and 1963, several hundred kinds of goods being available in 1963. In 1956 it was claimed that 54.3 percent of the total exports consisted of mineral ores; 36.8 percent, of processed metal and chemical products; and 0.3 percent, of machinery and equipment. By 1963 the proportions for the same categories were 12.4 percent, 53.5 percent, and 4.6 percent, respectively. As North Korea's industrial base continues to expand, domestic manufacture may become increasingly capable of absorbing much of the output of raw materials currently offered for export (see table 34).

Imports of machinery and equipment declined from 32.7 percent of the total imports in 1956 to 23.6 percent in 1963, reflecting the increased sophistication of the domestic machine-building industry. The regime claimed that in 1964 the country was 94.3 percent self-sufficient in machine production. Still beyond North Korean capabilities, however, was the production of various types of heavy and highly specialized machinery. Industrial expansion has required greatly increased imports of coking coal and oil resources, which the country lacks. Imports of foodstuffs, especially wheat, have risen sharply as a consequence of a rapidly

Table 34. North Korea's Imports and Exports by Commodities, Selected Years, 1953–64

(in percent)

Commodity	1953	1956	1959	1960	1964
Exports:					
Machinery and equipment	0.4	0.3	0.9	5.3	3.9
Fuel and related oil	—	0.4	4.8	3.2	n.a.
Electrical materials	2.2	0.1	2.4	—	n.a.
Minerals	81.8	54.3	14.5	12.8	11.5
Iron and nonmetallics	9.0	30.9	33.4	43.7	49.9
Chemical goods	0.05	5.9	13.4	12.1	6.0
Construction materials	—	—	1.5	3.3	n.a.
Fiber and fiber goods	0.7	0.3	—	0.6	n.a.
Agricultural by-products	3.9	3.6	13.7	10.2	n.a.
Foodstuffs	0.1	1.3	12.2	6.3	5.9
Marine products	1.8	2.9	2.8	1.8	n.a.
Other	0.05	—	0.4	0.7	n.a.
Imports:					
Machinery and equipment	34.3	32.7	34.8	22.5	21.2
Fuel and related oil	9.8	8.4	12.4	18.3	22.1
Electrical materials	8.6	7.7	5.4	1.6	n.a.
Minerals	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.0	4.6
Iron and nonmetallics	7.2	11.8	10.1	7.0	n.a.
Chemical and rubber goods	9.8	7.5	6.2	6.2	11.8
Contruction materials	1.4	0.02	0.1	0.1	n.a.
Pulp and paper goods	3.2	0.8	1.0	0.9	n.a.
Fiber and fiber goods	3.9	13.0	5.2	7.6	n.a.
Cultural goods and daily necessities	1.0	0.9	0.4	0.6	n.a.
Agricultural by-products	1.2	6.3	7.7	19.9	n.a.
Foodstuffs and related items	0.2	1.2	1.2	5.8	2.1
Other	19.2	9.2	14.7	8.5	n.a.

Source: Adapted from Democratic People's Republic of Korea National Economy Growth Statistics, as quoted in a translation of an article in *Chōsen Kenkyū* in JPRS: 27,724, *Economic Report on North Korea,* No. 134, pp. 28, 29; and *Chosŏn Chung'ang Yŏngam, 1965* Pyongyang), p. 159.

growing population. In 1966, 38 percent of total imports from non-Communist nations consisted of wheat and wheat flour. The main exports to non-Communist countries were semimanufactured metals, 42.9 percent; mineral ores, 21.8 percent; and foodstuffs, chiefly corn and marine products, 9.2 percent.

Trade with Communist Countries

Trade with the Communist world is claimed by the Government to have increased sharply since 1957. In the 1960's Cuba and North Vietnam were added to North Korea's Communist trading

partners. North Korea has long-term agreements with the Soviet Union and Communist China; agreements with Eastern European countries, Cuba, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia are renewed annually. Commodities specified for shipment do not appear to vary from year to year.

Soviet Union

Trade with the Soviet Union is based on a long-term agreement signed in December 1960. Before that year Soviet-North Korean trade was usually unbalanced to the disadvantage of North Korea (see table 35). As a consequence of the agreement, the Soviet Union greatly increased its imports from North Korea, resulting in a closely balanced trade pattern since 1961. In 1965 North Korean exports to the Soviet Union consisted mainly of rolled steel, magnesia products, rice, apples, and leaf tobacco. Imports included machinery and equipment, plant installations, petroleum products, raw cotton, grain, and tires. In December 1968 the two countries signed a protocol for 1969, envisaging "a marked growth in trade volume" during that year. North Korea agreed to deliver machine tools, electric motors, transformers, ferrous and nonferrous metals, magnesia products, nonmetallic minerals, and construction materials in return for Soviet machines, power equipment, bearings, oil products, fuel, electric wire, and other unspecified goods.

Table 35. North Korea's Trade with the Soviet Union, 1950–67

(in millions of dollars)

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance *	Year	Exports	Imports	Balance *
1950	42.6	68.7	—26.1	1960	74.6	39.1	+35.5
1951	29.5	18.1	+11.4	1961	79.1	77.0	+2.1
1952	28.7	39.1	—10.4	1962	87.4	79.9	+7.5
1953	25.4	32.5	—7.1	1963	88.0	81.3	+6.7
1954	27.0	18.2	+8.8	1964	80.6	82.8	—2.2
1955	40.7	44.1	—3.4	1965	82.2	89.7	—7.5
1956	51.2	53.8	—2.6	1966	92.2	85.7	+6.5
1957	62.5	59.9	+2.6	1967	107.9	110.1	—2.2
1958	47.0	58.0	—11.0				
1959	51.6	81.0	—29.4				

* Plus sign indicates balance in favor of North Korea; minus sign indicates balance in favor of the Soviet Union.

Communist China

Trade relations with Communist China are governed by yearly protocols. Few details are known of the value of North Korean-

Communist Chinese trade, as statistics are not published by either country; however, the Republic of Korea stated that the total amount in 1962 was about $100 million.

Fragmentary evidence indicates that the total value of trade has closely approximated that with the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1966. In 1966, for example, North Korea had a $6.5-million surplus in its trade with the Soviet Union, whereas it accumulated a total surplus of $6.7 million in its dealings with unspecified countries, which presumably included Bulgaria, Mongolia, North Vietnam, and Communist China. As trade with the first three countries is believed to be insignificant, it appears that the bulk of the $6.7-million surplus resulted from trade with Communist China; this suggests that the trade pattern with Communist China closely paralleled that with the Soviet Union in the 1964–66 period.

In 1964 Communist China agreed to deliver coking coal and other minerals, crude oil, alloy iron, seamless pipe, various kinds of structural steel, tires, raw rubber, various chemical reagents, ginned cotton, sugar, and other commodities in exchange for North Korean machine tools, magnesia products and other mineral ores, pig iron, various kinds of metals and alloy steel, cement, carbide, other chemical industrial products, red ginseng, and fiber goods.

Other Communist Countries

Trade with Communist countries other than the Soviet Union and Communist China amounted to about 9.5 percent of North Korea's total trade, according to a United States source published in 1968. Annual fluctuations rather than steady growth in volume have characterized the trade pattern between Pyongyang and the Eastern European countries (see table 36).

Products which North Korea has sent to Eastern Europe include magnesia products, ferrous and nonferrous metals, machine tools, chemicals, pig iron, electrolytic lead and zinc, carbide, cement, structural and alloy steel, processed foods, fruits, tobacco, and canned fish. From these countries North Korea has received a variety of manufactured items. Poland has sent mining machinery, ship engines, synthetic rubber, tires, and chemicals; East German exports were chemicals, photographic equipment, and machine accessories; and Czechoslovakia delivered tires, gauges, and installations for powerplants and film production. From Rumania North Korea obtained aluminum wire, bearings, tires, coke, soda, and spare parts for machinery; and Hungary has sent medicines and medical equipment, accessories for ships and motor vehicles, electric gauges, and condensers.

Table 36. North Korea's Trade with Selected Communist Countries Other Than the Soviet Union and Communist China, 1963, 1964, and 1966

(in millions of dollars)

Country	1963	1964	1965
Exports:			
Czechoslovakia	5.4	7.4	10.1
East Germany	2.8	4.6	3.1
Hungary	1.5	....	3.1
Poland	3.9	3.8	6.4
Rumania	5.5	5.5	3.1
Cuba	2.6	....	....
Total	21.7	21.3	25.8
Imports:			
Czechoslovakia	3.4	4.7	3.8
East Germany	4.0	4.9	3.8
Hungary	2.9	....	1.8
Poland	4.8	4.5	5.8
Rumania	4.9	5.5	3.6
Cuba	2.6	....	2.6
Total	22.6	19.6	21.4

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Analysis Division, *Export and Import Statistics on Trade between Communist Areas and Free World Countries* (mimeographed annual summaries), 1960–1967.

In 1961 North Korea bought $3.1 million worth of sugar from Cuba, although this volume has not been equaled in subsequent years. A 1964 agreement with Cuba provided that North Korea would supply machine tools, carbon steel instruments, locomotive accessory parts, disc plows, and porcelain ware in exchange for sugar and rope. A 1964 agreement with North Vietnam involved deliveries by North Korea of various machines and tools, rolled steel, chemicals, fiber products, and other commodities in exchange for chrome ore, apatite, tin, bamboo, and other goods. Mongolia has sent wax, glue, and wool in return for North Korean chemicals, tools, and processed food.

Trade with Non-Communist Countries

The Government launched a trade offensive in 1955 designed to establish ties with the non-Communist world. Although the primary motive was political, economic considerations assumed increasing importance (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). In early

1956 the Government began a widespread campaign to reduce the consumption of foreign goods and to increase the production of potential exports in order to earn foreign exchange. In August 1965 Pyongyang announced the opening of Ch'ŏngjin, Hŭngnam, and Namp'o to foreign shipping for the first time since the Korean war.

The decision in 1957 by most members of the United Nations to end the trade embargo against North Korea that had been in effect since the Korean war substantially aided the Communist regime. In 1961 Japan also lifted its embargo. The United States and the Republic of Korea have had no trade relations with the north.

In 1957 official trade and payments agreements were concluded with India, Indonesia, Burma, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). In the 1960's efforts were directed toward African and Middle Eastern countries, resulting in trade and payments agreements with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco in 1961 and with Pakistan in 1966. A most-favored-nation agreement was signed with Ceylon in 1962. Unofficial trade agreements have been made by the Foreign Economic Relations Committee or by a State-controlled trade organization with trade associations or leading firms in a number of other countries, including almost all of the Western European countries and Mexico, Canada, Australia, Iraq, Turkey, Cambodia, Thailand, and Hong Kong.

The trade agreements enumerated in detail the kinds of goods offered for export. Some contained statements of trade goals, quotas, guarantees, and periods of validity. The agreements with Ceylon and Indonesia called for payments to be made in pounds sterling, whereas the agreement with India specified payment in nonconvertible rupees. The large number of items on the commodity lists does not reflect the amount of trade actually conducted; North Korea has too little foreign exchange to make regular purchases from all the countries with which it has agreements. Many commodities or items are purchased on a sporadic basis, when a pressing need arises for them (see tables 37 and 38). The regime regards the trade agreements primarily as political propaganda and gives widespread publicity to each one that is signed or renewed.

In 1965, 50 percent of North Korea's exports to non-Communist countries consisted of iron, steel, and other metal products; pig iron is the largest single item in this group. Metallic ores accounted for 20 percent; fish and rice, 10 percent; and silk and coal, 6 percent each. Foodstuffs, mostly wheat but also some sugar, amounted to 50 percent of imports in 1965, followed by machinery and transportation equipment, 18 percent; chemicals, 12 percent; and other manufactured goods, 10 percent.

Table 37. North Korean Imports from Non-Communist Countries 1960, 1964, and 1965–67

(in thousands of dollars)

	1960	1964	1965	1966	1967[1]
Western Europe:					
Austria	1	236	873	55	123
Belgium	4	101	104	76	107
Denmark	.....	1	1	1	3
Finland	.....	.....	.....	7	.....
France	.....	38	4,373	6,844	8,145
Germany (West)	459	897	1,606	1,041	3,276
Greece	.....	.....	.....	5,464	.....
Italy	535	653	221	325	862
Netherlands	.....	4,740	4,625	1,346	720
Norway	.....	5	.....	.....	.....
Portugal	.....	.....	.....	.....	35
Spain	.....	2	.....	1	11
Sweden	.....	.....	18	1	104
Switzerland	9	1	5	2	78
United Kingdom	222	52	109	48	75
Subtotal	1,230	6,726	11,935	15,211	13,539
Asia:					
Australia	3,032	3	4,300	3,034	5,907
Burma	63	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ceylon	.....	.....	34	34	.....
Hong Kong	1	3	103	121	95
India	4	.....	2	.....	.....
Indonesia	.....	.....	.....	669	.....
Japan	1,138	11,285	16,507	5,017	6,370
Pakistan	.....	.....	1	3	139
Subtotal	4,238	11,291	20,947	8,878	12,511
Africa and Middle East:					
Dahomey	.....	.....	.....	28	.....
Morocco	.....	2	.....	.....	.....
Sudan	.....	21	.....	7	.....
United Arab Republic	.....	649	428	1,152	1,012
Subtotal	.....	672	428	1,187	1,012
Latin America:					
Argentina	.....	.....	.....	1,106	.....
Colombia	.....	.....	574	.....	.....
Mexico	.....	32	.....	.....	.....
Subtotal	.....	32	574	1,106	.....
Total	5,468	18,721	33,884	26,382[2]	27,061

[1] Data incomplete.
[2] Based on data compiled in September 1967; a later compilation in February 1968 lists the total at the equivalent of $31.6 millions.

Table 37. North Korean Imports from Non-Communist Countries 1960, 1964, and 1965–67—Continued

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Analysis Division, *Export and Import Statistics on Trade between Communist Areas and Free World Countries* (mimeographed annual summaries), 1966–1967.

Table 38. North Korean Exports to Non-Communist Countries, 1963–67

(in thousands of dollars)

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Western Europe:					
Austria	2	—	238	2	21
Belgium	1	6	815	340	467
Denmark	—	—	275	141	105
Finland	—	2	3	—	—
France	19	14	76	46	443
Germany (West)	338	333	2,072	1,233	673
Greece	—	—	110	—	—
Ireland	7	—	—	—	2
Italy	16	113	308	194	66
Netherlands	250	5	848	1,135	1,843
Norway	2	—	1	29	—
Portugal	—	—	—	39	—
Spain	—	2	11	31	40
Sweden	—	1	372	—	18
Switzerland	87	24	276	299	361
United Kingdom	593	68	101	543	1,476
Subtotal	1,315	568	5,506	4,032	5,515
Asia:					
Australia	116	—	—	—	—
Burma	—	—	—	—	12*
Cambodia	1,409	—	—	462	—
Ceylon	—	—	13	—	—
Hong Kong	749	1,708	1,781	4,239	2,586
India	13	—	79	261	—
Japan	9,431	20,233	14,724	22,694	29,608
Malaysia	10	—	—	—	—
New Zealand	—	—	13	—	—
Pakistan	1	—	1	—	—
Thailand	—	—	5	53	19*
Subtotal	11,729	21,941	16,616	27,709	32,225
Africa and the Middle East:					
Congo (Brazzaville)	—	—	—	—	12*
Congo (Kinshasa)	—	—	—	—	2*
Ghana	—	—	20	7	287
Iran	—	—	—	79	—
Iraq	—	2	—	127	—
Jordan	—	—	—	21	—
Kuwait	—	—	—	—	5
Morocco	—	—	—	3	—
United Arab Republic	264	748	490	1,845	239*
Subtotal	264	750	510	2,082	545

Table 38. North Korean Exports to Non-Communist Countries, 1963–67 (in thousands of dollars)—Continued.

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
America:					
Canada	—	—	—	—	2
Mexico	—	—	—	10	76
Venezuela	—	—	—	—	2
Subtotal	—	—	—	10	80
Total	13,308	23,259	22,632	33,833	38,365*

*Data incomplete.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Analysis Division, *Export and Import Statistics on Trade between Communist Areas and Free World Countries* (mimeographed annual summaries), 1960–1967.

Japan

North Korea's most extensive trade contacts other than with Communist countries are with Japan. Geographic proximity and Japan's need for Korean marine and mineral resources help make the two countries natural trade partners.

Japan officially prohibited economic relations with North Korea until April 1961, when pressure from Japanese business groups, especially the fishing interests, forced the Japanese Government to rescind the trade ban. Japanese official statistics, however, had begun to show trade with North Korea as early as 1953. In 1955 a Japanese trading company signed with North Korea a $14-million barter agreement covering a 14-month period. In 1957 North Korean trade officials signed with three private Japanese firms a 1-year trade agreement calling for the exchange of goods worth $16.8 million. Trade was conducted through Communist China and the Soviet Union and later through Hong Kong, until direct trade became possible in 1961.

In 1964 the total trade with Japan amounted to more than $31.5 million. The principal exports to Japan were: pig iron, 36 percent; electrolytic zinc, 19 percent; iron ore, 18 percent; granulated iron, 6 percent; Indian corn, 5 percent; magnesia products, 4 percent; and silk products, 3 percent. The most important imports from Japan were steel piping, 17 percent of all imports; rayon yarn, 7 percent; urea, 5 percent; wool, 5 percent; nylon fishing nets, 4 percent; and tinplate sheets, 3 percent.

Other Japanese manufactures with which North Korea is concerned include machine tools; precision instruments; paper products; and chemical, mining, and shipbuilding equipment. North Ko-

rea is especially interested in Japanese machine tools. This item was mainly responsible for the increase of North Korean imports from Japan, which reached $9.5 million for the first 7 months of 1968, as against imports from Japan of $6.3 million for 1967.

Japan took nearly 73 percent of North Korea's exports to non-Communist countries in 1966 and 1967, but it furnished only 22 percent of North Korea's imports. North Korea's trade surplus for these 2 years was $40 million, which was spent in Western Europe for industrial products and in Canada and Australia for wheat. The small volume of Japanese export trade to North Korea is because of the absence of official approval by the Japanese Government for a system of delayed payments for commerical transactions with North Korea. Without such approval, the Japanese Export Bank was reluctant to finance North Korean purchases. Another irritant was the Japanese-imposed travel ban between North Korea and Japan from 1966 through mid-December 1968.

Western Europe

Western Europe has supplied North Korea with a variety of manufactured articles. In the early 1960's North Korea was buying tinplate, manila rope, chemical reagents, and dyestuffs from Belgium; steel, automobile tires, dyes, enameled steel wire, wire rope, and ferromanganese from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany); chemical reagents and dyes from Switzerland and Austria; and various types of paper from Finland.

In October 1963 the British Council for International Trade signed a trade agreement with North Korea whereby Great Britain would deliver special machine tools, complex plant equipment, ships, and synthetic fibers, and North Korea would provide various metals, minerals, chemicals, agricultural products, and other commodities. Great Britain also supplied shipping for the transportation of North Korean goods. Payment was to be made in letters of credit in pounds sterling, and deferred payments would also be available for certain products.

It was reported in 1965 that North Korean trade representatives in France, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany were discussing the possible purchase of heavy industrial equipment, including complete thermal and hydroelectric power generation facilities, power-transmitting equipment, and freighters. The Netherlands sold a 10,000-ton refrigerator ship to North Korea in 1964, and negotiations were underway in 1965 for the construction of a 100,000-ton urea plant and the purchase of nine compressors. Financing was to be accomplished by a 5-year delayed payment arrangement. Talks were also held in 1965 with Austria concerning the purchase of rolling equipment.

Other Non-Communist Countries

As a result of their 1957 trade agreement, the United Arab Republic has supplied North Korea with cotton materials, woolens, rayon yarn and fabrics, spices, leather goods, manganese, and gypsum. In return, North Korea has sent its usual exports, including structural steel, electrolytic lead and zinc, fertilizer, graphite, dried and salted fish, and ginseng.

Indonesia has supplied rubber, tea, coffee, rattan, quinine, copra, vegetable oils, other tropical oils, tanning materials, gums, and resins. North Korea offered electrolytic lead and zinc, high-speed and high-carbon tool steel, cement, chemical fertilizers (ammonium sulfate), sheet glass, caustic soda, calcium carbide, dynamite, marine products, and silk. Trade reached a peak value of $669,000 in 1966, but it subsequently appeared to be negligible.

The commodities listed in the agreement with India were much the same as in that with Indonesia, with India offering other goods, such as salt, shellac, soap, jute products, raw cotton, woolen textiles, handloomed products, leather goods, shoes, linoleum and electrical appliances. Trade became insignificant, however, in the years after 1963, when goods worth $740,300 were exchanged.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Information concerning the balance of payments is inferred mainly from trade statistics released by North Korea's trade partners and is, at best, incomplete. It is probable that North Korea's balance of trade was usually unfavorable until 1966 (see table 39). Depending largely upon foreign shipping and insurance for handling of its goods, North Korea is likely to have a deficit on "invisible account," extra expenses that are not reflected on trade balance sheets.

Table 39. North Korea's Balance of Trade, 1964–67

(in millions of dollars)

Trade Partner	1964	1965	1966	1967 *
Communist countries	—1.9	—13.3	+17.6	+ 8.8
Non-Communist countries	+4.6	—11.2	+ 7.4	+11.6
Balance	+2.7	+24.5	+25.0	+20.4

* Data incomplete.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Analysis Division, *Export and Import Statistics on Trade between Communist Areas and Free World Countries* (mimeographed annual summaries), 1960–1967.

CHAPTER 23
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY SYSTEM

The main emphasis of financial policy has been to ensure sufficient resources to carry out planned capital investment. Resources for the production of consumer goods have been limited to the level that the Government has deemed necessary to induce the population to exert maximum effort and to provide price stability. Starting in 1967, large resources have been allocated to defense.

The major instruments for executing financial policy are the national economic plans, the national budgets, and the banking system (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). Since 1964 the budget has been one of two sources of investment and operating funds for state enterprises. The other source has been the profits from the enterprises. Public finance and banking are integrated, with the Central Bank channeling revenues to state enterprises and cooperatives to be spent in accordance with the budget, or credits may be obtained from other state banking facilities to cover operating losses.

Since the private sector has been eliminated and capital accumulation has become a function almost entirely of Government, the role of private savings is not significant, although forced savings campaigns are conducted.

The total budgetary revenues and expenditures, planned and actual, are the only important financial information regularly published. For 1968 revenues as well as expenditures were budgeted at 5.234 billion wŏn (approximately 2.5 wŏn equal US$1). In 1967 revenues had amounted to 4.106 billion wŏn and expenditures to 3.948 billion wŏn, resulting in, according to Communist sources, a surplus of 158 million wŏn.

By 1968, 98 percent of the revenues were derived from what the Government calls "Socialist management" and only 2 percent from individual income taxes. An agricultural income tax in kind, once an important source of revenue, was abolished in 1966. The Socialist management revenues, which have replaced the agricultural tax, consist of the profits of State-owned enterprises and cooperative farms and are the equivalent of a retail sales tax. The Government claims on this basis that North Korea is practically a tax-free society.

Actually a heavy burden of governmental expense is borne by the population, most of it without the benefit of any gradation based on ability to pay. This is because basically the Government finances all operations and services by collecting and allocating, through various devices, the difference between what it buys and what it sells. In some instances, this may be labeled "profit," or it may be called "tax." These and other terms such as "earnings," "reserves," "costs," "capital," and the like have a meaning different in Communist lexicon than in the marketplace of a free economy. However defined, in the last analysis all revenues must be extracted from the population or, to a limited extent, from export sales. Since the State plans and fixes all prices, wages, and allocations of goods, it can rigidly control its income and its expenditures to match its economic program, except for the occasional instances of what the Government deplores as carelessness, waste, theft, and speculation.

Economic development expenditures are by far the largest expenditure item. They constituted 68.7 percent of total budget expenditures in 1965 (the last year this percentage was disclosed); 24.3 percent was designated for social and cultural expenditures, leaving only 7 percent for defense and administrative expenditures. Defense expenditures were reported as low as 2.9 percent of the budget in 1961. It is probable that some defense expenditures were hidden in other categories. In the 1967 and 1968 budgets, however, defense expenditures were reported as constituting about 30 percent of total expenditures.

After repeated reoganizations of the banking structure, the most important of which occurred in 1964, three Government-owned banks operated in the country: the Central Bank, the Industrial Bank, and the Foreign Trade Bank. The Central Bank issued notes and controlled money supply to help reduce inflationary pressures on the economy; the Industrial Bank served as a lending and savings institution.

Subsequent to a currency reform in 1959, the North Korean wŏn, first issued in 1947, has been stable. The Government advocates payment by bank transfer, limiting the use of wŏn to wage payments and retail trade.

PUBLIC FINANCE

The Function of the Budget and its Impact on the Economy

The national economic plans, drawn up for a varying number of years, are the basic blueprint for economic development; they establish economic policies, priorities, and targets (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). The annual budgets

determine which of the planned projects should be undertaken in the budget year and what should be spent on defense and other governmental functions. They also govern the level of investment and the level of consumption.

The total budgetary revenues and expenditures, as published by the Government, are the best available economic indicator. The figures are internally consistent and, since the price level has been stable, the figures are not likely to be distorted by inflation; they reflect the trends of the economy, if not its detailed working.

Between 1961 and 1967 actual expenditures increased from 2.338 billion wŏn to 3.948 billion wŏn, and revenues from 2.359 billion wŏn to 4.106 billion wŏn (see table 40). The growth of the budget was rapid between 1961 and 1964. In 1965, however, a slowdown occurred which continued until 1966, when actual revenues and expenditures lagged behind the budgeted amounts. This was attributed by the Government to unfavorable weather which impeded agricultural production and power generation. It stated that, nevertheless, revenues exceeded those of the previous year. Planned and actual revenues and expenditures rebounded in 1967, when actual revenues reached 4.106 billion wŏn and expenditures, 3.948 billion wŏn; and resulting in a surplus of 158 million wŏn.

The budget for 1968 was about 5.234 billion wŏn, an increase of 28 percent as compared with the 1967 revenues and 33 percent, compared with the 1967 expenditures. This jump exceeded any increase achieved in previous years. The amount allotted to capital construction showed an even larger increase, of 50 percent. The

Table 40. Budgeted and Actual Government Revenues and Expenditures in North Korea

(in billion wŏn *)

Year	Revenues		Expenditures		Surplus	
	Actual	Budgeted	Actual	Budgeted	Actual	Budgeted
1968	n.a.	5.234	n.a.	5.234	n.a.	.....
1967	4.106	3.964	3.948	3.964	.158	.....
1966	3.671	3.752	3.571	3.752	.100	.....
1965	3.573	3.721	3.476	3.721	.097	.....
1964	3.498	3.434	3.418	3.434	.080	.....
1963	3.144	2.996	3.028	2.986	.116	.010
1962	2.896	2.817	2.729	2.811	.167	.006
1961	2.400	2.359	2.338	2.336	.062	.023

n.a.—not available.
* 2.5 wŏn equal US$1.

Source: Adapted from various North Korean sources, and *Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbooks:* 1966, (250); 1965 (232); 1964 (236); 1963 (178).

Government claims that the budget reflects its determination to accelerate economic expansion. The report on the implementation of the 1968 budget, due in April 1969, is expected to show the extent to which the Government has succeeded in reaching its goals.

The budget, in deficit until 1957, has been in balance since that time. Since 1961 a surplus has been reported every year, including 1965 and 1966, when the actual revenues fell short of projected revenues and expenditures had to be curtailed.

Budgetary Procedure

The Minister of Finance is responsible for the preparing of the State budget. He is guided by recommendations from the Party's Central Committee and maintains coordination with the State Planning Commission (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). The budget must be approved by the Cabinet. The State budget covers all provincial, city, and county expenditures. These local authorities receive their revenues in the form of grants from the Central Government and are responsible for social, cultural, educational, and public health items.

The fiscal year coincides with the calendar year. In April of each year the Minister of Finance presents the budget to the Supreme People's Assembly. The meeting is attended by the Cabinet, Party dignitaries, and the diplomatic corps.

The budget presentation consists of two parts: a report on revenues and expenditures anticipated for the current year and a report on the actual revenues and expenditures of the preceding year, focusing on the achievements of the various sectors of the economy. The chairman of the budgetary committee of the Supreme People's Assembly reports on the examination by his committee of the planned and actual budget, and then the Assembly adopts these reports unanimously.

Budgetary Revenues

In 1968 the Socialist sector contributed 98 percent to the total budget revenue; direct taxes were only of marginal importance. Foreign aid, important after the Korean war, has not appeared as budgetary income since 1961.

Income Tax

This tax contributed 27 percent of total revenues in 1949. At that time, the law provided for five categories of taxpayers. The rates were then progressive, ranging from 5.4 percent for scientists and artists to 14 percent for merchants. The rates were gradually reduced, and exemptions were increased. Some categories of

taxpayers, for instance, merchants, had disappeared by the end of 1958. By 1968 the income tax on individuals amounted to only 2 percent of the revenue.

The way in which it was assessed or how it may have been graduated is not publicized by the Communists. The Communists call taxation "redistribution of national income," which actually is the collection by the State of that portion of national income already distributed to the workers and enterprises and its use for state purposes.

Agricultural Tax

An agricultural tax was first introduced in June 1946, following the land reform. The peasants were required to deliver in kind 25 percent of their crop to the Government. The tax rates were gradually reduced as cooperative farms were established. An increasing number of cooperative farms were exempted from this tax in whole or in part. In early 1966 the agricultural tax was completely abolished. Cooperative farms are still subject to a money payment which is classified as socialist management income. The State sets the price paid to the cooperatives, whether or not this covers all costs, and sets the price of implements, seed, fertilizer, and the like which it sells to the cooperatives; therefore, imposition of a tax as such becomes irrelevant.

Foreign Aid

Aid furnished by the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other Communist countries amounted to almost one-fourth of the income of the budget before the Korean war and about 40 to 50 percent between 1950 and 1955.

In subsequent years the Communist countries continued to give aid, but on a decreasing scale. In 1957 receipts from the Communist countries made up 12 percent of budgetary income; in 1958, 4.5 percent; in 1959, 2.7 percent; and in 1961, 1.9 percent. This was the last year in which aid receipts appeared in the budget. These credits were used mainly for reconstruction and economic development (see ch. 22, Foreign Economic Relations).

Socialist Management Revenues

That most budgetary incomes originate in the socialists sector is cited by the Government as a great achievement of Socialist management. The bulk of the Socialist management revenues is derived from retail sales, accounting in 1965 for nearly 60 percent of total national income.

Although the procedure differs among manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and cooperatives, the Communist system retrieves for the State all of what might be the profits distributed to stock-

holders or owners in a private economy. This revenue is taken under various headings such as "transaction income," as a "profit," or in the form of a "turnover tax," which is more in the nature of a rebate or discount.

State enterprises obtain their capital in two different ways. One of these is by budget allocation, under which an enterprise receives a given amount of budget from the State, called circulating funds (working capital) to cover all projected operating expenditures. Any surplus arising from economies is returned to the State. If there is a deficit, additional budget funds are allocated, and corrective measures are taken. The other system of capitalization, increasingly used in recent years, is called the independent economic accounting system. Under this plan enterprise management is expected to pay all costs out of sales revenues. It is allowed to charge a price to the State distribution system made up of allowable costs, plus a planned profit and a turnover tax, the latter being returned to the State. (Even under this system funds come from the budget through the State agency making the purchase.) If goods are sold inter-industry rather than directly to the State distribution system, there is no turnover tax included in the price, but the net return to the enterprise is the same. By reducing costs below the planned amount, a factory manager can produce an unplanned profit in addition to the planned profit. This is a measure of his efficiency, and the whole system appears designed to provide greater incentive than the budget system for improved management.

Information on how profits are used is incomplete. One Communist publication explained that pure profit of enterprises was used as incentive payments or to meet the social and cultural needs of the people. Planned profit is used for new construction or as "floating capital." An elaborate system of rules covers the use of profit for division among workers, for covering operating losses from previous years, as rewards for new plans and inventions, and similar purposes. Creation of cash or material reserves is restricted.

After authorized costs have been met, profits of State enterprises are subject to a 10-percent tax—50 percent in the case of banks. The same rate applies to cooperative farms, and fishery cooperatives pay from 2 to 3 percent. Excess capital is also taxable. Miscellaneous sources of State revenue, other than taxes and profits are yielded by state forestries, irrigation fees, customs duties, and other minor sources. Social security is financed by a payroll tax levied on employees and employers. Profits of the Central Government as distinguished from those of production units, go into capital or to finance general State operations.

Budgetary Expenditures

The major budgetary expenditure items, in order of importance, are economic development, defense, social and cultural activities, and administration. Information disseminated abroad concerning budgetary expenditures has been fragmentary. Item-by-item figures are seldom given by North Korea, even for propaganda advantage. Only overall totals are published. In some years the percentage which a particular expenditure bears to total expenditures is disclosed. Selected percentage increases over the previous year are highlighted for propaganda purposes, but decreases are never mentioned.

Economic development expenditures constituted 56.8 percent of total outlays in 1954 and increased to 68.7 percent in 1965. In 1967 and 1968 nearly 50 percent of all expenditures were earmarked for economic development. In North Korean terms economic development expenditures included not only construction of plants and other fixed assets but also the training of personnel and the provision of working capital required for the operation of the new installations.

The national economic plans determine the basic investment priorities over a given period (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). For a specific year, the annual budget reports serve as a standard indicator of the current investment priorities. The budget for 1968 envisioned spectacular increases, far ahead of the actual increases reported for 1967 (see table 41).

In 1968, 1.617 billion wŏn was budgeted for defense outlays. This amouted to 30.9 percent of the total budget compared with 30.2 percent in 1967 (see ch. 24, The Armed Forces).

Table 41. Indicated Investment Priorities in North Korea

(in percent)

Type of Investment	1967 Actual Increase Base 1966	1968 Scheduled Increase Base 1967
Capital construction	23	50
Agriculture	30	50
Metal industry	n.a.	160
Transportation	n.a.	90
Power	n.a.	60
Mining	n.a.	60
Light industry	n.a.	20

n.a.—not available.

Source: Adapted from various North Korean sources.

The social and cultural item covers education, public health, social security, old people's homes, nurseries, and orphanages. In 1954 this item claimed 13.1 percent of the budget, and in 1965 24.3 percent. Its share decreased to 17.5 percent in 1967, presumably because of the sharp increase in defense expenditures.

Administrative expenditures constitute a small part of the budget. They declined from 8.6 percent of the total in 1954 to 2.6 percent in 1961.

Controls

Planning and financial control are integrated at the Cabinet level on the basis of Party policy direction, and the Ministry of Finance and the State Planning Commission serve as the principal coordinating agencies. Thereafter, control of the system as it existed until at least 1966 diverged through separate chains of command, making it difficult for outside observers to determine where actual authority existed at various levels. The executive chain of command passed down through the provincial, county, and village People's Committees. There was also a banking channel through the various levels down to each cooperative farm, where considerable control over all financial operations was exercised, The State Planning Commission directed the work of its subordinate units at the provincial and county levels, and the Agriculture Commission supervised agriculture management committees at these same levels. There were also provincial and county committees on light industry under the appropriate Cabinet ministries. All of these, besides the special inspection, auditing, and review agencies of the State, had a hand in financial control.

Descriptions of the system appearing in Communist publications were somewhat contradictory. For example, the Vice Minister of Finance urged in 1965 that local People's Committees take the leading role in coordinating all agencies within their jurisdiction, yet banking journals defined major responsibility for banks. An authoritative journal describing the system in practice in 1965 indicated that state organizations, financial organizations, banks and People's Committees shared authority. That there is some duplication and overlapping has been acknowledged periodically by the leadership in demands that the system be streamlined.

In 1966 the Ministry of State Inspections was reactivated, presumably at least in part to meet the need for a more unified control system. What measures it may have taken to simplify the system have not yet been announced.

BANKING

In 1968 the most important financial institution was the Central

Bank, established in December 1946 as the bank of issue. It was supported by two other institutions, the Industrial Bank and the Foreign Trade Bank.

In 1959 the Central Bank absorbed the Peasant Bank and its branches that had been serving as credit departments for various cooperative farms. In 1964 it also took over the Construction Fund Bank, which had financed capital construction, expansion, and rehabilitation of 300 industrial plants.

The Banking Reorganization of 1964

In May 1964 the banking system was reorganized because of what the Government called "confusion and waste." Government officials stated that the banks made loans according to their own arbitrary plans and, in some instances, only to strengthen their financial control over industry. The purpose of the reform was to coordinate and integrate more effectively economic planning, the national budget, and banking. Under the new plan, national revenue were to cover new investment and expenditures for current operations of all state enterprises and agencies. The funds for these purposes were to be deposited with the Central Bank and disbursed by it in accordance with the national expenditure plan. Because the budget became the source of all the necessary funds, the Central Bank no longer extended credit. The bank was to be responsible, however, for checking all disbursements to ensure compliance with the plan, which was said to provide "overall financial control" of the country's economic activities.

Banking Since 1964

The Central Bank

This institution, subject to daily supervision from the Minister of Finance, is the administrative organ that executes the fiscal policies and regulations instituted by the Cabinet and the State Planning Commission (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy). It is used chiefly by Government agencies.

The Central Bank is the only agent authorized to issue notes, which are released on the basis of cash flow plans submitted by the various Government agencies and enterprises. It is responsible for coordinating these cash plans and taking the necessary steps to hold the amount of currency in circulation to as low a level as is compatible with the requirements of the expanding economy.

The Bank is designated as the sole recipient of all national revenues and the repository for all precious metals. All Government agencies and state enterprises are required to deposit cash

receipts on their clearing account at the Central Bank and its branches and to make payments by transfer to the clearing account of the payee. It is also authorized to administer and supervise the registration of all fixed properties of state enterprises, cooperatives, and Government agencies and to enforce rules concerning acquisitions, transfers, and maintenance of such properties.

In addition to supplying the basic construction and maintenance funds to the various sectors of the economy, the Central Bank provides Government agencies and enterprises with the working capital in accordance with a monthly plan. If an enterprise requires additional funds, the Bank may furnish them, after an investigation, from the so-called adjustment fund.

Still another function of the Central Bank is to disburse the wage fund. Cash not covered by a wage plan is not paid out, even if the customer has the necessary balance on his clearing account, until an investigation is made and corrective measures taken.

The Industrial Bank

The Industrial Bank was established in 1964 following the banking reorganization; it administers the State insurance system, acts as a savings institution, and is the only bank granting loans. It maintains an extensive system reaching into rural areas with a branch at every cooperative farm, where it exercises on-the-spot financial control.

The recipients of loans are mainly farm and fishing cooperatives, but short-term loans are also made to Government agencies and enterprises requiring additional funds because of deficit operations. When applying for a loan, such enterprises must submit a plan detailing corrective measures to be taken. If such loans are not repaid when due, the bank charges a penalty interest exceeding the regular interest rate and imposes a fine on the managers of the borrower.

One of the most important functions of the Industrial Bank is its financial control and management of cooperative farms. The bank makes all disbursements to, and accepts receipts from, these farms.

Making use of its extensive branch network, the bank handles savings. Savings collection bureaus are established at various Government agencies and enterprises and at post offices. The bank also provides service for individual remittances.

Foreign Trade Bank

The Foreign Trade Bank, established in 1959, carries out international settlements resulting from trade relations with foreign countries. Its operation is closely supervised by the Central

Bank. Its functions include the financing of procurements abroad, the payment of foreign currencies, and the implementation of the foreign trade plan. It concludes agreements with foreign banks in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Government and conducts business under these agreements. It also provides foreign currency exchange for tourists and sells tourist tickets. Remittances to foreign countries are handled by this institution.

Savings

Although the regime has repeatedly asserted that saving is absolutely voluntary and that private funds could be withdrawn at any time for an emergency, it has conducted drives similar to those in other Communist countries in which saving is made a patriotic duty not to be shirked. The authorities call this mobilizing "idle money in the hands of the people." Considerable pressure is exerted on each worker to subscribe a portion of his salary as saving; as with direct taxes, the amount pledged is deducted from the individual's pay every month. Not only banks, but enterprises, cooperatives, the postal system, and other agencies receive savings deposits.

INSURANCE

In the course of the banking reorganization of 1964, the newly established Industrial Bank was entrusted with handling the national insurance business. Until then this function had been performed by the Ministry of Finance. The types of insurance written by the bank include property insurance covering fire, livestock, and fishing boats; this insurance, introduced in 1957, is compulsory for all properties owned by Government agencies, state enterprises, and cooperatives. Others are personal insurance, introduced in 1961, for liability and accidents occurring when traveling; and international insurance for air traffic and marine activities. The bank also handles international insurance business through reinsuring part of the risk, presumably abroad.

CURRENCY

Between 1945 and 1947, an undetermined amount of Bank of Chōsen notes, Japanese yen notes, and Soviet military scrip circulated in North Korea. In December 1947 the wŏn, which is divided into 100 chŏn, was introduced as a new currency unit, and the Government instituted a currency conversion. The equivalent of 200 wŏn per person or 500 wŏn per head of family of the old

currencies could be exchanged for the new on a 1 to 1 ratio. Bank deposits under 2,000 wŏn equivalent were redeemable in full in the new currency. For deposits equivalent to over 2,000 wŏn, the conversion scale was regressive so that the larger the deposit, the smaller the percentage that could be redeemed.

By 1955 paper money was put in circulation, in denominations of 50 chŏn and 1, 5, 10, and 100 wŏn. The 100 wŏn notes were most widely used, and many stores and merchants refused to accept the smaller denominations. In late 1956, the Government, considering the wŏn to have three times the value of the Japanese yen, announced an official wŏn-U.S. dollar cross rate of 120 to 1. The actual value of the wŏn is believed to have been considerably lower, with estimates between 340 and 600 to 1.

On February 17, 1959, a second currency reform was carried out, and a new wŏn was introduced. One hundred old wŏn were exchanged for 1 new wŏn. After this reform the exchange rate between the United Kingdom and North Korea was said to be £1 (approximately equivalent to U.S.$2.80) to 7.2 wŏn. The rate which was still widely quoted by non-Communist sources in 1968, was estimated to be 2.57 wŏn to U.S.$1.

The amount of currency in circulation has never been disclosed. The budgetary balance and the curtailment of bank credit indicate that currency has not been issued excessively, accounting in part for the relative stability of the exchange rate.

SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 24
THE ARMED FORCES

In mid-1968 the estimated strength of the Armed Forces, officially called the Korean People's Army (Chosŏn Inmin'gun), totaled 400,000, about 3 percent of the population of 13 million. This strength included the Army of some 360,000, an Air Force of over 800 combat aircraft and 30,000 men, and a Navy with a defensive coastal fleet of about 160 small craft and 10,000 men. The regular forces were supplemented by a well-trained Militia of over 580,000. In size the North Korean forces were surpassed only by those of the Soviet Union and Communist China among the Communist nations.

Because of limitations in technology and resources, the north has been almost totally dependent on foreign logistical support, especially that of the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, Communist China. Since the early 1960's the governmental leaders have appeared acutely aware of this disadvantage and have sought to achieve a larger measure of military as well as political independence from their Communist neighbors (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations).

Senior officers of the Armed Forces are those who had been associated closely with Premier Kim Il-sung before and during World War II and who survived the purges after the Korean conflict. Many hold key positions at the highest echelons of the Korean Workers Party (Chosŏn Nodong Dang), and their influence has increased steadily.

The enlarged role of the military in politics and in the economy was especially pronounced after October 1966, when the regime decided to change the character of economic development to give greater attention to military preparedness. This decision coincided with an increase in the number of North Korean provocations across the Military Demarcation Line.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Throughout most of the country's long recorded history, war

as an instrument of national policy was virtually unknown to its people (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Imbued with Buddhist and Confucian teachings which consider military strife as a degrading form of human endeavor, the Koreans have shown marked antipathy toward war and in no instance have initiated foreign military conquest. The soldier has usually ranked low on the social scale.

Korea has not been free of war, however. Military campaigns between rival kingdoms for domination of the Korean Peninsula occurred at various times, and major invasions included those of the Chinese in the second century B.C., the Mongols in the 13th century A.D., the Japanese at the end of the 16th century, and the Manchus in the mid-17th century. Internally, wars were fought between small, privately organized military forces over dynastic successions, but the aggregate was insufficient to establish permanent national military traditions.

One of the early invasions, however, is known to most Koreans because of the outstanding leadership of General Ulchimundŏk, one of the country's few military heroes. In A.D. 612 the Chinese emperor Young Ti, of the Sui dynasty, with a "million men," attacked the ancient kingdom of Koguryŏ, which was defended by an army of 300,000 under General Ulchimundŏk. By constant harassment tactics on overextended supply lines, he made the Chinese situation untenable, destroyed the invading hordes, and contributed to the dynasty's collapse in A.D. 618. Thirty years later the emperor of the T'ang dynasty, seeking revenge, invaded Korea again. After 4 months of fierce fighting, the emperor lost an eye, and the Chinese again broke off the action and withdrew.

During the Mongol invasions in the mid-13th century, resistance was determined but uncoordinated. Nevertheless, it took over 30 years to defeat the Koreans even though the Mongols held almost the entire Peninsula during all of that time. The Koreans, taking advantage of the Mongols' lack of sea experience, conducted raids from the sanctuary of a number of islands where the land-bound Mongols could not easily reach them. Peace was restored by negotiation but was kept precariously. On two occasions the Mongols used the Koreans to help them invade Japan, but in both instances seasonal typhoons destroyed the Korean fleets with their Mongol troops. Japanese historians later described the typhoons as *kamikaze* (lit., divine wind) in support of their chauvinistic contention that their country had had divine protection.

When the Japanese invaded Korea in 1592 on their way to conquer China, the resistance was disorganized and ineffectual. Seoul, 250 miles from the landing point, was taken in 20 days. A notable

exception to the dismal defense was a series of naval victories achieved by Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Yi was a superb tactician and innovator. Although some form of ironclad ships had been used in Korea for perhaps 500 years, he is credited with being the first to use the iron-plated "turtle ships" in a major sea battle against a strong adversary. As designed by the Koreans, these ships were decked, compartmented, heavily gunned (up to 26 cannons of 5.5 inch caliber) fighting ships. They were longer, faster, and more maneuverable than the Japanese warships.

Admiral Yi overcame the lack of high-sea worthiness of his ships by choosing the time and place of battle—almost never out of sight of land—and by adjusting his tactics to take advantage of times, tides, positions, weather, and the time of day or night. He once scattered a Japanese fleet of 300 ships in a night attack with only 10 ships of his own. He has been credited by some historians with laying down the first smokescreens employed by a navy. It was claimed that the mouths of the turtle heads of his ironclads emitted clouds of smoke to frighten the enemy. There is, however, no convincing evidence to show that the ships could store sufficient combustibles for an effective smokescreen or had the speed and maneuverability to exploit one. In his 6 years of sea operations against the Japanese, the Admiral's fleet sank hundreds of ships and seriously damaged the enemy's logistic sealift; many Koreans would like to place him in the first rank of the world's naval commanders.

For many years Koreans living in China and Russia had furnished some troops and a few officers for Czarist and Manchu armies. They gained their first experience during the Japanese occupation. Many Koreans served with Japanese military and police forces. Some aided the Chinese forces in China against the Japanese and later became known as the Yenan faction. Some, the so-called Soviet-Koreans, served with the Soviet Army not only against the Japanese along the Manchurian-Soviet border, but also against the Germans on the western front.

Still others developed small bands of Communist-led anti-Japanese partisans who operated in Manchuria and the Soviet Far East in the 1930's. This was an activity of an irregular, military-civilian character and was viewed with great favor by the Korean populace. One of these bands was led by Kim Il-sung, who in 1968 held among his several titles those of Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Kim Il-sung's military reputation, as claimed and established by his Communist publicists, has been subject to interminable debunking by nearly all non-Communist observers. The Japanese authorities, until 1945, described Kim Il-sung as a bandit chief-

tain of from 40 to 50 marauders. Observers in the Republic of Korea have questioned the North Korean assertion that he was a "General" and the "Division Commander of the Communist Second Route Army." If he held the second post, and there is some evidence that he did, careful researchers would put this command at no more than 300 men. He has been reported as having served in the Soviet Army, both in the Far East and in the west against the Germans. He returned to Pyongyang in 1945 with the rank of major in the Soviet Army.

In the middle and late 1930's Kim Il-sung was a partisan in Manchuria. The group he led has been labeled erroneously as the "Kapsan faction" by chroniclers because of his connection with a group of Korean partisans in the town of Kapsan near Mount Paektu, Korea's highest mountain, located on the northern border. Among a number of his anti-Japanese skirmishes was the battle of Poch'ŏnbo, perhaps the high point of Kim Il-sung's partisan career, even allowing for exaggerated North Korean accounts. In June 1937 a guerrilla force of about 100 men, combining the Kapsan partisans and Kim Il-sung's group, raided the town of Poch'ŏnbo (population less than 1,000) and are said to have burned the Japanese police station, killed the Japanese police officers, and destroyed the homes of pro-Japanese Koreans. Although the size of the claimed victory and Kim Il-sung's leading role in the attack are open to question, the North Korean regime has increasingly extolled the battle of Poch'ŏnbo as the model to be emulated in popular antiforeign struggles. It has been glorified as the symbol of patriotism as well as the embodiment of the spirit of militant nationalism.

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the anti-Japanese fighters returned to the north either individually or with the Soviet occupation forces. A sizable number were given high command and staff positions by the Soviet authorities as they began organizing the military in their own image.

ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY

As units of the Soviet Far Eastern Army moved into the north from their bases near Vladivostok in August 1945, they were greeted as "liberators" by the people waving Korean and Allied flags. Gratitude for freedom from the Japanese and optimistic hopes for immediate independence overcame for the moment the Koreans' innate distrust of foreign military forces on their soil and their traditional antipathy toward military solutions of political problems.

North of the 38th Parallel the Soviet forces rapidly consoli-

dated their military position. They instituted political and military organizations they felt would give them the control they desired. They recognized the value of making their moves through friendly Koreans, many of whom, including Kim Il-sung, they had trained in the Communist techniques of power seizure.

In addition to the grooming of Kim Il-sung, the Soviets established in October 1945 a quasi-military organization of Koreans, the Peace Preservation Corps, consisting of some 2,000 men. There were also border guards, railroad guards, and secret police units, all established to eliminate opposition as well as to preserve law and order. Facilities were erected; cadres were chosen; units were founded; training was started; pride in military service was fostered; and the prestige of military units was developed.

The Korean People's Army was formally established on February 8, 1948. At the ceremony marking the founding of the Army, Kim Il-sung reminded the nation of "the tasks of strengthening military discipline, educating the soldiers in bravery and heroism, and mastering Soviet military science, and the valuable combat experience of the Soviet armed forces." He also asserted that his army was "armed with Marxism-Leninism" and, more particularly, with the inspiration of Joseph Stalin's achievements. Gradually, however, the early emphasis on emulating the foreign military benefactor shifted to one extolling the military examples of Korean heroes, nationalism, and patriotism.

By late 1948 the Korean Communists, with Soviet advice and organization, a steady stream of serviceable equipment, almost unlimited financing, and a security that provided uninterrupted and unmolested development, had erected a modern, efficient and well-disciplined military organization. The Soviet forces withdrew from the north in December 1948, leaving behind a potent military assistance group for continued direction and support. In their invasion of the south in June 1950 the North Korean Armed Forces, with an estimated strength of over 200,000 (as against the Republic of Korea's 103,000), quickly established superiority over the underequipped and undertrained defense forces of the south. They suffered heavily, however, during their offensive and, especially so, after the counteroffensive by the United Nations forces in mid-September 1950; by the end of the month, some of the invaders were able to retreat north, but the bulk of them were killed, wounded, or captured.

Beginning with its massive infusion of "volunteers" in late October 1950, Communist China exerted considerable influence over the North Korean Armed Forces, whose remnants at the time of the intervention were estimated to be from 25,000 to 30,000. Until

the Korean conflict ended in July 1953, it was fought for the most part by Chinese troops and Soviet arms. The cessation of hostilities found the North Korean Army badly beaten and more than ever dependent on the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The armistice brought an end to the fighting, but it did not bring peace. It also established the Military Demarcation Line. This line, about 150 miles long, is a provisional boundary between the Communist and United Nations military forces. It was selected by the military commanders of both sides at the end of hostilities on July 27, 1953, and was to serve, along with an evacuated zone 1.24 miles on either side of the line, as a buffer between the two forces until "a political conference of higher level . . . be held . . . to settle through negotiations, the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. . . ." Although commonly believed to be the 38th Parallel, the line is actually a sinuous one, almost all of it above that latitude, and it corresponds to the last actual line of contact between the opposing forces (see fig. 1).

REBUILDING AND MILITARY TIES WITH FOREIGN POWERS

The process of rebuilding the Armed Forces through foreign assistance coincided with Premier Kim Il-sung's personal efforts to consolidate his own power base within the Military Establishment. His successful elimination of pro-Communist Chinese and pro-Soviet elements by early 1958 was inspired apparently less by antiforeign feelings than by Kim Il-sung's personal power goals (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

Although there had been a purge during the Korean conflict at the division and regimental levels which took a toll of Yenan and Soviet-Korean officers, at the time of armistice in 1953 a liberal number of both groups were in positions of military leadership. Premier Kim Il-sung appeared to have had no desire to antagonize either Communist China or the Soviet Union, but the alternative of having potential dissenters and perhaps even armed revolt to contend with was more repugnant. By 1958 Kim Il-sung had eliminated nearly all of these remnants of the opposing factions by accusing them of wartime crimes; the charges against them included insubordination, professional incompetence, faulty Party organizational work, espionage, and treason (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics and Values).

The extensive industrial damage and the acute manpower shortage after the conflict meant a continued dependence on outside sources if the military forces were to be rebuilt. Even if the country achieved a healthy economy, it would be wholly dependent on

outside help for such military necessities as oil, rubber, and cotton.

The task of rebuilding and reinforcing the defense capability was measurably aided by Soviet and Communist Chinese support. It was eased in the manpower problem by Communist China's continued stationing in the north of more than 200,000 "volunteers" until the completion of their phased withdrawal in October 1958. These Chinese troops helped to train local recruits, provided them with some logistics, and at times furnished manpower even for nonmilitary reconstruction projects. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued its substantial assistance and reaffirmed its aid policy in May 1958, when a North Korean delegation visited Moscow.

North Korea obtained additional firm pledges from the Soviet Union as well as from Communist China in July 1961, when Kim Il-sung visited Moscow and Peking and concluded identical, but separate, mutual assistance treaties with his Communist neighbors. The 10-year pacts, while reiterating that the reunification of Korea must be carried out "on a peaceful and democratic basis," called for strengthening economic and cultural ties and consulting on all important international issues affecting both parties, and prohibited the conclusion of alliances against the interests of either party. Most important, they provided that if one party is attacked, the other "will immediately render it military and other assistance with all means at its disposal." In public remarks accompanying the announcement of the pact in Moscow, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev stated that if North Korea were attacked it would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union and that his country would support North Korea "with all available forces and means." Kim Il-sung stated that North Korea was signing with the understanding that, upon reunification, both the Pyongyang-Moscow Treaty and the mutual assistance treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States would become unnecessary and therefore void. Concurrent with this political reassurance, the Soviet Union promised additional assistance in the form of long-term credit, aid in metallurgical and mining fields, acceleration in the construction of thermal power stations, sizable deliveries of chemical equipment in 1962–65, and the building of a television center.

The rebuilding effort was, therefore, premised mainly on continued Soviet assistance. This factor enabled the Government to concentrate on economic development, especially in the area of heavy industry. In the years following the Korean conflict officially publicized defense expenditures ranged from 2.9 to 5 percent of annual national budgets. The governmental leaders' optimistic ex-

pectation of continued Soviet support was also basic to the formulation of the 7-year economic plan (1961–67) (see ch. 17, Character and Structure of the Economy).

The military buildup, however, was adversely affected by deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union was angered by North Korea's expressions of support of Communist China in the Sino-Soviet disputes and by its criticism of the Soviet handling of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Its military mission dispatched to Moscow in November 1962 reportedly returned empty-handed. The Soviet Union was still professing Communist friendship, but its generosity had declined. The following month North Korea declared that its defense capacity would be strengthened, even if it meant "partial restriction of the people's economic development," and announced the slogan: "Weapon in One Hand and Hammer and Sickle in the Other." A public attack against the Soviet Union in October 1963 for its alleged "neglect of the due cooperation in strengthening the defense power of socialist countries" appeared to be an allusion to strained military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow.

After 1965, However, the Soviet military influence appeared to be increasing gradually as Pyongyang began readjusting its ties with both Peking and Moscow. Premier Kim Il-sung began to assert in earnest a larger measure of political, economic, and military independence from the two Communist benefactors—a development welcomed implicity by Moscow but resented by Peking (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). In May 1965 and again in February 1967, North Korea reportedly received pledges of increased military assistance from the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, because of the delayed impact of the reduced Soviet aid, North Korea announced in October 1966 a dramatic step to reinforce the defense posture "in parallel" with economic development. The defense outlays for calendar year 1967 were raised sharply to 30.2 percent of the budget, to 1.2 billion wŏn (2.5 wŏn equal U.S.$1). In April 1968 a Cabinet minister announced a 33-percent rise (the previous average increase was 20 percent in the mid-1960's) in the national budget for that year. The military portion again was substantial, constituting 30.9 percent (the equivalent of U.S.$647 million) of the total budget.

COMMAND STRUCTURE

Supreme command of the Armed Forces is exercised by the Premier and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Kim Il-sung, through the Ministry of National Defense (see fig. 11). The Min-

istry is divided into three principal units: the General Staff Department, which administers the operational part of the Armed Forces; the General Rear Services Bureau, which is largely a logistic and planning organization; and the General Political Bureau, which is responsible for political indoctrination and receives its guidance from the Party. Under the General Staff Department there are general headquarters for each of the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and separate ones for Artillery and Armor commands. Each of the headquarters is commanded by an officer bearing the title of Vice Minister of National Defense. Theoretically, these vice ministers are on a equal level within the Ministry, but the Army probably has the greatest influence in establishing policies common to all services. The political control of the command structure is ensured partly through the General Political Bureau and partly through the chiefs of the top echelons in the Ministry, who usually are members of the Central Committee of the Party.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION

In addition to the defense of the country, the Army has a constant training mission. According to published accounts, the training mission receives a particular emphasis, and all elements perform some training of new troops. Certain units consist only of cadres of officers and noncommissioned officers who constitute a permanent establishment designed to receive, train, and indoctrinate the conscripts and militia. The objective seems to be not only to provide capable and ready troops but also, and perhaps even more important, to "graduate" a vast pool of trained military strength that can be resummoned when needed.

The available ground forces consist of from 18 to 20 infantry divisions organized into several Army groups. The presence of headquarters for Armor and Artillery forces suggests that the infantry divisions are supported by sizable groups of both. The existence of reserves in organized units is not clear, except for the large nationwide Militia. Armament for the ground forces is said to include some 2,500 to 3,500 artillery pieces of various types, more than 4,000 rocket launchers and antitank guns, 400 to 700 armored combat vehicles, and some 40,000 trucks and armored carriers.

The Navy is the smallest of the three services and apparently ranks low in priority of development. Its headquarters at Pyongyang supervises shore installations which administer and supply the fleet that is said to consist of approximately 160 small craft. These boats are largely patrol craft, including 60 high-speed torpe-



Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Ch'onggam, 1945-1968* (General Survey of North Korea, 1945-1968), pp. 524-553.

Figure 11. Organization of the North Korean military structure, January 1968.

do boats. There are known to be three or four W-class submarines, each displacing 1,000 tons. Wŏnsan on the east coast and Namp'o on the west serve as two main naval bases for the Eastern and Western fleets, respectively.

The Air Force derives its main strength from its more than 500 MIG fighter planes, including some MIG 21's, which are roughly comparable to the United States F104 (sweptwing supersonic jet fighter). In addition, there are some 350 planes, including light jet bombers, reconnaissance and transport aircraft, and helicopters. Service facilities for the Air Force are available at from 30 to 40 airfields, 16 of which are said to be capable of accommodating jet aircraft. At least four of the airfields are reported to have underground facilities. Two of the most important bases are at Pyongyang and Wŏnsan.

The territorial militia, Nonong Chŏgwidae (Worker-Peasant Red Guards), is an important civil defense military organization. According to North Korean press accounts, the Militia is composed of men (from 18 to 45 years of age) and women (from 18 to 30 years of age) and includes factory workers, farmers, intellectuals, and people from all walks of life. Its members are organized in regiments composed of about 12 companies, and the regimental strength is about 5,000. Companies, generally formed in factories, villages, cooperatives, and schools, are assigned to county regiments, which are in turn assigned to regional training brigades. Each brigade is sponsored and supervised by one of the Army groups and by the Party as well. Approximately half the members reportedly are discharged Army soldiers who presumably furnish the bulk of the unit leadership. In 1958 the Militia strength was announced by the North Koreans as being 580,000; it seems certain that there has been growth since then. There are reports from the Republic of Korea that the Militia at the end of 1967 numbered 1.2 million, of which women accounted for 20 percent. A trained force near the million mark appears to be a formidable factor for domestic discipline and for organized wartime support.

MANPOWER

The quality of the manpower available for military service continues to be good. The combat record of Armed Forces personnel has demonstrated that Koreans are staunch, tough fighters when properly trained and led. They are inured to hardship and capable of sustained effort over long periods of time on a meager ration. Koreans average about 5 feet 6 inches in height, are wiry, sturdy, and have good physiques. Trained from childhood to fit into a hierarchical society, they adjust readily to military discipline.

The bulk of the enlisted men are conscripted youths who are trained and administered by relatively permanent cadres. Under the conscription system young men and women may be inducted in peacetime from ages 20 to 25 and in wartime from ages 18 through 45. Only a few women are conscripted, however, to meet the need for nurses, telephone operators, and clerks. The size of manpower, after allowing for about 5 percent of physically unfit, ranged from 1 million, based on age groups from 18 through 35, to 1.5 million, based on from 18 to 45 years of age.

The normal service is 3 years and 6 months for those in the Army and 4 years for those in the Navy and Air Force. Conscripts may be discharged before the expiration of the usual term of service for medical, ideological, or disciplinary reasons. A vocational placement and guidance program following an honorable discharge reportedly is carried out effectively. The usual route to a commission is to attend one of the service officer candidate schools or academies, but some junior and senior officers have risen from the ranks. Promotion is unlikely if political and cultural criteria are not satisfied.

TRAINING

Military training was under the direct supervision of the Soviet occupation forces and Soviet advisers between 1946 and 1950. After the Chinese Communist "volunteers" entered the Korean conflict in October 1950, their influence to some degree was reflected in training. By the time the Chinese withdrew in 1958, however, the North Korean forces, still under the guidance of Soviet advisers, were constructing their own training installations and facilities and had adopted their own training programs. A military school system was created for the different arms and services. Officers were trained at special schools in each branch. An officers' staff school was established. Basic and specialist training centers were set up for enlisted men. Recruits have found that the Party's indoctrination program was rigorously enforced and that it usually took precedence over nonpolitical military routines. Furthermore, soldiers had to spend much of their time farming, caring for livestock, or working on government projects; the manpower shortage made such effort mandatory. In addition, many officers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists have attended military schools in the Soviet Union. Although Soviet methods have prevailed, military training in the country has been by the North Koreans.

Substantial progress has been made in training effectiveness since the end of the Korean conflict, particularly in the Army and Air Force, judging from the reported appearance and performance

of troop units in parades and anniversary demonstrations. Field training is emphasized for all units progressively from squad to battalion, culminating at the end of the training year in combined exercises with divisions participating. Instruction is said to include guided missiles and antinuclear tactics.

A special feature of the training system is the military instruction introduced in the colleges and universities. Male students are required to undergo a minimum of 200 class hours of instruction and training each year. This heavy schedule is in addition to a full academic program. The military subjects are taught by active-duty officers, and students must pass their examinations in military subjects to be eligible to take the examinations in their academic subjects. Those who fail must drop out of school.

The majority of the youths not attending the colleges and universities receive Militia unit training in 2-hour periods twice a week. This instruction, which is given after working hours, includes basic close order drill and practice in the use of infantry weapons. This comprehensive nationwide program gives some basis to the frequent propaganda assertion of North Korean leaders that their country is a "nation in arms trained to defend the achievements of the revolution."

RANKS AND PAY

The rank structure of the North Korean Navy resembles that of the United States Navy. The Air Force and the Army have three lieutenant ranks, three ranks of colonel, and a marshal, equivalent to the United States rank, General of the Army. By all accounts, differences in rank are regarded with some ceremony. Enlisted grades appear to be closer to the United States grade structure of World War II and do not have the variety and gradations of the services of the 1960's.

As in all military organizations, pay is important and comparative. Two comparisons in military pay are clear: the officer corps is well paid, probably considerably better than its civilian equivalent and extremely well paid compared with enlisted men (see table 42). Colonels receive about 100 times the monthly salary of privates; generals, over 200 times. Pay in the lower ranks is meager, but there is extra income for technical specialties, hazard duty, sea duty, forward area assignment and longevity which is not dependent on rank. Flying personnel are particularly well paid. Food, clothing, housing, and medical care are provided to all ranks, and these are probably better than many civilians could get. Toilet articles, cigarettes, stationery and similar items are government issue.

Table 42. Monthly Military Pay Scale in North Korea January 1968

(in wŏn [1])

Rank	Salary [2]	Rank	Salary [2]
Private	1.4	Captain	75
Corporal	1.8	Major	85
Junior Sergeant	2.8	Lieutenant Colonel	90
Sergeant	4.2	Colonel	110
Senior Sergeant	5	Senior Colonel	150
Master Sergeant	7	Major General	190
Junior Lieutenant	50	Lieutenant General	230
Lieutenant	60	Colonel General	280
Senior Lieutenant	70	General	350

[1] In January 1968 approximately 2.5 wŏn equaled US$1.
[2] A single factory worker's monthly earnings averaged 40 to 45 wŏn in mid-1966.

Source: Adapted from *Pukhan Ch'ŏnggam, 1945–1968* (General Survey of North Korea. 1945–1968), pp. 411, 531.

Even with a low pay scale, the fringe benefits, coupled with the fact that his life is one of regimentation either in or out of military service, make the enlisted man's pay compare favorable with a civilian's equivalent. Attempts to reduce the upper-level military pay to bring it closer to civilian scales have been rejected by Kim Il-sung.

Leave and recreation policies in all services are restrictive. General and field grade officers are treated well in this regard as are flying officers of all ranks. Company grade officers do not fare so well, and enlisted men seem to be given time away from military duty at the personal discretion of their superiors, rather than as a matter of right.

AWARDS

There is a full array of decorations and awards for performance of exceptional merit. These range from the Hero's Medal, the highest military decoration, to an award for outstanding physical fitness. There were about 400 Hero's Medals awarded during the Korean conflict. Some of the awards can be given to civilians, some to foreigners, and some to disabled veterans; many awards have political performance as well as military service as the basis of merit.

The highest medal in the Navy is named after Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Some have extra emoluments, such as special housing privileges, guaranteed salaries, foreign travel, and free transportation. This last benefit may be passing into disuse since so many awards have been made that bus systems are in danger of losing revenue.

All awards have political overtones, and bestowal is designed to bring greater glory to the Communist movement. The Hero's Medal, given for gallantry in combat at the risk of life, is also given for outstanding achievement in any occupational field. Since 1960 the accent on awards (such as the Red Flag Company Medal) has been toward units and away from individuals, to extoll the virtue of collective rather than individual achievement.

MILITARY JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE

Within the military forces, the modeling of procedures on Soviet practice extends to military justice. The adjudication of most infractions at the division level and lower appears to be left in the hands of the individual commanders, except for political and serious crimes. The political offenses are handled through the Political Safety Division of the General Political Bureau; serious crimes require the convening of a military tribunal. A review body at the Ministry of National Defense level reviews cases from lower courts and tries high-ranking officers when the occasion arises. In most cases the sentence of the court of first instance is carried out, and the appellate function rarely reverses original decisions.

Until 1960 punishment for infractions was swift and severe at the lower levels; much was dispensed in front of assembled troops. Second offenders were especially harshly punished. Commanders had much latitude in deciding both guilt and penalty; cases were rarely appealed. Since 1960, however, group indoctrination and group culpability have replaced the method of individually oriented discipline: Individual failures or infractions are treated as bringing disgrace to the group as a whole.

ARMED FORCES AND THE PARTY

Until 1959 a dual political-military control apparatus, familiar in Communist military organizations, functioned at all levels of the Armed Forces. At the highest level it was controlled by a "cultural commander" in the Ministry of National Defense. The political and cultural machinery, which was punitive as well as instructive, was designed to be all pervasive. Its control was exercised through a separate hierarchy of specialists whose principal function was to carry out a vigorous indoctrination program at every echelon of command and to ensure political reliability within them.

The program was aided at the lower levels by the active members of the Korean Democratic Youth League (renamed Socialist Working Youth League in 1964). The dual control system, however, precipitated conflict between the professional military com-

mander attempting to accomplish a military mission and the equivalent of the old Soviet "political commissar," whose program interfered with that mission. Moreover, according to Premier Kim Il-sung's statement in March 1959, "the total lack of political training and revolutionary heroism" persisted among the rank-and-file, thus suggesting that the indoctrination machinery had not produced desired results.

The old system was reorganized in 1959 to tighten the Party control of the Armed Forces. A hierarchy of Party committees, established at all levels of command, carries out its organizational and educational activities through a corresponding hierarchy of political officers who report to the General Political Bureau. The head of the Bureau, who is accountable directly to the Party's Central Committee, supervises and directs the parallel channels of committee and political officers. In 1968 the post was held by General O Chin-u, a candidate member of the Party's Political Committee. The reorganization also involved a clearer delineation of the military and political commanders' prerogatives, but indications in 1968 were that the political-military controversy was being resolved by combining the two functions in the same properly indoctrinated commanders.

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Section IV. National Security

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GLOSSARY

Bureaucratism (kwallyo chuŭi)—A problem frequently acknowledged by the regime as persisting in the north because of ". . . the still incomplete liquidation of the outworn ideological legacies of the old society." The term refers to the insensitivity of the Party-governmental-managerial personnel to the actual needs and feelings of the populace because of what the regime calls ". . . the lack of modesty, simplicity, and courtesy" on the part of those in responsible positions.

ch'ŏllima—Literally, "one thousand-*ri* horse" and officially called "Flying Horse." It refers to the legendary Chinese horse said to have galloped a phenomenal distance in a single day. Starting in 1958 the term was used by the regime to designate its mass production drive. All peasants and factory workers are exhorted to excel in the manner of "*ch'ŏllima* riders;" exemplary individuals and production units are awarded with *ch'ŏllima* titles.

chŏn—Monetary unit. No internationally recognized par value. 100 chŏn make up 1 North Korean wŏn. As used by North Korea's trading partners, 257 chŏn or 2.57 wŏn are equivalent to 1 United States dollar. For the present study, the exchange rate of 250 chŏn or 2.5 wŏn is used to facilitate conversion.

chŏngbo—unit of measurement. 1 *chŏngbo* equals about 2.45 acres.

Ch'ŏngsan-ni (also Ch'ŏngsan-i or Ch'ŏngsan-ri)—The name of a village unit in Kangsŏ-kun, P'yŏngan-namdo. It is normally identified with the managerial-guidance system for the rural areas called Ch'ŏngsan-ni pangpŏp (Ch'ŏngsan-ni method). This method is said to have been first demonstrated by Kim Il-sung in February 1960 when he personally inspected the Ch'ŏngsan-ni Cooperative Farm and showed that production could be much improved if Government cadres actually mingled with and guided the peasants ". . . instead of merely issuing orders and directives from above." The success of this direct guidance method is to be ensured, however, only through intensive indoctrination.

Chosŏn Minjujuŭi Inmin Konghwaguk—The Korean term for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Chosŏn Nodong Dang—The Korean Workers Party.

Chōsōren—A shortened name for the Zainippon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai (General Federation of Korean Residents).

chuch'e—Literally, "subjective core." Used by the regime to identify with the meaning of "national identity and self-reliance." For practical purposes, *chuch'e* is synonymous with the Party's *yuil sasang* (the one and only ideology) and is promoted by the regime to popularize the policy of three self-reliances in politics, economy, and national defense. It is claimed by the regime that, as a revolutionary doctrine, the *chuch'e* amounts to a "creative" example of applying Marxism-Lenism to national realities.

Demilitarized Zone—Commonly known as DMZ. Established under the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 1953, it serves as a buffer area along the Military Demarcation Line, extending 1.24 miles on each side of the line.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea—Official designation by North Korea for the Communist state established in September 1948.

do (or *to*)—Province.

DPRK—Acronym for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Fatherland Liberation War—North Korean designation for the Korean War (June 1950–July 1953).

General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Zainippon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai)—Better known by its abbreviation, Chōsōren. It is supported by North Korea and by its following within the community of 600,000 Korean residents in Japan; functions as North Korea's political and propaganda instrument in Japan.

kang (also *gang*)—River.

Korean Armistice Agreement—The truce pact signed on July 27, 1953, by the representatives of the United Nations Command, North Korea, and Communist China. Apart from providing for the establishment of a Military Armistice Commission, Military Demarcation Line, and Demilitarized Zone, the agreement stipulated that ". . . a political conference of higher level" be held ". . . to settle through negotiations, the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. . . ." The political conference was held in Geneva in 1954, but failed to agree on anything.

Korean Central News Agency—Usually abbreviated KCNA; the sole official distributor of news. Publishes daily news bulletin in Korean and English versions.

Korean Communist Party (Chosŏn Kongsan Dang)—The first Korean Communist organization set up in Seoul in April 1925 by a group headed by Pak Hŏn-yŏng; was ordered disbanded in 1928 by the Communist International for factional troubles. In reconstructing the history of Korean Communist move-

ment, North Korea minimizes the role of this organization, emphasizing only that movement in which Kim Il-sung was personally involved.

Korean Workers Party (Chosŏn Nodong Dang)—The name of the ruling Communist Party, first used in June 1949; it is sometimes called Korean Labor Party in non-Communist sources. The official date for founding of the Party is October 10, 1945.

Kŭlloja (Workers)—The most authoritative theoretical journal of the Korean Workers Party; published twice a month.

kun (or *gun*)—County.

kwallyo chuŭi—See bureaucratism.

Military Armistice Commission—Established under the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 1953, it is composed of three representatives, one each from the United Nations Command, North Korea, and Communist China—the three signatories to the agreement. Any matters of mutual concern are brought before the Commission for discussion and resolution.

Military Demarcation Line (Kunsa-Kyŏnggye-Sŏn)—Established under the Korean Armistice Agreement, this line marks the actual cease-fire position at the end of the Korean War. It replaces the 38th parallel as the de facto political boundary between North Korea and the Republic of Korea.

Minju Chosŏn (Democratic Korea)—Daily organ of the Government of North Korea.

Nodong Sinmun (Workers Daily)—Organ of the Korean Workers Party.

Panmunjom—the site of truce village in the Demilitarized Zone, serving also as the conference site for the representatives of the Military Armistice Commission.

Party Conference—Convened at intervals between Party congresses to debate and adopt important policies and programs. The most recent conference, the Party's second, took place in October 1966; the first one met in March 1958.

Party Congress—Nominally the highest organ of the Party to be convened every 4 years to debate and adopt the Party's basic policies and programs. The last meeting, the fourth in the Party's history, took place in September 1961.

Plenum of the Central Committee—Convened at least once every 6 months to debate and resolve Party policies and programs; also determines the number of members on the Political Committee and elects the members and their General Secretary.

Poch'ŏnbo—The site of Kim Il-sung's much publicized anti-Japanese partisan raid in June 1937, about 180 miles northwest

of Pyongyang and 37 miles south of Mt. Paektu. It has been transformed into a national shrine and has been instrumental in the building of Kim Il-sung cult.

Political Committee, Korean Workers Party—A select unit within the Central Committee; guides the Party in the intervals between Central Committee plenums.

Presidium, Political Committee, Korean Workers Party—The most powerful inner council of policy deliberations and decisionmaking within the Party. Newly established following the Party Conference of October 1966.

ri—Refers to the lowest territorial subdivision when preceded by geographical terms. If followed by numbers, *ri* stands for a unit of measurement for distance. One *ri*, or "10-ri" as the Koreans call it, equals 2.44 miles (4 kilometers).

san—Mountain.

Seven-Year People's Economic Development Plan (1961–67)—Divided into two stages, the first (1961–63) stressing consumer goods industries and agriculture, and the second (1964–67) reverting to an intensified heavy industry development. Because of various difficulties in meeting the plan targets, the plan had to be revised, and the announcement for extending the plan period to 1970 was made in October 1966. Under the new scheme of the plan, national defense buildup and heavy industry development are to be undertaken concurrently.

Socialist Working Youth League—The most important auxiliary organization of the Party comprised of youths of either sex, aged 14 through 30.

Taean system—This system is an application of the Ch'ŏngsan-ni method to the factory-enterprise. Started in December 1961 at the Taean Electric Appliance Factory by Kim Il-sung, the Taean system is described as one in which ". . . superior agencies assist lower agencies and superiors assist inferiors" in managerial and ideological matters. Apart from features designed to maximize productivity, Party committees are established in these factories to ensure the ". . . primacy of politics over economy."

wŏn—Monetary unit. No fixed par value internationally recognized. As used by North Korea's trading partners, 2.57 wŏn is equivalent to 1 United States dollar since the currency reform of February 1959. Fairly stable. 1 wŏn divides into 100 chŏn. For the present study, the rate of 2.5 wŏn to US$1 is used for easy conversion.

yangban—Literally, "two groups," referring to the traditional ruling class composed of two types of bureaucratic elements: civil and military. Because of the traditional civil and military

monopoly of all important governmental and social positions, members of the *yangban* became identified with the upper class or nobility as distinguished from the commoner class. In the modern context, *yangban* generally refers to those persons popularly regarded as cultured, educated, and gracious; the usage is rapidly becoming archaic.

yuil sasang (the one and only ideology)—First used in December 1962 when the regime resolved the policy of self-reliance in national defense, along with the previously proclaimed policy of economic self-reliance. Popularized especially since 1967, the term is synonymously used by the regime with the concept of *chuch'e* (national identity and self-reliance) said to be the "consistent revolutionary teaching" of Kim Il-sung. *Yuil sasang*, "the one and only ideology" of the Party, refers to the regime's policy of self-reliance in three key areas: politics, economy, and national defense.

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* Abbreviations used
GIP—gross industrial product
GNP—gross national product
KWP—Korean Workers Party
N.K.—North Korea
R. of K.—Republic of Korea
U.N.—United Nations

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